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Abstract: This research deals with the discordance between the national state and 
the nation state in the formation of the Republic of Korea (ROK). Charles Tilly (1992) 
distinguishes between the concept of the national state and that of the nation state, even 
though many scholars use the nation state. According to Charles Tilly (1975;1985;1992), 
a national state is simply state that rules demarcated territories, has a differentiated 
administration, and centralized autonomous structures, while the nation state is a state 
that comprises one single nation, in other words, a nation is the basis of the nation state.  
Tilly defines the nation as one community in which people share a strong linguistic, 
ethnic, religious1and symbolic, historical identity. Based on this national state theory, 
 
1 In the Korean case, religion is not a key factor of nation element. The same blood and historical identity 
are added in Tilly’s definition. 
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national subject and identity of the new Korean nation are keys to understand this 
research.  
The ROK has been a very strong state in terms of despotic power, which means 
physical violent means of the state. The ROK has reemerged as a strong state after the 
Korean War. The regime based on this characteristic tries to mobilize people and their 
resources. People should answer the state’s call and participate in national development 
projects. But even the strongest regime cannot rely on its superiority or monopolized 
means of physical violence to mobilize people and their resources. Therefore, as in fascist 
states, the regime created a variety of Administered Mass Organization (AMOs). There 
are two big purposes in mobilizing people of the ROK: one is de-politicization; the other 
is enforced cooperation in the name of nationalism, which means “state-formed 
nationalism.”  
The Saemaul Undong (New Village Movement), the Hankooknochong 
(Federation of Korea Trade Unions), and the Hakdohokookdan (Student National 
Defense Corps) were the main AMOs under Park’s rule. De-politicization played a role in 
making Koreans participants in the AMOs by avoiding being labeled as Uhyong, 
meaning collaborator with the dictator. Under surf of various ideologies to encourage 
South Koreans’ participation in development projects or AMOs, South Koreans began to 
identify themselves with a new ideology as state citizens of the ROK. A new Korean 
nation emerged through the experiences that Koreans had participated in. This thesis 
investigates the process of the creation of the new Korean nation during the economic 
development period. The salvation of a struggle between the nation state vs the national 
state in Korea emerged as an economic development and the creation a new Korean 
nation within the boundary of demilitarized zone the ROK. National subject discourse 
becomes a key factor of the process of emergence of a new Korean nation.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction: the State Vs the Korean Nation 
1. BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH  
This research deals with the discordance between a national state and nation state 
in the formation of the Republic of Korea (hereafter ROK). Charles Tilly (1992) 
distinguishes between the concept of a national state and that of a nation state, even 
though more scholars use the term nation state. According to Charles Tilly 
(1975;1985;1992), a national state is simply a state that rules demarcated territories, has a 
differentiated administration, and centralized autonomous structures, while nation state is 
a state that formed from one single nation. Tilly defines the nation as one community in 
which people share a strong linguistic, ethnic, religious, 2  symbolic, and historical 
identity. The Korean nation, which has had members who have been strong ethnic 
nationalists suffered from the historical, political contention caused by the politically 
separated regimes in both the North and the South of the peninsula.  
In Korea, neither the North nor the South built on a single nation state, which 
Koreans traditionally had longed for. To the separated regimes, regardless of whether the 
North and the South, gaining any nation’s legitimacy as an heir of the Korean nation was 
very important in each polity. The illegitimate situation pressured political elites on each 
side and made them solve the problem.  
The South Korean case selected the goal of economic development and 
modernization of the fatherland, while the North Koreanschose nation’s subjectivity and 
cleaning of the Japanese legacies (Shin 2006). Economic development goal became the 
chief national goal of the ROK. Syngman Rhee, the first Korean president, was not 
 
2 In the Korean case, religion is not a key factor of nation element. The same blood and historical identity 
are added in Tilly’s definition. 
 2
interested in economic development and modernization. His interest was in 
anticommunism and in using military forces for unification to the North. Most 
Administered Mass Organizations (hereafter AMOs) were initially created by Syngman 
Rhee. As Kasza (1995) said that AMOs worked only for the regime, not the state in 
fascist states and communist states, they were closely related to the regime and worked 
for regime security (Hong Young 2000). 
 However, President Park was completely different from his predecessor, 
Syngman Rhee in that he seemingly tried to depoliticize Koreans and AMOs. 
Furthermore, he tried to use nationalism and other state ideologies to keep Korean society 
stable and also achieve economic development. It is not possible for any dictatorial 
regime to mobilize only by relying on violent means of the state, although the physical 
ways of state despotic power became an essential key to marshal subjects (Kasza 1995; 
Oh You 2002).  
De-politicization of Koreans was effective because it made South Koreans think 
that they were participating in the national development projects and movements in the 
name of the state development and modernization of the fatherland, not in the name of 
regime security or President Park. Based on a strong characteristic of a national state, 
ROK became a developmental state, which has institutionally intervened in economic 
development as an actor. AMOs played their roles in making ROK a successful 
developmental state by improving synergic impact in a embedded relationship between 
the state and civil society in Korea (Evans 1985, 1999; Fox 1996). 
As a result rapid economic growth in South Korea was different from that in other 
countries’ experience. ROK during the economic development period, showed a very 
effective leadership because Park’s leadership made South Koreans began to aggressively 
participate in AMOs, developmental projects, and other movements. In this process of 
 3
                                                
solving the nation’s problem, the separated regime in both sides, South Koreans selected 
alternative methods which aimed at developing the Korean economy. Mechanisms of 
mass mobilization worked in this process and contributed to forming state citizens in the 
ROK. Based on this national state theory which includes other nation state theories, 
national subjects and the identity of the new Korean nation are keys to understand this 
research. National Subjects as state citizens and the identity as members of the Korean 
nation become mainly a starting point of the research questions. 
 
1.1 National Subjects; Citizens vs, Identity as Members of the Korean Nation 
This research starts with two different questions related to South Koreans sense of 
identity: citizenship and nationalism. Many Koreans, not to mention politicians, like to 
call themselves Kookmin. Even civil or antigovernment activists identify themselves with 
Kookmin, which was derived from Hwangkookshinmin, “the Japanese emperor's loyal 
and dutiful national subject.” Why do South Koreans prefer Kookmin (National Subject) 
to Shimin (Citizen) for identifying themselves? South Koreans regard themselves as very 
nationalistic citizens. Red Devils 3  in the World Cup game in 2002, symbolized the 
nationalist character of Koreans (Shin 2006). Koreans have been depicted as backers of 
strong nationalism against Japan. Are Koreans really nationalist? At this point, a very 
sensitive issue arises: the unification of the Korean peninsula. After liberation from 
Japan, the United States of America Military Government in Korea (hereafter 
USAMGIK) ruled South Korea while the Soviet Union dominated North Korea 
temporarily under their mutual agreement. In 1946, USAMGIK conducted opinion polls 
 
3 The Korean society has suffered from a red-complex, which resulted from the Korean War and 
anticommunism that had been created by dictatorship regimes. Therefore, red has been a social, political 
labeling on people as communist suspects. But during the World Cup game period, Red Devils was a code 
of new type of the Korean nationalism.  
 4
                                                
on the issue of building a state and ideological distribution of Koreans such as 
communists, nationalists, centrists. In the research, ninety percent of Koreans thought 
that making a single nation state should be pursued strongly and immediately (Lee Seung 
1985). South Koreans regarded unification and building one nation state as an emergent 
goal and a duty of Koreans. In early 2007, however, the Government Information Agency 
reported “the opinion poll research of 2006 Koreans’ Social Consciousness and Value 
Sense.” There are some interesting questions such as reunification of the Korean 
peninsula, and the political terrain. Concerning the reunification of the Korean peninsula, 
55.2 percent answered, “We don’t have to hurry reunification,” and 17.7 percent did not 
want to reunify the Korean Peninsula.4 Compared to the period from 1946 to 2006, why 
are contemporary South Koreans more reluctant to unify the separated Korean peninsula 
with North Korea? What happened to the Koreans drive for unification based on 
nationalism? Kookmin and nationalism are keys to understanding the historical change in 
Korean nationalism and the right answer for research questions: the South Koreans 
identity as Kookmin, and issues of citizenship and nationalism are intertwined. The 
questions converge on the matter of economic development and making national subjects, 
during the economic development period. Here citizenship and national subject concepts 
have the same meaning, of which content is a state rather than a nation point. 
For the first question related to citizenship, I would like to introduce an identity 
concept, “Kookmin,” to initiate the following discussion. Even though many Koreans 
know the meaning and origin of Kookmin, they like to use the term -- including civil 
activists or liberalists, or even Leftists in South Korea. Koreans are famous for their 
strong nationalism. Whenever Japanese politicians and other Rightists claim that Dokdo 
is a Japanese island, an absolute majority of Korans are very upset and rebuke Japan as 
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being still an imperialist power. Also a sense of resentment against Japan remains strong. 
South Koreans are, however, very generous to those who were collaborators of Japan and 
its legacies, though. There were some government projects of cleaning legacies of Japan 
and historical researches to historicize pro-Japanese traitors who worked in colonial state 
apparatuses such as bad policemen, military officers and sergeants, company owners, and 
landlords -- including other social sectors5. However, these were criticized as Leftist and 
pro-North Korea issues by many South Koreans, because Rightists and conservatives 
think that the research had aimed at former President Park Chung Hee who served in 
colonial army as an officer. Nationalism as a source of Koreans’ identity is very complex 
with many ideologies mixed in, such as anticommunism, traditional Korean nationalism, 
economic nationalism, economic development, and so on. Most ideologies related to the 
Korean nationalism consist of three elements: anticommunism, developmentalism, and 
stateism. A sociological concept of nationalism as imagined community (Anderson 
1991), should be introduced at this time. The South Koreans’ nationalism basically 
followed an essential format of the “imagined community,” which was created by the 
ruling elites in politics and economy. Therefore, a guise of the nationalism has always 
changed at the different moment. But the key factors of Korean nationalism have been 
struggling with traditional Korean nationalism which tried to include North Korea and its 
subjects. 
 Paradoxical nationalism in the Korean nationalism shows a format of distorted 
nationalism in the struggle of relationship between anticommunism created by dictator 
regimes and a traditional Korean nationalism including all the members of the Korean 
 
5 In modern Korean history, there were many efforts to remove legacies of the Japanese colonial rule. So 
called, Ilje Janjae Chungsan, howver, have been stopped by colonial traitors’ successors who have 
dominated Korean society for a long time after the liberation from Japan. One year after ROK was 
established, the Korean Assembly enacted a special law to clean the Japanese legacies and punish 
collaborators. But soon the law was vetoed by President Rhee and the trial was soon removed by the regime 
(Shin 2006; Seo Joon 1997). 
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nation with a strong, historical, and blood identity. A Distorted Nationalism, which is 
formed in the minds of South Koreans, is a false ideology, which tends to exclude all 
other alternatives to the ideology (Meszaros 1989). South Koreans accepted amorphous 
distorted formats of nationalism that the state molded during the economic development 
period. It is obvious, however, that regardless of any approach like citizenship, national 
subjects, or nation identity, exclusion politics of other members of the Korean nation 
works in this distorted nationalism of Koreans.  
 
1.2 A Form of State-Created Nationalism and Complexity of Korean Nationalism   
There are many faces of nationalism in different times and places. A form of 
state-created nationalism in Korea is sometimes regarded as a distorted nationalism 
which can hardly show its face. It may be a kind of false ideology which does not only 
exist but also has a powerful influence on behavior of Koreans. When South Koreans are 
asked about the definition of the Korean nationalism, most Koreans cannot clearly define 
their nationalism, despite the fame that South Koreans are very nationalistic. Since most 
Koreans have never defined their nationalism, but accepted and identified the nationalism 
created by the state or the ruling elites, nationalist identity of South Koreans always 
changes its content and guise. The kind of nationalism which was created by former 
President Park is called a defensive nationalism (Kim Il 2006; Choi Yeon 2007). After 
the newly formed Korean nationalism has had a characteristic to exclude an issue of 
unification of the Korean peninsula, the Korean nation should develop economy, 
modernize its fatherland, and build a wealthy, strong state (Kim Il 2006). Because the 
new Korean nationalism was used only for the mobilization of economic development 
and modernization by Park’s regime, Korean nationalism has changed its formats, when 
ROK faced some different political and economic moments. So today, Korean 
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nationalism always imagines that it has enemies outside of the Korean peninsula in 
economic areas, not other areas. Traditions of the Korean nation were created and 
developed by the state ideologues in the name of modernization (Choi Yeon 2007). This 
is a basic cause and effect, and form of the state-created nationalism. There is no content 
but appearance, and goal that Koreans must achieve (Hobsbawm 1983).6  
Economic crisis was an historical event which provoked the economic Korean 
nationalism, in which Korean economy was defeated by foreign capitalists (Kwon Hyuck 
2000).7 There were two interesting happenings in 1997 and in the following year of 1998. 
When the economic crisis, the so-called second national disgrace or the IMF trusteeship 
or the second Samjundo’s humiliation, 8  hit South Korea in December 1997, South 
Koreans held together firmly against foreign capital and international speculation funds 
from other countries in the name of Great Korean Nationalism. The resurgence of 
economic nationalism grew rapidly and strongly, binding South Koreans together with 
the belief that they would be able to overcome the national economic crisis. The 
collecting gold movement, in which every Korean donated gold goods, was one excellent 
example in order to buy dollars. 9  Koreans have kept gold products such as rings, 
necklaces, bracelets, and even gold teeth for a long time. In the face of the national crisis 
resulting from the economic crisis caused by insufficient dollars, South Koreans showed 
their strong bondage as a Korean nation. At that time, however, buying a foreign-
 
6 If Koreans are asked what Korean nationalism is  
7 President Park Chung Hee had set economic development as a war in which let Korean nation survive.  
8 The first national disgrace was the day in which Japan annexed Chosun (Korea) by military and 
economic means in 1910. Trusteeship means here that when South Korea was liberated from Japan, the 
United States, and the Soviet Unions agreed to a five-year trusteeship in December 1945. At that time, this 
trusteeship was a national (Minjokjuk: ethnic and nation’s) disgrace and regarded as another colonial 
domination by others. Samjundo’s humiliation is a historical disgrace when the Qing Dynasty’s army 
invaded the Chosun Dynasty in 1636. The King of Chosun surrendered to the Qing emperor whom Koreans 
regarded as a barbarian kingdom in Manchuria with three big and deep bows and with nine times of hitting 
the floor with the head. These historical events have been a symbol of national disgrace to all Koreans. 
9 The reason why Koreans were eager to buy dollars was because the economic crisis resulted from 
insufficient dollars and they asked IMF to borrow dollars.  
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produced car was seen as the act of a traitor, because buying foreign brand cars meant 
spending dollars in doing so, and later, the consumption of dollars resulted in the 1997 
economic crisis. One day, a woman who owned a German car drove to the place where 
gold products were being donated because she wanted to participate in the national 
movement of collecting gold. However, when people saw her driving the car, some of 
them began to rebuke and abused her. Some even attacked her. This scene is an example 
of defensive economic nationalism that regards those who bought foreign products as 
national traitors (Kim Il 2006; Yoon Hae 2003).10  
There is another example excluding a Korean nation member, the Judo athlete 
Sunghoon Choo, who was born in Japan but has had a Korean nationality since birth. 
Even though he had been discriminated against because of his Korean nationality in 
Japan, he never thought of giving up his Korean nationality because his identity was 
strongly tied with Korean nationalism, like that of other Chosun nationality holders in 
Japan. 11  In 1997, he came to Korea in order to become a national athlete of Judo. 
However, he realized that he could not become a national athlete and continue to play in 
Korea because he was not a native South Korean and suffered from biased favoritism in 
Judo games. He returned to Japan in 2001, discarded Korean citizenship and obtained 
Japanese citizenship. One year later, as a Japanese national Judo athlete, he won a gold 
medal at a Judo game of the Asian Games in 2002. His opponent at the final game was a 
 
10 A form of state-created nationalism intertwined with economic nationalism was emitted emotionally 
because there were conspiracy theories about foreign capitalists and countries like the United States and 
Japan (Kwon, HhyukBum. 2000, Nationalism and Developmental Fantasy Seoul, Korea: Sol Chulpansa). 
All Koreans seemed to be very strongly bound by Korean nationalism. 
11 Koreans in Japan consist of three nationalities: Korean nationality; Japan nationality, and Chosun 
nationality. About 530,000 Koreans are living in Japan; 200,000 Koreans have Japanese nationality, 
another 200,000 Koreans have Korean nationality, and 130,000 have Chosun nationality. There is no North 
Korean nationality because North Korea has not official diplomatic relations with Japan. In fact, 130,000 
Chosun nationality holders actually do not have any nationality because there is no Chosun state in this 
world. They do want to get involved in the separated states but rather to participate in the single Korean 
nation state.  
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Korean Judo athlete. Identity as a Korean which he had kept for a long time since he was 
born made him tear and discard his nationality.  
This event is a typical example of an exclusive characteristic that nationalism has 
inherently in general (Volpp 2002; Alexander 1992). The case of the woman who had 
wanted to donate her gold goods, but soon was assaulted by other Koreans because of her 
German imported car, is another example of the exclusion that Korean nationalism has 
showed. South Korean nationalism shows dual faces to us: one is a very strong ethnic 
unity bound by a traditional nationalism like anti-Japan sentiment (Shin 2006); the other 
is excluding some Koreans, who have lived outside of South Korea or would be regarded 
as national traitors if they bought foreign products. These South Koreans have willfully 
tended to exclude other members of the Korean nation largely due to economical and 
political reasons, even though all Koreans are members who made up the Korean nation. 
This nationalism to exclude other members negates the root of being a nation. Some 
questions can be raised here. Why do these conflicts and struggles among nationalism 
values happen among South Koreans? What made South Koreans so nationalistic as to be 
hostile to foreign products, even though South Korea has benefited from globalization? 
What is the relationship between South Korean nationalism and the economy?   
The new nationalism created by Park’s regime worked in economic development 
and contributed to making his regime stable. It has been accepted by most South Koreans, 
who do not recognize their colonized situation by the new nationalism (Habermas 1987). 
Above all, the new nationalism was linked to the distorted nationalism, which made the 
national (Minjokjuk: the Korean nation’s) unification the second question and showed the 
colonized situation of Koreans by System. Many Koreans who lived in the economic 
development period thought that the unification issue was an important duty of the 
Korean nation. The Ministry of National Unification of Territory (hereafter MNUT) 
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reported in researches of Korean Consciousness that over 90 percent of Koreans 
supported unification of the Korean peninsula in 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972 
(SeoulDaehakyo 1970; Kooktotongilwon 1971, 1972, 1973). In these three annual 
reports, the research outputs of MNUT showed that South Koreans still strongly wanted 
to unify the Korean peninsula with the South Korean economic and social system. 
Especially, in a research report of 1969, 90.61 percent of respondents answered that 
unification must be achieved (SeoulDaehakyo 1969).12 The means of unification were 
determined by the state, however, not by private sectors. The government completely 
repressed any unification movement scheduled by the private sectors for a long time 
(Grinker 1998). Majority support toward unification changed after Park’s regime. Most 
contemporary Koreans are reluctant to unify the Korean peninsula and overcome the 
separated situations that the Korean nation faces. A format of state-created nationalism 
resulted from complexity of Korean nationalism, which can be easily defined and 
understood by one strong element. 
The complexity of Korean nationalism by and large consists of three elements: 
anticommunism, economic development, and traditional ethnic nationalism of Koreans. 
These elements are mixed and intertwined with one another. But in most cases, economic 
development and anticommunism have been combined with one another. 
Anticommunism is represented by Ilminism (meaning one nation with one 
ideology)13which was created by Ahn Ho Sang, during the Syngman Rhee’s regime. 
 
12 In 1969, the administration research center at Seoul National University conducted a national poll on 
reunification funded by MNUT. 1685 men answered and 329 women participated in the poll. Age divided 
them into four groups: 18-25, 250 (12.41 percent); 25-35, 450 (22.34 percent): 35-45, 608(30.19 percent; 
more 45, 698 (34.66 percent); N/A, 8 (0.39 percent). Urban residents consisted of 43.10 percent (868 
persons). People in rural domicile were 1146 persons (56.90 percent).  
13 Ilminism is an ideology that the First Republic of Korea tried to bind Koreans with. This meant that one 
people should have one nation ideology to resist communism. This Ilminism ideologue and Syngman Rhee 
thought that democracy was not enough strong to defeat communism and distributed the ideology to South 
Koreans ( Kim Il 2006; Shin 2006; Ahn Ho 1949). 
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Economic development became a strong divine duty of the Korean nation by Park Chung 
Hee. This wrong combination showed that colonized situation by System 
(anticommunism and economic development) closed an origin of legitimacy of the 
Korean nation (Habermas 1975; 1991).  
 
1.3 A Historical Disparity with the Distorted Nationalism 
The distorted nationalism is a product of modern Korean history has made. A 
series of historical events show us the historical product, distorted nationalism and that 
the national aspiration of building a peaceful nation state was strong until the early 1960s. 
After liberation from the Japanese colonial domination, during the period of USAMGIK, 
over 90 percent of Koreans wanted to build a single Korean nation state. When the first 
constitution was settled, the territory of the ROK included all the Korean peninsula and 
unnamed islands to contain the national aspiration of unification. After the Korean War, 
in the third presidential election on May 15, 1956, Jinbodang’s (Progress Party) 
candidate, Cho Bongam, got 2,160,000 votes.14 Even though Cho Bongam was labeled as 
a Red Communist, he claimed peaceful unification. Syngman Rhee who incessantly 
claimed “advance north,” disagreed with Cho’s idea and in the end, Cho Bongam was 
killed by the National Security Law (Shin 2006; Seo Joong 1996). When Syngman 
Rhee's dictatorship was overturned by student and civilian demonstrations in April 1960, 
the first South Korean demand was limited to only one goal: peaceful reunification with 
North Korea, as well as democratization of the ROK. When a military coup d’état was 
carried out in 1961 by a major general, Park Chung Hee, civilians and students in Seoul 
 
14  In the presidential election of May 1956, the first opposition party’s candidate died and the second 
party’s candidate was Cho Bongam. Of the 9,606,870 who could vote, 94.4 percent (9,067,063) joined in 
voting for the presidential election. Syngman Rhee got 70 percent of voters (5,046,437), with 79.5 percent 
(7,210,245) of the 906,763 were valid at that time.  
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held a unification movement for three days with a slogan, “Let’s go to Pyungyang.”15 
May 16, coup d’état day, was the last day of the movement. In addition, even though the 
unification issue was completely controlled by the state, over 90 percent of Koreans 
thought that unification should be achieve soon by peaceful means (Kooktotongiwon 
1971; 1972; 1973). However, since the 1980s, the issue of unification has been paid 
increasingly less attention by South Koreans, even though they still think reunification 
and making a nation state is an urgent and ultimate goal (Grinker 1998).  
The nationalism that South Koreans had been holding was newly created by 
President Park and his ideologues. There was no president who had used a nationalist 
rhetoric as much as him as a discursive conception of ideology (Kim Jung 2000). But at 
this time, even though the nationalist rhetoric of Park Chung Hee was obviously 
effective, researchers continued to investigate nationalism because ethnic and other 
formats of nationalism of the Korean nation has been identified by South Koreans and 
have had a very strong power in influencing on both South and North Koreans 
(Chatterjee 1999; Shin 2006).16  
Building a strong and wealthy state, so-called modernization and economic 
development, was one of the urgent issue that the Korean nation must achieve (Moon 
2005). President Park replaced the unification issue with modernization of the fatherland 
issues.  He, however, often used the issue of unification as a means of domination when 
he faced strong resistance from civilians and students in the early 1960s and 1970s 
internally, on the one hand, and also felt pressure for a peaceful relationship with North 
 
15 Pyungyang is Capitol of North Korea.  
16 Particularly, Chatterjee (1999) says about nationalism. The discourse of nationalism should be studied 
because despite its tautological meaningless character as a means of domination by the state, nationalism 
has a very strong impact on people’s mind and behavior, especially in emancipated colonies after the 
Second World War. Shin Kiwook agrees with Chatterjee’s opinion, because strong ethnic nationalism in 
both South and North Korea let political elites rely on nationalism (2006).  
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Korea from international forces (especially the United States) on the other hand (Kim 
Jung 2000)17.  
Former President Park created a variety of nationalism in which the ROK would 
build an economically wealthy national state, even though the national state in those new 
nationalisms would be a state separated from the North. This idea converged on 
economic development and the modernization of the fatherland. The state efficiently and 
effectively utilized the ideological state apparatuses in order to plant a new nationalism 
format like economic nationalism. South Koreans identified economic development with 
the national (Minjokjuk: the Korean nation’s) goal, not with reunification and building 
one nation state in the Korean peninsula. There was a historically large event in 1997 that 
illustrated various kinds of South Korean nationalism such as distorted nationalism, 
defensive nationalism toward foreign powers, small and narrow nationalism for South 
Koreans, and economic nationalism identified with the Chaebol miracle. That event was 
the economic crisis.  
To understand this current controversial issue about the nationalism that South 
Koreans have held, it is important to comprehend the historical process of both the 
development of nationalism as well as the economic development of South Korea. The 
Korean nation has been divided into two quite different national states: 1) the North and 
Communist state and 2) the South and Liberal capitalist state. After the Korean War, the 
South Korean government tried to compete with and win against North Korea in every 
state sector such as military, economy, politics, and other social sectors. Economic 
development and the building of a strong military state were the main South Korean goal. 
South Korean nationalism was created by the state and by state elites to make national 
subjects dutiful to the state’s orders, who voluntarily participated in the national 
 
17 Kim Junghoon (2000) says that nationalism in Korea has been utilized by each regime for security of 
the separate regimes.  
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development projects (Moon 2005). The Korean nationalism as “imagined community,” 
was used for mass mobilization. It showed a tendency that excludes anyone who has not 
shared economic growth and participation in AMOs with them in the South Korean 
territory. The new nationalism continued to depoliticize Koreans, mobilize them into 
national development projects, or movements, and finally secured President Park’s 
regime  (Anderson 1991). Therefore, the new nationalism resulted in unification issue 
and the North inside of its territory. Regarding the paradox in South Korean nationalism, 
we can conclude that the state has succeeded in making a national subject, instead of a 
member of a nation by making state citizen to work for economic development and 
modernization of the fatherland.  
When this research investigates the process of historical change in building 
national subjects, not citizens, AMOs become a means of mediating between the state 
and individuals. The state needed to dissolve the Korean nation’s identity, because the 
main goals of the ROK, economic development and modernization of the fatherland, 
were conflicting with a value of the Korean nation, an issue of unification. The regime, 
therefore, created AMOs and made South Koreans participate in them. This method 
resulted in the problem of Uhyong, which means collaborators for the dictator. The 
regime achieved its goal by de-politicizing people in order to avoid being labeled with the 
Uhyong. The de-politicized individuals were ready to respond to a calling from the state 
and became national subjects, instead of remaining members of the Korean nation. The 
new nationalism worked at this moment. The new nationalism created by President Park 
emphasized individuals’ responsibility for their own poverty and the Korean nation’s 
miserable past experiences. It asked Koreans to abandon their past identity and 
participate aggressively in a national development with a new revolutionary spirit. AMOs 
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in this relation played a role in making people depoliticized and identifying themselves 
with the new Korean nation’s value.  
Personal experiences can sometimes be related to macrohistorical events or be 
understood in the context of societal changes. We may be able to understand the situation 
of a specific society by understanding other people’s experiences and lives. Because 
AMO participants experienced historical events as members of their social groups, even 
though their lives and experiences were limited to the very personal arena, their life 
should be understood in the social context. An individual is a bearer of social structure 
and stands at the center of the structure (Althusser and Balibar 1979). 
 
1.4 Research Questions  
 The questions for this research are divided into three different levels: first, the 
state level; second, the AMO level; third, the personal level.  
 
At the first level 
The Republic of Korea is not a nation state because it excluded North Korea and 
its people. Therefore, to understand the Korean nation’s legitimacy, ROK leaders had to 
find other alternative goals which were different from those of North Korea, (such as 
anticommunism, ilminism, and economic development and the modernization of the 
fatherland). This research will deal with following questions;  
 
1. What characteristics does South Korea hold as crucial to the development of a 
national state?  
2. How was the Republic of Korea formed in the postwar period? What did the 
Korean War contribute to forming the ROK?  
 16
3. What are the roles of strong states in economic development? Is the strong state 
related to development state theory? Or was the authoritarian regime necessary 
for the rapid economic growth of the ROK?  
4. In making dutiful national subjects in South Korea, a new kind of nationalism was 
essential. Ideology at this time shows a class structure in a society. The ruling 
ideology is an ideology of a ruling class in a specific society. A question arises in 
this moment.  
At the AMO level 
In making South Koreans of the state citizens of the ROK, AMOs played a role in 
identifying them with a new nation ideology. Three AMOs were analyzed in this research  
1. What were the historical backgrounds of the Hakdohokookdan (the National 
Student Defense Corps) and what were the roles of Hakdohokookdan?  
2. What were the historical backgrounds of the Hankooknochong (the Federation of 
Korea Trade Unions) and what were the roles of Hankooknochong?  
3. What were the historical backgrounds of the Saemaul Undong (the New Village 
Movement) and what were the roles of the Saemaul Undong?  
 
At the individual level  
1. What were the experiences of participants in the AMOs and in the national 
development projects?  
2. In the era of democratization, now did past experience have an impact in defining 
their past experience and is a de-politicization attitude linked to Uhyong? 
3. How is a concept of being a national subject different from the concept of 
citizenship and what is the result of the formation of a national subject in the 
national state in South Korea?  
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 1.5 The Time Periods of the Research  
In this research, the emergence of a new type of the Korean nation began from 
Park’s regime in 1961. During the period of Syngman Rhee’s regime, the state tried to 
make some national ideologies like Ilminism, Anticommunism and many symbols of the 
ROK which succeeded in inheriting the Korean nation such as Tangun, a founder and 
father of the Korean nation, Hwarngdo, Sillas’ private militant junta group (Im Chong 
2005; Chae 2006). Even though the First Republic and President Syngman Rhee tried to 
make a new nation by using ideological ways to avoid being labeled as the separated 
regime from the Korean nation, Syngman Rhee’s efforts were not successful for some 
reasons that are mentioned in the early part of this chapter. Even though Im Chong 
Myung’s argument is very useful to understand what the First Republic tried to make at 
the early stage of formation of the national state, this research focuses on the period of 
Park’s regime because the first republic’s effort was regarded as a failure in making 
disciplined subjects. The effort of the First Republic failed, because it focused on 
reviving nationalism ideals of a nation under the legacy of colonial period nationalism of 
Koreans that could replace with the Korean nation (Chae 2006).18 
However, despite of Syngman Rhee’s efforts, Koreans’ desire to unify the Korean 
peninsula became stronger. When his regime collapsed, demanding for unification 
became a urgent national duty that our nation member must achieve in near future. But 
with emergence of Park’s regime, Koreans’ mindsets were reformed and Koreans became 
national subjects, not members of the Korean nation. Therefore, this research begins at 
the emergence of Park Chung Hee in Korean history.  
 
18 Chae Oh-Byung (2006) in his dissertation said that the structure of colonial state culture had been 
homologically transformed under Syngman Rhee’s rule by an ideologue, Ahn Ho-Sang, because the 
domination lost political legitimacy caused by revival of Japanese colonial legacies.   
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Therefore, the year 1961 when Major General Park Chung Hee seized power by a 
coup becomes a major starting point that is regarded as historical threshold, which made 
South Korean members of a new nation.  
 
2. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH              
Until now, most research about the period of former President Park from 1961 to 
1979 has focused on the military dictatorship, authoritarianism, causes and effects of the 
rapid economic development, mass dictatorship, and comparatively recent ethnographical 
research on everyday life that common South Koreans liked to enjoy. Some researchers 
have focused on forming a modern national subject in South Korea with the Saemaul 
Undong or other national development projects. However, these studies paid little 
attention to the relationship between the personal experiences that AMOs members had 
and identified themselves with, and the state that created AMOs. In addition, most 
researchers have missed the output of the de-politicization in Korean history. De-
politicization emerges as a major issue in this research, which focuses on the issue of 
Uhyong because in the democratization era, people who participated in AMOs created by 
dictator regimes were attached to the issue of de-politicization and to the state issue. De-
politicization made Koreans identify values of the state, not Korean nation values. 
Therefore, this research can also investigate characteristics of nationalism in terms of the 
national state in modern history. Nationalism discourses have been a hard issue for 
researchers to define, as Weber (1978) already pointed out. Nationalism with its 
malleable characteristics has always been related to the state regardless of national states, 
kingdoms, or dynasties. This study has significance, in that the research defines 
nationalism as a characteristic that links to “exclusion of others.” 
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This study conducted in-depth interviews with AMO participants to understand 
the entire process of building national subjects. Listening to their live voices and 
analyzing them helped this study to be insightful in understanding modern Korean 
history. This research, therefore, has an important significance because it is the first to 
attempt to understand the particular lives that AMO members lead. We can comprehend 
what happened in the 1970s by understanding their lives. Such AMO members will allow 
us to grasp the processes by which South Koreans were formed. It will give us strong 
points to help many South Koreans still attached to the miracle of the Han River and 
rapid economic growth.  
This issue is related to the traditional sociological arena. The subject as an object 
structured by the society in which the subject lives responds on the basis of the object’s 
own interests, ideologies, and desires. In addition to the interview, this research used 
much literature, including government documents, Park Chung Hee’s speeches, and 
books regarded as President Park’s works. After analyzing the literature, this research 
compares the interviewees’ identity with President Park’s ideals and the nationalism they 
attempted to establish. It has also strong advantages to compare the new Korean 
nationalism with Park Chung Hee’s ideals to understand what South Koreans as new 
members of the Korean nation identified as important. Through these analyses, the 
research will reveal that the distorted nationalism is a created false ideology, but is still in 
reality working strongly on the minds of Koreans.   
In this research, the state is the major object to be investigated. The state in South 
Korea has been regarded as a strong state. However, it is a strong neither in terms of the 
infrastructural power of the state nor in terms of the developmental state. Rather than a 
strong state, the ROK is a very efficient and effective state in terms of mobilization of 
social and economic resources. The state level and the individual level are mainly 
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investigated mediated by the AMO levels. Therefore, this study will give us a broad 
framework to understand modern South Korean history.  
 
3. THE PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH                                          
My research proposes to explore the question, “What created the contradictory 
contemporary nationalism identity of current South Koreans, which excludes some 
members of the Korean nation and includes others?” Koreans who suffered from 
Japanese colonial military domination wanted to build a strong nation state of Koreans. 
However, there were two quite different ideological states in the Korean peninsula, and 
they fought against one another fiercely during the Korean War. Each separate regime 
tried to achieve a moral and national (for the Korean nation) legitimacy and to create a 
national subject, in place of a member of the now-split Korean nation. Since it is hard to 
access data from North Korea, this research will look into the historical development of 
South Korea. The goals of the Korean nation were to build a strong military state, which 
meant an independent nation state, to overcome chronic poverty and achieve economic 
development (Park No 2005; Moon 2005). In South Korea, former President Park and his 
regime began to try to achieve these two goals. But the state first needed a dutiful and 
loyal national subject who could be mobilized into two areas: national security-
conscription and economic development. Former President Park created a new form of 
nationalism as an ideology, but it was closely related to state absolutism, rather than 
traditional Korean nationalism, which aimed at forming a single nation state.  
Therefore, South Korean nationalism excludes Korean nationals who have not 
lived in South Korea or even in proSouth Korean regions like the United States or 
European countries. The research is to find the possible causes of these contradictory 
consequences in Korean nationalism. AMOs were an important means of mobilization in 
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the two areas stated above during the economic development period. In Western 
European states, the states first tried to dissolve individuals from their traditional 
subjects. And after that, the states like France and German tried to create a new nation for 
their own state (Brubaker 1992). In Korea, the regime dissolved the traditional subjects 
which mean the Korean nation by mobilizing them into AMOs and thus depoliticizing 
them.    
This study intends to examine the process of national state citizen formation in 
Korea since 1948. The existence of a modern national state is necessary for the formation 
of a national subject. After forming the national state, political elites and decision-makers 
sought to domesticize, or nationalize South Koreans into a new nation, because they 
realized that South Koreans did not accept the division of the Korean peninsula at all. 
They needed new nation members who did not identify themselves with one Korean 
nation but rather with citizens of the ROK. The first president, Syngman Rhee, tried to 
build one ideological nation in his discourse, Ilminism (Im 2005; Seo 1997; Shin 2006).  
However, when dictatorship and corruption were ended by the civil protest 
movement for democracy in 1960, the earliest demand was for reunification with North 
Korea and the building of one nation state on the Korean peninsula. Also when the 
second republic of 1960 appeared in Korean history, the issue of reunification with North 
Korea emerged again as the most urgent task of the new republic. South Koreans held 
one Korean nation identity. However, after a major general of the Korean army took 
power by a military coup, the situation changed and the state tried to build a very dutiful 
national subject as a citizen of the Republic of Korea. President Park, unlike his 
predecessor (Syngman Rhee), succeeded in domesticizing South Koreans as dutiful 
national subjects. South Koreans discarded their grand nationalism that shared all the 
Koreans’ past experience, culture, and finally one nation: one state with North Koreans 
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and other Koreans out of the Korean peninsula. They accepted a narrow form of 
nationalism and forged a new national ideology related to nationalism only for South 
Koreans. This means they excluded the other Koreans. The South Korean government 
and its citizens created their own space. The southern part of the Korean peninsula 
became the territory for the new nation of South Korea.  
This research will focus on the emergence of the new, narrow nationalism related 
to this new state, made possible by the emergence of a national subject. This new 
nationalism and the emergence of a new nation of South Koreans completed the 
formation of the national state in the southern part of the Korean peninsula. The new 
nation is comprised of collective citizens who like to live as a group instead of individual 
lives. So an individual should be ready to sacrifice himself or herself for the group, such 
as family, community, organizations, and finally the state. The new, narrow nationalism 
became a state ideology and provided a sense of identity for state citizens. The research 
will, therefore, look into the process of dialectical synthesis between the state and citizens 
mediated by AMOs. The state initiative and citizens’ participation in AMOs and other 
developmental projects or movements were important in creating the new nation of South 
Korea. Even though the state used despotic power and infrastructural power to generate 
national subjects, if South Koreans only followed the state, due to fear and terror of death 
as they had felt in the first ROK and if there had been no voluntary or active acceptance 
of the new order, the efforts of the national state would be nothing (Hwang Byung 
2000)19.  
As a result, my research will focus on finding out what made citizens’ voluntary 
participation in the national project possible. The national state created certain channels 
for a reciprocal relationship between the state and citizens. This perspective will focus on 
 
19 Hwang Byung Joo (2000) said there was another situation that people must select people (North Korean 
side) and Kookmin (South Korean side) again in the development age.  
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the new relationship between state and citizens in ways of governing, and how these are 
organized and institutionalized (Roberts 2000). AMOs were the main channel that 
allowed the state to succeed in mobilizing South Koreans. My research focuses on the 
role of AMOs in South Korea. Most of South Korean state elites experienced Japanese 
colonial mobilization strategies and cooperated with the colonial state’s efforts to 
conscript social resources at that time. President Park was a military officer in the 
Japanese army. The Japanese collaborators wanted to learn how Japan rose as a strong 
nation state and how Japan mobilized social resources to build that state. In order to 
mobilize social and economic resources, they introduced AMOs similar to those of both 
Left and Right Fascist regimes, like Japan’s military imperialism, Soviet mobilization 
strategies, and the Nazis’ third Reich (Kasza 1995; Mosse 1975). The state and its 
political leaders mainly created many AMOs with the political goals of removing 
opposing ideologies.  
Syngman Rhee, first president of the Republic of Korea, created many political 
AMOs. Their members were mobilized in demonstrations, various kinds of elections, the 
destruction of politically opposed organizations or social organizations, and particularly, 
in educating Korean youths. But during the economic development period from 1961 to 
1979, AMOs started to play important roles in that economic development and in social 
change, as well as in the political arena. President Park’s regime was successful in setting 
goals by which political and economic plans were correlated. This relation made it 
possible for the state systems to mobilize national subjects by expanding throughout the 
whole society. The state transformed South Korean society into a “conscription society” 
by organizing South Koreans into AMOs in every area. The state could accomplish its 
goals, economic development and modernization of the father land by the formation of 
national subjects as individuals who participated in AMOs and accepted the values from 
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the above. Individual South Koreans forged a new national identity, the national values of 
which were set by the state elites. Both agents of the state and national subjects worked 
for the emergence of a new nation.  
My research will examine the role of the state in the running of the AMOs and the 
participatory role of citizens. Specifically, the interests of individuals who participated in 
national development projects will be part of the study. This paper will try to conclude 
that the emergence of a new nation of South Koreans means the completion of the 
formation of a national state in the southern part of the Korean peninsula. Institutional 
completion alone does not create a national state (Im chong 2004). Identity and solidarity 
among South Koreans with new national values of the nation are essential to the 
completion of a modern national state. To have a full national state, South Korea (the 
state elites and leaders) need a citizen of the Republic of Korea who internalizes the 
values of South Korea and voluntarily participate in national issues. The 155miles of 
armistice line, the 38th parallel is an important element of Korean nationalism 
(Thongchai 1997). South Korea started to detach North Korea from the Korean nation, as 
the division between south and north was consolidated. South Korea created its own 
space. In the end, South Koreans identified themselves with a new Korean nation within 
the border of the armistice line. The new Korean nation and national subjects are a 
historical product of ROK and economic development. Struggling between the nation and 
national state produced a distorted nationalism, even though it contributed to economic 
growth and modernization in South Korea.  
 
4. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Literature review focuses on the national state theory, state religions and fascist 
regime, and the era of former President Park Chung Hee. Most state theories including 
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the war and the state theories will be dealt with in the chapter 2. In addition to state 
theory, the change of social consciousness of Koreans and distinct historical experience 
will also be touched in the following chapter 2.  
 
4.1 The State  
The theory of the national state is helpful to understand the ROK, which is not a 
nation state but a national state in terms of the fact that one nation should form a single 
nation state. Because the Korean nation failed to form a single nation state and made a 
separated national state instead (Tilly 1992). Understanding the theory of the national 
state is helpful to know why the some presidents of the ROK tried to form a national state 
and build a national subject after the Korean War. In this research, the term Nation-State 
is not precise enough to cover the characteristics of states like South Korea, in which one 
nation consisted of two ideologically different states. Even though many studies have 
used the term Nation-State, this research will replace the term with national state (Tilly 
1975; 1985; 1990). Since much of the existing literature uses the nation state term which 
means the national state, this research will define the national state concepts from those 
nation state characteristics. Most of the discussion about the national state will be 
presented in the second chapter.   
Another discourse to be given is state religion and state absolutism. These studies 
focused on research on Fascism and Nazism in Europe and the role of the people in 
supporting dictatorship and their regimes (Na In 2004). Despite the failure of state 
religion in supporting fascist regimes, some regimes did create a state religion, which let 
people support and participate in fascist projects. They showed how the masses became 
important partners with fascism and internalized fascist logic (Reich 1970). Hogan (2001) 
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offers insights for understanding the process by which some social consent occur among 
people through self-interest (social psychological desire), and internal coercion (social 
forces). The state based on an understanding of the psychology of masses and a 
knowledge ways of the masses uses creates a state religion, in other words, absolutism of 
the state like a religion. This theory can explain South Koreans’ feeling how they 
acquired about their national state, which wielded its power without restriction. In 
addition, as a developing state, ROK was a symbol of Leviathan and terror (Hwang 
Byung 2000; Cho Hee 2005). However, even though the state in South Korea was 
regarded as a divine being, common Koreans could not resist this image. Even though the 
state established itself as divine, most divine entities were inherently the characteristics of 
the Korean nation. Because President Park always used nation, or nationalism rhetoric, 
not state rhetoric, the state was regarded as a temporary phenomenon that must achieve 
the nation’s ultimate goal, to achieve unification. Of course, the state was the main face, 
which consisted of nationalist rhetoric. The state religion discourse helps this research to 
understand how the regime set a national and state goal to mobilize individuals and 
dissolute them to make a new nation.   
 
4.2 The Era of Park Chung Hee 
Since the economic crisis in 1997, there has been much nostalgia about the period 
in which South Korea achieved rapid economic growth and a stable social system (Hong 
Yoon 2002; Jin Joong 2002). At the same time the syndrome of former President Park 
Chung Hee arose.20 In this social mood, many scholars began to reevaluate Park Chung 
 
20 In the 1997 presidential election, a candidate who looked like former President Park set himself up as 
Park’s heir and claimed that only with him would South Korea overcome the economic crisis (national 
disaster). 
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Hee and his era. Before the economic crisis in 1997, dichotomous epistemology21 was a 
key frame to understand the age of Park Chung Hee. Some of the discussions about the 
Park Chung Hee period have, in fact, focused on a single aspect of that time. Some 
people suffered from the dictator, or others enjoyed economic development, or laborers 
suffered from severe exploitation by employers. The most frequent ways to view Park 
Chung Hee and his rule of eighteen years has been as a “hero” of the modernization and 
rapid economic development, or as a military dictator who served as a pro-Japanese 
lieutenant.  
One side of the argument has focused on Park’s achievements like Korea’s, while 
the second has taken the view of Park as a dictator. Most contemporary works criticize 
this pattern of research because modern Korean history has different and varied aspects 
of modernization. These characteristics focus on other issues about the era of Park Chung 
Hee, such as the characteristics of the state, development dictatorship discourses, 
corporatist rules and the social welfare viewpoint, the creation of a citizen view, and mass 
dictatorship theories. The trend is to look back on the period and try to reflect 
contemporary Korean society as in this research.  
The arguments related to President Park Chung Hee’s period and economic 
development have different categories: first, there are the traditional perspectives that 
deal with the causes and effects on the rapid economic development and the role of Park 
Chung Hee; Secondly, there are authoritarian and democratization perspectives that focus 
on Park Chung Hee’s dictatorship, mass dictatorship approaches that see popular 
agreement with dictator Park and his party’s aggressive support of his dictatorship and 
ethnographical approaches that focus merely on gender issues or the everyday lives of 
common South Koreans at the microlevel. The first two perspectives are created by 
 
21 Dichotomous epistemology means that people regard Park Chung Hee as a dictator, or as a great leader 
to achieve economic development. This conflicting perspective is dichotomous epistemology. 
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macro approaches and the latter three are approached via micro levels. This research will 
focus mainly on the state, national subject, and resistance perspective to understand and 
define Park’s age.  
There is a group of scholars who want to see the period as a historical threshold of 
Korean society because the president changed Koreans into modern members of the 
Korean nation. They see the period, its dictatorship, and violent authoritarian rule relying 
on despotic state apparatuses like the KCIA or secret police as unavoidable historical 
forces necessary to develop the Korean economy. What is interesting in their argument is 
that they regard the Japanese colonial domination as positive rule. They deny all the 
blame of colonial rule by Japan and legitimatize it, as they have done to the period of 
Park Chung Hee. This trend, however, does concede that former President Park’s roots by 
former colonial rule. Therefore, any critics of the age of Park Chung Hee are very close 
to critics of the former colonial domination by Japan. In this research, however, only the 
age of President Park will be addressed:  
The first group of scholars focuses on the topic of development dictatorship. Lee 
Byung Chung, Hong Yoonki, and Hong Sung Tae et al. (2003) assess the development 
dictatorship of Park Chung Hee. They explain a social phenomenon of missing the period 
of Park’s regime and of economic development. Jin Joongkwon (2003) also wrote an 
article about Park Chung Hee in the democratization era. According to the theory of Lee 
Byung Chun (2003), the development dictatorship is based on the developmental state, 
but beyond the development state theory. Park Chung Hee’s model to develop the state 
was obviously drown from the experiences of Bismark Germany’s development in the 
late nineteenth century and Japan’s Meiji Yushin (Restoration). The development 
dictatorship state was a warfare dictatorship state for development that tried to use the 
separated, hostile, ideologically different North Korea as the main enemy of South Korea. 
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From the political perspective, the regime tried to build a permanent dictatorship state of 
Park Chung Hee. This state has a character similar to the developmental state in that 
Park’s regime concentrated on a specific unbalanced development by strong 
powerholders. The state formed a connection with the State-Chaebol-Bank and thus gave 
privileges to Chaebo and other big conglomerates, a few groups of companies including 
foreign investment companies. Therefore, this development depended on display output, 
quantitative expansion of the economy and bulk economy, and crony capitalism which 
was inherently corruption in the networks among the private and public sectors (Kang 
2000). The combination of the state, the dictator, and national subjects produced this 
development dictatorship. It is also close the term, unsustainable development (Paik Nak 
2005).  
Lee Jung Woo (2003) agrees that President Park Chung Hee and his regime led to 
economic growth, not economic development. He distinguishes economic development 
from economic growth. Lee Jung Woo’s argument never agrees with any argument that 
democracy would keep economy from growing and developing. On the contrary, 
democracy he believes can actually contribute to a balanced income distribution. His idea 
is related to Amartya Sen22 (1999), not Haggard (1992). Lee Jung Woo builds on Sen’s 
assumption that freedom is a means as well as an end of development. Therefore, Park’s 
regime, which suppressed freedoms for Koreans, was a dictatorial regime. Because 
Park’s regime wielded its dictatorship and violent rule over people by sacrificing 
democracy above all, the regime left many negative outcomes in South Korea. His 
economic growth should be reevaluated from a long-term perspective in terms of the 
 
22 Sen (1999) introduced five distinct types of freedom, which are very dependent on one another to 
develop each freedom. Five distinct types of freedom, seen in an instrumental perspective, are particularly 
investigated in the empirical studies that follow. These include 1) political freedom, 2) economic facilities, 
3) social opportunities, 4) transparency guarantees, and 5) protective security.  
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Korean nation. In the long run, economic growth distorted Korean society and human 
rights. In terms of income distribution, Korean society has never been an advanced state. 
Development dictatorship was not able to create a just society in Korea. As with other 
development dictatorship theories, his idea, in the end, insists that the Korean economy 
should evolve in terms of “sustainable development.” 
Yi Hang and Park Sup (1997) chose approaches combining the term of strong 
state with well-developed local administrative power. They argue that the state which 
continued to develop after Japanese colonial domination began to expand its capacity 
through laws, infrastructures, and administration changes before the Saemaul Undong. 
These state apparatuses provided the Saemaul Undong with a crucial factor for success. 
They define a successful movement of the state and the causes that allowed the Saemaul 
Undong to succeed in Korea. They suggested three elements crucial to the movement, 
such as efficient control and a surveillance, the existence of villages malleable to state 
policies, and the peasants’ desire and capacity to develop rural areas. They focused on the 
social conditions when the movement began and were implemented, while the established 
literature concentrated on the impact on the policies of the states and the roles of 
President Park Chung Hee. This research overlapped with Alavi’s “overdeveloped state 
power” (1972), which experienced rapid growth penetrating the civil society of Korea, 
during the colonial period of Japan (Cho Suk 2005). Park Jin Do and Han Do Hyun 
(1999), along with Oh You Seok (2002) oppose Yi Hang and Park Sup. They agree with 
Yi Hang and Park Sup in terms of a strong state discourse. However, they do not agree 
that the movement was successful. They measured two essential factors: the debt of 
peasants’ households, and the growth of migration to urban areas. Because the rural 
movement was carried out in a top-down way in which the strong state mobilized people 
to develop rural areas, despite early success, the movement lost its voluntary momentum 
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and failed to promote the rural economy. Their framework to understand the movement 
was the use of despotic power to lead and peasants to follow.  
Kim Chulgyu (2003) defines Park’s period as the elementary Taylorism and 
Bureaucratic Authoritarian Industrialization period to develop modernization and the 
Korean economy. Furthermore, Park Chung Hee used the overdeveloped bureaucratic 
system and state power to keep his dictatorship stable. Economic growth in Park’s regime 
was a means to make his regime permanent.  
Cho Sukgon (2005) sees the social boom reviving Park Chung Hee as a dangerous 
effort to make President Park a hero and a myth. He is more critical than others in that he 
does not even agree with the opinion that economic development in South Korea was not 
a meant of Park Chung Hee’s leadership, in terms of distorted income distribution, degree 
of social corruption, and political oppression and authoritarian rule over South Korea. 
Like Cho Hee Yeon, he sees advocates of Park Chung Hee and their logic as very similar 
to advocates of the colonial period. Because Lee Young Hoon (2003; 2005) sees Japanese 
colonial domination and Park’s rule as a momentum of economic growth and 
modernization of the Korean peninsula, Lee’s argument is blamed of his giving a nation’s 
legitimacy to them.  
Jung Tae Hun (2002) diagrees with the view that the economic growth of the 
ROK was not a historical result of Park Chung Hee. Jung sees Park’s era as a period in 
which the authoritarian state and ruler oppressed the voluntary efforts of Koreans’ to 
build democratic and national citizenship consciousness and utilize social capital of 
Koreans for income distribution and economic development. He also criticizes arguments 
of Park Chung Hee’s leadership and the roles of authoritarian rule by him with two 
elements. One is that without Park Chung Hee, the United States would help Korea 
achieve economic development, and the result of economic development was contributed 
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by sufficient labor forces and social capital that Koreans had invested on their children 
and on their own learning for a long time. In the end, Park’s age was a specific period in 
which the authoritarian state subjugated and distorted the voluntary trials of Koreans to 
build the democratic national citizenship identity in Korea.  
The efforts of making South Koreans into Koomin “National Subject” are also 
approached. In most cases of contemporary research on Park’s age, a discourse of making 
Kookmin is very insightful to understand the period. This discourse is close to mass 
dictatorship and mobilization in the national development project, like the Saemaul 
Undong. This approach is different from Jung Tae Hun’s in that this one defines mass 
dictatorship by a term of to some degree voluntary supporting. Mass dictatorship and its 
issues was addressed by Lim Jihyun (2005) and his colleagues (Hwang Byung Joo, 2004; 
Na Inho, 2005). Their approach focuses on the fact that no dictatorship can keep their 
power stable without the people’s support or cooperation. Therefore, the dictatorship 
tends to create ideological apparatuses and use them by creating hegemony. Park’s 
regime was strong because the regime could make ideological strategy, “the nation’s 
modernization and development.” By holding hegemony, Park’s regime could 
consolidate its power for a long time and could make modern Korean people or modern 
Korean subjects. Hwang Byung Joo’s article (2000) shows how peasants in the Saemaul 
Undong (the New Village Movement) were attached with Park Chung Hee until now. 
From the Saemaul Undong, peasants began to identify themselves as modern beings of 
the ROK and realized their position by participating in the movement. From the 
experiences of participation, peasants became national subjects.  
Koh Won’s article (2006) is another study related to making modern national 
subjects, although he does not mention “mass dictatorship.” In his article, he described 
the Saemaul Undong as one important factor that contributed to the appearance of 
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modern nation subjects (Kookmin). The Saemaul Undong enabled the state power to 
penetrate civil society, especially rural communities, with to some degree the great 
passionate participation of peasants. Even though cleavage appeared between the state 
and peasants in the late 1970s, according to him, the state could make peasants members 
of the new nation through the Saemaul Undong. Making Kookmin discourse, however, 
cannot give any insight to contemporary Korean society. 
 Seung-sook Moon (2003; 2005) and Sheila Miyoshi Jager (2003; 2006) see the 
period as one to build a Korean nation and to make Koreans of dutiful national subjects 
based on feminist perspectives. They can analyze the Korean society where the ruling 
culture has alienated a specific group like women. The modernization by military 
dictatorship was followed by marginalizing the weak in society. According to them, Park 
Chung Hee’s modernization and economic development including military dictatorship 
built a manhood Korean nation and marginalized Korean women, who were mobilized in 
complementing national development projects and sacrificed themselves with the 
development of the Korean economy and modernization. Especially, Seungsook Moon 
(2005) regards Korean society as a gender discriminated society established and deep-
rooted in the process of mass mobilization for economic development and the security of 
national defense. Jager (2003) especially sees the Saemaul Undong as a movement that 
made Confucian peasants modern agrarian patriots. Moon and Jager warned a negative 
side of modernization of the ROK in terms of the feminist. However, they did not reveal 
the exact consequences of modernization in terms of national subjects.   
Kim Dong-No (1998) provides a research with a frame to understand peasants 
who participated in the Saemaul movement and supported the dictatorship of Park Chung 
Hee. He has a different approach from that of Cumings (1981), as he argues that peasants 
in the period of liberation from Japan and the period of the USAMGIK rule were passive 
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in uprising against the military government in October 1946. Cumings analyzed that the 
peasants’ uprisings against the government were very autonomous and voluntary. 
Because peasants were socio-economically exploited in harsh ways by the military 
government, peasants rose against the military government and the Rightist policemen. 
However, Kim disagrees with him in that the peasant uprisings were organized by local 
Leftists and Communist organizations. Especially, when the revolt spread outside of 
Taegu city, Kyungsanbook-do, Communist organizations and Leftists played important 
roles. Even though there were strong objective conditions to foster an uprising against the 
military government in the late 1940s, the peasant uprising was possible only with help 
from Communists and their organizations. This peasant conservative character was 
mentioned by Skocpol (1994) to determine whether peasants could play a role in social 
revolution in the developing countries. The conservative nature of peasants, in the end, 
was used to promote the Saemaul Undong in 1970s by state bureaucrats propelling the 
movement. Through the experiences of participation in the movement, peasants were 
molded easily as modern national subjects by the state’s discipline (Foucault 1977), the 
state’s interpellation (Althusser 1972), and finally the colonization as national subjects by 
the “System,” which consists of the state power and capitalist’s capital (Habermas 1974;  
1989;  1991).  
Cho Hee Yeun (2003; 2005) seizes on the resistant and democratic approach by 
people. First Cho defines that Park’s regime tried to create an anticommunist regimented 
society, but it continued to suffer from resistance from the below (1999). He sees Park 
Chung Hee’s dictatorship as different from Japan’s military imperialism and Fascism in 
Germany because Park’s dictatorship was ruptured by resistance from the below, while 
German and Japanese Fascism were destroyed by external powers. The Korean people’s 
aggressive resistance against Park’s regime caused its collapse. Korean modern history, 
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therefore, was the history struggling for human rights and democracy. For example, 
according to him, The Saemaul Undong was one way that Park’s regime which faced the 
people’s resistance initiated the creation of expansive supports from the below as well as 
violent measures like military ordinance, garrison decrees, and emergency measures. Kim 
Bohyun (2005; 2006) criticizes the mass dictatorship discourse as naïve and too abstract 
because it sees Park’s regime as the perfect rule. Kim asks, “What could explain 
resistance from the below, especially students, citizens, and laborers in the mid to late 
1970s if we see Park’s regime as a strong, and perfect administration.”  Therefore, he 
shows how female workers in very severe working condition became resistant in the late 
1970s.  
Kim Youngkon (2005) also sees the labor forces as revolutionary ones as well as 
student and civilian groups in Park’s age. Kim Youngkong studies all period of the labor 
history in Korea after Japanese colonial domination. Kim sees labor history as a 
continuous historical change from the colonial period to date. Workers from the below 
continued to resist Park’s regime and the unfair practices of employers, and finally 
contributed to the collapse of the Yushin system. These studies emphasized 
democratization from the below and the weakness of Park’s regime.   
However, both the mass dictatorship perspective and the resistant and democratic 
perspective look at different faces and regions of Park’s regime; The first approaches 
analyze the rural peasants and farmers who were successfully internalized (Poeseop), 
while the resistant and democratic approaches choose industrial laborers, especially 
textile laborers as the unit of analysis (Kim Bo 2006). There is a group of scholars who 
try to synthesize both perspectives. According to this group, most of the working class in 
the early economic growth in 1960 and in early 1970s were migrants who left their rural 
areas. They were conservatives and had conflicting feelings about urban life as laborers 
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(Park Hae 2005). Their conflicting feelings consisted of fantasies of urban life for their 
future, which was regarded as contrary.  
In chapter 2, most state theories necessary to this study will be dealt with. In 
addition, nationalism, war and the state formation, and other literatures will be presented 
in detail.   
 
5. METHODOLOGY 
This research is limited to one historical case, South Korea. Because there are 
many institutions and administered mass organizations in this research, in order to 
understand them better, comparative methodologies may be used in the case of 
citizenship between Korea and other countries (such as France, Germany, and some of 
the Latin American Countries); in the case of the labor policies of South Koreans with 
Taiwan, pre World War II Japan, and other; in case of the roles of women’s with other 
developing countries. However, even though this research uses partially comparative 
sociology, two different methodologies will be used for the research. The first is content 
analysis to understand certain documents, particularly former president Park’s speeches, 
other important government documents, and informants’ interviews. Also in order to 
understand and interpret personal experiences and lives, hermeneutic phenomenology 
will be introduced.  
 
5.1 Data Collection and Sampling     
    This paper deals with the dynamic relationship between the state and 
population of South Korea. There are two main target groups for the research. The first is 
the role of the state. The other is the participants in AMOs and other national 
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development projects. Three major AMOs, created by the state in South Korea during its 
economic development period (particularly 1961-1979) will be selected. In analyzing 
these three major AMOs, informants will be sought for interview. Historic government 
documents will also be researched. Documents collected from the national archives, the 
National Assembly Library, the National Library of Korea, and other newspaper archives.  
News papers are another source for this research. Since 1961, the year of re-
creation of the Hankooknochong, the Hankooknochong has published a labor newspaper 
(called Nochongbo, later the Hankooknochong) to distribute union news to members23. 
Analyzing the texts helps to understand what topics the Hankooknochong was interested 
in. In particular, matching newspapers with the political issues of the state should provide 
insights into the roles of the Hankooknochong during the economic development period 
under President Park. 
For a second goal, interviews and qualitative methods will be used to investigate 
people’s experiences in the national projects. In qualitative questioning, among three 
interview guides for interview such as structured, unstructured, and semi structured, 
semi-structured method will be used. Semi-structured interview has open-ended question 
structure and is non-directional question. “Probes” will be discussed in research 
questions. Probes are a type of promoting inquiry. Probes are asking for details so that the 
interviewer can understand what happened. For example, “could you give me an example 
of,?” “how did that go?,” or “what happened then?,” and the like. These semi-open 
questions will help this interview to make informants feel free to tell their personal 
experiences. Political sensual issues are not presented to informants because their past 
 
23 The first published newspaper showed the news that 35, 000 workers assembled at the front of Seoul 
City Hall and supported May 16 military coup de’tate as an national event which would make Korean 
nation survive and construct future of Korean nation.  
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experiences were related to very sensitive political issue in terms of Uhyong and dictator 
collaborator. 
5.1.1 Sampling  
Finding informants for this research is hard because participation in AMOs during 
the economic development period was limited. The age range of participants is from the 
40s to 60s, and included men and women. Participation in AMOs will be examined at 
both the national and local level. Snowball sampling was used to collect interview data. 
This nonprobability method is employed when a researcher has difficulty locating 
samples because the target populations are too few in number to find (Babbie 2001). 
Because these experiences occurred more than thirty years ago, it was hard to track down 
interviewees. Therefore, if I found a candidate for an interview, I would ask friends of the 
person to share their experiences by joining the interview. Snowball sampling also 
presents a good opportunity to collect such data as information from others who have had 
AMO experiences, by contacting, and interviewing them in this same relationship base. 
Therefore, if a researcher finds an informant, then the interviewer may ask that person to 
provide for the information. A social feature of the Korean society is a good example of 
nonprobability sampling. Korean society is “a relationship society,” meaning that private 
relationships work in doing both public or private business. Interviewees are categorized 
into two different levels.  
The first level is the lower level, which means local participants. The second level 
is a high level in which participants are taken from successful cases of the Saemaul 
Undong, or policymakers of the Saemaul Undong in governmental organizations. For the 
Saemaul Undong, eleven informants participated in interviews. Three of them were 
policy-makers, four of them were successful peasants in the movement, and another four 
of them were Saemaul leaders and local rural residents. For the Student National Defense 
 39
                                                
Corps, there are ten informants. 3 presidents of University, 2 staff of the 
Hakdohokookdan at University level, one president of college, 3 high school students 
staff and two students members of the Hakdohokookdan.  
There are two big labor union Federations in Korea currently: one is the 
Hankooknochong, Federation of Korean Trade Union; the other is the Minjoonochong 
(Korean Confederation of Trade Unions). In this research, former the Hankooknochong 
members were interviewed using snowball sampling methods, because the second union 
was established in 1990 in order to build a new democratic labor movement based on the 
fact that the Hankooknochong was “Uhyong.” 24 Seven labor union members from the 
chemical industry, transportation, electronics, textile industry, telecommunication 
company workers, and metal industry, were also interviewed.  
 
5.2 Ways to Interpret Data 
There are two ways to interpret data. One is analyzing documents, books, news 
papers and so on. In literature, we can understand what happened during the economic 
development. Hermeneutic phenomenology is another way to understand personal 
experiences of participants in developmental movements and AMOs. Sociologically, this 
method can be used to show how personal experiences have been intertwined with one 
another.  
5.2.1 Content Analysis 
Content Analysis is a method used for structuring and analyzing written materials. 
Historical documents for example, presidents’ speeches, governmental reports, and some 
Charters of the South Korean government. It is a systematic research method for 
 
24 Uhyong means literally “Work for King”. In this era, it has meant “work for dictators”.  
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analyzing textual information in a standardized way that allows evaluators to make 
inferences about that information (Weber 1990; Krippendorff 1980). Another expression 
of this is as follows:  "A central idea in content analysis is that the many words of the 
text are classified into much fewer content categories" (Weber 1990). The classification 
process, called "coding," consists of marking text passages with short alphanumeric 
codes. This creates "categorical variables" that represent the original, verbal information 
and that can then be analyzed by standard statistical methods. The text passages can come 
from structured interviews, focus group discussions, case studies, open-ended questions 
on survey instruments, work papers, agency documents, and previous evaluations. To 
classify a document's key ideas, the evaluator identifies its themes, issues, topics, and so 
on.  The result might be a simple list of the topics in a series of meeting notes. Content 
analysis can go further if the evaluator counts the frequency of statements, detects subtle 
differences in their intensity, or examines issues over time, in different situations, or from 
different groups. Thus, content analysis can not only help summarize the formal content 
of written material; it can also describe the attitudes or perceptions of the author of that 
material.  For example, if an evaluator wanted to assess the effects of a program on the 
lives of older people from their perspective, he or she could analyze open-ended 
interview responses to determine their outlook on life, loneliness, or security.  Similarly, 
an evaluator could assess the effect of Voice of America broadcasts by analyzing the 
content of Soviet newspaper articles and radio broadcasts (Inkeles 1952). 
5.2.2 Hermeneutic Phenomenology 
Hermeneutic phenomenology will be used to understand one’s life experience that 
she has lived as war victims. Hermeneutical interpretation will be used for Life of 
survivor of communist family in an ideologically opposite state. Meaning would become 
available to others through interpretation (Ohman and Soderberg 2004).   Hermeneutic 
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phenomenology is the label this study use. The hermeneutic phenomenological method or 
simply phenomenology is also used interchangeably to avoid the lengthy label. The 
hermeneutic part of the label refers to the interpretation that accompanies description in 
this method. Although informant’s words are important, there is no assumption in this 
research that every word is necessarily precise. However, other principles do apply to this 
research, such as “something learned from its context (Cohen 2000). Partnership is 
important to phenomenological research between interviewer and interviewee. Therefore, 
this research calls a person who participates in this study informant, because she informs 
me about her experience and event. This research methodology involves in-depth 
interview, analysis of the interview, and description of the key elements of experience 
(Cohen 2000). Through analysis and interpretation of data from the interview, the 
research will reveal the possible ways in which South Koreans internalize or identify 
themselves with South Korean national value, in other word, economic development and 
removal of chronic poverty.  
In this research, traditional sociological methodology is applied to hermeneutic 
phenomenology. Hermeneutically, actors tend to understand their everyday lives by their 
own minds and are inclined to give universal validity to their understanding. From a 
phenomenological point of view, individuals have many experiences and their behaviors 
should be understood as an aggregate of various experiences. In the context of an 
aggregate of experiences, universality is grasped (Ferguson 2001). Sociologically, actors 
are sometimes structured in a complex society because of socialization, and their 
behaviors sometimes depend on exogenous social structures such social facts25 (cultures, 
religion, social forces), on one hand (Weber261962; Marx 1977; Turner 2001). On the 
 
25 Emile Durkheim (1982) defines social facts as social forces to influence human behaviors in society. 
26 Max Weber particularly defines “a social relationship as certain types of behavior by some of those 
involved in the relationship, which in turn affect the conduct of others (Weber 1962, 103).  
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other hand, actors often make their own decisions, different from those social structures 
(Roberts 2005; Meyer 1999; Long 2001). There are, therefore, always general conflicts 
between the actor perspective and the structure perspective in sociology. Introducing 
hermeneutic phenomenology will help this research overcome sociological conflict 
between actor and structure.  
This paper focuses on the dialectic between the actor perspective and the structure 
perspective based on individuals’ experience. Hermeneutic phenomenology will be used 
to understand the experiences of Koreans who participated in the national development 
projects or in the AMOs. Personal experience remains private but its meaning might 
become available to others through interpretation, because hermeneutically human beings 
try to connect their experiences with universal beings and truth (Ohman 2004). As agents 
of social behavior, individuals have shown their variable characteristics in their actions, 
because they are structured by various exogenous cultures and social values. Therefore, 
an adequate theory of the temporal nature of human experience (Emirbayer 1998) is 
necessary to this study. Hermeneutic phenomenology will offer insight.   
It has taken a long time to build dutiful national subjects in South Korea out of 
individuals who experienced their private lives under macro historical changes and 
continued to conduct dialogue with the macrosocial changes. Sometimes individuals 
identify their experiences with distinctive views they have held since birth, and tend to 
witness what happened in their society through their particular lenses. Individual 
experience continues to be cumulated and intertwined with that of others. However, what 
they experienced was from what others--exogenous beings outside of them--had already 
created before them. Therefore, we can understand people’s universal lives of a particular 
time period by comprehending their individual lives or experiences. Furthermore, 
individual consciousness is apt to be formed through a dialogue with the Zeitgeist during 
 43
                                                
their entire lives. Therefore, sometimes when certain interview candidates were asked to 
participate in this process with their experience of the AMOs such as Saemaul Undong, 
HakdoHakdohokookdan, and Hankooknochong, they usually turned down the offer 
because, in this democratized era, their past experiences (which had collaborated with 
military dictatorship) might not be welcomed by contemporary Koreans. The Zeitgeist is 
democracy and liberalism, not coercion and conservativism27.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 However, the paradigm has shifted from democratization to neoeconomic conservatism. Once former 
President Park Chung Hee has been revived.. 
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Chapter 2 Theories of Political Sociology: National State, Nationalism, 
AMO, and History of South Korea 
1. INTRODUCTION  
What is a national state? When did the national state appear in the Korean 
peninsula? Why is the national state important in this research? As mentioned earlier, the 
Korean nation failed to build its own single nation state after liberation, due to both 
internal and external factors. For a long time, the ROK has had a strong relationship over 
society between its members. Among various discourses about state theories, national 
state discourses are of great importance to explain the ROK, known internationally as 
South Korea. Called the ROK, South Korea, in fact, may be linked with nationalist 
conversations rather than with national state, since South Korea should be understood in 
the context of its counterpart, North Korea. In recovering the homogeneity of the Korean 
nation, unification has been a very important goal that all Koreans have longed to 
achieve. Yet even with the desire to achieve that goal and to resolve overcome the 
separated situation facing both Koreas, Koreans are still concerned about unification due 
to its cost. Therefore, as a separated regime, the Republic of Korea began in Korean 
history without the unification discourse. It took the Republic of Korea to exclude it. 
Given such a dilemma then how could the ROK both exclude and create a new nation? 
Through understanding this process, we shall seek to make sense of the national state 
discourse.  
The first modern type of national state formation in the Korean peninsula actually 
appeared during the era of Japanese colonial domination, although many Koreans may 
become upset when they hear this fact. Cumings wrote about how Japan transformed 
Korea into a modern country in one of his monumental works, The Origins of the Korean 
War I: “The colonial state soon came to possess a comprehensive, autonomous, and 
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penetrating quality that no previous Korean state could possibly have 
mustered”(Cumings 1981). Japan introduced modern state systems in every state and 
social sector. Therefore, when the thirty-six-years of colonial state (1919-1945) in the 
Korean peninsular is viewed through the Weberian perspective of institutionalism, it 
becomes the first national state system in the Korean peninsula. In brief, the ROK has 
hardly been a strong state but rather a weak and poor one like other Third World 
countries were at that time, especially, during the period of former President Park’s 
regime.  
The modern national state concept begins with Max Weber, who defines the state 
as “a human community” that claims “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force within a given territory.” He adds more about the state, saying: the state is a 
relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e., 
considered to be legitimate) violence (Weber 1958). Charles Tilly takes Weber’s 
definition of the state further with the concept of the national state, not nation state which 
he delineates after long research into Western European history (Tilly 1975; 1985; 
1992). 28  Michael Mann defines it precisely with four elements of the nation state: 
institutions, centrality, territory, and monopolization and the essences of state power: 
state despotic power and state intrastructural power (Mann 1988). According to these 
perspectives, the colonial state created by Japan in 1910 was included with the scope of 
the modern national state, because the colonial government was well equipped with 
elements that the national state should have as an institution.    
At this point, however, there is a concrete question: Why have most of the modern 
national states tried to create their own nations and state symbols ideologically in both 
 
28 Tilly particularly emphasizes the role of the monopolization of the means and use of physical violence 
that national state holds. He shares the basic definition of the state with Weber’s in terms of legitimate use 
of physical violence, which allow the state to distinguish organized crime gang groups (Tilly 1985). 
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Western and Eastern areas for a long time since the sixteenth century? Institutional 
perspectives like Weberian theories missed an important element, even though Weber 
pointed it out (Weber 1958; 1962; 1978),29 this is, that an issue of internalization related 
to the dominated population or people who live in a demarcated territory. Understanding 
the European history of France and Germany, and the making of their nations (Brubaker 
1992)30  will help us to understand the process of creating nationalism in East Asia, 
particularly in Korea. If the concept of people is considered as one important element of 
the national state, we should be able to understand the reason why nationalism was strong 
in the minds of Koreans. We can grasp why former President Park who was a Japanese 
collaborator, army officer, and a communist spy in the Korean army became a nationalist, 
and also why he liked to use nationalist rhetoric in his dictatorship. In this chapter, 
national state theories including developmental state theories, the historical emergence of 
the ROK, Korean nationalism, and Park Chung Hee will be addressed as a means of 
understanding South Koreans and the new nation of Korea created by the state. Finally, 
opinion polls about the desire for unification of the Korean peninsula will also be 
analyzed.  
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In this section, the national state theory with the nation state, nationalism, and 
AMO theories will be presented. Particularly, the Korean War and its consequences will 
 
29 Weber defines nation as “political solidarities and solidarity sentiments which can be formed by 
cultures” (Weber 1978). 
30 According to Brubaker (1992), the nation existed before the state in German and the state existed before 
the nation in France. However, in both sides, the state issue was highly closed to the nation issue, which 
was incessantly created and managed by the political ruling elites governing other social elites. 
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be addressed to understand the political and social background of ROK in economic 
development.  
 
2.1 National State 
Before understanding a national state, we must understand war and its role in 
European state history, because war in Europe has been deeply related to the process of 
formation of national states.  
War sociologically has two faces. On the one hand, it is inclined to destroy 
society and all things in it, even the state. On the other hand, it can create a new order. 
The paradox of organized destruction flows from other paradoxes of war. For example, 
by weakening or destroying traditional structures, or by compelling internal reforms, war 
may create conditions conducive to social change and political modernization (Porter 
1994). Hence, war might be considered as a necessary condition for modernization in 
European history (Smith 1983). When the state conducts warfare against other countries, 
the state must mobilize the resources required for waging war. The state directs the whole 
of its vast efforts, using extraordinary and extralegal means (Porter 1994), since war has 
the characteristic of total concentration of all possible forces to win the battle. Generally, 
state and policymakers knew that they needed such efforts in order to win the long 
continued contests against other countries, and their efforts generally depended on how 
many resources they extracted from their societies (Tilly 1975; 1992; Skocpol 1979: 
Mann 1987).  
How did war allow the state to extract all kinds of resources? Paradoxically, it 
resulted from war’s destructive function (Smith 1983). If one state wanted to win a 
contest, it would have to mobilize all possible resources. If they could not mobilize more 
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than the enemies, that state would lose the contest, which meant that it would disappear 
from the stage. Hence, the state could acquire the rights to mobilize resources by making 
its people fear the consequences of losing the war. However, this characteristic is no 
more than a secondary feature of a states’ essence. It is the violent feature, that is, the 
state as organized crime allowed it to extort from the society’s people. The state stands 
out from other organizations in society by its tendency to monopolize concentrated means 
of violence. In terms of power and the monopolization of the means of violence, the 
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate force makes no difference (Tilly 1985). 
Because political rulers and policymakers recognized that if they could monopolize the 
means of violence by laws and forces, then, they could do whatever they wanted to do. 
Therefore, they tried to monopolize violent means as much as possible. In the end, 
because only the state could monopolize violent means, the state could dominate all 
organizations in society. Now we can ask again: What is national state? The common 
features of a national state are as follows:  
(1) Demarcation of territory and consolidation of territorial control from foreign 
sovereignty;  
(2) Differentiation of administrative state apparatuses from the society (Mann 
1988);  
(3) A rational actor that is inclined to possess profit for itself;  
(4) The subject of nationalization of subjective people;  
(5) Monopolization of physical violent means.  
 
To explain the completion of the formation of a national state in the Korean 
peninsula, theoretical approaches for understanding how the formation of the national 
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state happened historically in other continents will be presented. The common features of 
a national state from each theorist will be reviewed as follows:  
 
2.1.1 Max Weber and the State        
Max Weber is the father of national state theories, even though he never 
articulated them as such. The state is a political community which consists of three 
element, territory, usage of violent physical means, and making rules for economic 
activities (Weber 1958). The community is a human community in which people are 
under coercive control. The human community continues to try to monopolize the power 
of coercive control and makes rules within its territory (Weber 1958). Weber asks “Why 
do people obey the orders of the state?” Weber answers “because the state has a violent 
monopoly of physical means, people fear any sanction from the state.” To Weber, there is 
no different between in the violent means monopolized by the state and individual 
violence (Tilly 1985). It is necessary to understand the national state concepts such as 
power, domination and discipline.  
 
Power is defined as one thing that one can carry out one’s will even against 
other’s resistance.  
Domination means the opportunity to have a command of a given specified 
content obeyed by a given group of persons.  
Discipline means the opportunity to obtain prompt, and automatic obedience in a 
predictable form from a given group of persons because of their practiced 
orientation toward a command (Weber 1962).  
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Weber sees power and its physically violent means as an essential characteristic 
that only the national state holds. With power and its force, the state can wield power 
over people within the territory of a political community. He cites Trotsky regarding the 
state, “Every state is founded on force.”  
2.1.2 Charles Tilly and his Political State Theory 
In the late twentieth century, more theories of the state have been developed and 
have tended to include concept of the nation and citizenship. Tilly is interested in War 
and its ramifications in Western European history in the formation of the modern national 
state. Tilly focuses on the historical origins of the emergence of the national state and its 
development through investigating historical processes of mobilizing social and 
economic resources including human beings in the domestic area demarcated by 
international treaty (Tilly 1975; 1985; 1992). Tilly’s research began at the historical 
question about the enormous number of independent political units (about 500) more or 
less independent political units, in sixteenth century that disappeared in the next few 
centuries, smashed or absorbed by other states-in-the-making. Thus, twenty-odd states 
remained (Tilly 197531). He claims that the important elements distinguishing winners 
from losers are:  
1) the availability of extractible resources, 2) a relatively protected position in 
time and space, 3) a continuous supply of political entrepreneurs, 4) success in war, 5) 
homogeneity (and homogenization) of the subject population, and 6) strong coalitions of 
 
31 P 24 and 38 
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the central power with major segments of the landed elite. 32 . He adds that: A high 
standing on one of the factors can make up for a low standing on another (Tilly 1975).33  
When a state considers a possible war in the near future, what is necessary to the 
state is a standing army. The formation of standing armies provided the largest single 
incentive to extraction and the largest single means of a state's coercion over the long-
running period of European state-making (Tilly 1975). The formation of a standing army 
progressed almost simultaneously progressed with the formation of the national state. 
According to Charles Tilly (1975; 1990), the process of state building showed a chain of 
causation:  
1) To win the contest against other countries, kings and policy-makers tried to 
build standing armies; 
2) They tried to extract resources and conscripted soldiers in order to sustain a 
standing army;  
3) They renovated their apparatus to become a more efficiently differentiated 
administration to be in charge of expanding the budget and enlarging with the 
army; 
4) Since war continued to occur in the European area, they provided the states 
capacity for more long-term war. Therefore, they tried to change the economic 
conditions in order to extort more resources;  
5) To obtain more support from people and society, they yielded some rights, that 
the state possessed before, for example, the right to vote,  
 
32 This part is very important to understanding the process of formation of the national state in Korea. 
After the Korean War, the Korean government had formed a strong coalition with economic power holders, 
land-owned classes and capitalists, while the landed aristocracies of Korea in the nineteenth century were 
separated from the state. They resisted Chosun dynasty.  
33 P. 45 
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6) Finally, there was the durable increase in the bulk of the state or capacity of for 
extraction. From these historical processes, the national state system survived 
among other state systems. 
 
When the regime or the state faces crisis, challenges, and problems they would 
use institutional solutions as follows. These solutions help to understand what the ROK 
and its leaders did to secure their regimes.     
 
Crises, 
Challenges, 
Problems 
Examples of Institutional Solutions:  
Penetration Establishment of a rational field administration for 
resource mobilization (taxes, manpower), creation of 
public order, and the coordination of collective efforts 
(infrastructure development, emergency action, defense) 
Integration Establishment of allocation rules equalizing the shares of 
offices, benefits, resources among all culturally and/or 
politically distinct sectors of the national community 
Participation Extension of suffrage to hitherto underprivileged strata of 
the population, and protection of the rights of organized 
opposition 
Identity Development of media and agencies for the socialization 
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of future citizens into the national community: Schools, 
literary media, institutionalized rituals and symbols 
(myths, flags, songs) 
Legitimacy Any effort to create loyalty to and confidence in the 
established structure of political institutions in the given 
system and to ensure regular conformity to rules and 
regulations issued by the agencies authorized within the 
system  
Distribution Establishment of social services and social security 
measures, income, equalization through progressive 
taxation and transfers between power and richer localities 
(Rokan 1060: 63-64)34
 
Tilly (1992) developed his early writings from the 1970’s to his later work, 
Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990-1992. Tilly explains that theory about 
the formation of the modern national state starts with the historical relationship between 
wars and the state’s efforts in resource mobilization. In this work, Tilly investigates three 
trajectories of the development of national state in European territories: coercion-
intensive, capital-intensive, and capitalized-coercion path. Among these trajectories, the 
formant of national state survived and other countries took the development model of the 
state. The heart of Tilly’s argument is based on the mobilization theory in the frame of 
rationality and social bases on which the state stood. The existence of standing armies 
and mobilization of social resources to political elites in early modern periods, illustrates 
 
34 Tilly (1975, 608-609) recited this again. 
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the concept elective affinity35 that Weber articulated as decisive concept in relating ideas 
and interests (Gerth and Mills 1946; Weber 1958, 284). He regards as important elements 
not only social and domestic conditions which let political leaders or kings and their 
staffs mobilize resources from the dominated, but also international treaties, the so-called 
“international membership.”  
Depicted as rational actors, policy-makers or kings and their staffs selected 
different ways from other countries where the social economic conditions were not the 
same, leading them to different historical trajectories in the formation of the national 
state. Having endless wars, both small and large scale, for five hundred years in European 
territories, policy-makers or kings tried to make their kingdoms or states fit for waging 
wars against their enemies. With great advancements in military weapons and strategies 
between states or kingdoms, military mobilization, the desire to mobilize social 
resources, including human beings grew and grew. In the long run, the specific format, 
“the national state system,” proved to have advantages that city states, aristocratic 
dynasties, and kingdoms could not defeat. Therefore, among various paths to 
development of state types, the national state system was the best fit among other types 
because it could mobilize social resources more efficiently and effectively than any other 
type in waging wars against enemies. Through the historical process to mobilize 
resources, bureaucratic differentiation, administration, and the modern system of the 
national state were born, and grew to be the best fit to the domestic flow and international 
streams in the continuous wars.  
In terms of Tilly’s conception (especially in his 1990 writing), the ROK has not 
taken the same path to develop the national state system. South Korea has developed with 
 
35 Max Weber in his writing, The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, explains the relationship 
between the ethic of Protestantism and the spirit of capitalism with elective affinities. Due to this elective 
affinity, in the Western hemisphere, capitalism arose while it was impossible in China. 
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outside military resources. Because most military resources were from the United States, 
including training officers and generals, the ROK has not worried about the domestic 
power holders and could become more autonomous than other countries in the Western 
hemisphere did. At this point, as an international system, the national state is an 
appropriate system term (Mayer 1998). Therefore, in terms of mobilization sources, the 
Republic of Korea has a weak state to international forces like the United Nations or the 
United States, while it is a strong state over society and citizens at the same time (Tilly 
1992).  
In addition, because Tilly approaches the national state term, he focuses on 
citizenship and identity instead of members of a specific nation. His citizenship 
discourses can be related to the Kookmin concept (the national subject), unlike members 
of the Korean nation. The citizen concept within the state is under a scope of the national 
state (1996). Citizenship is defined by the state based on the state strategies to include or 
exclude its subjects.   
2.1.3. Michael Mann and Joel Migdal 
The relationship between the state and society is articulated further by Michael 
Mann. While Tilly focuses on the characteristics of national state, especially violent 
means of the state, Mann (1988) who uses historical approaches understands state 
theories by tracing the origins of social and state power. His interest therefore stays in 
state autonomy from the ruling economic class or social classes. To explain a concept of 
the state autonomy, Mann first divided power groups into four: political, ideological, 
military, and economic social groups. Among these groups, political group obtain a 
power to rule the other three groups. Political elites are relatively autonomous because 
they haves their own origins of power. The other three groups are restricted only into 
their own boundaries, while the political elites are beyond their limits and can pursue 
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general interests. The reasons why the state and political elites are able to control the 
other social elites are because the state has its own characteristics such as the necessity of 
the state, the multiplicity of state functions, territorial centrality of the state and the 
mechanisms for acquiring autonomous state power over society (1988).  
Mann says “because states have undertaken such a variety of social activities, 
there are also numerous ways in which at different times they have acquired a 
disproportionate part of society’s capacity for infrastructural coordination” (Mann 
1988).  
This coordination gives the state superior status over social groups, such as 
ideological, military and economic. Here his theory gives this research insight into the 
way in which Mann’s theory consists of two different powers: despotic and 
infrastructural. State despotic power is the physically violent power of the state over 
social classes and elites. Infrastructural power is the state power penetrating and 
coordinating social life which presents effective logistical infrastructures to state despotic 
power. Ironically, this infrastructural power initially pioneered by despotic states tends to 
make the state strong but infrastructural power is soon carried off into civil society. This 
infrastructural power during the economic development period was initiated by the 
government and the state could control civil society. The Saemaul Undong helped the 
state infrastructural power to play a role in penetrating civil society by expanding its 
power (Yi Hang and Park Sup 1997). Mann’s theory on infrastructural state power will 
help other research to understand how a civil society could thicken its arena after military 
dictatorship ended, because many of the AMOs like the Saemaul Undong, 
Hakdohokookdan and Hankooknochong were used by people when they would actually 
have liked to resist the state policy makers. This stat autonomy played a great role in 
planning economic development projects and movement in South Korea. Especially         
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A theory about the tense relationship between political power groups versus social 
power group was articulated by Joel Migdal (1988). His main argument is that in the 
history of the process of being colonized, weak states in the Third World lost their power 
to control social classes and social powers, and started on the path to be colonized by the 
imperialist countries. At this point, power elites in society had a direct relationship with 
foreign power holders and excluded their country’s political power elites. Social power 
groups could grasp a stronger power than state powers and resist the state’s reform 
policies. In the vortex and counterpart of reform by social power groups, the Third World 
states became weaker and weaker. The state power elites soon lost their power base, and 
could not manage the socio-economic ruling classes. The Third World states finally 
became colonized by imperial states. Migdal’s theory can be related to Jame Palias 
(1975) and Bruce Cumings (1981), who articulated how the Chosun Dynasty (Korea) 
failed social reforms and were colonized in terms of the relationship between the state, 
kings, political elites and society, the economic ruling classes, and aristocrats. The 
political elites of the king and Kojong’s father tried to reform the tax system and institute 
other social reforms to build a strong military state and economically wealthy in the tide 
of foreign invasion during the late nineteenth century. Palais (1975) revealed that the 
Chosun Dynasty failed to reform the overall national system, because social power 
groups kept controlling their local bases and could resist the efforts of the state (Chosun 
Dynasty). Even though the Chosun dynasty created a very strong centralized bureaucracy 
and controlled local elites by the King’s authority with Confucianism, that philosophy 
was used by local elites in order to resist the King’s policies. In traditional Korea, James 
B. Palais analyzed the reforms of the king’s father. The ruling aristocracies were related 
to international strong powers like China, Russia, and Japan who were struggling with 
each other to gain superior status in the Korean peninsula during the nineteenth century. 
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However, in the twentieth century, the condition and situation changed quite a bit. The 
state and political elites were in league with international powers. Social power groups 
were weakened by the Korean War (Choi Jang 1988), land reform (Haggard 1992), and 
military forces (Jeon Sang 1990).  
2.1.4 Althusser and Interpellation Structure 
Althusser revealed this imbalanced relationship between the state and civil 
society, or individuals. Althusser developed the characteristics of the state’s ideological 
apparatuses as strategies for ruling over people. In his writings, the state used two state 
powers to control civil society: repressive power and state ideological power. Ideology is 
a means of showing a specific production relationship and class relationship. As a 
structural means, the state powers played a role in planting state ideologies into citizen 
minds. At this time, the state interpellates individuals as a subject of calling. The 
interpellation shows the structure where by individuals live and identify themselves. In 
the movie, “The Devil Wears Prada,” a newly hired character named “Andy” is called 
“Emily” by her senior and editor of Runaway magazine. The name, “Emily,” illustrates a 
power and ideological relation between the editor and the new staff member. When Andy 
was called “Emily,” she dared to ask the editor to call her name, Andrea or Andy. 
However, when the editor called her by her actual “Emily” again, she turned around and 
responded as if she had become “Emily.” Andy became Emily upon calling by the editor. 
According to the hidden production relationship, the class relationship is reproduced by 
the state’s interpellate. Ideolog as Althusser mentioned, is the system of the ideas and 
representations which dominate the mind of a man or social group (Althusser 1972, 158). 
Ideological state apparatuses are inherent in the production relations that the state 
articulates in modern times as well as repressive state power.  
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Althusser complements Marxist state theories by introducing the Ideological State 
Apparatuses (ISA). These theories contain a certain number of realities that present 
themselves to the immediate observer in the form of distinct and specialized institutions 
such as the religious ISA (the system of different churches), the educational ISA (the 
system of different public and private schools), the family ISA, the legal ISA; the 
political ISA (the political system, including different parties), the trade-union; the 
communications ISA (press, radio and television, etc.), the cultural ISA (literature, the 
arts, sports etc.). wTraditional Marxist state theorists regard the state apparatus containing 
only the repressive state apparatus such as the government that the administration, the 
army, the police, the courts, the prisons, and so on (Althusser 1972). The ISA contributes 
to keeping imaginary relationship between individuals and System (capitalist orders and 
state) intact. 
The state in Korea used both the repressive state apparatuses and the ideological 
state apparatuses. When the government tried to mobilize people into national 
development projects, the social structures where they lived with while they identified 
themselves were inherent in the calling. Therefore, they should follow and respond to the 
state’s interpellates. The superior state over individuals could call people into the 
projects. The term Kookmin which was used incessantly by the state, involved the 
ideological relationship of production in which Koreans participated. Laborers, peasants, 
and students identified with false positions like leading roles in economic development or 
warrior in modernization of fatherland. At the first calling, individuals became subjects 
who had held the ideological product relationship under capitalist orders. As they 
participated in the projects, they became national subjects of the ROK.  
Althusser’s analysis differs from the South Korean experience in that he regards a 
subject as merely a passive agent. In South Korea, anticommunism, nationalism, 
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capitalism, and liberal democracy were ideologies that the state tried to implant into 
South Koreans. Those ideologies included a specific political structure as well as an 
economic reproduction relation. During the economic development period, capitalism 
was not fully established. Therefore, the state had to intervene to create spaces in which 
capitalism could function and to make South Koreans subject to the newly emerging 
capitalist order and system. The state began making members of ROK by interpellating 
them as national subjects. The role of the ideological state apparatuses (ISAs) worked in 
this area. The state monopolized most education, mass media, religion, the legal system, 
the cultural system, and the like. There was not even the presence of the relative 
autonomy of the ISA in anticommunism, capitalism, and state absolutism. However, in 
South Korea, the state needed the active compliance of its subjects, not just their passive 
compliance, to make its national development project work.  
Therefore, the state -- particularly Park’s regime -- created the AMOs in areas of 
ISAs, and then let South Koreans participated in those organizations. For example, the 
student association for national security (Hakdohokookdan) was founded on September 
28th 1949. It started as an autonomous student association, but in fact was funded and 
controlled by the state. The association taught anticommunism, capitalism, and 
patriotism. It demanded military training too. Park’s regime created Christian 
associations and also economic associations of both men and women. By participating in 
national projects, and by getting the benefits, South Koreans came to interact positively 
with the state. In the end, Althusser was right because creating national subjects became a 
work of creating a type of capitalist human being in the name of modernization by 
President Park Chung Hee.  
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2.2 The Developmental State  
Despite its controversial disputes, the state under President Park Chung Hee’s rule 
experienced the rapid growth of the state’s capacity to intervene in society to develop the 
Korean economy. There has been no doubt that state intervention was essential in the 
course of economic development and industrialization in Korea during the economic 
development period. The developmental state discourses, unlike the national state 
theories, ask the state to provide a clear set of rules for economic activities and basic 
infrastructures (Woo-Cumings 1999). In this theory, as said Chalmers Johnson (1987), 
the developmental state does not inherently rely on the procedural legitimacy but rather 
depend on economical achievement and growth set up as the most urgent goal (Lee 
2003). This developmental state theory is based on a strong state and weak society.36  
Some scholars argue that the emergence of the relatively strong state in Korea 
resulted from a weakness of social classes in Korea. Landlords in the Korean economy 
had been a major social class for centuries throughout Japanese colonialism. From 
Japanese colonial domination to the U.S military rule and the emergence of the ROK, 
there was land reform and distribution by the land reform law. However, the reforms 
could not remove landlords in the Korean economy. Japanese land reform in the 1910s 
enabled the landlord class to maintain their position more firmly.37 During the period of 
U.S. military government rule, the land reform redistributed the farming land to peasants 
who were suffering from economic hardships after the liberation. However, those two 
 
36 Migdal (1988) did not articulate the developmental state discourse but his ideas can be likened to the 
developmental state theory because the developmental state should be based on a strong state and a weak 
society, and should be autonomous and capable.  
37 The Korean landlord class was particularly rice-based, backward-looking and non-entrepreneurial. 
Thus, they remained small scale and did not develop extensive plantation agriculture as in Latin America 
(Cumings 1989). 
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land reforms were not effective. The substantial land reform was accomplished by 
Syngman Rhee’s regime to give peasants a carrot and get political support from them 
during the Korean War and in the 1950s. This action prevented the formation of a 
powerful landlord class creating only a vast number of peasants who held small lots of 
land. There were a small number of industrial capitalists, but they were heavily 
dependent upon state subsidies during Syngman Rhee’s regime, since the Korea economy 
was relying on international subsidies (Lee Dae 1986).  
Institutional approaches to explain the developmental state in Korea were used by 
some scholars like Evans (1989; 1995) and Johnson (1987). The institutional 
characteristics of the Korean state can be summarized in the term embedded autonomy 
(Evans 1985). Highly selective meritocratic recruitment customers and long-term career 
rewarding traditions created a high level of organizational capability and brought 
members’ commitment to the organizations. This condition gives the state a certain kind 
of "autonomy," which doesn't mean a state separated from society. The embeddedness in 
a set of social ties provided the state with institutionalized channels for the continual 
negotiation of goals and policies. Evans particularly focuses on the roles of the state 
owned big company, Pohang steel. Under the military regime, the state apparatuses were 
filled with bureaucrats who graduated from the military academy and some prestigious 
universities in the nation. Particularly, the Economic Planning Board (hereafter EPB), 
created to implement the Five-Year Economic Plan, was instituted by the president and 
could have the most talented bureaucrats. EPB in fact followed the example of the 
Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The EPB played the single 
most important role in the process of Korean industrialization (Johnson 1987). Yet, 
bureaucrats and technocrats in the EPB, as well as in other state bureaucrats established 
close relationships with an especially private business group called Chaebol' based on 
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pseudo-familism like education, hometown, and family backgrounds and so on (Park 
Young 1984).38 Kang (2002) pronounced this situation to be crony capitalism in which 
state bureaucrats and business elites were connected through personal ties largely based 
on educational and hometown backgrounds. 39  These close ties, despite their 
disadvantages, contributed to the rapid economic development of Korea, in terms of 
transaction cost. This embeddedness is, however, very complex in South Korea. In South 
Korea, the state has had a very close relationship not only with Chaebol but also civil 
society. The state was very intertwined with civil society. The rapid economic growth of 
the ROK was achieved by the embeddedness of the state with civil society through 
AMOs. This embeddedness is related to Fox’ study on synergic relationship between the 
state and civil society (Fox 1996). During the economic development period, the state 
developed state infrastructural power and used it for economic growth. The Saemaul 
Undong gave the state a spacious room to intervene rural lives of peasants. The 
Federation of Korean Trade Unions also presented the state for controlling power of the 
labor sector with the established Hankooknochong cheje (the Federation system). The 
roles of AMOs were to mediate individuals, civil society with the state to develop state 
infrastructure power. 
The state in Korea took active a role in planning industrial transition, mobilizing, 
allocating the necessary capital, and channeling the activities of private corporations in 
certain ways. Many scholars view ROK as different from other Asian state in terms of 
being strong state and weak society. Amsden and Cumings each explain the origins of 
strong state with the historical background. Amsden (1989) argues that "a strong state in 
Korea was the outcome not of policy choice but of a long process of social change". He 
 
38 Paik Nak Chung (2005) terms this structured corrupt relation unsustainable development.  
39 The crony capitalism climate in Korea caused the 1997 economic crisis, was the developmental model 
that Park Chung Hee created.   
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used three dimensions of social change: historical, political, and institutional. The key 
historical bases of the strong, developmental state in Korea were the legacy of a 
centralized state under Japanese colonial control (Cumings 1981; 1997). The Japanese 
colonial government was highly centralized and efficient in extracting social resources 
through institutional capacity and coercive ways, while also creating a very over-
developed state in Korea (Alavi 1972). This over-developed state remained during the 
postwar period and was soon revived by USAMGIK. On the contrary to most Koreans’ 
desire, American occupation reinforced the authoritarian and anticommunist state which 
Japanese colonial domination raised in Korea, thus giving the Korean state sufficient 
coercive capacity to silence other social groups that had different interests in the state 
(Choi Jang 1993). This state despotic power was strengthened through the Korean War 
and became the basis for the developmental state during the economic development 
period.  
 
2.3 Image of the State: Necropolitics, Terror and Fear 
The developmental state discourse in Korea is meaningful in terms of the national 
legitimacy of the Korean nation. Economic growth in South Korea and the failure of 
economic development in North Korea distinguished the South from the North. To South 
Koreans, the North Korean image reminded them of rural, undeveloped, awkward, and 
pitiable people (Grinker 1998). As soon as economic development in South Korea 
strengthened the superiority of South Korea in the struggles of the social system: 
Capitalism vs Communism; Political Democracy in the South vs Inherited Dictatorship in 
the North, it was not unusual to say “South Korea is to have historical legitimacy rather 
than North Korea” (Lee Byoung 2003). When Korea was relieved from the Japanese 
colonial domination, the legacy needed to be removed, and it was the most urgent duty of 
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the Korean nation. However, compared to North Korea which wiped it out thoroughly, 
South Korea revived the apparatuses of the colonial government of Japan and recruited 
most of those who collaborated with Japan and the colonial government. Therefore, at the 
first stage, the historical legitimacy of Korea was a property of North Korea due to 
eradicating the legacy of the colonial ruler rather than that of South Korea. But after 
ROK’s rapid economic growth, it won legitimacy in the Korean nation by becoming a 
wealthy and strong state both in economy and in military, respectively. The economic 
development of Korea left unification as an unfinished national duty.  
Besides the development state theories, the terror and fear that South Koreans had 
at that time are important to understanding why they accepted the national project and 
mass mobilization. As a war machine, the state’s feature is distinct. Mbembe (2003) 
points out the contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of death, the 
“necropolitics” profoundly reconfigure relations among resistance, sacrifice, and terror. 
He illustrates that the contemporary characteristics of the state by analyzing the 
necropolitics. War, terror, violence, and sovereignty are the characters of the 
contemporary state. The violent state character, an important element of necropolitics, is 
related to the state border, or territory. Inside of the territory, the state has a right to kill 
any state person or citizens, while outside the territory it has the right to wage war against 
“Other.” At this time, the state, in the name of “police operation,” criminalizes the 
“others” and kill them (Agamben 2000). During the Korean War, many Koreans were 
killed. People in South Korea realized and identified the state with violence and cruelty. 
Terror and survival were the main topics among Koreans during the Korean War. After 
the war and its truce agreement, the state continued to play upon threats of invasion from 
North Korea. The estimated four million casualties were a substantial proportion of the 
thirty million Koreans (the total sum of both North and South). Mass killing done by the 
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state power, the police, actually illustrated some characteristics of necropolitics and 
means without end (Agamben 2000; Kim Dong 1997). 
If there is another Korean War, it would lead to the demise of the Korean nation. 
Anticommunism and antiNorth Korean Communists beyond the Demilitarized Zone 
(hereafter DMZ) became a means of propaganda and an ideology to bind the South 
Koreans. North Korean Communists were seen as betrayers of the Korean nation. And 
the South Korean government became the only heir of the Korean nation. The 
Communist government is depicted as an enemy of the South Korean capitalist and 
liberalist government as well as a turncoat to the nation. In this definition, as Mbembe 
said earlier, history, geography, cartography, and archeology have been used. Mbeme’s 
necropolitics is important because it furnishes the space and the basis for the state to 
create a new national identity based on anticommunism and to bind South Koreans into 
subjects of one nation. Kim Dong Choon (1997; 2000; 2002a;2002b) has been interested 
in civilian massacre by the state and rightist militias during the Korean War. In his works, 
the state has another face that it killed civilians in the name of national security without 
any restriction. Also victims of the state violence have not spoke out their past 
experiences because they still worried about the state’s punishment. On contrary to 
victims, offenders are very proud of their past violence (Kim Dong ; 2000; 2002b). After 
the Korean War, especially 60s to 80s, official record of death by illegal state violence 
are 431 and 76 are missing (Cho Hee and Cho Hyun 2002).40 
  
 
40 The number of death by the state violence was done under the military dictatorship including Park’s 
regime (1961-1979) and Jeon’s regime (1980-1987). This number is officially accepted by a state apparatus 
which was established by a law to compensate victims for state’s wrong deeds in 2000 (Cho Hee and Cho 
Hyun 2002). 
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2.4 Citizenship 
It is time that this study investigated citizenship in the context of the national state 
to understand national subjects. The citizenship concept is very close to a discourse of 
“national subject.” The state in the modern era needed to create their own citizen in order 
to mobilize social and economic resources when the state faced continuous wars (Tilly 
1975). However, in general, the Korean historical experience was different from the 
Western European experiences in the period of forming a national state, in that South 
Korean citizenship was accorded by liberation from Japanese colonial domination and 
articulated by the state, particularly one separated regime of the Korean nation. In the 
process of getting a political legitimacy, citizenship was nationalized as a concept in 
South Korea, in precise terms of the Republic of Korea. Of course, some specific 
background of Kookmin (national subjects) will be explained in the following section of 
this chapter, during the Korean War in terms of mobilization of resources by the state. In 
addition to this, Brubaker’s citizenship discourse is very accessible in explaining the 
similarity between this national subject concept and citizenship (1992). In both France 
and Germany, even though they had different nationalist feature of citizenship with blood 
and the state centric, respectively the ultimate goal of citizenship in both countries 
created a new nation of the state and member by dissolving local communities and 
traditional communities into new members in new borders of the state. 
Most citizenship theories start with the conceptualization of citizenship by T. H. 
Marshall (1964). He articulated the citizenship concepts of civil, political, and social 
rights based on class concept. Civil rights developed in the eighteenth century during 
which individual rights were secured and protected such as liberty, freedom of speech, 
equality before law, and, the right to own private property. Political rights developed in 
the nineteenth century, when it was seen as important to ensure access of the working 
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class to the political arena. Social rights became a major component in the definition of 
citizenship in the twentieth century. Emerging from the challenge of solving the social 
inequality created by markets in capitalist society. While Marshall’s theory helps explain 
the evolutionary development of citizenship in the United Kingdom, it cannot be applied 
directly to the Third World. Because citizenship emerged from the long historical 
struggle against the pre-modern social structures and autocratic states by citizens, the 
characteristics of citizenship in Europe have been influenced by popular demands and 
organization. However, in the Third World, where people were emancipated from 
colonial domination, citizenship has been a top-down process imposed by the modern 
national state and the political elites of the newly emerging national states (Charrad 
2001). None of the three components of citizen rights were advanced by the South 
Korean state during the economic development period. Therefore, Marshall’s theory 
needs to be modified to fit the Korean situation because civil, political, and social rights 
in Marshall’s terms were at best formal rights whose substantive implications were 
ignored by the political elites of South Korea. The term, national subject, therefore, is 
available to explain what South Koreans got by their citizenship in the ROK. None of 
these rights of Marshall’s was given in a substantial way to South Koreans, only top-
down orders and calling to national subjects.  
 A more relevant use of Marshall’s distinction between the three types of 
citizenship is Mann’s (1987) critique of Marshall’s as being evolutionary and Anglo-
centric. In European history, citizenship evolved as a process of gaining individual rights 
during the formation of national state (Tilly 1975). It resulted from elites, yielding rights 
because of their weak position due to inadequate fiscal resources and of their low levels 
of support among the middle and popular classes (Tilly 1975 1990). Progress in civil, 
political and social citizenship depended on the strategies that ruling class elites 
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employed,, with respect to diverse interest groups: landowners, peasants, the bourgeoisie, 
proletarians, and the like. Mann outlines five viable strategies for the institutionalization 
of class conflict: liberal, reformist, authoritarian monarchist, Fascist, and authoritarian 
socialist. Even within these ones, such as the liberal regimes of the United States and 
United Kingdom, there are significant differences in how citizenship evolved. For most 
ancient regimes, the ruling classes could survive the onslaught of the emerging classes 
with a few concessions here and there, such as elections and parliaments devoid of 
content. Mann argues that authoritarian monarchism based on divide-and-rule and 
selective repression could have survived until today as a successful model if war had not 
resulted in the destruction of these regimes. In fact, geopolitics and war determined 
which models persisted after World War II: liberalism (the Unites States and Europe) and 
authoritarian socialism (the Soviet bloc). To Mann, giving rights became a strategy for 
consolidating the power of the elites, with social rights often preceding civil or political 
rights, as in the case of Germany at the end of the nineteenth century (Mann 1987).  
Also relevant to understanding the citizenship process in South Korea is the 
emphasis by Althusser (1971) on the state’s role in the making of a national subject. 
Althusser argues that the state is a very active agent and social structure in forming 
individuals to be subjects. Althusser said these ISA caused the production system in 
society to reproduce by making subjects participate in the current production system. 
Subjects cannot recognize the alienating power in the capitalist production system due to 
the ISA’s influential power. The subjects are individuals made to take note of and act on 
(interpellation) ideology, whose concrete forms are realized in the Ideological State 
Apparatuses (ISAs). The subjects, caught in a quadruple system of interpellation, are 
inserted into practices governed by ISA rituals. Through ideologies, which were created 
by the state and the ruling class of ROK, individuals are transformed into subjects, after 
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being atomized. By being interpellated, the individual is posited as an objective being 
within the social web. In the name of the state, the individual became structured as a 
bearer who contains the social structure (Althusser 1979). In the end, individuals became 
national subjects in ROK by the state’s calling.  
Because of the mix of traditional and modern elements in both economy and 
society, the development of citizenship in developing countries depends on the particular 
combinations between social structure and types of social power. Charrad (2001) shows 
that women’s rights were institutionalized and protected by political elites in three 
northern African and Islamic countries: Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. Political elites 
and national founders wanted to weaken the tribunals controlling power over society and 
tried to reduce their capacity to control individuals in each country. The introduction of 
women’s rights became a litmus test in assessing the power balance between the social 
ruling classes and the state’s political elites. Although social conditions around South 
Korea were different from three North African countries, where social ruling classes were 
destroyed during the Korean War, South Korea took a similar path in constructing 
citizenship and its rights, which were granted by the political elites who governed and 
legislated law at the beginning of national state formation. After the Korean War, formal 
citizenship was institutionalized by the state. This institutional approach is not strong 
enough to explain the formation of national subjects in South Korea. Because the process 
of citizenship formation in South Korea was another facet of detaching a part of one 
Korean nation, the theoretical investigation of the development of citizenship in South 
Korea must pay attention to identity and solidarity.  
Therefore, my use of the citizenship concept includes the issue of identity, which 
is part of the dialectical relationship between exclusion and inclusion of people. One 
imagined community (Han Minjok: the Korean nation), which has been regarded as one 
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single nation since 2330B.C was formed into two quite different national states. Volpp 
(2002) analyzed the relationship between the identity issue and the role of formal rights 
protected by law. According to Volpp, citizenship consists of four distinct discourses: 
citizenship as a formal legal status, citizenship as rights, citizenship as political activity, 
and citizenship as identity /solidarity. Citizenship is a form of inclusion (Volpp 2002). At 
first, the state (Republic Of Korea) tried to make the state and society legible in order to 
centralize people and society and mobilize social resources for waging a war against 
North Korea. Particularly during the Korean War, the state carried out land reform in 
order to create the basis of modern capitalism and to transform the South Korean 
economy into a modern one. State legibility is a condition of manipulation (Scott 1996). 
The South Korean government tried to improve state legibility by depending on physical 
forces. The existence of a national subject, who followed orders from above, was 
necessary to make state legibility high and strong. Then the state could focus on the 
national development project. However, efforts to make dutiful subjects out of South 
Koreans failed. The state did not internalize and domesticize South Koreans with the 
values of the separate regime and republic of Korea. In the history of the creation of 
citizenship in South Korea, making South Koreans into citizens through internalization or 
domesiticization was necessary. The issue of identity emerged at this point. Therefore, 
before Park’s regime for 18 years, the Korean nation identity was strong enough for any 
regime to be incessantly concerned with its political legitimacy, which the separated 
regime from the Korean nation should get in the end.  
 
2.5 The Nation  
To understand the Korean nationalism, we should start at grasping the concept of 
the nation. Weber sees the “nation” as a different political community from the state. The 
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nation is a political and culturally structured community in which one specific element 
like language or blood cannot determine the formation of that the community (Weber 
1978). He added one more point about the nation and state issues -- making state 
discourse is a job of politicians. However, articulating national ideas related to cultural 
matters is a job of the intellectuals, like sociologist to Weber. A German scholar, Otto 
Hintze, also saw that the state and the nation were different (Hintze 1973).41 In the end, 
in the early modern era, the nation ideas are not included into the state area but rather into 
culture and volatile issues. To scholars in the nineteenth century and twentieth centuries, 
the nation and the state were regarded as different concepts to scholars in terms of 
original arenas like politics, society, or culture (Weber 1978; Hintze 1973). However, 
unlike Weber or Hintze, the nation was soon understood within boundary of the state, 
because the nation concept has taken a very clear but traditional position regarding 
inclusion or exclusion, like citizenship has taken.42 
The process of internalizing a group of people can be well analyzed by 
Alexander’s concept “citizen and enemy.” Actors are not intrinsically either worthy or 
moral: they are determined to be so by being placed in certain positions on the grid of 
civil culture. When citizens make judgments about who should be included in civil 
society and who should not, about who is a friend and who is an enemy, they draw on a 
systematic highly elaborated symbolic code (Alexander 1991). People sometimes in a 
border of the nation tend to identify some with their friends or other with their enemies 
among a group of people within their political borders (Volpp 2002). Alexander (1992) 
 
41 Hintze (1973) sees the nation as different from the state, which is close to society. To Hintze, society 
and nation are very differentiated. He said, “When we speak of society, we have in mind the mutual needs 
and the system of communication that tie people together-the sphere of economic life, material culture, and 
external civilization. …we have in mind a common ancestry, a community of language, morals, law, and 
religion, and on the higher stages of cultural development, the words of art and literature (Hintze 1973, 
155). 
42 According to Brubaker (1992), German’s case of state building is defined as the nation before the state 
unlike France’s case in which the state existed before the nation.  
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argues that a nation includes “citizen” and “enemy” at the same time, when he defines a 
nation as a being in which a nation is filled with people who either do not deserve 
freedom and communal support or are not capable of sustaining them.43 According to 
him, outside of a nation, members of a nation live in place of a nation together. Under 
these conditions, the state tried to internalize a different group of people. Therefore, no 
pure nation exists in the human world. To overcome impure nation issue and create a new 
nation, the state and the ruling class need a new ideology to conceal current class 
structure. The ideology of a pure nation is just a means that has been created by the ruling 
class for manipulating subjects. Although members of a nation at times do not want to 
include the unqualified persons in the nation, the distinction between the worthy and the 
unworthy is not real in a nation, because the distinction is just symbolic and a nation is 
also an “imagined community”, like Anderson (1992) defines. But in specific cases, the 
reality is different from the “imagined community.”  
Anticommunism was systematically created and rooted in South Korea after both 
sides experienced military conflicts for examples, the Korean War (Seo Joong 1994). 
Hatred against North Koreans and Communists had worked very powerfully toward 
creating a new nation in South Korea. The exclusion of North Koreans changed the target 
to South Koreans who opposed military dictatorship and demanded democratization in 
South Korea. There were only two choices permitted to South Koreans – to become a 
citizen of the ROK or to become an enemy (or marginal). After the Korean War, the 
former meant “living,” the latter meant “death.” (Hwang Byung 2005). During the period 
of economic development, the state continued to identify a minority of the population as 
inside enemies of South Korea. The state continued to call them (minority of Koreans) 
betrayers, pro-Communists, traitors of the Korean nation, or antiROK discontents. By 
 
43 P, 292 
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excluding these minorities, the state and its elites could mobilize the majority of South 
Koreans as friends and domesticize them as citizens of ROK. 
Anderson (1991) articulated the concept of nation as “imagined community,” 
because even thought the members of the nation will never know most of their other 
nation members, nation member feel other members with the same nation members. The 
nation is an imagined community, because, regardless of their class positions, the nation 
is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship by its members. Ultimately in the 
nation of the nation, for last two centuries and now, many people sacrificed themselves or 
killed others throughout the world. Anderson looks at the role of print capitalism in 
inventing the nation with nationalism (Habermas 1991). The roles of mass media based 
on the capitalism era were essential to create the nation through the efforts of the state. 
According to Anderson, therefore, a nation is a product of modernity by capitalism and 
the state. It is another false ideology but it has power to let people sacrifice themselves 
for their nation and gives legitimacy to kill other members of the nation or enemies of the 
nation in the name of the holy nation (Kwon Hyuk 2000, 2004; Park No 2005). In South 
Korea, the nation became a powerful means by which the state mobilized resources (Shin 
2005). In the First Republic of Syngman Rhee, the term Minjok was banned from use by 
the regime and instead Kookmin (national) was recommended, because it undermined the 
legitimacy of the South Korean government (Im Chong 2005; Lee Chi 2005). However, 
Park’s regime revived the nation again in Korea. Right after the military coup in 1961, a 
Major General Park Chung Hee announced that the military raised up to restore the 
Korean nation. After his early successful rule for 7 years, he created the Nation Education 
Charter Kookmin Kyoyook Hyunjang in 1968, which begins “We were born for the 
historical task in which we restore the Korean Nation.” The charter aimed at unifying 
South Koreans with anticommunism, democracy, capitalism and Korean nationalism by 
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educating every Korean in each level of educational institutions and creating a new 
nation of the Korean nation after reforming Koreans’ mindsets. But his concept of the 
nation and the state development was ironically borrowed from the Japanese imperial 
message for education. At this point, Anderson’s terminology is very useful to understand 
the shift of “Nation discourse” (Hwang Byung 2006).44 
  Im Chong Myung (2005) argues that the efforts of the ROK tried to make of the 
ROK a single nation state of the Korean nation from 1948 to 1950. He articulates the 
shift of the nation characteristic from a nation of blood to a nation of idea. The first 
Republic tried to change the meaning of Korean nation as a nation based on the state 
theory. The state tried to gain legitimate as an heir of the traditional Korean nation, while 
most Koreans wanted one Korean nation state, instead of the separate state. So the 
government of the South made ideology of a nation and a nation state. Also it tried to 
domesticize South Koreans and get support and legitimate. He pays attention to the 
differences between Minjok and Kookmin, although both terms are translated into “the 
nation” (Im Chong 2005). According to him, Kookmin means a political subject in the 
modern period and is highly state-centered, while Minjok was used to denote the same 
ethnic, racial entity. Furthermore, the Minjok undermined the legitimacy of the ROK.  
 
2.5.1 The distinction between “Nation” and “National” in Korea 
This research distinguishes between Kookmin45 and Minjok, even though Minjok 
and Kookmin are intertwined with one another and both related to the state. Minjok is 
 
44 Hwang Byung Joo (2006) said that the chart was very identical with Japanese emperor’s educational 
chart in nineteenth century.  
45 Kookmin, a national subject, originated from the Japanese colonial domination policy. The Japanese 
colonial government tried to transform Koreans into second ranked subject of Japan. In other words, Japan 
needed to make Koreans dutiful national subjects who should show their loyalty to the emperor without 
change, to mobilize social resources including human and material. 
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included to the concept of the nation, while Kookmin is close to the national subject 
context of the state, or formal citizenship, concept. Although nation can be interpreted 
both as Minjok and Kookmin in English, “Nation (members of a nation)” differs from 
“National (citizens of a state)” in Korean. This research accepts a Korean concept of 
‘national’ as Kookmin and a concept of ‘nation’ as Minjok (Im Chong 2005; Chae 2006). 
The state that emerged in the southern part of the Korea peninsula in 1948 will be 
identified with the institutionally national state. South Korea can be regarded as an 
institutionally national state form. Its institutionally national state characteristics were 
completed during the Korean War. However, the seeming institutional completion of 
national state formation did not mean the completion of a national state in the Korean 
peninsula since there was as yet no South Korean citizen (national subject for the ROK), 
only one Korean nation. The concept, “National” refers to the state and formal 
community, particularly the modern national state within the territories of the state (Tilly 
1992). ‘Nation’ is a different form of “national” in that the nation means “an imagined 
community,” the origin of legitimacy of nationalism, and an ideology created and 
alienated from the creator (Hobsbawm 1983). In the national state, the Republic of Korea, 
Kookmin is an important term. Since the first constitution set the term Kookmin in its 
first article, it has been used as a counterpart to Inmin (means people),46 a term for North 
Koreans (Lee Chi 2005).  
Hwangkookshinmin, which meant a dutiful subject for Japanese emperor, was 
created to mobilize Koreans and Japanese during the Japanese colonial period. Kookmin, 
as a national subject from the word became an important calling to the state. Japan 
changed the name of elementary schools from Sohakyo, meaning elementary schools for 
 
46 In the liberation politics, North Korea emphasized on Inmin (means people). By the people, of the 
people, and for the people became slogan of North Korea against South Korea who revived the colonial 
legacies and domination structures (Lee Chi 2005).  
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children, to Kookminhakyo, meaning schools for Hwangkookshinmin. Kookminhakyo, 
the name of elementary schools had been used until the 1990s. Lee Chi-Seok defines 
Kookmin as a word in which the state controls humans while Inmin emphasizes human 
rights. The usage of the word Kookmin (which is related to the anticommunism ideology, 
the separated system of one Korean nation state, and anti Korean nation concept), 
symbolizes an ideologically different separate national state in the Korean peninsula. It 
has been firmly rooted in minds of the South Korean people. The school system as an 
ideological state apparatus exercised its power of influence on Koreans, to make 
Kookmin work in their minds (Lee Chi 2005). 
 One Korean nation has existed for a long time, since 675, when Silla unified the 
Korean peninsula and built a unified kingdom. The nation has been close to ONE 
traditional Korean culture and history. But the national was created by the modern 
national state in 1948, when the ROK was built. After late 1960s, the state liked to use 
the term Korean traditional nationalism,47  whose use had been prohibited because it 
meant “reunification of the separated Korean peninsula”. On the contrary, President Park 
Chung Hee, when he needed a new political legitimacy, he introduced a new kind of 
nationalism which was close to the nineteenth century’s nationalism in which the Korean 
nation must build a strong and wealthy nation state, because of his weak legitimacy that 
got political power by military coup, changed twice the Constitution of the ROK to 
ensure the perpetuation of his dictatorship (Moon 2005; Park No 2005). President Park 
wanted to get an ideological mechanism to consolidate his regime and used nationalism 
and Korean style democracy based on nationalism (Park Chung 1970)48. That was the 
 
47 Korean traditional nationalism demands that the nation should form a single nation state.  
48 The book is only stored in the national library of the ROK in Seoul. According to many scholars, the 
book was written by President Park Chung Hee, but it was not published but only one piece is preserved in 
the library. The book is very close to what he had emphasized. Particularly, to prepare his permanent 
dictatorship, he continued to distinguish Korean democracy with other western democracy formats (Park 
Chung 1970).  
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moment nationalism emerged in the history of modern Korea. The state created a new 
kind of the Korean nation replacing South Koreans with national subjects of the ROK by 
inputting a new kind nationalism into Koreans. Along with it, the South Korean nation 
emerged again as only one pure nation in Korean peninsula, and succeeded traditional 
Korean nation and its values. At this time, North Koreans and their state were excluded 
and detached from one Korean nation. Nation and nationalism could not normally survive 
without their own political shell, the state as the concept of “National” (Gellner, 1983).  
Therefore, understanding the nation and the national in Korean and Korean 
history helps to grasp social psychological complexity of the distinguished Korean 
nationalism in the stateism context. In the next part, the Korean nationalism is being 
analyzed. Particularly, how did the formats of the Korean nationalism changed at the 
different political moments.  
2.5.2 Korean Nationalism 
Nationalism in South Koreans has changed its face over time through eighteen 
years of President Park’s rule. As in the early ROK after the Korean War, nationalism 
was one of the words banned by the state like Inmin (people).49 The early nationalism 
meant “one Korean nation” and symbolized an aspiration of Koreans to build “one 
modern state for themselves,” which meant overcoming the separated Korean peninsula. 
This was an influence of the colonial experience, which desired to build an independent 
state (Chae 2006). Therefore, political leaders who had established the separate regime in 
both sides, prohibited people from using the nationalism. However, the term changed its 
meanings and became popular when South Korea adopted new agenda to develop the 
Korean economy and rebuild a new and different Korean nation from the previous nation. 
 
49 Peaceful unification based on the Korean nationalism was prohibited and one famous politician was 
killed by the law, the national security and anticommunism law (Seo Joon 1997). 
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Korea’s nationalism can be divided into four historically different categories by period 
and by the characteristics of the ruling regime: first, colonial domination period; second, 
after liberation and before President Park’s emerging period; third, President Park’s 
ruling period; the fourth after 1980s, resurrection of old nationalism.  
The first and second nationalism periods show the past orientation that shares the 
same experiences based on same history and the ideas that Korean should form only one 
national state for one Korean nation. In those periods, anticolonial nationalism was strong 
in the first phase to get an independent position for the Korean nation (Chae 2006). In the 
second stage, political elites including ultrarightists and ultraleftists kept South Koreans 
from using the term Korean nationalism right after the liberation from Japan. This post 
colonial period had a characteristic of strong sentiment to build a single nation state (Jung 
Hae 1995). Most nationalists were centrists to unify the separated regime and to build a 
nation state (Yoon Min 2004). However, before and after South Koreans experiencing the 
Korean War, the Korean nationalism had another face, so called anticommunism. At this 
time, North Korea and communists were depicted as nation traitors because they waged a 
war against the Korean nation to build a strong communist state in the Korean peninsula 
(Lee Chi 2005; Kim Jung 2000; Kim Dong 1997). Ideologically, a formula, 
communists=nation traitors=international sociologists had been established by them (Kim 
Dong 1997). However, in most cases, anticommunism was emphasized without 
nationalism term, because nationalism demanded that South Korea try to begin to talk 
with North Korea for peaceful unification. 
In the third period, Korean nationalism became different from the previous 
feature. When there was a military coup by a Major General Park Chung Hee, some of 
liberal Korean nationalists as well as military junta who led the coup supported the coup 
because the coup announced renewal of the Korean nation (Kim Jung 2000; Park Jin 
 80
                                                
2005). The General and later President Park relied on strong nationalism of Koreans who 
wanted to become strong and wealthy (Moon 2005; Park No 2005; Kwon Hyuk 2004, 
2000; Jager 2003). President Park said that because the Korean nation was weak, it 
suffered from 923 times of foreign enemies’ invasions including colonized experience by 
Japan and we should build a strong and wealthy nation (Park Chung 2005, 1970; Kim Se 
1996).50 In the early period of his rule in the 1960s, Park insisted that economic 
development and modernization of the fatherland be pursued by the state and national 
subjects of the Korean nation (Kim Se 1996; Lee Woo 1990). The nation discourse of 
modernization and economic development changed a little, when South Korea started to 
build a perfect one man dictatorship in 1972, political elites needed a new mechanism to 
bind South Korean into one (Lee Byung 2003; Kim Se 1996). So-called, the Korean 
democracy discourse was emphasized in the name of the Korean nation. We should have 
a distinctive democracy which was different from western democracy. The Korean nation 
appeared in the front of politics. The spirit of the Korean nation from the splendid Korean 
ancestors like Kokuryo’s Manchurian rule, Silla’s Hwarnado, Admiral Lee Soonshin’s 
undefeated spirit were encouraged South Koreans to bear in their mind (Hwang Byung 
2006; Kim Se 1996).  
The time for the reemergence of nationalism in Korean history had come. The 
state became a creator of nation and nationalism in South Korea. Gellner’s definition, 
“nationalism is primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the 
national unit should be congruent,” may be useful for looking at South Korean 
nationalism (Gellner 1983). The Korean nationalism has changed its guises for a long 
time since the start of Japanese colonial domination. Nationalism, even though it has 
been created by the ruling class, the state and its elites, has existed in members’ mind in a 
 
50 Park Chung Hee’s writings were written in 1962 and 1963. These writing were re-published in 1970s 
and 2005. The titles of these books changed several times except the 1970’s book, Korean democracy. 
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nation. Particularly in the post colonial period, the Korean nationalism has had a strong 
impact on Korean politics in both North and South Korea (Shin 2006; Chatterjee 1999; 
Kim Jung 1999). The existence of nationalism cannot be denied in other countries either. 
Therefore, the strong dictator, President Park, even relied on nationalism of Koreans to 
keep his rule from collapsing. However, in this research, nationalism has a strong 
characteristic which the state creates and keeps. Due to strong initiative power of the state 
to the nationalism discoursem, South Koreans took their future as an alternative of 
prosperity instead of the past and their shared experiences (Sjoberg 2003). Now, 
“Koreans” means South Koreans, who live in the Southern Korean peninsula (Thongchi 
1997).  
2.6 AMOs and Mass Mobilization 
 There have been many AMOs and movements in South Korea. Most of them 
were created by the state and regime. This research shows the relationship between mass 
mobilization and the formation of the national subject building via AMOs. At first stage 
of AMOs, they were created by the dictator, Syngman Rhee and his ideologues to secure 
their political power by destroy enemies’ organizations and absorbing the remnants of 
enemies’ organizations. These organizations were used to strengthen the dictatorship of 
Syngman Rhee.AMOs in liberation politics after 1945 played their roles in securing each 
political group. Each political group that had its AMOs had a competitive advantage 
against other political groups. Syngman Rhee was strong enough to destroy other polical 
groups’ AMOs and keep his political power status quo after he being elected the first 
president of ROK (Seo Joong 1995; Jung Hae 1995). During his rule, AMOs were typical 
by AMO theory. Kasza (1995, 7) defines AMOs in follows:  
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An administered mass organization is a mass civilian organization created and 
managed by a political regime to implement public policy.  
-administered; external agencies of the regime define the AMO’s structure and 
mission and appoint its top leaders, who do not rise independently from within the 
organization.  
-the state will refer here to all institutions that make or enforce legally binding 
commands over society as bodies implementing public policy, AMOs are part of 
the state so defined, though public law does not always classify them as state 
agencies. The regime will refer more narrowly to the authoritative, decision 
making institutions of the state, including officers of a ruling party  
       
In addition to these, the AMOs’ main function is to implement state policy by the 
authoritarian regime (Kazsa 1995, 11). These AMOs are financially controlled by the 
regime. The structure of AMOs is very hierarchical and vertical to implement state 
policies (Kazsa 1995, 27). Kasza (1995) gives us the historical and theoretical answer 
articulating a means of mass mobilization in fascist and communist states. Kasza 
enunciates the concept of the AMO as follows: 1) The AMO’s principal purpose differs 
from that of the party and the interest group. Parties are launched to take over the 
government, interest groups seek to influence the government, and AMOs are forged to 
implement government policy. 2) The founders of AMOs have declared that they were 
building something different from a party or an interest group, and the regimes using 
AMOs have differentiated sharply between their ruling institutions and their subordinate 
mass organizations. 3) The original AMO model is the conscript army, another body that 
officials use to mobilize the masses in support of state policy. This AMO was a means of 
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the regime as vanguard groups and played its typical roles to mobilize people for regime 
security (Hong Yong 2000).   
However, unlike under the one single ruling party’s dictator, under the military 
rules of Park Chung Hee, AMOs changed its roles, which were replaced with economic 
development instead of regime secure. With ex-Japanese colonial officer experience and 
particularly, experience of military imperial Japanese mobilization ways, he created many 
AMOs in generating citizenship in South Korea, like Japanese military regime tried to do 
in School like youth organizations, male student union, college leagues etc., Industrial 
Sectors like a government-patronized unions and company workers organizations. Social 
sectors like women consumer organizations, the old organizations. The period of Park’s 
regime was the climax of the AMOs. The economic development unexpectedly 
strengthened the military regime.  
Seungsook Moon (2005) in her book Militarized Modernity and Gendered 
Citizenship in South Korea views Korean society as a gender discriminated society 
established and deeply-rooted in the process of mass mobilization for economic 
development, and national defense and security. Moon (2005) characterized the 
militarized modernity of South Korea as based on three related processes of sociopolitical 
and economic formation: the construction of the modern nation as an anticommunist 
polity; the making of its members as duty-bound “nationals;” and the integration of the 
institution of male conscription into the organization of the industrializing economy. 
Because of personal military background of Park Chung Hee, his AMOs advanced to 
economic development and must show their output.  
In South Korea, during the late nineteenth century and most of the twentieth, 
nationalist leaders imagined modernity primarily in terms of economic and political 
conditions, embodied in a nation that possessed an industrial economy and a strong 
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military (Park No 2005; Moon 2005; Park Chan 2002). The process of Korean national 
modernization depended on mass mobilization in the area of the economy and the 
military. During the economic development period, those two goals were articulated as 
follows: one was for overcoming poverty and the other was to build a militarily strong 
nation state against communist North Korea and the red alliances. To mobilize the South 
Korean populace, the state and elites tried to make a dutiful national subject, by using 
both disciplinary power and violent sovereign power. According to Moon (2005), 
national modernization projects were accepted by South Koreans, despite some resistance 
to military and dictatorship rule. She sees the combination of the state’s national projects 
with the populace’s willing participation in mobilization as a powerful means of success 
in the economic development. However, despite its success in economic development 
and military security, South Korean society made men and women differentiated 
subjects, because mass mobilization over the economy and military were carried out for 
men and women were marginalized.  
Moon (2005) sees the populace’s willing participation through military 
conscription as the structural base for substantive citizenship. Moon regards conscription 
as a legacy that transforms nationals into rights-bearing citizens. Her definition of 
citizenship is not merely a legal status conferred by the state but rather democratic 
membership in the body politic, characterized by the human struggle to give substance to 
that formal status. From this perspective, a citizen is an actor willing to struggle and 
negotiate to obtain and protect rights and fulfill obligations and is thereby able to redefine 
the substance of entitlements and obligations (Moon, 2005, 12).  
However, because Moon deals with the whole period of citizenship development 
in South Korea from 1960 to 1987, and sees the development from dutiful nationals to 
rights-bearing citizenship, instead of formal citizenship, this research excludes the time 
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period after 1980. Gender issues will not be dealt with in this paper either, because this 
study investigates nondiscrimination between men and women in mass mobilization. My 
research will accept the process in which mass mobilization forms the relationship with 
the populace’s willing participation under the state’s spell for modernization of economy 
and military. We need to see what kinds of means were created by the state in order to 
mobilize the South Korean populace.  
The development of AMOs in South Korea was related to the fact that most state 
elites and founders were Japanese colonial officers or pro-Japanese Koreans during 
imperialist Japanese colonial domination. Even the former president, ChungHee Park, 
was a Japanese army officer. Most Koreans’ AMOs were created by following Wartime 
Japan’s prototype. The definition of AMO in this paper is that the state organizes and 
manages it, while subordinates are to participate voluntarily, to implement state policy. 
Voluntary participation in the national development projects, at first stage, was enforced 
by the state. The state appointed the CEOs of AMOs, and also funded the AMOs. CEOs 
and local managers tried to mobilize people into AMOs. Distributions to AMOs were not 
equal, because the state wanted AMOs to compete with each other. In fact, the state did 
not possess enough resources to distribute equally to all kinds of AMOs. CEOs of AMOs 
tried to mobilize some people more than others to gain larger governmental subsidies. In 
the Saemaul Undong, many local units competed with each other to obtain governmental 
support. AMO types differ by area: integrated National AMOs; Producers’ AMOs; 
AMOs by Residence; AMOs by Age; Women’s AMOs. South Korea brought in AMOs 
from Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Wartime Japan (Kasza 1995). There were AMOs 
types such as, the National Assembly of Corporations, Syndicates, Industrial Patriotic 
Society, Neighborhood groups, Villages and District Associations, Youth League, 
Women’s Associations and so on. Particularly, the fascist Italian corporatist AMOs in 
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South Korea was possible due to the economic situation in which the state maintained 
close ties with their own nationally owned conglomerates that dominated the economy 
and selectively encouraged the growth of dynamic export sectors (Roberts 1995). These 
types were derived from Nazi German, Fascist Italy, and wartime Japan (Kasza 1995).  
 
3. THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATIONAL STATE IN SOUTH KOREA: WAR AND THE 
STATE 
 
Human beings have tried to eliminate war on earth because of its destructive 
characteristics. Despite their many efforts, however, they could not eradicate it. Why 
does war continue to occur on this plant? Another face of war that shows a different 
function and output provides a good answer to this question: the creative function -- that 
is, function that makes a new social order (Smith 1983). War can be creative as well as 
destructive. In this paper, I will pay primary attention to the creative function could 
(Porter 1994; Smith 1983; Sckocpol 1979).  
In this paper, the creative function of war is defined as allowing the formation of 
national state, which resulted from continuous war for five hundred years in modern 
Western history (Tilly 1975; 1992; Downing 1992). This research will examine the 
relationship of this Western experience to that of the Korean War. This work on the 
Korean War is a suitable case to examine the creative functions of war. The Korean War 
was so tragic that it could not be remedied easily for many Korean people and their 
society (Jun Sang 2000; Kim Dong 1997). However, it gave South Korea a great deal of 
profit -- namely, it allowed South Korea to form its own national state in the southern 
area of the Korean peninsula. South Korea and its political elites became the chief 
beneficiaries of the Korean War (Kim Dong 2003, 1997). The ROK acquired despotic 
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power to an extent that no political dynasty in Korean history had ever had before (Palais 
1975; Cuming 1981). It was surprising that South Korea which had to face strong social 
resistance from the below, became a strong political entity (Kim Dong 2005; 1997; Jun 
Sang 1991)).  
In this chapter, I will analyze the causes, process, and consequences of the Korean 
War. Most of the actors, such as the Left, the Right, and Nationalists responded to their 
maximum profit in the process of occurrence and execution of the Korean War (Boudon 
1998; Kim Yong 1996). The formation of the strong national state was an unintended 
consequence that resulted from the behavior of the various actors. This paper has a very 
distinctive feature in that it analyzes the period of the peace talks, from June 1951 to June 
27 1953 -- when the truce agreement was signed. That period was regarded as time of the 
formation of a national state in South Korea. What happened in this period?  
 
3.1 Background of War and Outbreak of War  
There were two causes of the Korean War. One was class conflict and ideological 
antagonism; the other was external elements caused by the conflict between the U.S. and 
U.S.S.R (Cuming and Holliday 1988; Cumings 1981). Internal variables stemmed mainly 
from external variables, since the internal cause, “the class conflict,” was a consequence 
of the Koreans' response to maximizing their profit from the presence of foreign forces; 
Japanese colonial domination, the Soviet Union in North Korea, and the United States of 
America in South Korea. The starting point of the Korean War should be traced to 
Japanese colonial domination period (Kang Jung 1996; 1990). The roles of both the 
USSR and the USA exacerbated the structured, conflict between the Leftists and the 
Rightists, of the propertied and the poor, the landlords and the peasants, and nationalists 
and betrayers. Internal and external causes were inter-wound with each other. Because 
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the internal causes are regarded in part as results from the responses to external 
provocation, both causes will be examined  
3.1.1 The Structured Causes and the Foreign Powers of the Korean War 
The foreign forces such as Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union were 
the main actors that established the schismatic and dichotomous structure of Korea. 
Before that time, despite the seemingly centralized state of kings, the aristocracy and the 
state in the Chosun dynasty competed with each other for available surplus resources, 
with the latter often losing out (Palais 1975; Cumings 1981; Kim Dong 1998a). The 
bureaucratic structure developed was adapted to aristocratic needs and therefore lacked 
the autonomy of the economic ruling class such as landlords and aristocrats. The 
extractive capacity usually associated with strong states was also low. The landed class 
used the state to perpetuate itself and to dominate the peasant masses (Cumings 1981; 
Palais 1975).  
However, the Japanese differed greatly from the Chosun Dynasty in terms of 
being a modern national state (Kim Dong 1998a. During the initial colonial period, the 
colonial state aimed at increasing the amount of state taxes and establishing a strong 
despotic power (Cumings 1981; Mann 1988). The policies that the Japanese colonial state 
executed for thirty six years in Korea were divided into two goals. First, they aimed at 
establishing a strong state in Korea, and wanted to easily and thoroughly dominate 
Koreans and crack down on any independent movements by using their despotic powers. 
To achieve this, the colonial state arranged for 246,000 Japanese in public and 
professional positions, and 63,000 Koreans in similar but subordinate ones that can be 
recognized as part of the colonial apparatus (Cumings 1981). There were about 230,000 
regular Japanese military troops and 3,212 police offices with 35,239 in 1936 (Kim 
Young 1994).  
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The colonial state also tried to build an infrastructure, such as many long 
railroads, roads, and forms of transport, for speedy, efficient, and effective 
communication, movement, and easy control of Koreans. The colonial state's efforts 
seemed to have been very successful, since the colonial state was too strong for any other 
groups in Korea to lead Koreans to build an independent state. The despotic power of the 
state apparatuses was so established that it persisted throughout the period, even in the 
political situation after liberation.  
The colonial state pursued a separate policy for easier rule of the Koreans (Kim 
Dong 1998b; Back Wook 1987). This was aimed at making Koreans become more 
antagonistic to one another. To achieve this goal, the colonial state decided to give 
selective incentives to the landlord class, who had been the economic, political, and 
cultural rulers in the Chosun dynasty (Cumings 1981). The Land Survey was the most 
powerful means of the colonial state. Officially, the Land Survey aimed at settling 
modern property rights in Chosun society. However, the Land Survey destroyed the 
moral economy that guaranteed the peasants’ right to live and cultivate their landlords’ 
lands. Modern property rights gave much more scope to landlords, while peasants lost 
their rights. This change was a big reward to landlords who had lost their political rights, 
and made the landlords satisfied with the new government (Kim Dong 1998b). Despite 
the fact that not all landlords cooperated with the colonial state, most became supporters 
of Japan and traitors to the Korean nation during the entire period of Japanese colonial 
domination. The colonial state mainly used the way that gave the security of economic 
profits to landlords. Even though landlords were deprived of their political power, they 
could acquire strengthened property rights (Kim Dong 1998b).  
There was no reason to resist the colonial state for most landlords. Therefore, they 
supported both explicitly and tacitly the colonial state (Back Woo 1987). Because of the 
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high rent of tenancy, most tenants became impoverished, and class conflict between the 
peasants and the landlords became worse (Kim Dong 1998b; Cumings 1981). As a result, 
the conflict between Japanese and Koreans seemed to be diminished. Instead, the class 
contradiction between the landlords and peasants increased to a greater extent than did 
the national conflict between the Japanese and Koreans. During the colonial period, class 
conflicts were very strong, and only mixed with national conflicts with the Japanese. This 
conflict structure later decisively determined the emergence of separated regimes in Both 
North and South Korea (Cumings 1981). 
Another external cause was the occupation of the Korean peninsula by the USSR 
and the USA. After liberation, foreign armies came into the Korean peninsula and made 
national divisions worse. The United States Army government ignored most Koreans’ 
hope, which was to eradicate the remnants of Japanese colonial domination and establish 
one Korean nation state (Lee Sung 1985; Jun Sang 1997).51 The USAMGIK would not 
listen to most Korean's voice, and even ignored it. Furthermore, it revitalized all the 
apparatuses of the colonial state for efficiency of control and domination by recruiting 
ex-officers as supporters to eradicate the leftists who were trying to control the Korean 
peninsula (Cumings 1981; Jun Sang 1991).  
The USAMGIK (United States of America Government in Korea) outlawed leftist 
militias on November 13, 1945, by the twenty-eighth military administration law as soon 
as they marched into South Korea. The U.S. military government created the Office of 
the Director of National Defense and established a Bureau of Armed Forces, which could 
control the Bureau of Police Affairs, while they ignored the voluntary militia 
 
51 In 1946, USAMGIK conducted a opinion poll by distributing 10,000 survey sheets in South Korea 
(particularly Kyungkido, and Seoul areas). It got 8476 respondents. Respondents’ job was various like 
laborers, business men, company owners, student, professionals, housewives and so on. Lee Sung Kun 
(1985) and Jun Sang-In (1997) analyzed the opinion poll because the research was only one social 
consciousness poll in 1946. Moderate was regarded as nationalism. 70 percent of respondents supported 
only one nation state.  
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organization of the people’s government (Kim Young 2005; Lee Won 2005). The 
military government recruited officers for the National Guard of Korea from the newly 
established military language school and the Korean constabulary training center, where 
former Japanese officers, Manchurian officers, and student soldiers, who were 
conscripted by Japan, and finally liberation army soldiers who fought against Japan, 
participated. Most officers of the National Defense Guard were Japanese and Manchurian 
officers (Ahn Jin 1987). Former President Park graduated from the Manchurian military 
officer training center and the Japanese military academy. The emergence of the Japanese 
colonial collaborators frustrated Koreans who had suffered from Japanese colonial 
domination and rallied them against the U.S military government (Cumings 1981; 1998). 
What was worse, the higher officers in the Bureau of Police Affairs consisted mostly of 
Japanese colonial police officers. Since law enforcement officials such as police had 
close everyday relationship with South Koreans, the sense of frustration that Koreans felt 
was strong (Ahn Jin 1987).52 Table 2.1 shows that the USAMGIK revived many of the 
colonial state repressive apparatuses. Most officers of the police bureau were from 
colonial law enforcement ranks.  
The existence of Japanese police officers provoked the Korean people who 
suffered due to the police, during the early period of the U.S. military government, which 
wanted to keep Rightist forces stable because Communist and Leftist forces were so 
strong that they could not control them (Cumings 1981; Ahn Jin 1987; Jin Tuk 1987).  
Most of the policies that the USAMGIK enacted and executed brought resistance 
in South Korea, because the policies were to neutralize Leftist and Communist groups 
whose policies were supported by South Koreans (Jun Sang 1991; Kan Jung 1990; 1996). 
 
 
52 Ahn Jin said that colonial police officials suppressed independent movement of Koreans and exploited 
Koreans during their time, but they still ruled them in the name of anticommunism and pro-Americanism.  
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Table 2.1 Distribution of Japanese Collaborator Police Officers  
 
          
          Rank Total in 1946 Collaborators Proportion (%) 
 
Senior superintendent general 1 1 100
 
Directors of police 8 5 63
 
Chiefs of bureau 10 8 80
 
Police superintendents 30 25 83
 
Police captains  139 104 75
 
Police lieutenants 969 806 83
 
In particular, in economic policies, the USAMGIK suppressed the autonomous 
factory running movement of workers and land reform by peasants in rural areas. The 
Harvest Uprising which was caused by USAMGIK’s rice levy policy in October 1946, 
was an example of resistance by South Koreans (Cumings 1981; Kim Dong 1998a).53 
The USSR's policies were welcomed by North Koreans, because their policies in North 
Korea focused on the removal of Japanese colonial legacies.54 The USAMGIK effort 
succeeded in, because the Lefts and Communists had lost most of their power bases, and 
many communist leaders went to North Korea to evade arrest and death. When relations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union became serious in 1947, the USAMGIK 
and the Right, not nationalists, began to try to build a separate state in South Korea. 
                                                 
53 Kim Dongno (1998a) said that peasants’ resentment against colonial police officers played a role in 
expanding the uprising to other regions.  
54 Of course, there were a lot of resistances by North Koreans in the early period of the USSR’s rule. 
Particularly, land reform, currency reform, suppression on religion against Christians let many North 
Koreans move toward the South. They consisted of most ultra Rightist groups members and played their 
big roles in the Korean War and building the ROK (Cumings 1981; Kim Dong 1997).  
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Finally, by ignoring the hope of most Koreans, the Right Wing and the United States 
decided on a general election (Im Chong 2005; Kang Jung 1996).55  
Foreign forces and the structured political situations gave Koreans restricted and 
different choices. But most Koreans could not help selecting the only choice, which was 
given by foreign powers and structured by internal class conflicts. The foreign forces 
looked for supporters in Korea. Each inner force tried to associate with such foreign 
forces, because they knew that if they did, their profits would be maximized (Seo Joong 
1997; Lee Chi 2005). Maximization of their profits meant maintenance of their properties 
in colonial domination and the securing of hegemony over the process of building a 
Korean Nation State in the arena of Liberation Politics (Kim Yong 1996). The 
consequences converged into a deep, irrevocable divided structure between Left and 
Right, and between North and South in the Korean Nation, and occupation of each by 
foreign forces. (Jung Hae 1995).  
3.1.2 Outbreak of the Korean War  
It is undeniable that the initial Korean War was intended to reunify the 
temporarily divided Korean peninsula (Park Myung 1996; Kim Dong 1997; Cumings 
1981). Politicians tried to examine all probable solutions for the political problem, the 
reunification of the separated Korean peninsula. When politicians realized that their 
political efforts were in vain, the leaders of North Korea decided to wage a war against 
Syngman Rhee. As a final means of state policy, war was decided (Clausewitz 1997).56 
At the beginning of the war, the South Korean army was defeated by the North Korean 
 
55 The resistance against the general election began in Cheju island and people did not participated in the 
election, but join in underground election run by Communists and North Korea. The Fourteenth regiment’s 
revolts in 1948 was an example of this resistance (Im Chong 2004).  
56 War is a last means of political leaders who want to implement their policies (Clausewitz 1997). 
According to this definition, the Korean War broke out, when political elites of North Korea realized they 
did not have any means to unify the divided peninsula.  
 94
army and over 90 percent of South Korean territory was conquered. However, the United 
Nations decided to intervene in the war and sent their own troops, most of which 
consisted of the U.S. army. During the early period of the war, Syngman Rhee decided to 
hand his rights of supreme command and all other rights to control the Korean army to 
the U.S commander in chief. After summer, the allies made a strong counterattack and 
conquered over 80 percent of the North Korean territory. Some battalions of the Korean 
army even reached the Yalu River. However, when the Red Chinese army invaded and 
attacked the allied forces, they retreated and gave up Seoul one more time in December 
1950. The following year, the front line was stuck around thirty eighth parallel. Also, the 
Communists and the U.S. allies began peace talks, which lasted for three years. In the 
end, on July 27, 1953, the Korean War ceased by armistice agreement between the U.N. 
allied forces and the Communists, after four million casualties, including both military 
soldiers and civilians. Killing the other side only because it had a different ideology 
definitely marked the Korean nation for life. Koreans were forced to select one calling, 
particularly Inmin (means people) or Kookmin (means national subjects) (Hwang Byung 
2000; Lee Chi 2005).  
 
3.2 Consequences of the War: the Emergence of a Strong State  
How did the state become strong in the most serious way, where all Koreans 
suffered from massacres, during the Korean War? First, the stabilized demarcation line 
gave the state room for intensifying its power and capacity. Secondly, most substantial 
resources were delivered from abroad like the U.S. and other international organizations. 
This paper will pay attention to the period of truce conferences from July 1951 to July 
1953. If the battle lines became stable, the state would reshuffle administration personnel 
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and the apparatuses would be stable. The state would make policies for waging war 
against others and extracting resources. The state could control the moving of the 
populace, and acquire the power of domination throughout inner battle lines. If the battle 
lines were destroyed, the state would be threatened with collapse (Skocpol 1979). 
Therefore, extraction was impossible. The state had to aggregate the power of the state 
for defense as well as for extraction. The stable battle line was a necessary condition for 
extraction. According to this propensity for war, even though there were many bloodshed 
battles, South Korea could mobilize a number of resources, such as conscription, 
taxation, and any other material needed to assist the U.N. forces (Tilly 1990). People 
could not resist the state's effort, because if they did, they were regarded as Communist or 
Left, meaning “death, or hardship” (Kim Dong 1997).  
However, if the ROK extracted such enormous resources only from domestic 
areas, South Korea could not maintain itself and thus win the war, as in the experience of 
France during the eighteenth century and Russia during the twentieth century (Skocpol 
1979). In the last two years of the Korean War, there were the increased number of 
soldiers casualties, regardless of the highest war costs, including the most consumption of 
ammunition (Lee Dong 1982; Lee Dae 1986; Ryuw Sang 1990).57 The total number of 
soldiers in the Korean and allied armies steadily increased. Even though there was a 
severe cost including human beings and materials, the ROK could get rid of internal 
enemies such as leftist guerillas, communists, and soldiers of the defeated North Korean 
army. What gave the ROK the ability to be strong under such severe conditions? It was 
the United States, which was the most powerful and wealthy state in the world.  
 
57 According to Ryuw (1990), KIA (Killed in Action) numbers in April 1953 was 4,343, in May 7,570, in 
June 23161, and July 29,626. Artillery shells used in those months were seven million. Lee Dong (1982) 
said that number of newly recruited soldiers in 1953 was 360,000 from 250,000 in 1952. This number 
showed the numbers of soldiers who fought in battles.  
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During the early part of the Korean War, Syngman Rhee gave his supreme power 
to control the Korean army to General Douglas McArthur a commander of the U.N. 
Allied Army on July 1, 1950. Due to the surrender of this commanding right as president 
of the ROK, Syngman Rhee, actually got a chance to strengthen his political regime and 
the ROK could get rid of internal enemies. What was more, most materials needed for 
executing the war were from the U.S. and other sources of international assistance, except 
for the costs of running the ROK. As a matter of fact, the South Korean government 
could afford to focus on strengthening itself thorough inner political and economic 
control. South Korea could eradicate the fifth column, communist guerrilla, and even 
moderates, and then, integrate the people under the leadership of the Right (Seo Joong  
1997; Lee Dal 1989).  
There were three characteristics of the ROK caused by the consequences of the 
Korean War. Political consequence means the increasing and monopolization of violent 
forces, consolidation of political groups, and independent and differentiated bureaucrats 
from other organizations. Social consolidation means the nationalization of Koreans, 
most of whom began to regard themselves as members of the ROK, not as the Korean 
nation, who must build one country. Liberalism and anticommunism integrated Koreans 
ideologically into national subjects. The international consequence revealed that the ROK 
greatly depended on foreign forces, especially the United States. 
  
3.2.1 Political Consequences: The Rise of National State 
The political consequences of the Korean War are said to be about the rise of 
violent state apparatuses and the ROK becoming a single power to control the whole 
southern part of the Korean peninsula. At the administrative level, the ROK could run the 
government for the war domestically. During the war, many of the Korean officials who 
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were once Japanese colonial assistants increased their power to run the government. The 
expansion of the ROK military force had two features: qualitative growth and 
quantitative growth.   
 
1) The Rising of Military Forces 
In qualitative growth, it was the military sphere of the state that expanded greatly 
through the Korean War. The process of expansion of the military forces began with the 
integration of military. Initially, the Korean Army had consisted of complex groups that 
were not in harmony with each other because their backgrounds were too different such 
as communists, ex-Japanese, or ex-Manchurian troops, private militia of the Right, and 
Kwangbokgun (Kang Mun).58 The military force was not united and integrated at all by 
any national values of the ROK such as capitalism, anticommunism, nationalism, and so 
on.  
In this situation, the government used the army for cracking down on 
demonstrations and communist rebellions (Jun Sang 1991). Many communists in the 
military forces even rebelled against the ROK, in fact against Syngman Rhee’s regime 
(Im Chong 2005). Political leaders and U.S. military advisors realized that they had to 
purify the Korean military forces by removing the Communists and the Leftists. During 
the Korean War, the Korean army continued to purify the military forces by 
anticommunism, capitalist and nationalist propagandas. The military also considered 
themselves the saviors of the ROK, who had successfully defended their homeland from 
the communist allies. They were easily consolidated by such self-confidence. Thus after 
the Korean War, many military and police officers knew very well the dire consequences 
 
58 Kang Mungoo (1991) reveals complexity of the Korean army founders’ background and their past 
experience. Kwangbokgun was Korean Army for Independence during the colonial period in mainland of 
China. 
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of losing the war. They and their families would be doomed to be killed by the People’s 
Army or the Communists because of their past, in which they had collaborated either 
with Japan or later the U.S. military government. North Korea and the Communists 
would kill members of the military, police, and their families through the People’s Court, 
if they conquered South Korea. Therefore, South Korean military and forces desperately 
resisted and took revenge against the Communists and North Koreans during the war.  
Antagonism appeared when each ideological side killed the others. This antagonism had 
an influence on integrating themselves into one entity. Through military purging, new 
found self-confidence, and hostility to the communists, they were easily integrated in the 
name of the ROK (Kim Dong 1997; 2005; Choi Jang 1990). 
There was also a quantitative augmentation in the repressive apparatuses. When 
the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, the People’s Army easily broke down the 
Korean army, defeated them, and finally conquered Seoul in three days. The size of the 
army shrank from 98,000 soldiers before the war to 28,000 in the first month of the war 
(Lee Dong 1982). The policy-makers tried to revive the collapsed the Korean army. It 
was an urgent problem to solve, since political and military leaders realized that even 
with the collapsed Korean army, they could not campaign effectively against the People’s 
Army. Conscription was a very effective means of controlling human resources in re-
building the Korean army again because other costs were born by the U.S. and other 
international allies. Especially as the battle line was stable near the thirty eighth parallel 
after the summer of 1951, the South Korean government could conscript the young 
without limits by the conscription law (Ryuw Sang 1990).59  
 
59 In fact, the conscription law was established in 1949, but the Korean government budget was inufficient 
to manage it. So it was postponed. However, after the army was defeated and dissolved by the People’s 
Army, the government used the law and constructed the massive Korean army, which had 600,000 soldiers.   
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The efforts to expand the military forces were highly successful. South Korea and 
the U.S were able to mobilize their violent forces longer to crack down on the remnants 
of a defeated People’s Army and local Communists. The military force, associated with 
the police force, succeeded in eliminating most inner enemies. One of main tasks of the 
police lay in finding and arresting communists and traitors or supporters of North Korea 
during its domination for three months. The ROK policy that aimed at eliminating the 
opposite was very effective and successful, for it terrified Koreans and forced them to 
support the South Korean government and all its policies absolutely. The merciless 
violence of the state apparatus and rightist militias killed, without any court or trial, 
Communists and even innocent civilians about whom there was any doubt (Kim Dong 
2000; 1997; Jun Sang 2000). 
 
Table 2.2 Quantitative Improvement of the Military Force of South Korea  
 
Year 1950
 
1950 (fall)
 
1951
 
1952 
 
1953
 
Personnel 98,000
 
150,000
 
250,000
 
360,000 
 
666,500
 
Combat divisions 8
 
0
 
10
 
10 
 
20
Sources: Lee, Dong Hee, 1982, Theory of the Korean Army system, p.424-426.           
Table 2.3 Numerical Changes in the Police Force (Unit: person, million, %)                          
 
Year 
 
1947 
 
1949
 
1950
 
1951
 
1952 
 
1953
 
Personnel 
 
27,000 
 
48,010
 
63,427
 
63,427 
 
50,731
 
Budget (won) 
 
10.6
 
30.3
 
56.7
 
107.3 
 
516.7
Proportion of  
budget (%) 28.7 17 10 18.2
Sources: Lee, Hanbin, 1969, Historical Analysis of Korea, p.151/  
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Both table 2.2 and 2.3 show that the South Korean forces increased rapidly during 
the war. Many budgets of the military forces were not in the charge of the South Korean 
government. However, the Korean government was responsible for the national police 
force. The proportion of the budget used for the police was very high. It is clear that, if 
there had been no help from the U.S and other international countries, the South Korean 
government could not wage war against North Korea and its allies. One more important 
point is that it was relatively easier to use the police force which was controlled by the 
government to strengthen Syngman Rhee’s dictatorship during the war. The police forces 
consisted mostly of pro-Japanese colonial police officers had been the victims killed by 
the Leftists and Communists, during the North Korean domination period. The police 
forces, therefore, cooperated aggressively with Syngman Rhee’s dictatorship during the 
war and later, when they retook most of the South Korean territories, and went on to kill 
many Communists, Leftists, and who had also collaborated with North Koreans.   
 
2) The Rising of the Administration 
The Korean administrative officers also increased their capability, not only to 
extract social and economic resources, but also to manage the state’s resources for 
example, budget and finance. The administrative officers tried to extract taxes, grain, and 
human resources from the peasants, putting in practice their power to manage the budget 
independently throughout the Korean War (Lee Dae 1987). When they were Japanese 
colonial sub-officers, they had been under the control of Japanese colonial bureaucrats. 
At that time they simply carried out orders from the Japanese officers in high positions 
without any independent autonomy.  
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After being emancipated from colonial domination, collaborators with Japan in 
the civil services were recruited into the administration by the USAMGIK. As members 
of the Korean government since 1948, the administrative officers hardly controlled the 
ruling class landlords because many congressional representatives were landlords. The 
opposition and majority party of parliament possessed a large amount of land in South 
Korea. Hence, the bureaucrats could not easily make policies against the profits of the 
landlords, the economic ruling class. But in 1951, the South Korean government 
reformed the land system in order to win over peasants who were the majority of 
Koreans. Because North Korea had successfully reformed the system of established 
landlords in favor of the peasants, many peasants initially were in favor of North Korea. 
In order to remove the power basis of the opposition party and extract more resources, the 
government carried out the land reform (Lee Dae 1987). The South Korean government 
in this way succeeded in winning the peasants over onto its side, although the reform of 
land system was incomplete and insufficient. The reform allowed the government to 
extort tax and food more efficiently than before the War. This reform gave the state 
administrative officers autonomy from the economic ruling class, as well as winning over 
the peasants.  
The ROK bureaucrats tried to increase the budget during the war with such 
measures as the Temporary Spot Goods Tax, the Special Account by Employing Relief 
Goods, and funds from international help (Tilly 1981; 1975).60 In this way they could 
reduce the inflation that War generally created at the expense of the peasants' hardship  
Why did the Korean peasants not rise against the government? Contrary to the 
experience of seventeenth century European history, when there were many peasant 
 
60 The temporary spot goods tax differed from Western European states’ exploitation to mobilize 
resources. In Europe, peasants must pay their tax by the cash, while the Korean tax should be collected by 
goods particularly rice and other grains (Lee Dae 1987 and Tilly 1981). 
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rebellions because the state burdened the peasants with heavy taxes and other measures 
(Tilly 1981), 61 and despite heavy taxes on peasants, the improvement of the state’s 
capacity to control and rule people kept the people from rebelling against the state. 
Before the Korean War, there were many peasant and communist rebellions, such as the 
Harvest Rebellion in October 1946 (Cumings 1981; Kim Dong 1997). The state now 
could easily break down the organizations of Communists and peasants through its 
improved despotic power. The state obtained its legitimacy by viciously wielding the 
sword (Tilly 1985).62 During the Korean War, peasants were mere objects that the state 
mobilized.63  Peasants, in the end, became subjects who had nothing for themselves. 
Consequently, there were no anti-state individuals or groups. These circumstances led 
peasants to conservatives, who followed orders from the state (Skocpol 1994).   
 
3) The Consolidating Political Elites United by one Ideology 
The political arena was strengthened by Syngman Rhee's dictatorial position. The 
steps he took were to remove Communists and dislodge the moderates and the 
nationalists in other political groups. Most Socialist parties, Socialists, and Communists 
actually were not removed from the formal arena of South Korea until early 1948 by 
violent state means. Some of them went underground to evade arrest, while others went 
to North Korea across the thirty eighth parallel. When the general election was held, most 
neutral nationalist parties did not participate in it -- only the extreme Right parties. 
Therefore, the National Assembly in general consisted of the most extreme Rightists. 
However, even though the extreme Rightists established a Constitution of the ROK, the 
 
61 P.138 
62 p.186 
63 There were a lot of guerillas who remained in the South Korean territories after the People’s Army was 
defeated in September 1950. So, many riot police regiments were mobilized to get rid of local guerillas, 
including local communists and leftists. They killed many Koreans without just trials. This aggressive 
termination of communists brought peasants and other Koreans’ active support (Kim Dong 2005; 1997). 
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document included many socialistic articles and clauses about the economic system. It 
meant that the contents of the Constitution were greatly influenced by a more social 
ideological base, or economic democracy.64 The political elites were not united through 
the ROK nationalism or Syngman Rhee’s ideology (Son Ho 1990).  
During and after the war, moderates and nationalists were both regarded as 
enemies of the ROK. He succeeded in removing his all political enemies and secured his 
strong position by integrating political groups, bureaucrats, and military forces under his 
leadership power. Of course, the constitution was transformed into a liberal and capitalist 
document, with the exclusion of socialist principles. The economic system followed the 
principles of liberal capitalism while social consciousness changed into liberal democracy 
and anti-communism or anti-socialism, needless to say in the political arena.  
 
3.2.2 Social Consequence: Making South Korean Citizens   
Before the Korean War, the political and ideological terrains obviously had some 
propensity for the Left and moderate nationalism, which the Korean nation could use to 
build into a single nation state in the Korean peninsula. During the early period of 
domination by the USAMGIK, although it tried to alter this, the situation did not change. 
Many Koreans resisted the military authority's policies, and even some regiments of the 
South Korean army rebelled against the government. 
 For example, two examples showed the ideological characteristics of the Korean 
people. The Left and the neutrality accounted for seventy four percent of respondents in 
the USAMGIK survey in 1946, and about seventy percent of the respondents answered 
that they thought socialism was more suitable than capitalism for Korea as an economic 
 
64 In 1946, the USAMGIK conducted a social consciousness opinion poll. According to the poll, seventy 
percent of respondents (8476 respondents) indicated a preference for the socialist economic system (Lee 
Sung 1985; Jun Sang 1997).  
 104
                                                
system (Lee Sung 1985; Jeon Sang 1997). According to another survey of social 
consciousness by the Association of Chosun Newspaper reporters in 1947 (Choi Min 
1985), seventy percent of respondents answered that neutral political groups should be in 
charge of efforts to unify Korea, and the parties of the extreme Right (Syngman Rhee) or 
the extreme Left (Park Hunyoung) must be excluded in the arena of negotiation for 
building a single nation state. The fact that most Koreans possessed an ideological 
tendency toward socialism appeared to prove hopeful because while the Soviet Union’s 
military authority Socialist policies were in general well received and welcomed by most 
North Koreans, the United States policies faced desperate resistance from Koreans (Choi 
Min 1985).65  
After the Korean War, however, everything changed. There were no Communists, 
no pro-Communists, no Socialists, and no pro-socialists in the territory of South Korea. 
What happened in South Korea during the Korean War? The answer consisted of four 
categories: the efforts of South Korea to change the ideological terrain, North Korea’s 
failure in the occupation policies, a change of population (many people coming from the 
North), and the effects of the conscription system (Kang Jung 1990).  
1) On the efforts of the state 
The state tried to change the ideological terrain by using both stick and carrot 
strategies. First, the state and militias of the Right Wing killed many people at their 
convenience who were suspected as traitors, or collaborators communist guerrillas. 
 When the North Korean Army defeated the South Korean Army, during the 
initial War, the Korean Army and the police forces killed about 300,000 of the 
 
65 The Soviet Union’s policies in North Korea were welcomed by low classes but Christians and landlords 
resisted. After failure of the resistance by them, majority of Christians and landlords moved to the South 
(Kang Jung 1990).  
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Bodoyunmang66  throughout the whole peninsula, wshen retreating from the front to the 
South (Choi Jang 1990; Kim Dong 1997; 2005). When the South Korean Army 
reoccupied the lost territories, they killed about 100,000 of the remaining defeated North 
Koreans, traitors to the South, or local communists, even good people without any trial or 
with formal trials (Cumings and Halliday 1988; Jun Sang In 2000). 67  The state 
encouraged those rightist militias and its army killed people legally and illegally. 
Thus, the Rightists could freely kill people, who they disliked, regardless of 
whether they were Communists or not. Furthermore, when the joint military forces with 
police forces operated to crush armed partisans, they uprooted most villages near the 
mountains and killed most men, who might shoot South Koreans or be likely to be 
partisans. Guchang-gun and Sanchun-gun in Kyungsangnamdo, Ilsan in Kyungki-do are 
examples of massacre by the Rightists and the Korean Army (Kim Dong 2000, 1997; 
Kang Jung 1996). Since there were no firm criteria to distinguish communists from non-
Communists, militia or officers in charge of trial killed or punished people at their own 
convenience (Kim Dong 2000). Genocide by the militia of the Rightists and the violent 
apparatuses of the state made Koreans very unpredictable, thus forcing most Koreans into 
active support of South Korea and the United States. Because of fear of death, most 
Koreans had to exhibit that they were not Communists, but supporters of the ROK by 
sending their children to the Korean army or by actively participating in the ROK’s 
policies (Lee Chi 2005; Kim Dong 2997; Jun Sang 2000). When Koreans realized that 
North Korea could no longer conquer South Korea, they had to follow and yield 
absolutely to South Korea and the United States. 
 
66 Bodoyeonmang consisted of ex-Communists or ex-Leftists who changed their ideology. Bodoyeonmang 
was established by a prosecutor, Oh Je-Do who thought that ROK needed a good propaganda association in 
ideological battle in 1949 (Park Won 1989; Choi Jang 1990) 
67 Halliday (1988, 148) reveals the number from a source of the U.S. embassy and documents.  
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However, it is neither efficient nor effective to integrate people by using violent 
means. For this reason, the state tried to use the ideological apparatuses of the state 
(Althusser 1972). In order to do this, the state controlled the education system, used mass 
media such as radio broadcasting, newspapers, and pamphlets (Lee Chi 2005). The 
religious segment of the state also played a role in planting anticommunism. Most of 
these were from North Korea. The roles of Christians including Catholics were important 
because religion gave a divine legitimacy to anticommunism (Kang In 1998; Roh Chi 
1998). The state intensified education of anticommunism from children to adults. It 
removed Red (leftists or communists) teachers, introduced an instruction system for 
educating about anticommunism, distributing pamphlets of anticommunism, and praising 
capitalism, liberalism, democracy, and enforced anticommunism education in elementary, 
middle, and high schools as well as at universities.  
The content of ideological textbooks that students studied showed mainly the 
communists’ cruelty, immorality, and anti-nationalist. With anticommunism education, 
the state infused anticommunism and patriotism into Korean by using social symbols and 
rituals (Lee Chi 2005). Students and common people should memorize the dead who died 
in the battlefields, participate in social rituals for the dead, and visit a national cemetery 
and so on.  
2) Failures of North Korea in Domination Policies  
The second element resulted from the failure of the North Korean occupation 
policies. The first failure was from revenge against the rich, rightists and members of the 
state. When the People’s Army conquered most territories in South Korea, they first tried 
to uproot the Rightists and officers of the state by using Peoples' Trials. Before and 
during the Korean War, many local communists and ex-Communists were killed by 
South Korea in the process of removing the Left. The survival of family members of the 
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deceased took their revenge on the Rightists or officers, and the propertied class. Anyone 
except peasants and laborers was regarded as an enemy of Communist society. Brutal 
retaliation and People’s Trials terrified South Koreans, making them hostile to 
communism and socialism.  
Another failed policy stemmed from problems of the resource extraction. Because 
the U.N. forces thoroughly bombed the North Korean army, the People’s Army suffered 
from poor supplies, and many logistical needs. Hence, the North Korean government 
made policies to extract immediately in the fields, namely, self-subsistence on the spot of 
the resources. The People’s Army bothered most peasants. North Korea lost the support 
of South Koreans due to these many failures. The South Korean government used these 
situations as propaganda against North Korea. South Korea's propaganda and North 
Korea's failed occupation policies were well matched with each other in consolidating 
South Koreans in the name of anti-communism (Kim Dong 1997; 2005). 
3) Change of Population  
The third cause lay in the change of population distribution. Before the Korean 
War broke out in 1950, many North Koreans went down to the South to evade the social 
reforms imposed by the communist regime (Kang Jung 1996; 1990). They had lost all 
their property and were threatened with death. Hence, they could not help escaping from 
North Korea to the South. North Korean refugees showed the most antagonism toward 
communism. During the Korean War, North Koreans who came to the South included 
Christians, landlords, the propertied, pro-Japanese Koreans, the young Rightists and so 
on (Kang Jung 1996).  
Christians in particular played an important role in symbolizing communism as an 
evil and liberal democracy as good. The young Rightists became high ranking military 
officers, and then important and strong power groups. Besides these groups, many North 
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Korean refugees also voluntarily mobilized themselves for propagating anticommunism 
(Seo Joong 1997).  
4) Effects of the Conscription System 
The fourth cause was the institutionalization of conscription in Korea. Even 
though it was enacted in 1949, the state could not afford to introduce and sustain it, due 
to its poor budget. But when the Korean War broke out, the government brought into 
practice the conscription law with the help of the United States. During the Korean War, 
especially from July 1951 until the date of the truce agreement in July 1953, many young 
Koreans were conscripted and then sent to the battle lines (Ryuw Sang 1990), where 
many of them died. Familism had been very strong force from the beginning of Korean 
history (Park Young 1996). Hence, if a member of a family died in battle, a bereaved 
family would hate the enemy, the Reds (Mosse 1990). Additionally, the fact that a soldier 
had participated in a battle to fight against the Reds was a certified check, which could 
secure him or his family from suspicion of communism. From that time to the present, all 
young Korean men have the obligation of military service imposed on them. The 
institution of conscription made a great contribution to form nationalization of South 
Korean.  
South and North Koreans revenged wrong with wrong. They killed each other in 
retaliation. Therefore, each side moved toward securing itself by following its ideological 
beliefs. As a result of the population moving and the change of population distribution, 
the battle line near the thirty eighth parallel became an ideologically dichotomous line 
and symbolized the separated Korean nation. The South Korean government tried to 
integrate South Koreans through making them members of the ROK. Anti-communism, 
liberal democracy, and capitalism also became ideological devices for nationalization.  
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3.2.3 International Consequences: Approval and the Dependent State 
As an international consequence of the Korean War, South Korea and North 
Korea were approved by each ideological “club.” The system of communism was 
approved in North Korea, and the system of capitalism was ratified in the South. The 
Korean War made ideological antagonism serious. Full-scale antagonism and the 
beginning of the Cold War saw a new realignment of the state system, between 
Communist states and Capitalist states. The United States and the Soviet Union sharply 
confronted each other in the process of the Korean War settlement, so-called beginning of 
Cold War. The war was a consequence of that confrontation, and simultaneously made 
the intensified South Korea confrontation as a member of the club which represented 
liberal capitalism and North Korea became a member of a club, too, but of another 
international system (Tilly 1975).  
South Korea's case was distinctive in the process of modern national state 
building, compared to other Third World countries and western experiences. In most 
cases of the formation of national states, Third World countries showed that the social 
groups, confronted by the state were inclined to align with foreign forces (Migdal 1988). 
As a consequence of this cooperation, the state became weaker, and the society stronger 
than the state. However, the situation was different in South Korea. Foreign forces 
cooperated with the state in pursuing their interests. In the Korean War, even though 
there was such extraction and violent genocide (Lee Dae 1987; Kim Dong 1997), South 
Korea as a national state became stronger than the society. That outcome was due to the 
fact that the U.S. and other international powers carried out the war against North Korea 
and the Reds with the right of controlling the Korean army. Thus, the South Korean 
government could focus on eliminating the inner red areas of South Korea, not the front 
lines of battle. The U.S. and other international powers gave the South Korean 
 110
government room to form itself by removing its enemies and dominating its own people 
by oppressive means.  
The international consequences of the Korean War were different from the 
experience of the Third World and the West, as well as similar to those, in that the ROK 
then belonged to a membership club (Tilly 1975; 1990).  
 
3.2.4 The Formation of a National State after the Korean War 
There were two main causes of the Korean War. One was the antagonism within 
the Korean Society caused by the established, structured class conflict. This division 
stemmed from Japanese colonial domination. Japanese policy-makers wanted to 
subjugate the Korea nation completely. Hence, they had overdeveloped state. There were 
many soldiers, police, and officers to dominate Koreans thoroughly. Furthermore, they 
selected the propertied and landlord class as supporters, while they excluded peasants and 
laborers. The other cause of the Korean war was the intensification of the Cold War 
between the United States and the Soviet Union on the international scene. The structured 
conflicts and the antagonism between the propertied and the poor-intensified as time went 
on, especially after two giant states conquered Korea. When politicians realized that there 
was no solution to reunification, they selected war as a last political resort (Clausewitz 
1998). During the Korean War, South Korea tried to extract and mobilize materials more 
than had been expected. In the course of its efforts, the state could raise its capacity to 
extract materials and control people. War has the characteristics of raising the state’s 
despotic and infrastructural power against its own society, because it must have 
information about society to extract money and other materials as well as subdue 
rebellions against the state.   
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Chapter 3 The Saemaul Undong 1: the Emergence of Modern Agrarian 
Subjects in South Korea   
1. INTRODUCTION 
The development of rural areas in Korea has been a problem for each successive 
dynasty and government for an extended period. Developing the rural economy and 
modernizing rural areas, which had long suffered from chronic poverty and, 
underdevelopment, were urgent for each administration. Each government always tried to 
develop rural areas and to stabilize its political status quo. Strengthening rural areas was 
the most urgent mission when new leaders seized power, because peasants were the 
majority of the Korean population, before the country was industrialized and modernized.  
Initially in the Republic of Korea, the economy had the charateristics of an Aid-
Economy in which foreign aids was strong enough to have an impact on the industries, 
especially the rural economy (Cumings 1987; Lee Dae 2002; National Council of 
SaemaulUndong 2003).  
The Second Republic government tried to boost the Korean economy and to 
overcome dependence on foreign aid by the Imports-Substitutes-Industrialization policy. 
But their program could not be implemented because the Second Republic overthrown by 
a military coup d’état did not last long enough to implement its economic policies by a 
military coup d’état. However, its economic policies were followed by the military 
interim government, because this also needed to obtain some legitimacy by overcoming 
rural economic hardship. When the coup d’état group seized power, they created a 
military revolution committee to rule Korea. This committee announced a military 
revolutionarly declaration consisting of six provisions. The fourth provision was 
concerned about the rebuilding the autonomous national economy (Kim In 1998). The 
military interim government began to propel the rural economy under the name of 
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restoration of the state (Kookga Jaegun Kookmin Undong). After being elected president 
of the ROK, Park Chung Hee launched two national projects to boost the rural economy. 
President Park, however, ultimately failed to achieve his goals, which generally aimed at 
developing the rural economy in the early 1960s, and concretely increasing peasants’ 
income in the mid late 1960s. 
Unlike other movements led by the state, however, the Saemaul Undong from 
1971 to 1979, illustrates one of the successes that peasants and the state achieved. The 
Korean people, including those in urban as well as rural areas, have also regarded it as the 
most successful undertaking in Korean history. Peasants who joined in the Saemaul 
Undong are still extremely proud of their participation. It is believed that Saemaul 
Undong is the most popular movement that the ROK has ever launched. Even though the 
Saemaul Undong was begun at a time when Korea sped up industrialization and 
modernization to full scale, it gave Park’s regime and the Republic of Korea strong 
supporters from rural areas.  
The Saemaul Undong began in unfavorable economic and social conditions in 
1970. The South Korean government was ready to focus on heavy-material and chemical 
industries after the success of the textile industry and the Import Substitution Industries. 
During the period of industrial emphasis, the state had insufficient resources to invest in 
rural development (Lee Won 2005; Lee Won 2002). Increasing migration to urban areas 
had made rural conditions and their surroundings worse and worse. Under these 
conditions, the state initiated the Saemaul Undong with scarce resources. Korean 
peasants aggressively participated in the movement by sacrificing themselves as well as 
officials including President Park. Due to limited resources, the state and Park’s regime 
could not help relying on propaganda to mobilize the masses. At this point, the state 
ideological apparatuses (such as mass media, religious institutions, and schools), played 
 113
                                                
an important role in mobilizing the people and planting national ideologies on Koreans 
(Althusser 1972). The Saemaul Undong, therefore, has the characteristics that the state 
used propaganda aggressively to mobilize Koreans and operate the state apparatuses 
efficiently as well as effectively.  
This movement was greatly successful in making modern Koreans accept 
economic development in the rural areas. The Saemaul Undong also contributed in a 
large way to the formation of national subjects -- in other words, “transforming Koreans 
into subjects of the Republic of Korea,” a dream of previous presidents of Korea, even 
though the movement could not succeed in developing the rural areas. What made the 
movement successful for years? What caused peasants and the Korean people to believe 
that the movement was successful and contributed to rural development?68 What were the 
roles of the state (the South Korean Government and former President Park Chung Hee)? 
Was it just a false ideology planted by the state? Then how and why do they still have its 
belief?  
 
2. THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND BACKGROUND OF THE SAEMAUL UNDONG  
In this part, the study will define the term, Sae Maul and will show the 
background of this movement. Particularly, it will investigate the reasons why the ruling 
class or political elites were interested in development of rural areas in the ROK unlike 
other developing countries. 
 
68 In 2006, the national information agency conducted public opinion research of Koreans. According to 
the agency, 19.7 percent of participants answered “Seoul Olympic in 1988,” 9.8 percent answerd “Helding 
World Cup,” and 9.3 percent answered “Saemaul Undong,” the question about proud historical events in 
Korean modern history (after liberation from Japan in 1945) of which they were most proud.  The 
Saemaul Undong reflected 9.7 percent and 9.8 percent respectively, in 1996 and in 2001. The Saemaul 
Undong was ranked in the opinion polls conducted by the governmental research (the Government 
Information Agency 2006). 
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2.1 Definition  
The term Saemaul is a word, which literally consists of two words Sea meaning 
new and Maul meaning a village in Korean. The National Council of the Saemaul 
Undong Movement in Korea (1999) added another meaning to the words: The term 
“Saemaul” was coined by the combination of ‘Sae,’ meaning “progressive renewal” 
based on past experiences, and ‘Maul,’ referring to regional and social communities. 
This Saemaul Undong was initiated by the Korean government at the national as well as 
at the regional rural level, as in other developing countries--such as the “back to village” 
campaign in Nepal, the “Samahang Nayong” in the Philippines, the “Adarashi Mura 
Ssukuri Undonu” in Japan, and the “Rural Reconstruction Movement” in Thailand (You 
Tae 1986).69 The movement was set for development of the rural areas, which were left 
behind in economic development during the 1960s.70  
This campaign was both a “live-well for rural area” crusade and a “spiritual 
revolution for peasants” drive. It is very hard to define the Saemaul Undong, because 
unlike traditional beliefs about the movement, the definition depends on people whose 
experiences differ. Although there is much literature on the Saemaul Undong, varying 
opinions and memories from both participants and researchers exist, Interpretation and 
analyses of the results of the movement are still controversial among scholars and Korean 
people.  
 
69 You Tae Young (1986) had studied these national movements before he worked for the Blue House in 
1972.  
70 However, the term Saemau literally differs from its definition, in which ideology, philosophy, and social 
meaning were added. Literally, Sae means ‘new’ and Maul means ‘community or village’. Tae-Yong You, 
who was a secretary of President Park Chung Hee and a sociologist, defines “Saemaul which means a new 
village or new community, and has come to symbolize the Korean nationwide movement to push 
modernization of rural communities (You 1986, 51)   
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Particularly, disputes between critics and advocates continue. Advocates generally 
tend to focus on the fact that the Saemaul Undong was a spiritual revolution movement to 
reform the peasants’ spirit. Advocates have tried to defend President Park Chung Hee by 
protecting the movement, regarded as the greatest achievement of President Park. Others, 
critics (sometimes including advocates), say that it was a “live-well” movement, which 
means increasing the income of peasants in rural areas -- including fishing villages -- who 
had suffered from chronic poverty for millennia in Korea history.71  
The government introduced three social values, which were expected to guide the 
Saemaul Undong and peasant participants: the spirit of diligence, self-help, and 
cooperation. These standards became symbols of the Saemaul Undong (National Council 
of Saemaul Undong 2003). The National Council of the Saemaul Undong defines these 
spiritual guides72 as follows: 
 
•Diligence is the spirit of looking afar, getting thoughts across broadly, and doing      
actions firmly. It means “sincerely working hard.” 
•Self-help is the spirit of doing my work by myself; realizing that my fate and 
future depends on myself, and doing the best in my efforts. Heaven helps those 
who help themselves. 
•Cooperation is the spirit of believing in the power of unity. When we unite as a 
whole, we can do much more than the simple add-up of each one. It is the spirit 
that cares for others first and encourages each other, and that shares with and 
 
71 Most critics see the Saemaul Undong as a well lived but failed movement, because migration increased 
and the debts of rural household’s increased in the end, although rural household income surpassed urban 
income for two years in the mid 1970s.  
72 Even though the values were to guide peasants in the rural developmental project, the government had a 
hidden reason to emphasize these values. When the government launched the movement, it could not afford 
to support all villages due to the limited resources. So many Saemaul leaders in the beginning of the 
movement should sacrifice them first and could have a strong power to lead people to donating their land 
and human resources (Oh You 2002; Park Jin and Han Do 1999).  
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helps each other and work and get over together. When we are diligent, we don"t 
need to depend upon others. When we are self-helpful, even heaven would help us. 
When we cooperate, there is nothing stopping us. "Diligence, Self-help, and 
Cooperation" are the spirit of invincibility which made a myth of success in poor 
Korea.    
These three moral values emerged from President Park Chung Hee’s desire for a 
revolution in humanity, or spiritual revolution that would provoke the peasants’ will to be 
wealthy. He emphasized this goal to succeed in developing and modernizing Korea. The 
spiritual revolution issue was the first priority Park Chung Hee addressed and making 
rural income better was the first national project, named Kookga Jaegun Undong (Park 
Chung 1961; 1962; Park Jin and Han Do 1999).73 Park Chung Hee depicted the essence 
of the Saemaul Undong as a movement for the spiritual revolution of peasants in addition 
to a live-well movement for rural lives in many of his speeches and writings (Park Chung 
1970). The Korea Institute for Local Administration (1999) defines the Saemaul Undong 
as a movement (Undong) to enlighten the Korean people’s spirit and improve their 
personal lives. This spiritual revolution or reform in humanity resulted in the creation of 
national subjects in Korea and succeeded in making a new nation that excluded North 
Korea and other Koreans. Therefore, the Saemaul Undong as a national development plan 
can be defined as a historical national project that made South Koreans -- national 
subjects of the Republic of Korea -- separated from the Korean nation.  
 
 
73 Park Chung Hee created a military committee to control Korea after the military coup d’état. He 
announced the Kookga Jaegun Choigohoiui (The National Supreme Committee for Nation Restoration) 
and its goals to modernize this country and develop Korean economy. At that time, agriculture was the 
main industry, which consisted of seventy two percent of the Korean population (Korea Statistical Office 
2006). Developing rural areas was the most urgent project that the military interim government faced (Kim 
In 1998) 
Figure 3. 1 Emblem and Flag of the Saemaul Undong  
 
Note: The yellow circle means cooperation, wealth, and unlimited capability. The green shoot and 
leaves means industry, self-help, cooperation, hope, and income. The wide trunk on this emblem 
symbolizes stability and prosperity (Saemaul Undong Joonganhoi 2003).  
 
2.2 Beginning and Development of the Saemaul Undong  
When natural disasters hit the Korean peninsula for three years in a row (1967-
1969), many peasants with poor irrigation systems suffered from droughts and floods. 
When President Park Chung Hee made an observation tour of flood damage in the 
southern provinces of Korea, he found one village that had recovered from the summer 
flood damage and had improved the village environment in 1969. The president asked the 
village leader what had happened there. He answered, “We were determined to make our 
village better than before in the general assembly of the village resident, if it is done, and 
then residents voluntarily participated in recovery jobs with passion and achieved the 
recovery plan and made the village environment better by cooperation.”74After one year, 
President Park presided over a cabinet meeting, which included all local governors and 
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74The Original Korean scripture is “기왕 마을을 복구할 바에야 좀 더 잘 가꾸어 살기 좋은 
마을을 만들어 보자고 마을 총회에서 결의하고 주민들이 자발적으로 협동하여 이루었다.” 
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majors, to overcome the drought disaster on April 22, 1970, and address his plan to 
deploy the Saemaul Kakkugi Undong (Kim Soo 1997; Jager 2003). He gave an example 
of voluntary self-support of the village in Shindo1-ri Chungdo-up in Chungdo-gun of 
Kyungsangbook-do at the meeting. The answer that President Park got from the Chungdo 
people in 1969 fit his long-held belief, which were that to achieve modernization and 
development by overcoming poverty in rural areas, the first thing to be done was to 
encourage an attitude shift of peasants -- that is, a peasants’ spiritual revolution.  
Officially the Saemaul Undong began in 1971 when President Park declared full-
out development of the Saemaul by promoting expansion to the national level of the 
Saemaul Undong and disciplining leaders of rural leadership at a meeting with governors 
and mayors on September 17, 1971 (Namubu 1981).75 Then began the biggest national 
development movement in which a total of 35,512 villages participated (Namubu 
1981).76 However, the first work of the Saemaul Unodng was begun on April 22, 1970, 
with model programs to change rural conditions and situations. The government 
distributed cement bags to all the villages (33,267 villages) in the winter of 1970.77 The 
Saemaul Undong was launched in rural areas nationwide at the outset as the 
“Constructing a better village” movement (Seamul Kakkugi Undong was the first official 
name). Even though it was not begun systematically and institutionally, the Saemaul 
Undong soon became a national developmental project beyond a rural one. President 
Park Chung Hee always checked the degree of achievement of the project goal in the 
Saemaul Undong and let Saemaul leaders and successful peasants speak of their success 
to the cabinet (National Council of Saemaul Undong 2003; Park Jin and Han Do 1999). 
 
75Today, shindori is an official origin village of the movement. However, Munsungdong in Pohang City is 
also regarded as an origin of the movement. In light of this research, this issue will be argued.  
76 The Ministry of Home Affairs (Namubu) published two types of books about the Saemaul Undong (data 
and information) in 1981.  
77 According to Namubu (the Ministry of Home Affairs 1981), the Distribution of 335 cement bags was 
decided in October of 1970, and the official beginning of the movement was 1971 ( Namubu 1981, 209).  
Led by Park Chung Hee who was inspired by the cases of both Chungdo-gun 
shindori and Munsung-ri in Kyungsanbook-do (a province in the southern part of the 
Korean peninsula) -- which will be mentioned in the latter part of this research -- the 
Saemaul Undong consisted of five development stages 78  (the National Council of 
Saemaul Undong 1999, 2000). 
 
Figure 3.2 Shindo-ri (left) and Munsung-ri (right) as origins of the Saemaul Undong79 
 
 
The three stages included the Foundation and Groundwork phase (aimed at 
improving the rural environment), the Proliferation stage (which the government led 
systematically and organizationally), and finally, the Energetic Implementation stage (a 
top-down movement run by the government. 
The first stage, Foundation and Groundwork (1970-1973), was the phase launched 
and inspired by the government. The main aim of this stage was the “Constructing Better 
Villages” campaign, inspired by two previous successful movement cases of 
Kyungsangbook-do. The government issued working guidelines for “Ten Projects for 
 119
                                                 
78 In this paper, only the first three stages will be dealt with.  
79 The left picture is a telephone card made in the 1980s to memorize the origin of the movement in 
Shindo-ri. However, the right one is also a stone in memory of the movement’s origin village, Kigyemyun 
Munsung-ri. Both are still disputing which village is the origin of the movement.  
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Constructing Better Villages” as a pilot program in order to achieve its goals. By 
improving the infrastructure of the rural villages, as well as rural living conditions, the 
Saemaul Undong was supposed to establish a base for increasing income and 
productivity. Financial support from the government was, however, not enough to satisfy 
all the peasants’ demands, because the government did not have enough financial 
resources. Furthermore, it had a strong characteristics that tested the peasants’ will about 
whether the movement would be successful or not. To be successful, the government 
introduced competition among the villages and decided to support only villages that had 
already shown success in their projects, of making their villages live better (Kim Soo 
2005; Park Jin 2005; You Tae 1986).  
 
Table 3.1 Village distribution percentage by three categories, 1972 through 197580                     
(Unit: %)        
Year Total No. Kicho Jajo Jarib Total (%) 
1972 34,665 53 40 7 100.0 
1973 34,665 31 57 12 100.0 
1974 34,665 18 62 20 100.0 
1975 35,031 11 60 29 100.0 
 
To ignite the peasants’ sense of competition, the government gave villages 
different names depending on their degrees of participation and achievement in 
environmental improvement projects: Kicho, meaning no achievement; Jajo, meaning 
self-help; Jarip, meaning self-support. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of village by 
                                                 
80 Park Jin Hwan (2005) compiled data from materials of the Ministry of Home Affairs published in 1980. 
Kicho means basic village. Jajo means self-help village. and Jarib means self-support village 
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categories and Table 3.2 shows the distribution of financial support from the government. 
Promotion from basic village, the low level, to self-help or self-support, higher level, 
became the aim of village residents. Promotion to a higher rank was also a matter of 
residential pride, because promoted villages would be able to get more support from the 
government. The table shows that the self-support villages received five times more 
governmental financial support as much as the average support all other villages got in 
1973. In 1972, there was fifty three percent of Kicho Maul (basic villages), but it 
decreased to eleven percent. The Jajo Maul (self-help) village rate increased from forty 
percent to sixty percent in 1975. This division of village level contributed to the peasants’ 
will to develop their villages for pride and for financial support.81  
 
Table 3.2 Governmental Financial Support and Investment Distribution82                             
(Unit: 1000 Korean won)
Classification  
of village 
Participated 
 manpower 
Governmental 
 subsidies Self-support Cash charge Projects
 
Average 1,948 499 2,217 257 31 
 
Basic 2,226 414 2,488 264 38 
 
Self-help 1,471 277 1,696 180 23 
 
Self-support 2,228 2,446 3,196 670 33 
Note: Korean currency 400 won=1 dollar in 1972  
 
The criteria by which each village was promoted to the Jarip Maul (self-support 
village) were ten items to prove that they had made their village better by such as 
                                                 
81 The center of public relation in the Saemaul Association said, “Turning green with envy” provoked 
peasants’ jealousy in rural areas.  
82 You (1986) recited this table from Ministry of Home Affairs (SaemaulUndong, Seoul: Ministry of 
Home Affairs 1973, 57).   
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achieving eighty percent of thatched roof replacements, making house walls better by 
eighty percent, making the twenty meter bridge better, remodeling the sewage and 
irrigation systems, raising a million won for village finances, and 140 won more per 
household, and so on. At the end, in 1979, the self-supporting villages made up 97 
percent (Yi Hang and Park Sup 1997; Namubu 1981).  
According to these two tables, after 1971 and 1972, the number of self-help and 
self-support villages increased and the governmental support concentrated on the self-
support villages. The competitive system helped the success of the movement. The 
government succeeded in inspiring the peasants’ self awareness and in letting peasants 
choose their own development campaigns. The government also fostered diligence, 
frugality, and a cooperative atmosphere among peasants. 83 The state used many 
ideological state apparatuses (such as the mass media, schools, family, law systems, and 
religious institutions) to do these jobs (Oh You 2002; Park Jin and Han Do 1999; 
Althusser 1972). With the experience of success, President Park prepared bigger national 
development projects for the future under the name of the Saemaul Undong.  
The second stage was Proliferation, from 1974 to 1975. President Park exhilarated 
by the success of the first stage, made the movement systematic and expanded the 
Saemaul Undong to the national level to include corporations, factories, and urban areas 
beyond the rural areas in both scope and function. In this phase, the state focused on 
increasing income by straightening rice field ridges,84 consolidating creeks, encouraging 
combined farming by operating in common working places, and identifying 
 
83 Advocates of the movement state that the first phase of the Saemaul Undong achieved greater success 
than had been expected due to the government’s strong commitment, the peasants’ active participation, and 
the social necessity for such a movement (National Council of SaemaulUndong 1999). 
84 The paddy ridges of land were not good to use for farm machines because ridges were full of twists and 
turns. It lowered the efficiency rate of using paddy lands too. Straightening ridges was important in that 
peasants would need to use farm machines in near future, scientifically and rationally. These projects were 
made for increasing the rate of the farmlands utilization, which was too low. The rate of utilizing farmland 
was 141.4 percent.  
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nonagricultural income sources. From a rural development point of view, rural household 
income at last became higher than the urban house hold income in 1976 (Namubu85 
1980; Park Jin and Hand Do 1999; National Council of Saemaul Undong 2002). This 
increase resulted from better rice productivity and a high-price policy for grains by the 
government, which introduced “Tongilbyeo” (a multiquantity rice seed) in the 1970s and 
encouraged peasants to use it. Sometimes the government wielded coercive methods to 
make them plant the rice seed. As a result of the efforts to increase productivity, the 
quantity of rice grew in the 1970s. Rice productivity was 3.14 tons per hectare in the late 
1960s, increasing in the 1970s to 4.46 ton per hectare86 (Nongrimbu 2003). Due to the 
increased productivity, Korea came close to solving its problem of insufficient rice 
supply and food supply (Park Jin 2005; Kim Soo 2002; Oh You 2003). The increase in 
rice productivity also resulted from an increase in the use of various natural and chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides (Yi Hang and Park Sup 1997; Nongrimbu 1977). 87  The 
elimination of starvation by peasants and other Koreans became a vital issue for both 
peasants and President Park, because freedom from hunger made peasants and other 
Koreans believe that the Saemaul Undong was successful and that the Republic of Korea 
would soon be wealthy.  
An important part of this period is that the state began to train Saemaul leaders 
and peasants through systematic education institutes. By this measure, the state achieved 
a measure of reform peasant attitudes. When the disciplined leaders and peasants were 
educated -- together with other higher officers, private company CEOs and even local 
 
85 Namubu was the Ministry of Home Affairs at that time.  
86 Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2003 (Statistics of Agriculture and Forestry). 
87 According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Yearbook 1976, the use of fertilizers and 
pesticides continued to increase from 1970. For example, pesticide, (17,530,969 kg in 1969) increased to 
80,969,315 kg in 1975. Yi Hang and Park Sup (1997) insisted that the increase in rice productivity resulted 
from the increase in pesticides and fertilizers. During the Saemaul Undong Period, collecting natural 
fertilizers was one job that peasants and villages must do.  
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province governors -- they returned to their villages to spread the spirit of the Saemaul 
Undong: Diligence, Self-Help, and Self-Support. These values were taught in a military 
manner (Jager 2003). With help from this discipline to encourage the Saemaul leaders 
and promote the campaign, the government introduced various public events such as 
televisions or mass-media interviews, lectures at Saemaul institutes, the national Saemaul 
Leasers’ Conventions,88 Saemaul medals, and the presentation of successful cases before 
the president.89 These events as well as education with others in higher social positions 
made peasants into modern beings in terms of equality. Before the movement, peasants 
were never treated as equal subjects by Koreans in socially high positions. As the equal 
educatees in the militarized institution, peasants identified themselves with a modern 
equal subject (Hwang Byung 2005).  
The third stage was the period of Energetic Implementation from 1977 to 1979. In 
this phase, the government focused on encouraging the construction of more modern 
housing, the growth of special purpose plants, and the running of industrial facilities to 
combine agriculture and manufacturing in rural areas. In urban area, paving alleys, 
cleaning, and establishing order were examples of the campaigns. Therefore, investment 
and financial support from the government rapidly increased along with the proportion 
for which peasants were responsible. Table 3.3 shows that the proportion of the 
government investment began to increase after 1975. At this time, the government built 
many buildings for Saemaul Education and expanded government projects of increasing 
income, which needed more money. Although the total sum of investment increased, the 
proportion of peasants changed little. After this, peasant household debt rapidly increased 
 
88 A total of 89,045 Saemaul leaders participated in the convention for seven years from 1973 to 1979: 
4,189; 41,941; 7,450; 7,586; 6,773; 4,200; and 16,906, respectively (Namubu 1980, 655).  
89 Presentation of 151 cases had been done at the Institute of the Saemaul Training for ten years from 1972 
to 1981. Male 61 and female 16 presented their stories at the institute. Some of them presented several 
times, and presented before President Park (Park Jin 2005; Namubu 1980) 
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in order to participate in the projects. The increase of peasant debt was an important 
cause that drove peasants out of rural areas in the late 1970s and resulted in a decrease of 
emphasis on the Saemaul Undong. 
 
Table 3.3 Financial resources of the Saemaul Undong (Unit: 100 million, %)                          
Year  Peasants Government support Others Total 
1971 81(66.4) 41(33.6)    - 122(100.0)
1972 273(83.7) 36(11.0) 17(3.2) 326(100.0)
1973 769(80.0) 171(17.8) 21(2.2) 961(100.0)
1974 840(63.3) 308(23.1) 180(13.6) 1,328(100.0)
1975 1,288(43.5) 1,653(55.9) 18(0.6) 2,959(100.0)
1976 1,504(46.6) 1,651(51.2) 71(2.2) 3,227(100.0)
1977 2,171(46.5) 1,808(38.8) 686(14.7) 4,665(100.0)
1978 2,951(46.5) 2,329(36.7) 1,061(16.7) 6,342(100.0)
1979 3,282(43.3) 2,268(29.9) 2,032(26.8) 7,582(100.0)
Note: 1) In others, governmental association and organizations, and civilian organizations, supported the 
Saemaul Undong. 
2) Financial resources include land, labor, materials, and other investments as well as cash.  
Source: Namubu (the Ministry of Home Affairs), 1980, Seamaul, Namubu: Seoul. 
 
According to the 1980s social research by Ahn Byung Man (1991), rural residents 
would migrate for “more money” (55.9 percent answered) and for better lifestyles (51.4 
percent answered) (Ahn and Boyer 1991). Park Hae Kwang (2005)90 also reports that 
urban lives to peasants were a future dream, which incessantly made peasants leave their 
villages. High buildings, well-arranged sightseeing, and dazzling neon signs in urban 
areas attracted peasants.  
                                                 
90 Park Hae Kwang shows that urban residents or laborers identified urban lives with complex feeling, 
which consisted of alienated feeling and dream for their future.  
 126
Table 3.4 shows the recorded rural population in Korea minus 12.5 percent 
growth during the 1970s, while the live-well movement was going on.91 Even though the 
state was building live-well rural villages, peasants still kept moving to urban areas. The 
higher the rate of urbanization was, the less the rate of rural population was during the 
economic development period. In addition, urban workers from rural areas looked back to 
their pasts with nostalgia, wanting to return to their villages in the future, but most did not 
return to their village (Park Hae 2005).  
Table 3.4 Urbanization in Korea 1949-1990  
                                                     (Unit: number, %) 
Population  
 
Total 
population 
 
Urban population 
 
Rural 
population 
 
% of  
urbanization 
 
 
1949 
1960 
1970 
1980 
1990 
  
Changes (%) 
 
1949-1960 
1960-1970 
1970-1980 
1980-1990 
 
20188 
24989 
30882 
37436 
43411 
 
 
 
23.8 
23.6 
21.2 
16.0 
 
3474 
6997 
13118 
21421 
32309 
 
 
 
101.4 
87.5 
63.3 
50.8 
 
16714 
17992 
18317 
16028 
11102 
 
 
 
7.6 
1.8 
-12.5 
-30.7 
 
17.2 
28 
42.4 
57.2 
74.4 
Source: Korean National Statistical Office 
 
The movement was not substantially successful in that both the rural resident’s 
debt, and migration to urban areas, increased in the 1970s. Park Hae Kwang (2005) 
                                                 
91 Oh You Seok (2002) states that in the early 1960s, 1.3 people per 100 rural residents left rural areas and 
3.7 people left rural areas in the late 1970s. As one of critics, Oh said that if the movement was a strategy to 
modernize rural areas, then it is right to say “it did not fail.” However, if we define it as a “live-well 
movement,” it cannot explain why more rural residents left their home dwelling the construction of live-
well villages.  
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points out that even though laborers in urban areas hoped to return to their homes, they 
did not, because living in the cities gave them more chances to earn money and enjoy 
urban lives. The Saemaul Undong, in fact, could not keep peasants from leaving their 
rural villages. Park Hae Kwang sees that there was both a “push factor” of rural life 
(which meant “hungry and poor”) and a “pull factor” of urban life, which was attracting 
many peasants (Park Haekwang 200592).  
 
Table 3.5 Major Saemaul Projects (1971-1980)93 
 
Project name Unit Objective Performance Per./Ob. rate 
 
Expanding village roads km 26,266 43,558 166
Constructing new  
graicultural roads km 49,167 61,797 126
 
Installing small bridges unit 76,749 79,516 104
 
Constructing village centers unit 35,608 37,012 104
 
Building warehouses unit 34,665 22,143 64
 
Housing improvement unit 544,000 225,000 42
 
Improving village layout village  2,747  
 
Constructing sewage systems km 8,654 15,559 179
Supplying electricity to rural  
and fishing communities household 2,834,000 2,777,500 98
 
Operating Saemaul factories unit 950 717 75
 
The official figures, however, show that the movement succeeded in modernizing 
rural areas. Table 3.5 shows the performance and achievement of major Saemaul projects 
                                                 
92 P. 22-23. 
93 Source: The National Council of SaemaulUndong Movement in Korea, 1999, (Saemaul Undong in 
Korea, 22).  
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over ten years. According to table 3.5, both the building up of infrastructures for 
agriculture and improvement of the rural environments were successful. It is interesting 
to see that both the development areas and the achievement each concentrated on overall 
village improvement rather than on individual households. Housing improved by forty 
three percent and building of warehouses by sixty two percent of their goal. Table 3.6 
shows the installation of electricity in rural households. In 1977, 97.8 percent of 
households in Korea had electricity. The distribution of Electricity to households was the 
main target of the third stage, which was concentrated on by the government and Korea 
electronics (National Council of Saemaul Undong 1999). These output figures explain 
that local officials and the government to some degree sought visible results, “display 
achievement.” Critics have blamed the movement by saying that it focused on the 
“display of development” because under the authoritarian regime, both local officials and 
peasants only needed to the ruler and dictator (Park Jin and Hand Do 1999; Oh You 
2002; Cho Hee 2005; Koh Won 2006). 
Both tables 3.5 and 3.6 show just a part of what the movement achieved in the 
1960s and 1970s. The output figures are concentrated on improving the infrastructures 
for the growth of agrarian products. However, the movement could not solve the 
problems caused by economic development in Korea, which aimed at building modern 
capitalist markets and an industrial economy. In other words, the movement could not 
provide many any good solutions to keep peasants from leaving their rural villages (Oh 
You 2002; Park Jin and Hand Do 1999). 
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Table 3.6 Rate of electric power supply per farm household (1964-1977) 
Year Total No. of farm 
households 
(Unit 1000) 
No. of farm house-
holds supplied 
(Unit 1000) 
 
Ratio 
(%) 
1964 2, 450 294 12.0 
1966 2, 540 404 15.9 
1968 2,579 505 19.6 
1970 2,483 670 27.0 
1972 2,452 1,000 40.8 
1974 2,381 1,402 58.9 
1975 2,379 1,818 76.4 
1976 2,336 2,184 93.9 
1977 2,304 2,253 97.8 
 
Furthermore, after the demise of President Park, the movement declinded rapidly, 
until it was revitalized under the Fifth Republic of President Cheon Duhwan (1980-
1987). One obvious result is that the movement lost the voluntary participation of 
peasants and local community residents, as the state intervened more and a top-down 
method of mobilization used by the state took the energy out of the movement (Park Jin 
and Hand Do 1999; Oh You 2002; Koh won 2006).  
From table 3.7, we see that the income in rural areas increased as rapidly as the 
income in urban areas. Seemingly, the movement did contribute to an improvement in 
rural household income. Yet this table does not explain why most peasants still left their 
villages at that time. In addition, the degree of household debt increased rapidly. Thus, 
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the movement failed to stabilize rural areas, although many Koreans still believe that the 
movement improved rural areas, as much as their fathers believed before.  
Table 3.7 Farmhouse income by year (Unit: 1000won, %)                                        
 
Year Farm house income Agricultural income Non farm income 
 
  Amount Percentage Amount Percentage 
 
1970 255.8 194 75.9 61.8 24.1
 
1971 356.4 292.9 81.9 64.5 18.1
 
1972 429.4 353.4 82.3 76 17.7
 
1973 480.7 390.3 81.2 90.4 18.8
 
1974 674.5 541.9 80.3 132.6 19.7
 
1975 872.9 714.8 81.9 158.1 18.1
 
1976 1,156.60 921.2 79.7 235.1 20.3
 
1977 1,432.80 1036.1 72.3 396.7 27.7
 
1978 1,884.20 1355.7 72 528.5 28
 
1979 2,227.50 1531.3 68.7 696.2 31.3
Source: Namubu 1981, the Saemaul Undong’s history and data. 
 
3. BACKGROUND OF THE MOVEMENT  
In this part, the background of the Saemaul Undong will be dealt with. In most 
other developing countries, the ruling elite and the state were not interested in developing 
This chapter will look into why the ROK had such interest 
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3.1 Economic Background 
The Saemaul Undong was the third policy that Park Chung Hee launched in order 
to develop and modernize rural areas. The majority of the Korean population (72 percent) 
still lived in rural areas (Boyer and Ahn 1991), while 72 percent of the national 
population had either no land or only very little that could be cultivated (Korea Statistical 
Office 2006). Most of them could not afford to have their regular daily meals. Young 
children had to help in farming instead of going to school, but they still did not have 
enough to eat (National Council of Saemaul Undong 2003). During Syngman Rhee’s 
regime after the Korean War, the Korean economy relied on aid from foreign countries 
and international aid institutes like the United Nations (Jang Sang 1998). However, most 
aid was in the form of surplus grains like wheat, rice, or corn. The agricultural aid 
actually weakened the rural economy (Park Jin 1988; Park Hyun 1988; Jang Sang 1988; 
Lee Dae 1987).  
The First Republic tried to boost the rural economy. The government initiated a 
“Community Development Movement (Giyeugsahoy Kaebal Undong)” in 1958, which 
failed to succeed (You Tae 1986). Table 3.8 shows the growth rates in agriculture and 
other industries. Agricultural growth (Kolhi 2004), actually experienced negative growth 
for some years. For example, one year after the government began the “Constructing 
Development Movement,” the growth rate of agriculture was recorded at -1.2 percent.  
Even though the state focused on developing rural areas in the first stage after the 
power seizure in order to obtain political legitimacy from the majority population of 
Korea – the peasants -- the South Korean government’s main economic policy focus 
moved from agriculture to more capitalist industry-oriented policies. For faster 
modernization, developing industry became a more important urgent goal (Lee Byung 
1999; 2003). 
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Table 3.8 Economic Growth by Industrial Sectors during the Rhee’s Period (Unit: %)94  
 
Year GNP Agriculture Industry Service 
1954 5.5 7.6 11.2 2.5
1955 5.4 2.6 21.6 5.7
1956 0.4 -5.9 16.2 4.0
1957 7.7 9.1 9.7 5.8
1958 5.2 6.2 8.2 3.5
1959 3.9 -1.2 9.7 7.5
1960 1.9 -1.3 10.4 2.8
Average per year 4.3 2.4 12.4 4.5
Note: Calculations are based on constant 1970 prices. The figures for agriculture include those for forestry 
and fishery, those for industry include mining and manufacturing, and those for services include 
social overhead expenditures.  
 
After 1963, the military government planned a five-year national economic 
development based on stabilizing the rural economy from inflation and poverty. At this 
time the government was trying to restore a formal diplomatic relationship with Japan 
under pressure from the Kennedy Administration in the United States. (Lee Won 2005). 
As a result of the industry-centered policies of the 1960s, however, the income gap 
between rural and urban areas rose (KILA 1999). As shown in table 3.9, in the early 
1960s, rural peasants’ income was higher than urban laborers’ income. However, after 
1965, urban laborers’ income increased more than that of rural peasants.  
                                                 
94 Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook (Seoul: Bank of Korea, 1973, 298-299). 
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Table 3.9 Differences in income between urban labors and rural peasants (Unit: won)                   
Year 
Income of urban laborers 
(per household) 
Income of rural peasants 
(per household) Ratio (%) 
 
1963 80.1 93.1 116.2 
 
1964 97.2 125.6 129.3 
 
1965 112.5 112.2 99.7 
 
1966 161.5 130.1 80.6 
 
1967 248.6 149.4 60.2 
 
1968 289 178.9 62.6 
Sources: The Economic Planning Board and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forest95 
 
The effects of the underdeveloped conditions from which peasants and rural areas 
were suffered varied; they included low productivity, single income source, scarcity of 
arable lands, the poor infrastructure of agriculture, and the dependent minds of peasants. 
Right after the Korean War, the South Korean government had tried to increase 
agricultural productivity by establishing various laws and development program such as 
the cultivation-promoting laws in 1962. and the General Law of Agriculture, the planning 
five years of agricultural productivity growth plans, and the opening of new types of 
agricultural financial credits (Yi Hang and Park Sup 1997; Park Jin 2005). 
One reason that rural areas were poor was because of a shortage of arable land 
that peasants could cultivate. The available arable land in Korea was very limited, 
because seventy percent of Korean territory consists of hills and mountains and the 
irrigation system to supply paddy lands with water was very poor. Table 3.10 shows that 
                                                 
95 This paper used the data from Oh You-Seok (2002). Even though urban laborers suffered from low 
income and longhour work, their incomes were better than peasants’ income. This explains why peasants 
left their villages (Park Hae 2005; Oh You 2002; Park Jin and Hand Do 1999).  
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in 1960 only about 20 percent of useful land in Korea were arable. Of the arable land, 
about 40 percent was dry land that could hardly be cultivated, because most irrigation 
systems in Korea at that time were insufficient. This proportion changed little until the 
late 1970s, when the Korean government focused on introducing a new high-yield variety 
of grain and building new infrastructures for agriculture.  
Table 3.10 Land use in Korea96                              
 
Classification 1960 1964 1974 
 
1. Total arable land 2042(20.5%) 2189(22.0) 2238(22.6%)
 
Paddy land 1,216 1,272 1,269
 
Dry land 825 917 969
 
2. Forest land 6,757(68.1%) 5,875(59.1%) 6,641(66.9%)
 
Wood land 3,946 4,888 -
 
Denuded land 2,627 852 -
 
Area not directly under forestry 173 140 -
 
3. Other 1,127(11.4$) 1,861(18.9%) 1,046(10.5%)
 
Total 9,925(100%) 9925(100%) 9925(100)
Average size of land per 
household .87 0.89 0.94
 
Paddy land .52 0.52 0.53
 
Dry land .35 0.37 0.41
Note: 1 Chongbo=9917.4 square meters.  
                                                 
96 Source: 1960& 1964 “Nong Ob Yeungam” (yearbook of agriculture and forestry) statistics 1965, 
adapted from agriculture in Korea, Seoul, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 1965, 2).  
1974 Statistical yearbook of Korea, Seoul, Economic Planning Board Republic of Korea (1975,76, 92)  
You (1986) published this information (p.11). 
 
 135
Most sterile lands in Korea caused a low degree of self-sufficient food and raw 
materials in the rural economy. Even though the state tried to clear forest land, waste 
land, lakes, and coasted areas for farming, the proportion of arable land increased by very 
little (see table 3.10). The size of arable lands per household97 was very low in Korea 
during the 60s and 70s. This meant that peasants could hardly earn enough for their own 
families. Their income depended on selling rice and other surplus agricultural products.  
 
Table 3.11 Amount of imported rice per year from 1962-197098  
Year  Degree of self-sufficiency (%) Amount of imported rice (1000 ton) 
1962 93.4 499 
1963 71.7 1318 
1964 85.2 916 
1965 - 669 
1966 93.1 525 
1967 81.7 1100 
1968 - 1497 
1969 78.8 2336 
To South Korea, importing rice was one way to solve the problem. According to 
Park Jin Hwan (2005),99 during 1966 to 1970, the proportion of imported rice of the total 
government-held rice accounted for 52.9 percent and the amount was 9 percent of 
national products. Compared to four previous years from 1961 to 1965, imported rice 
                                                 
97 Kim Dongno says that 70 percent of peasants did not have their own land after Korea was liberated from 
Japan (1997).  
98 Oh You-Seok, 2002, Park Chung Hee sic Kundaehwa Junryakkwa Nongchon SaemaulUndong. The 
author compiled data from the Yearbook of Agriculture and the Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics 
99 Park Jin Hw-an compiled data from the Agriculture and Forest Statistical YearBooks, 1968. 
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amounts increased rapidly from 24,000 tons to 331,000 tons. Also, in the following four 
years (1971-1975) the amount increased to 523,000 tons, which accounted for 46.5 
percent of the amount of government-held rice (at that time, 601,000 tons). Table 3.11 
shows the total amount of imported rice under the rule of Park Chung Hee during the 
1960s, because of insufficient internally produced amounts of rice. The proportion of 
imported rice increased until 1969. 
The increase in the amount of imported rice for government held rice and its total 
amounts had a deep impact on both peasants’ lives and contribution to the shortage of 
foreign currency. Even though the existence of imported rice had a positive impact on 
balancing price stability, it caused the country’s degree of food self-sufficiency to 
diminish (Park Jin and Han Do 1999; Oh 2002). Another result was an effective lowering 
of peasant income by making the rice price lower, which lowered laborers’ wages. This 
low-grain policy helped Korea’s economy grow by lowering workers’ wages. But it also 
had a negative effect in destroying the rural economy by lowering peasants’ income, 
which depended on the price of grain, especially rice (Oh 2002).  
According to Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing data (1970), peasant household 
debt also increased by year: 4,751 won in 1962; 6,669 won in 1963; 7,575 won in 1964; 
10,570 won in 1965; 9,986 won in 1966; 11,432 won in 1967, 13,996 won in 1968; and 
112,518 won in 1969. The increased import of rice also caused a financial burden on the 
Korean government which suffered from insufficient dollars. Also the low-grain-price 
policy reduced the demand of domestic consumption by decreasing the rural majority 
population’s income, in turn weaken the industry-oriented economy (Namubu 1980).100  
The government needed to cut the vicious circle of poverty while modernizing 
and developing rural areas (KILA 1999). A lot of literature and government documents 
 
100 Namubu is the ministry of Home Affairs. It published ten years of the Saemaul Undong history: data in 
1980.  
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point out this as the reason for launching the Saemaul Undong. The government needed 
to make efforts to increase the peasants’ income and to improve their living environment.  
The first economic aim of the Saemaul Undong was to increase peasant income 
and their household income by increasing agricultural productivity per unit of land. In 
order to achieve this goal, the government developed a high-yield rice seed and 
encouraged peasants to find other income sources than rice during the agricultural off-
season,101 if peasant households depended only on grain as a source of, these prices were 
not enough alone to increase income dramatically. The Korean government tried to find 
new ways to use land, regardless of whether it was arable or barren. The government also 
encouraged peasants to cultivate other commercial crops, which resulted in the 
appearance of modern commercial peasants.102  There were many successful cases of 
peasants in commercial cultivation, and the government introduced these stories to other 
peasants.103  
The next aim in the first stage of the movement was to establish better 
infrastructure for agriculture and improve the living environment. The government, 
therefore, distributed cement bags to all villages in Korea to expand roads, build bridges, 
improve thatched roofs and houses, and finally upgrade sewage systems. The cement 
 
101 Off-season work source to peasants had another goal -- that is, during the off season, male peasants 
drank alcohol and gambled. It was a serious problem that Park Chung Hee hated ,and regarded as a 
premodern feature to be removed. It was necessary to reform in humanity and achieve spiritual revolution 
(Park Jin 2005). 
102 In fact, some successful peasants began to appear after the late 1960s with the movement for special 
income growth (Yi Hang and Park Sup 1997).  
103 However, increasing peasants’ income policy shows President Park Chung Hee had continuous interest 
in the movement after taking power. President Park who experienced previous failures in modernizing and 
developing the rural economy, began to initiate a national development project, so-called “Saemaul 
Undong,” in the 1970s. 
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distribution in 1971 and 1972 contributed to solving the problem of depression in the 
cement industry (Kim Jung 1990).104  
Development in rural areas contributed to the growth of the Korean economy by 
augmenting the number of consumers. The export-oriented policies of the late 1960s and 
low-wage policies resulted in depressed domestic consumption. When the size of the 
international market decreased, the depressed domestic consumption became a problem 
for Chaebul (Park Jin and Han Do 1999). Consumption of cement was an example of this 
situation. Developing the rural economy and increasing peasants’ income would create an 
attractive market for domestic cement companies. With this economic background, the 
political support was strong enough to explain why either the state or President Park 
drove the movement to the national level during his entire period of rule.  
 
3.2 Political Background  
In a democratic society, or in a state, acquiring support from the majority is 
crucial for the ruler and political elites. The Saemaul Undong was, at first, not a 
systematic and offocial project of a national development movement. In order to attain 
political legitimacy, developing the economy and modernization were important goals for 
each regime of the Republic of Korea. To show tangible results, the government had to 
satisfy the peasants, who comprised the majority of the Korean population at that time. 
The president had failed to develop the rural economy in two previous efforts, however. 
In the process of economic development and modernization, developing agriculture was 
given less attention by the state in the 1960s. Resources were in general limited to 
 
104 Cho Hee Yeon (2005) defines the Saemaul Undong in the following: “The Saemaul Undong has 
characteristics of complementary policy to keep his political support to expand cement industry to rural 
areas as well as to boost cement industry by mobilizing peasants to rural development.” 
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investing in industrial areas, because at that time, South Korea had less capital (Park Jin 
2005; Oh You 2002; Cho Suk 2005). For official display purposes, however, the 
government would have to focus on development both in agriculture and industries to rise 
to political legitimacy.105   
The Korean economy got into trouble in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The 
Import-Substitute Industry Policy faced hard challenges in structure (Lee Won 2004). 
Particularly, the amount of foreign debt increased due to ISI policies based on 
nationalistic economic ideas in (Jung Tae 2006). The differences between rural and urban 
income levels began to grow. In urban areas, political resistance by labor106 and other 
dissident groups, as well as student activities, were strong enough for President Park, who 
dreamed of permanent rule over Korea, to be worried about the future of his power (Kim 
Sun 2000). Laborers who had been alienated during economic development began to 
resist after a worker, Jun Tae Il, immolated himself in 1970 (Kim Bo 2005). Besides 
these events, natural disasters such as droughts and floods often did damage to 
agricultural productivity and destroy the rural economy (Park Jin 2005; Kim Soo 1999; 
Oh 2002). Public sentiment including the rural areas deteriorated.  
 Park Chung Hee was reelected for the third time in the presidential election on 
April 23, 1971. The result of this election, however was unsatisfactory for him and his 
staff, because he obtained only 6,432,828 (53.2 percent) of the votes whereas his rival 
candidate, Kim Dae Jung, earned 5,395,900 (45.3 percent) votes (Kim Sun 2000; Oh You 
2002). According to the history of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, the 
ruling party (Korea Republic Party) won the election by receiving 113 (55.4 percent) 
 
105 President Park Chung Hee continued to elucidate development in both areas in four presidential 
inauguration speeches, (Korean National Archives: presidential inauguration speeches).  
106 According to Kim (2000), there were 130 labor disputes in 1969, 165 in 1970, 1656 in 1971, and 346 
in 1972. Labor disputes and dissidence in labor really began by workers after Jun Tae IL burned himself 
alive and died in 1970.  
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members of the Assembly on May 25, 1971. The result was not satisfactory, because the 
ruling party lost more than fourteen percent of the members more than in the seventh 
National Assemblymen election. What was worse, the ruling party got just one 
Assemblyman in Seoul Metro and garnered decreased percentage of population votes in 
every rural area except Kangwon and Cheju provinces (Park Jin and Han Do 1999). Park 
Chung Hee realized he would not be able to keep his presidency in the next election. He 
needed a new system and new supporter groups (Kim Sun 2000). And even in rural 
settings, except in the Kangwon province, support for the ruling party decreased.   
Above all, however, the Saemaul Undong as “a live-well movement” was very 
closely connected to the Yushin system and its process of implementation, which was 
carried out under a constitutional order created by President Park Chung Hee for his 
permanent rule over Korea in 1972 (Oh You 2002; Park Jin and Han Do 1999). That year 
when the state formally and systematically launched the Saemaul Movement from the 
Saemaul Kakkugi Undong, President Park Chung Hee proclaimed martial law and 
subordination orders over the whole country. After the announcement, the state called for 
a national referendum for the Yushin Constitution. 91.9 percent Koreans participated in 
the referendum. Koreans approved the constitutional changes needed to let President Park 
be a president for life with 91.5 percent of the votes, while the Saemaul Undong was 
happening in rural areas. Politically, he received support from most of the Korean 
population in the 1970s, although he still met by resistance from students and other 
dissidents in the political and economic areas. After the Yushin Constitution was 
approved, the movement spread to the whole of Korea, -- in schools, factories, religious 
groups, companies, urban communities, and so on (National Council of Saemaul Undong 
1999; Park Jin 2005). Success at the beginning of the movement encouraged Park Chung 
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Hee to ask peasants and Koreans to support him for better development in the future. This 
worked at least in rural areas.  
An interesting story illustrates the way President Park Chung Hee satisfied his 
supporters in the movement. According to Kim Jungryum, who was Park Chung Hee’s 
prime minister in 1990, the cement industry was in deep trouble in the summer of 1970. 
So a financial chairman of the ruling party (Korean Republic Party) and the CEO of a big 
cement company, Ssangyong, asked the government to provide subsidies to the industry. 
President Park Chung Hee discussed the request with the minister of home affairs and, 
his deputy prime minister. After the discussion, he came up with a plan to support the 
project to improve the rural environment by supplying cement bags for free (Kim Jung 
1990: Park Jin and Hand Do 1999). The government gave 34,665107 national villages 300 
to 350 cement bags in October 1970 (National Council of Saemaul Undong 2002; Oh 
You 2002; Park Jin 2005). In South Korea, it was clear that a new political order (Yushin 
System) needed the majority of Koreans, peasants as well as the economic ruling class to 
cooperate with the government (Cho Hee108 2005).109  
The Saemaul Undong showed tangible results to Koreans, especially to the 
peasants (National Council of Saemaul Undong 1999, 2002; Oh 2002; Park Jin 2005; 
Park Jin and Han Do 1999). To urban residents as well, the success of the movement was 
impressive. With these tangible results, the peasants and others gave President Park 
strong support, while intellectuals and students were resisting the new constitutional 
system, Yushin. As Kohli (2004) noted, “the Saemaul Undong gave the president a ‘rural 
 
107 The exact number of village in South Korea differed withscholars. Some insisted that there were 
36,000 or 35,000 at that time. However, governmental record show that the correct number was 34,664.  
108Cho Hee Yeon (2005) states that Park’s exceptional, or Bonapartian state lost urban support and needed 
to get support and stabilize political security. It was a complementary feature. 
109 The Republic of Korea has been regarded as a Bonaparte state whose features show that the capitalist 
ruling class is not mature enough to determine the political agenda and other established peasants are still 
strong (Cho Hyun 2005; Hwang Byung, 1994). However, it is now close to a politically weak state in 
legitimacy.  
 142
                                                
tilt’. Park Chung Hee won the political support in the countryside and the rural economic 
conditions became better than before, especially in Syngman Rhee’s period” (Kohli 
2004). The political background was related to the reason why the movement was 
expanded to a national level, beyond rural areas, even though it began for rural 
development. Most Saemaul projects were just tasks that the state could give citizens 
such as distribution electronics, health services, and infrastructure sources. The regime 
designated the Saemaul Undong projects as necessary for the state to provide people, to 
show the tangible result of the movement. This was a “display-administration.”  
 
3.3 Social Background  
During the off-season of agriculture in winter, peasants did nothing but gamble, 
drink, chat, and so on. Because most peasants engaged in rice production, after the fall 
harvest, they had little to do (Park Jin 2005; You Tae 1986). The village movement (the 
Saemaul Undong) which had began in October110 changed the peasants’ life cycle to a 
modern one. In order to change the poor circle, two sides were considered at the same 
time: one was an improvement in living conditions and the other was spiritual revolution. 
The National Council of the Saemaul Undong (1999) points out two social backgrounds: 
poor living conditions and a pessimistic attitude toward life. The Saemaul Undong aimed 
at improving a coarse living environment. Inferior housing such as thatched cottages, 
undeveloped roads, and poor drinking water and sewage systems were notorious in rural 
villages. These bad living conditions made village residents weak in time of natural 
disasters and kept the peasants in rural areas from living well. The situation caused 
peasants to leave for urban areas. Thus, improving living conditions for peasants would 
 
110 Beginning the off-season after harvest in October mean the government should make peasants work in 
the off-season without stop, which would allow peasants to become lazy worms, President Park said 
(Biseosil 1978). 
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help to slow the speed of migration to urban places, which suffered from overpopulation 
and its resulting social and economic consequences (Park Jin 2005; Park Jin and Han Do 
1999; National Council of Saemaul Undong 1999; Yoo Tae: 1985).  
Another social issue that was important to the movement was the need to change 
peasants’ mindsets. The National Council of the Saemaul Undong addressed their 
attitudes about their futures in the following way: The lives of most Koreans in the 1960s 
were dictated by irrationality, low productivity, and disorder. Few people prepared 
themselves for the future, out of pessimism or uncertainty regarding the future. Many 
were accustomed to living in despair, frustration and idleness (1999).  
The document that the presidential secretary (1981) published talks about the 
virtues peasants needed to foster: 1) diligence, self-help, and cooperation; 2) preserving 
regulations of family rituals followed by rational and scientific ways; 3) saving money 
and frugality; 4) socially just lives based on law-abiding spirits; 5) enlightening 
traditional ethics (loyalty and respect to the old); 6) establishing an independent national 
identity and historical perspective; 7) establishing voluntary neighborhoods 
organizations.  
The Saemaul Undong was created to change this attitude and remake peasants 
into modernized people (Jager 2003). This factor was a key to President Park Chung 
Hee’s dreams of changing Koreans’ humanity for a long time after he wielded political 
power. Whenever he spoke about his plan to develop Korea, he laid emphasis on reform 
in humanity for modernization of Korea as a nation (Park Chung 2005). When he 
received the answer from the Chungdo-up residents in 1969, as mentioned earlier, he 
realized that he would be able to find a good method to provoke spiritual revolution. In 
order to make peasants into modern capitalist farmers, the state introduced competition 
among villages in the movement. In fact, Nonguhmin Soduktukbyeolsaup (The Special 
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Projects for Peasants and Fishermen Income Growth) followed by Jaegun Kookmin 
Undong (National Subject Movement restoring the state) focused on transforming the 
rural economy into a commercial agricultural economy (Park Jin and Han Do 1999; You 
Tae 1985).111  
When the government distributed cement bags to villages at the first time, the 
distribution was a kind of test to see whether each village deserved getting more support 
from the government. One year after the distribution, the government selected 16,000 
villages that showed better results than expected, and distributed another 500 cements 
bags and 1000 tons of iron rods to them in 1972. President Park wanted village 
competition to raise efficiency and effectiveness, and therefore, improve the project. 
Making each village compete was highly successful. The government categorized 
villages into three kinds by degrees of residents’ participation such as Jarib maul (self-
support village) of the highest participation, Jajo maul (self-help villages) of the middle, 
and Kicho maul title (basic villages) of the lowest. Initially, Kicho Maul (basic level) 
accounted for 53 percent (18,415 villages of total 34,665) of all villages in Korea in 1972. 
However, as time went on, most of kicho maul (basic villages) disappeared in the late 
1970s. the number of kicho maul decreased from 18,415 in 1972 to 302 villages out of a 
total 35,031 in 1976 (Namubu 1981).112 After the year 1977, Kicho maul did not come up 
in the government statistics. To get rid of the basic village (Kicho Maul), peasants in a 
village worked harder than these in other villages. Competition was the motivating 
factors in the spiritual revolution that made peasants act for their villages.    
The spiritual revolution of peasants and other Koreans was a dream President 
Park wanted to achieve. Social backgrounds were the first good target that needed to be 
 
111 After the projects, some of peasants in rural areas who were successful in commercially cultivating 
crops such as cucumber, potato, sweet potato, and cabbages appeared in the late 1960s (Yi Hang and Park 
Sup 1997). 
112 Data of the Saemaul Undong published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Namubu). 
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removed to succeed in motivating peasants and leading to success of the movement. He 
emphasized creating a new modern type of Koreans. At the beginning of the year at a  
press in meeting, he addressed the importance of a spiritual revolution of peasants to 
accomplish national development (Biseosil 1978): 
We can achieve a goal of rural area modernization for the first time by cultivating 
a spiritual revolution of peasants’ as well as by giving peasants financial, materialistic, 
and technical support. I reached a conclusion that spiritual revolution or cultivating the 
spirit of the peasant is the key factor to the success of modernization in rural areas, I an 
spreading out the Saemaul Undong to the far corners of the country last year.113  
 
4. CONCLUSION  
Why did the military government and authoritarian regime have a strong interest 
in developing rural areas? This chapter 3 has tried to answer the question. First the study 
began to investigate the dictator’s desire and dream to develop rural areas, to overcome 
poverty, and to reform peasants’ mindsets. The state was run by a military dictator who 
strongly wanted to develop rural areas and revolutionize people’s mindsets. The 
dictator’s desire became a national goal, when the power of the dictator was strong 
enough to decide anything that he wanted to achieve. For the second reason, as a general 
interest pursuing actor, the state must solve problems, which resulted from rapid 
economic growth (Hegel 1955). Due to the rapid growth of urbanization and the collapse 
of rural areas caused by industrialization and capitalization in the Korean economy, many 
social problems rose in both urban and rural areas such as housing, public health, urban 
 
113The original text of Korean is “재정적인, 물질적인, 도는 기술적 지원과 아울러, 오히려 
그것보다도 더 앞서서 우리 농민들의 정신 개발이 앞서야만 농촌의 근대화가 우질 수 있다.  
이것이 농촌 근대화의 성패를 판가름하는 관건이라는 결론에 도달해서 작년부터 우리는 전국 
농촌 방방곡곡에서 새마을 운동을 전개했다.” 
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ghetto’s appearance in cities, shortage of agricultural workers, surplus urban reserved 
workers. The regime, therefore, needed to stabilize rural areas and appease the peasants’ 
public feeling. These social problems had an impact on the political power of the ruling 
party.  
The economic, political, and social background of the movement, were crucial to 
its emergence of development. To overcome poverty, to stabilize rural areas and keep the 
peasants as supporters of the dictator, and finally to reform peasants’ mindsets from 
feudal manners and to make them into modern patriots were intertwined with each other. 
Above all, the movement was initiated by a strong desire of President Park’s individual 
dream and his desire to make his power permanent. This complexity of the movement’s 
backgrounds shows the reason why a distinctive form of democracy appeared in the 
1970s, so-called Yushin system. The national development of the ROK was a key to the 
security of Park’s regime.  
In the implementation of the movement, this rural development movement was 
initiated by state power and peasants who saw their achievement in the first period of the 
movement and participated aggressively in it. The movement planted an ideology that the 
movement was very successful, even though there were much growth of peasant 
households’ debt and migrants to urban areas. The next chapter will deal with how 
peasants responded to the state’s asking them to participate in the national development 
movement.  
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Chapter 4 The Saemaul Undong 2: Individual Experiences  
1. INTRODUCTION  
In this chapter, the research focuses on individuals whose experiences have an 
impact on building a national subject in Korea. In the Saemaul Undong participants’ 
answers, this research found several items of interest: spiritual revolution, nationalism 
within the state, and de-politicization of Korean peasants. Above all, the process of 
creating commercial peasants is intriguing.  
Peasants who participated in the Saemaul Undong show the characteristics of 
having internalized the growth-oriented, developmental, anticommunistic, and nationalist 
philosophy initiated by President Park. The result means peasants in Korea during the 
economic development period passionately supported the reactionary political system, 
Yushin, and participated in forming a historical bloc using, a Gramscian term, Passive 
Revolution (Gramsci 2000). They consisted of a vanguard group of the Yushin system as 
well as conglomerate companies, the ‘so-called’ Chaebeol. Even though their rewards 
from the state were much less than the rewards that Hakdohokookdan members gained, 
they were proud of their achievements and rural development. Moreover, they were 
strongly attached to everything to do with President Park and the national development of 
the Republic of Korea. These findings were intertwined with other terms such as fusion 
(Park Young 1996), or state religion (Na In 2005). In April and May 1972, for example, 
students (university and high school), journalists, and peasants participated in a social 
research study. To the question, “Korean politics is going well,” 66.4 percent of peasants 
answered yes, while only 10. 9 percent of university students and 18.8 percent of high 
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school students, along with 3.6 percent of journalists, answered yes (Hong Sung and Lee 
Young 1976).114  
Why did peasants participate in building an historical bloc against the 
democratization movement, by supporting President Park’s dictatorship? Distinctive 
Korean conditions related to peasants explain their reactionary characteristics as well as 
their conservative features (Kim Dong 1997; Skocpol 1994).115 Since the failure of the 
1946 October peasant uprising in South Korea (Cumings 1981; Kim Dong 1997), 
peasants had taken a conservative path while participating in the Korean War and 
Syngman Rhee’s regime. Research suggests possible reasons: identification with 
President Park, a strong desire to overcome poverty, and finally the bond binding 
themselves with the Saemaul Undong spirit. The Saemaul Undong bound people together 
through one bond a shared experience, a homogenous one with which they began 
overcoming the long-term poverty of peasants in Korea.  
Another interesting aspect of this research that emerges is the myth of the strong 
authoritarian and interventionist state. In certain economic areas, South Korea had 
suffered from long term underdevelopment and failed to boost rural economic 
development. Therefore, even though South Korea had some over-developed state 
apparatuses as a post-colonial state (Alavi 1972), the Republic of Korea had not had any 
well-prepared system to generate rural economic development. In terms of the despotic 
power of the state, Korea was strong enough to control and watch its national subjects (or 
citizens). Particularly in the early phase of the Saemaul Undong, the government could 
 
114 The article was edited by Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee (P.137). 
115 Even though Skocpol (1994) did not say directly the peasants in the third world were conservative, her 
definition may be understood that way: “We will do well to keep in mind a basic truth: during all the 
centuries of peasant existence from ancient to modern times, the forms of revolt open to peasants, as well 
as the political results conceivably achievable by peasants protests, have been powerfully shaped by the 
stakes of political struggles, domestic and intersocietal, going on within the ranks of the dominant strata. 
Peasants revolutions are not at all an exception to this enduring truth.”   
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not help relying on local power leaders and, thus, established local administrative 
branches. 116  In the end, the government could get the state infrastructural power 
upgraded by spreading the Saemaul Undong throughout Korea (Oh You 2004).  
 
Table 4.1 Financial resources of the Saemaul Undong (Unit: 100 million, %)                         
Year Peasants Government support Others Total
1971 81(66.4) 41(33.6)    - 122(100.0)
1972 273(83.7) 36(11.0) 17(3.2) 326(100.0)
1973 769(80.0) 171(17.8) 21(2.2) 961(100.0)
1974 840(63.3) 308(23.1) 180(13.6) 1,328(100.0)
1975 1,288(43.5) 1,653(55.9) 18(0.6) 2,959(100.0)
1976 1,504(46.6) 1,651(51.2) 71(2.2) 3,227(100.0)
1977 2,171(46.5) 1,808(38.8) 686(14.7) 4,665(100.0)
1978 2,951(46.5) 2,329(36.7) 1,061(16.7) 6,342(100.0)
1979 3,282(43.3) 2,268(29.9) 2,032(26.8) 7,582(100.0)
Note: 1) In Others, governmental association and organizations and civilian organizations supported 
Saemaul Undong. 
2) Financial resources includes land, labor, materials and other investments, as well as cash.  
Source: Namubu (the ministry of Home Affairs), 1980, Seamaul, Namubu: Seoul. 
 
In addition, the weak state could not afford to provide all the resources peasants 
needed to transform their surroundings. From table 4.1, therefore, we can see that the 
economic and social resources peasants needed came from the peasants themselves, 
which made their debt increase rapidly because the movement events became larger than 
each village could afford to share in size. The proportion of sharing changed very little 
                                                 
116This argument means that the state, which was not strong enough to penetrate into civil society could not 
help utilizing. When I said that “the movement was not a well systemic movement,” it was to explain this 
idea.  
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over the years, but the total sum increased greatly.117 This unchanging proportion of 
financial burden that the peasants assumed caused increasing debts in peasant 
households, while the movement was developing (Oh You 2002: Park Jin and Han Do 
1999). 
 
Table 4.2 Investment in the Saemaul Undong by Year (Unit: 100 million won, %) 
                                             
Year 
Production 
foundations 
Income growth
Welfare & 
environment 
Enlightenment
Urban & 
factory 
Total 
1973 618(64.3) 59(6.2) 276(28.8) 8(0.8)    - 961(100.0)
1974 565(42.5) 338(25.4) 288(21.7) 32(2.4) 105(7.9) 1,328(100.0)
1975 637(21.5) 1,875(63.4) 305(10.3) 46(1.6) 96(3.2) 2,959(100.0)
1976 901(27.9) 1,541(47.8) 676(20.9) 57(1.8) 52(1.6) 3,227(100.0)
1977 1,358(29.1) 1,826(39.1) 1,100(23.6) 107(2.3) 274(5.9) 4,665(100.0)
1978 1,307(20.6) 2,426(38.3) 2,446(38.6) 126(2.0) 37(0.6) 6,342(100.0)
1979 1,584(20.9) 3,266(43.1) 2,428(32.0) 79(1.0) 225(3.0) 7,582(100.0)
Source: ibid  
In table 4.2, investment in the Saemaul Projects changed a bit. Investment initially 
was put into production foundation, while as time went on, investment concentrated on 
income growth. Urban growth and product foundation were the main targets of Saemaul 
investment. Officially, farm house income continued to grow from 1970 to 1979. It never 
                                                 
117 The state did not have to rely on participation from the below and ordered villages to 
participate in such grand projects as the rural factory movement, public gardening and planting, and others 
to increase rural income.  
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dropped. The farm house income was 255,800 won in 1970, increasing to 2,227,500 won 
in 1979 (Namubu 1981).118 However, household debt increased steadily. The debt growth 
rate for rural households grew 2.5 percent per year from 1970 to 1975, while it was 30 
percent per year from 1975 to 1980 (Hwang Soo 1988). The growth rate of debt was 
faster than the growth rate of the household income.   
According to a 1982 opinion poll, which 92.7 percent of peasants answered that 
the Saemaul Undong contributed to income growth in rural areas, 48.6 percent hoped, 
however, to change their jobs from rural areas. 51.5 percent said that they would live in 
rural areas, and 35 percent answered that they would prefer to migrate to urban areas (Ym 
Chang 1984). In fact, during the 1980s, migration to urban areas continued to increase 
and reached up to a 75 percent urbanization rate (Korea Statistical Bureau 2006). The 
movement as a live-well movement can be measured by the results.  
 
2. CONTINGENT APPEARANCE AS A NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 
      The Saemaul Undong should be understood as a consecutive series of national 
development projects and movements by the government. It began by organizing new 
villages (Saemaul Kakkugi Undong) and expanded to the national level through engaging 
with the political situation, “Yushin system.”  
Many people who worked for President Park and the state in the 1960s and 1970s 
insisted that they led the Saemaul Movement. Definitions given by informants for this 
research on the Saemaul Undong are varied because their experiences in the Saemaul 
Undong were fragmentary. Since the movement has been regarded as one of the most 
successful stories that President Park achieved, they emphaase on their roles and work for 
the success of the Saemaul Undong. Because there were so many special movements 
 
118 P.23 
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related to rural development such as Jaegun Undong (a national reconstruction 
movement), Sodukjungdae Undong (an income-growth movement of rural areas) and 
Saemaul, participants who joined in those movements are naturally confused.  
The Saemaul Undong emerged from the continuous efforts of the both state and 
President Park to attempt to boost the rural economy. The Saemaul Undong, however, 
was not a movement that President Park tried to propose as a national development 
project for rural areas. Instead, he was thinking of continuing to develop his previous 
plan, Suduk Jungdae Tukbyul Undong (Special Income Growth Movement). His cabinet 
meeting address on March 12, 1970, showed that he still had an interest in developing 
rural areas and was thinking of continuing special projects to make peasants’ income 
increase even further. According to the presidential secretary office (1978)119, President 
Park addressed his cabinet members, local mayors of cities, and local governors of 
counties in the following excerpt:  
 
You should know that National Special Projects to Increase Peasants’ Income 
(Soduk Jungdae Tukbyul Saup) are a kind of discipline and guidance project [of all 
coming projects for modernization] and that the state will invest a lot of the government 
budget in rural and fishing areas in the 1970s to develop and modernize these areas in 
the near future.120 
According to his address, there was no Saemaul Undong term. He was thinking of 
keeping the special project, and was ready to allot part of the governmental budget to the 
 
119 The Presidential Secretary Office published President Park Chung Hee’s speeches about 
SaemaulUndong in 1978.  
120소득증대 특별 사업이라는 것은 앞으로 우리 농촌을 근대화하기 위해서 정부가 70년대에 
농어촌에 방대한 예산을 투입하기 위한 하나의 훈련 사업이며 선도 사업이라고 생각해야 될 
것이다. 
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development of rural areas in the 1970s. As the biggest national development movement, 
however, the Saemaul Undong was only mentioned a month before the time when he 
insisted that the government needed to begin the Saemaul Undong.121 The movement was 
built on the basis of some previous initiative of President Park. It is clear, therefore, that 
the Saemaul Undong did not begin as a systematic and well-organized national project. A 
former Saemaul advisor of the presidential secretary, Tae-Yeung You,122 explains:  
 
“I know that the movement did not begin with a well-equipped, or well-prepared 
plan in the beginning, because I planned it after a meeting with President Park Chung 
Hee in 1972, not 1970, or 1971. One day, while I was working at the KBS (Korea 
Broadcasting System), I got a call from the Blue House. I met President Park there and 
talked with him for five hours about a political effort to develop rural areas. After the 
meeting, President Park asked me to work for the Saemaul Undong which was newly 
initiated by him, I began to work at the Blue House as an advisor of Saemaul. When I 
went to the Blue House for the first time, there was nothing to work with. I did not even 
have any chair to sit on. There was no plan to develop rural areas. He decided to begin 
the new movement while talking with me about rural development. I opened a new office 
in the Blue House. There was also no one to work with me. So I had to recruit someone 
who could work. ….the New Village Movement began. I called the people I needed but 
they relied only on me because they did not know what they had to do. Therefore, I taught 
 
121 He first mentioned the movement on April 22, 1970, named “the Saemaul Kakkugi Undong.” 
122 This part is compiled by the research because Dr. You suggested that the researcher need his essay on 
the beginning of Saemaul Undong. His essay is on the website of the Tomorrow Foundation for Korean 
Youth & Rural Development. http://youthf.com 
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them with what I had learned in Denmark before. That was the beginning of the New 
Village Movement, the Saemaul Undong.”  
He mentions the origin of the Saemaul Undong, which is different from the 
original story of the Saemaul Undong. He says, “The first instance of Saemaul Undong 
was not the story of Chungdo-gun, but of Munseong-ri, Kigeymyun Yongwol-gun 
Kyungsangbook-do. There was a leader of Saemaul in Munseong-dong. It was two years 
before the Saemaul Undong began. It was not a flood but a drought in Korea. At that 
time, due to heavy drought in the southern part of South Korea, most small streams in 
rural villages scarcely contained any water at all. Then, the leader at Kigye-myun let 
people dig deep into the stream from dawn to night and let water flow from the stream. 
This supplied water to the pepper fields. In other areas, their pepper farming was so 
successful that they were able tot make more money than any other village, because they 
had sufficient water. This case was reported to President Park. After President Park was 
informed of the story, he led his staff and local governors to the village. When he 
returned to Seoul, he ordered his staff to find possible ways to use this story to help rural 
development by saying that heaven helps those who help themselves.”    
However, Soohak Kim, who participated in the movement as a director of the 
local bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs cited the Shindo-ri, Chungdo-up case as the 
real origin of the movement (Kim Soo 2005). And another Saemaul advisor of the Blue 
House also agreed about the Shindo-ri Case. The fact that the movement did not begin 
effectively in a well-prepared way, confused peasants and farmers, who participated in 
various national developmental movements for rural areas. An informant who had 
worked for Jaegun Undong since 1963 stated:  
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“The Saemaul movement began in 1963 after Jaegun Kookmin Undong and 
central education by the Jaegun movement. Therefore, the Saemaul Movement started in 
1966.” Another participant of the Saemaul movement in the same county gave a similar 
account: “The Sameaul Movement began in 1963 by the launching Jaegun Kookmin 
Undong Bonbu and it began the central education for peasants in 1965. After those 
movements, the Saemaul started in 1966.”  
Their informant in the same county remembered the movement kwon as “the 
Income growth movement for Peasants and Fishermen in the 1960s” and asked “Was the 
Saemaul Undong ‘the Income Growth movement for Peasants and fishermen’ in the 
1960s?”  
As is seen in the term the Saemaul Undong, which first began as the Saemaul 
Kakkugi Undong (A Movement of the New Village Cultivation), it became a national 
movement because of the success of the original movement, which focused on renovating 
rural environments. The effects of the movement were immediate and successful in 
promoting rural development and changing peasants, who could see for themselves what 
they could achieve. This result made ideologies effective in peasants’ minds and so they 
willingly accepted the developmental strategies of the state, especially President Park’s 
ideas.  
To participants of the Saemaul Undong, it was just another effort to develop rural 
areas and improve the rural economy. In fact, the Saemaul Undong began as another 
governmental policy, to overcome natural disasters. The movement, with its initial 
success in rural environments and infrastructures, was expanded to the national level 
when President Park ordered military rule and announced the initiation of the Yushin 
Constitution. However, regardless of the role of political ideology in the movement, the 
Saemaul Undong was obviously different from previous government plans. There was, in 
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addition the peasants’ spiritual revolution, for which President Park had longed. The 
spiritual revolution project was an important goal, of both the government and President 
Park. In addition, policies that succeeded in making peasants commercial also worked 
toward modernization. Ideologies and ideological state apparatuses such as religion, 
education, and mass media will be investigated next.  
 
3. SPIRITUAL REVOLUTION, AND EMERGENCE OF MODERN FARMERS  
Most other projects in the Saemaul Undong were, however, not so successful in 
terms of the living well movement. Even though farm household income continued to 
grow from 1970 to 1979, rural household debt increased rapidly in the late 1970s. The 
income growth of peasants households increased from 255,800 won in 1970 to 2,227,500 
won in 1979 (Namubu 1981). However, the annual average consumer price index rose 
15.7 percent over five years (from 1972 to 1976 (Lee Won 2004).123 What was more 
serious was the increase of debt. The growth rate of debt during 1970-1975 was only 2.5 
percent but during the period of 1975-1980, reached 30.3 percent (Hwang Soo 1988). The 
amount of debt per household increased twenty one times between 1980 and 1970, from 
16,000 won to 340,000 won, while the income increased ten times between 1980 and 
1970, from 26,000 won to 270,000 won (Park Jin and Han Do 1999). Migration to urban 
areas also increased from 1.3 persons per 100 in the 1960s to 3.7 persons per 100 in the 
late 1970s, (Park Jin and Han Do 1999; Hwang Soo 1988). This income level reduced by 
77 percent of the urban household income. Table 4.3 shows the detailed numbers of 
migration from rural to urban areas.  
 
 
123 See table 4.6 in chapter 4 about the Federation of Korea Trade Unions 
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Table 4.3 Transition of Peasants from Rural to Urban Areas124 (Unit: 1000, %)          
Time Range  Total flow number Average  
annual flow number  
Average annual flow rate 
1960-66 1,133 189 1.22 
1966-1970 2,516 629 4.05 
1970-1975 2,561 512 3.60 
1975-1980 3,350 670 5.39 
1980-1984 2,449 612 5.95 
 
As mentioned earlier (in the section about development of the movement), the 
movement showed real results and objective official figures to show the change and 
development in rural areas. Peasants’ impressions of the movement’s early success can 
hardly explain their identity and mindset about it. Peasants’ pride and impressions offer 
merely an aspect that this research should consider. Spiritual revolution is a key 
ingredient upon which this research focuses. 
The new village movement (the Saemaul Undong) was another spiritual crusade 
that needs to be measured. This spiritual revolution had been mentioned by President 
Park as a major concern since 1961 (Park Chung 1970; 2005). President Park pushed two 
previous government-led movements (the Kookmin Jaegun Undong-National 
Reconstruction movement and the Nonguhchon Sodukjungdae Tukbyul Undong-A 
movement for Special Income Growth in Agricultural and Fishing Villages), which aimed 
at promoting rural household income in the late 1960s and transforming peasants into 
commercial farmers (Yi Hang and Park Sup 1997; Oh You 2002; Park Jin 2005).  
                                                 
124 Yi Young Ki (1988) compiled the table from The Year book of Agriculture and Forestry, Agricultural 
Census. Park Jin Do quoted it in 1988.  
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Even though he already had a well-developed state apparatus and a social 
consensus for overcoming poverty (Yi Hang and Park Sup 1997), it was difficult for 
President Park to cultivate peasants’ voluntary and passionate participation in his 
projects. In other words, spiritual revolution was not enough for the movement to succeed 
(Hwang Byung 2005; Cho Hee 2005) 125 . Therefore, President Park still faced the 
unchanged rural area poverty and many unenlightened peasants from his point of view. 
He thought that he needed to inspire the peasants’ spiritual resources for success in his 
national development projects. After his two projects before the Saemaul Undong had 
hardly attracted peasants’ attention and participation, he was told about two successful 
stories (the Munsungdon case and the Shindori case) in Kyungsangbuk-do, both of which 
matched the spiritual revolution he desired. His speeches in a meeting which consisted of 
the cabinet, local governors, and mayors, show his will to inspire the peasants’ minds for 
the movement in the following way:  
 
 “Without the village residents’ voluntary participation and will to be wealthy, it 
will not be able to be wealthy for 5000 years. However, with their will, it would take them 
only two or three years to rise with only a small amount of governmental support 
(Namubu 1979; Park Jin 2005).” 
 
In another speech to the cabinet, the local governors, and mayors meeting in 1970, 
he stressed the importance of a peasant spiritual revolution. He said: 
 “From now on, the government should invest first in the peasants who are strong 
enough in self-reliance, willingness to participate, cooperation, unity, and a labor 
 
125 Yi Hang and Park Sup (1997) view the well-organized existing state apparatuses as sufficient evidence 
of the movement’s success.  
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mindset, because the effect of the government investment will begin in those peasants who 
are enlightened.”  
 
He meant that only the enlightened farmers would receive financial support from 
the government. This emphasis encouraged each village resident to voluntary 
participation. The first village excellence award was given to Munsungdong Kigyemyun 
in Pohang city, Kyungsangbook-do, where President Park was inspired by their recovery 
and achievement to improve their village in 1971. Competition between villages worked 
here by stimulating other village members. In addition to competition, education and 
training played roles in the spiritual revolution. With an increase in educated peasants, 
scientific agriculture became possible. The proportion of six years of schooling in peasant 
households was 35 percent in 1960, 50 percent in 1965, and 54 percent in 1970 (Yi Hang 
and Park Sup 1997).  
The spiritual revolution included individuals’ change of minds and attitudes to 
poverty, which depends on individual responsibility. This view ascribes poverty to 
personal responsibility. Particularly successful peasants who achieved personal richness 
showed this neo-liberal attitude without social structures to result in poverty. The 
following text is from a peasant’s definition of individualism:  
 
“If one worker works well, then he would not worry about lay-offs. Save your time 
even by reducing smoking time. Somebody who was laid-off deserved it. Don’t blame 
others and conditions. If someone does not work, then he or she should not be given 
money. Even though someone does not work, he or she is getting money. It is a serious 
problem. No work, No money….Consciousness should change. The essence of the 
Saemaul Undong is to live well. We can live well only with each individual’s good deeds. 
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If we change our minds, then our behavior will change. After our behavior changes, our 
household will change, then our country will become wealthy…. Everything depends on 
each person. Let us compete with each other. Then everybody will be rich… money 
should be given to capable men. Don’t blame corrupt politicians, because people should 
make politicians work better and not be corrupt. People have to know where they are 
now and should wake themselves up.”   
 
The emergence of diligent productive farmers in the late 1960s inspired President 
Park to introduce more efficient ways to create the results he wanted. Diligent, productive 
farmers were a symbol of capitalist human beings because most saved enough money to 
expand their land by themselves without expecting any support or inheritance. The case 
of Sayong Ha, first medalist of the Saemaul, is that of a typical productive farmer. 
President Park Chung Hee was interested in meeting some peasants who had succeeded 
in their farming. Sayong Ha had already prospered and made big money by introducing 
new technologies like a plastic greenhouse in his village. When President Park met Mr. 
Hasayong, the man was his ideal type of a modern farmer that President Park Chung Hee 
had tried to find to emphasize the spiritual change. Later, some peasants who succeeded 
as farmers became public speakers at the Saemaul Education Institute in Suwon, 
Kyungki-do. Mr. Ha was the first speaker of the Saemaul Institute.   
When this effective farmer presented his story before the president and 3000 
farmers and fishermen, including administrative ministers, national assembly chairmen, 
and the chief justice of the Supreme Court, during a national exposition general 
conference of Farmers and Fishermen for Special Income Growth on November 11, 
1970, President Park was so impressed that he cried and ordered the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry to plan an education program for farmers based on spiritual 
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revolution (Wolganchosun 2002). Park Jin Hwan (2001) also dealt with this successful 
story and published a paper, “A successful story of a diligent productive farmer, Sayong 
Ha and the Saemaul Undong in the 1970s.” Competition for living well was the main 
concern of the Saemaul Undong and Sayong Ha’s case proved that competition resulted 
in productive growth among peasants (Park Jin 2001).  
This spiritual revolution was related to helping Korean peasants become modern 
citizens of the Republic of Korea instead of being members of the Korean nation. 
Peasants who participated in the movement accepted an ideology aimed at developing 
and modernizing the Republic of Korea. In the ideology, the old Korean nation was 
replaced with a new Korean nation, that is to say, the Republic of Korea. Modernizing the 
Republic of Korea was the route to building a wealthy and strong military state (Moon 
Seung 2005; Park No 2004).  
 
3.1 The Roles of the Ideological State Apparatuses  
In mobilizing peasants into the Seamaul Undong, the state relied on its ideological 
state apparatuses (Althusser 1972), which played their roles in influencing peasant minds 
like that of Mr. Ha. Althusser defines the ideological state institution as “a certain 
number of realities which present themselves to the immediate observer in the form of 
distinct and specialized institutions: the religious ISA (the system of the different 
Churches);the educational ISA (the system of the different public and private Schools); 
the family ISA; the legal ISA; the political ISA (the political system, including the 
different parties); the trade-union; the communications ISA (press, radio and television, 
etc.); the cultural ISA (Literature, the Arts, sports etc.)” (Althusser 1972).  
As Nazis distributed radio-sets to Germans in order to broadcast Hitler’s speeches 
lively use of them as a means of propaganda, Park Chung Hee distributed 10,000 radio 
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sets to Koreans before the beginning of the Saemaul Undong in order to deliver selected 
information and use them as a means of propaganda for the movement (Hwang Byung 
2005). President Park Chung Hee wrote the words of the Saemaul Song himself, which 
was aired every day and everywhere. Mass media were the most effective and efficient 
instrument, especially documentary movies, and television and radio news.  
In 1973, eight large newspapers opened ten regular Saemaul sections, twenty four 
editorials of Saemaul, and printed 240 special reports. Six Saemul programs on television 
and six radio programs were started and aired every day (Hwan Byung 2005). In total, 66 
Saemaul movies were made and 10,300 copies distributed nationwide from 1973 to 1980, 
while 1,118 million Saemaul monthly magazines were made and distributed over eight 
years (Namubu 1981). For example, the Ministry of Broadcasting and Advertising State 
Policies created some documentary films including ‘Ohnyuri’s Women: Wise 
Women’ 126 , and ‘Munsungdong 1973: The Self-reliance village as the origin of the 
Saemaul Undong 1970’. President Park also established a Saemaul Prize to give medals 
to Saemaul Leaders or successful peasants. In addition, successful peasants could address 
issues in the monthly economic reports organized by the Ministry of Economic Planning 
Board after 1973 (Park Jin 2005; National Council of Saemaul Undong 1999; 2003; 
Hwang Byung 2005; Koh Won 2006). 
An informant recalled the period when Saemaul news and its song were aired 
daily: “It was only time in the period of Saemaul that all Kookmin (national subjects) 
worked in unison and all people became one. At that time, with the Saemaul theme song 
played every morning, people came together and worked in public jobs allotted to the 
community such as sweeping public roads, tracks, collecting trash and cleaning villages. 
 
126 Introducing the real case stories was a key factor that had an impact in inserting “We can do it too,” 
into peasants’ minds. Jung Munja’s successful story was made into a film on November 13, 1973, titled 
“women in Onuy-ri: wise women in a Village.” 
 163
We were so excited by the song that we could work with them in unison and make the 
village better.”  
His following speech gives a hint to understanding the roles of the Ideological 
State apparatuses: “Every time we turned on the radio, wet saw just the Saemaul Undong 
news and other villages’ participation and their results. Therefore, we thought this was 
not optional but an obligation for the new Korean nation. And we began to rebuild the 
roofs of our houses by replacing our thatched roofs.”  
The radio and mass media did broadcast some local news and had some success in 
improving the environment. This progress inspired other village residents to work harder 
than before so as not to be ranked lower than the successful village. The mass media 
played a major role in awakening peasants to these rural projects. An informant gives an 
example about the Kumsan-gun improvement of a rural environment project: 
 “In Kumsan, Chungchung province, most houses were smaller than ours in 
Taean, also in Chung Chung province. It was comparatively easy for Kumsan village 
residents to replace their thatched roofs with tiles or cement, because the houses in 
Kumsan were small. When we saw and heard Kumsan people improving their thatched 
roofs on T.V and radio, we thought we also should participate in ant improvement 
campaign in our village. I thought every village like Kumsan is improving themselves by 
replacing thatched roofs and only our village was left behind.“    
 Mass media was used to inflame peasants with the will to compete against other 
villages.  
3.1.1 The Roles of Institution: the Saemaul Training Center  
Park Chung Hee, after he was satisfied with the success of the first cement 
distribution, ordered a training center to be opened to educate leaders like Sayoung Ha in 
1971 (Park Jin 2005). The president established the Saemaul Leadership Training Center 
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on January 14 1972. It began to educate Saemaul Leaders (National Council of Saemaul 
2003: 1999). Over eight years, a total of 39,459 participants entered the center and were 
schooled (Park Jin 2005). After 1972, cabinet members were also educated there and 
higher officers and social leaders (elites) were encouraged to enter. All trainees were 
supposed to be trained in military rules for two weeks (later, this was changed to one 
week). A general daily schedule of the training program is provided in table 4.4  (Jager 
2003, 88) 
Table 4.4 Daily Schedule of the Training Program at the Saemaul Center 
Activities 
 
Hours  
Wake-up 5:50 
Roll-call and physical exercise 6:00-6:30 
Cleaning and washing 6:30-7:00 
Breakfast 7:00-8:00 
Morning session (success case-studies) 8:00-12:50 
Lunch 12:50-14:20 
Afternoon session (success case studies) 14:20-18:10 
Dinner 18:10-19:10 
Group discussion 19:10-22:00 
Evening roll-call 22:00-22:30 
Sleep 23:00 
According to this table, trainees were treated more like soldiers in a military 
training base. This center aimed at reeducation of the less educated. In fact, evaluations 
about the training center from trainees show its success. Of first time trainees, 121 of 122 
answered that the training was very effective in reforming their spirits, but they indicated 
that acquiring agricultural knowledge was not effective (no response). To question 
members of the third cohort in the center, 140 of 140 gave the same answer (Park Jin 
2005).  
Later, the center’s focus moved from educating about agriculture to changing 
attitude and giving case studies. In another response to the question whether they had 
achieved a will to work harder than before their training, 55 percent of 769 respondents 
answered that their will to work harder had increased, while 28.5 percent of respondents 
said their attitudes remained the same and 16 percent said they had lost their will (Park 
Jin 2005).127 Furthermore, after being trained with other elites of the state and society, 
peasants now identified themselves as equal citizens of the ROK. In other words, being a 
classmate at the training center with other government officers, ministers, CEOs, and 
sometimes professors in the same class, gave peasants a great deal of pride. It contributed 
to the increase of a shared political identity on the part peasants to the state (Oh You 
2002; Hwang Byung 2004; 2005). 
 
Table 4.5 Occupational Distribution of Saemaul Leader Participants 
 
(unit: 
 
person)
 
Occupation 
 
1972
 
1973
 
1974
 
1975
 
1976
 
1977 
 
1978 
 
1979
 
Male leaders 1490 1212 1882 2215 2497 2396 2391 1913
 
Female leaders  1203 1000 978 1079 1202 1062 1505
Officers of Agriculture 
and Fishing Oragnization 1903 1538 453 201 302 318 353
Higher Officers and Society 
Leaders  1302 878 1257 1445 1282 1692
 
CEOs   36 380 457 73 301  
 
Professors    254   405  
 
Others   32 213   43 316
 
Total  1490 4318 5790 5371 5491 5418 5802 5779
Jager (2003) argues that the training was a good way to transform peasants from 
Confucian farmers into patriotic farmers. Those leaders who were educated by the 
institutes were supposed to return to rural areas to redeem their former lives of indolence 
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127 Park Jinhwan says that the center played a role in spiritual revolution of peasants and other trainees.  
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and sloth (Jager 2003). According to research conducted in 320 villages in the 1980s, 48 
percent of the respondents answered that Saemaul leaders worked harder in their village 
jobs than at their own work, 16 percent of respondents said that they worked harder for 
their own work than at village jobs, and 36 percent answered that they worked equally 
hard for their own jobs as in their village jobs (Yi Hang and Park Sup 1997). In the same 
research, 73 percent of the people answered that Saemaul leaders contributed to the 
development of the movement.128  
An informant who was selected by the general meeting of residents gives a kinder 
definition of the movement and also denies some of the coercive ways to implement the 
movement by themselves. He recalled the mood among peasants and the surroundings of 
the Saemaul Undong: “In order to rebuild the state and live well, the government 
encouraged us to participate in the movement. The Saemaul projects were, in one word, 
‘something great,’ very splendid. The enthusiastic mind of peasants were strong enough 
to lead us voluntarily and passionately to the Saemaul Projects and in addition to the 
peasants’ passion, all local branches’ officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs focused 
on the movement. All people in Korea paid attention to the movement and participated in 
the movement.”  
He continues, “Coercion is necessary to mobilize people in the national movement 
to succeed. Later, many landowners who were forced to donate their land to expand the 
roads inside village, understood the situation and were happy to see what their land 
became.”   
The ritual of selecting their leader was important to rural residents and peasants. 
Before the Saemaul Undong, assembling peasants was not common. However, in order to 
implement the Saemaul projects, all rural residents had to gather and decide what was 
 
128 Ibid, p 21. 
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necessary for their villages. This local autonomy of politics among peasants and residents 
was an experience in self-rule. There were Saemaul leaders who had been elected by 
rural residents, not appointed by the government. When rural residents including women, 
the old, and the young as well as adult men, came together to elect leaders, everyone was 
supposed to participate in the residents’ general meeting. They experienced grass-roots 
democracy at the local level. In addition, village residents were expected to participate in 
a general meeting to decide who would be responsible for which parts of the Saemaul 
projects, what kinds of deals would be available with the state, and what rewards were 
available. At these meetings, rural residents played a democratic role and experienced 
independence from the state, because at that time, the state gave them the big picture with 
projects at the village level (Hwang Byung 2005: Park Jin 2005; Yi Hand and Park Sup 
1997).129  
 An informant who was a Yi Jang, leader of the local administration unit (Yi), 
said: “We elected a leader in the general meeting of village residents. All people 
including women came together and voted for our leader.” 
An informant who served as a leader also said: “The reason why he participated 
in the movement and as a Saemaul leader was selected by village residents, because they 
wanted a leader with leadership and capability to lead their village to become a 
successful village.”  
 
With little governmental support, the peasants achieved more than they 
expected.130 They took pride in changing their villages for the better. An informant who 
 
129 This part can be related to Fox’s synergy (1996). When he said, “to explain patterns of state-society 
synergy, one must analyze both with an interactive framework that can capture the processes of mutual 
influence between state and society. From this autonomy, peasants could form a strong relationship 
between governmental officials. To peasants and to officials, achievement was important to get rewards 
from the central government.”  
130 The government supported the Saemaul Undong with few resources. The financial government 
supports account for 33.6 percent in 1971, 11.0 percent in 1972, 17.8 percent in 1973, 23.1 percent in 1974, 
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was a Yi Jang at Sowon-myun said: “In 1971, the government gave us 400 cement bags 
to make new roads and to expand roads inside the village. The government gave us only 
cement and we had to prepare other materials like sand which were necessary to the 
project.”  
Another informant who lived in the neighboring village and also worked as a Yi-
Jang said:  
“It was radical change because we increased our household income and 
improved our thatched roofs. We created riches from rags. We just got some bags of 
cement from the government. We can do anything with the help of the Saemaul spirit. We 
improved and corrected poor manners, but we need again a spiritual revolution. If we 
change our corrupt mind, we will become richer and richer.” From the interviews, we 
can see people believe that changing minds and a revolution in spirit will give them 
prosperity and wealth.”  
3.1.2 The Role of Religion 
Christian and Catholic magazines, as well as public mass media also stressed 
participation in the Seamaul Undong to overcome income inequality. A Christian 
magazine, Christian Thought, in 1972131 said: 
“Now we have to stand by ourselves and should prove that we are democratic 
national subjects by standing alone without help from the outside world. The 
revolutionary spirit of the Saemaul Undong which translates into self-help and self-
reliant human being is a starting point and a key that will determine Korea’s future. 
 
55.9 percent in 1975, 51.2 percent in 1976, 88.8 percent in 1977, 36.7 percent in 1978, and 29.9 percent in 
1979. The reason why the governmental support amounts increased in 1975 was that the government 
invested in the income growth projects and supported peasants financially. In particular, the government 
tried to intervene in the Saemaul Undong more than before and it began to lose its autonomous 
participation, of which peasants had a little (Koh 2006; Park Jin and Han Do 1999). 
131 Christian Though, 1972, introduction, volume 169, Korean Protestant Church press: Seoul.  
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Cooperation is possible in a person who is autonomous and independent will construct a 
democratic basis. Therefore, the historical significance which the Saemaul Undong has 
in the 1970s exists here.”  
Kyunghayng Jabgi (temporary magazine of Catholic Church 1972)132 also said: 
“The state is deploying Saemaul Undong to lead this society to a better society and the 
Church is deploying the Justice and Peace movement. Both movements have their great 
idea and goals. Therefore we, the ‘laity’ should eagerly participate in these movements.”  
3.1.3 The Role of Family 
The roles of family were of importance in the spiritual revolution. According to 
Park Youngshin (1992), during the period of economic development, familism played a 
role in mobilizing people. People should sacrifice for their family. King, teacher, and 
father are one under the Confucian belief. The state is regarded as an institution that 
expands family. Youngshin Park sees religious values as a key factor in explaining 
human behavior with the term fusion. Therefore, for family, for the community, for 
society, and for the state, people should work hard. In Saemaul Undong, people were 
mobilized to improve their environment through improving projects.  
An informant from Jeolanam-do said: “I was the eldest son and there was no 
other son to cultivate the paddy lands and do my father’s job. Living in a rural village 
and serving parent as a eldest son, I think, is a feudal concept. At that time, our village 
had a strong Confucian belief that the eldest son should serve the parent. After finishing 
my military service, I returned to my village and began to engage in agriculture. I 
organized a youth farmer group to cultivate various seeds and plants to earn extra 
money. Because I had never left my village, my village residents called me for a Saemaul 
leader to work.”  
 
132 Kyunghyang jabgi, 1972, introduction, volume 1250, Korean Catholic Church press: Seoul 
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Peasants often identified the movement with a successful national program by 
ISA. An opinion poll conducted at the national level (sampling 2043 adult males and 
females) showed peasants’ consciousness of the role of the Saemaul Undong for income 
growth (Im Chang 1983). According to this poll, 92.7 percent respondents answered that 
the Saemaul Undong helped peasants’ income grow (very helpful, 57.5 percent; little, 
35.2 percent). When the research was conducted in 1982, the Saemaul Undong was about 
to be revitalized by the new military authoritarian government after President Park Chung 
Hee was assassinated in 1979. The Korean government information agency in 2006 
reported that based on national opinion polls the Saemaul Undong was the biggest and 
most remarkable project that changed Korea greatly. 
The spiritual revolution propelled by the Saemaul Undong was very successful in 
making peasants into national subjects. The movement showed the successful results to 
peasants, who previously received little support from the government and what they  had 
achieved by themselves to modernize rural areas and develop the rural economy.  
 
4. THE DE-POLITICIZATION OF KOREAN PEASANTS AND PARK CHUNG HEE 
The New Community Movement officially began in 1971. However, it is hard for 
any researcher to say when the Saemaul Undong actually began, because the movement 
was related to previous development projects. An informant who participated in planning 
and driving this movement remembered the situation in his 1997 essay: “I went to the 
Blue House after getting a call from the chief staff in early March 1972 and discussed 
rural problems and their development with other presidential staff for 5 hours. It was the 
discussion that led my work in the Blue House to the Saemaul Undong.”  
The success of early movement (the Saemau Kakkugi Undong) in fact, made 
President Park expand it to the national level. The informant’s talk above shows that 
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President Park and his staff were planning the movement’s expansion and changing it 
into a more systematic movement in 1972, while they were also planning the Yushin 
system. It was a scheme that turned the peasants’ attention to other national development 
projects. After he saw the effect of the spiritual revolution in the movement’s first stage, 
President Park inspired the peasants’ will to “live well and change their mindsets into a 
more modern one.”  
Political disillusionment caused by the movement resulted in the permanent 
dictatorship of President Park. On October 17, 1972, the government ordered martial law 
to control social order and secure national security (Oh John 1999), while the second year 
of the Saemaul Undong was energetically achieving its goals.133 One year before the 
Yushin Constitutional Amendment, President Park declared a state of national emergency 
on December 6, 1971, six months after he was re-elected as a president and four months 
after the ruling party (Republican Party) failed to get a two-thirds member majority by 
winning only 113 seats in the National Assembly election (Oh Chang 2001: Oh John 
1999).  
Failing to get two-thirds of the members meant that President Park could not 
change the Constitution to establishe his permanent rule. More interesting is that 
President Park ordered the garrison decree on October 15, 1971, forty five days before 
the declaration of a state of national emergency, and ordered his loyal army to advance 
into Seoul. The Korean army was stationed at some universities and forced them to close. 
In early November, after 1,900 students were arrested and 198 among them were 
removed from their schools, 74 university clubs were closed, and 13 kinds of university 
presses were abolished, the garrison decree was ended. Afterwards, no demonstration 
occurred against the state a full year (Oh Chang 2001; Kim In 1994).  
 
133 According to martial law, the National Assembly was dissolved and all political parties were banned. 
All colleges and universities were closed.  
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During these political events, the Saemaul Undong played a role in building a 
historical bloc of support for President Park Chung Hee and his ruling party by 
supporting the president and the new constitutional system, Yushin, even though they did 
not participate enthusiastically in meetings and conventions. Peasants showed 
indifference about the political struggle in the process to introduce the Yushin 
Constitution Amendment. Some informants’ attitudes showed their indifference. They 
answered in the following way about the Yushin System and former President Park:  
“President Park separated the government from politics. The government led 
Saemaul Undong and was devoted to the movement. The government persuaded Kookmin 
(Koreans) to agree with constitutional changes and the Yushin Constitution. So we 
believe that Yushin is just Yushin and nothing else. About the Yushin Constitution, we did 
not know what Yushin exactly meant. We were also not interested in the Constitutional 
changes. The term, the long-term rule by Park Chung Hee, was not a series interest of 
ours. Among peasants, there was no resistance to Yusin restorations or to changes of the 
Constitution.”  
Another informant, who had worked for JaegunKookmin Undong since the early 
1960s gave a similar answer: 
 “Peasants have held a desire to live prosperously for a long time. We have been 
pressed by money and poverty, so we have had hostile against chronic poverty for a long 
time. In this situation, the state guaranteed to overcome chronic poverty and to let us live 
well. Then we followed the state’s lead without any judgment about the Yushin 
Constitution /or the permanent military dictatorship of President Park Chung Hee. We 
have never decided whether Park’s military dictatorship was wrong or not. Despite a 
long term military dictatorship, we can live as well as today with the Saemaul Undong. 
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Without the dictatorship and the Saemaul Undong following it, we could not achieve our 
current wealth and prosperity.” 
An informant, who received a governmental medal for his successful agricultural 
products from President Park Chung Hee in 1970, said, “Don’t see Park Chung Hee as 
just a dictator, Understand the national conditions with which we were faced at that time. 
The younger generation does not know our situation. Without dictatorship at that time, 
we could not enjoy our current wealth as much as we can, or our country would not live 
as well.”  
Another participant spoke without preliminaries: “Only the Saemaul Undong 
could make us live better and as wealthy as today.” 
One of his friends said in a similar way: “With long term dictatorship, we could 
get over the barley hump, which means the farm hardship period of the past.”  
In terms of democracy, informants’ identity with the South Korean style of 
democracy was molded by what the state put into it. Even then, although Yushin 
Constitutional Amendment deprived Koreans, including peasants, of democracy and 
political freedom, informants identified the South Korean system with a liberal democraic 
system, which stood as a counterpart to the North Korean communist system.  
An informant defines the South Korean social and economic system as follows: 
“In South Korea, private property law existed and protected individuals’ property 
right. Therefore, if someone works hard in the capitalist order, then he or she will be able 
to make lots of money as long as he can work. We achieve more in an advanced economic 
system and economic development than North Korea, because we had a capitalist 
economic order. We had an impact of superior political system compared to North 
Korea. Economic system’s impact was more important. Capitalism is democracy, isn’t it? 
In a communist state, though someone works hard, the product that they make will not 
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become his or her property, but becomes the state’s property. Therefore, people won’t 
work hard and the economy is underdeveloped. The reason why North Korea is poor and 
underdeveloped is because of the communist economic order.”  
Another said similarly, “In one word, if there is a big difference between North 
and South Korea, North Korea does not have any system that respects human rights and 
individual property rights, while we respect them. In North Korea, people are starving to 
death and exploiting their labor. That is the communist economic order. In comparison, 
we, South Korea, value individual’s effort and achievement. The national state became 
wealthy because there were some important facts: the state respected basic human rights, 
Kookmin’s property rights and under these capitalist democratic systems, individuals did 
their best in order to get rich. This is the biggest difference between North and South 
Korea.”  
According to this informant’s definition, the South Korean economic system 
(capitalism) was superior to that of North Korea, and therefore South Korea still 
continued to develop and achieve its present wealth. The capitalist economic order’s 
advantage has already been investigated and developed by other researchers (Park Jin 
2005). In fact, economic development and dictatorship were asking peasants and other 
Koreans to sacrifice their rights and democracy. However, they did not agree with that 
reasoning. All of the informants denied that they were mobilized for political issues or 
agendas. Even though the government often organized anticommunist demonstrations, 
peasants in the Saemaul Undong had never been mobilized for them.  
An informant who worked for a Saemaul women’s group respects President Park 
and regards the economic development of Korea as a result of his existence. Even though 
she is from Chollanam-do which has been alienated from political power, economic 
development, and social benefits that the ROK should have provided to it by former 
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presidents including Park Chung Hee, she admires President Park (Yi and Chung 2003; 
Song Bok 1990; Kim Yong 1989)134. She says: 
 “President Park Chung Hee let Koreans live, especially in rural areas. I respect 
him very much. … Without his ideas, we, Korea, would have stayed behind out of time 
and lagged behind other countries. We are ranked in the first position among the 
developing countries. However, if we have not had President Park Chung Hee, we would 
have been from developing Korea. Everything was from President Park Chung Hee.”  
In Chungchung-do, Park Chung Hee is also still respected by others. An 
informant says, “When President Park was assassinated and died on October 26th 1979, 
all Koreans were disheartened completely by the news. No Korean would ever grieve like 
that, if the current president dies.” 
Another informant from a different village in Sowon-myen Chungchung-do, said 
more radically: “Sometimes, when I met my contemporaries, they say that we need 
someone like President Pak once more. Then we, the Republic of Korea, could continue 
to be wealthy.” 
Another participant said: “At that time, we became disoriented when we heard the 
news about his death.” 
President Park succeeded in turning the peasants’ attention to national 
development from political issues. Peasants joining in the movement were interested in 
economic development and modernization because they had been in a long-term poverty 
situation. The Saemaul Undong included all kinds of projects that the government 
implemented in economic policies, urban policies, education policies, and even health 
policies. The state used the term Saemaul to show that the movement was successful. In 
 
134 Regionalism and regional discrimination in South Korea have been serious problems, particularly 
socially, economically, and politically, which the ruling party of President Park and following leaders 
intensified to obtain their goals to keep their hegemony against one single region (chollado or Honam) 
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the mid 1970s, President Park showed his commitment to the movement on television 
and radios, while he was preparing his permanent dictatorship by sacrificing democracy 
and human rights. Peasants’ indifference to political issues made his plan possible and 
supported his long-term dictatorship. 
President Park liked putting a straw hat on, and peasants identified him with a 
farmer. Whenever Park Chung Hee planted rice plants in paddy fields, always wore his 
trademark straw hat. In modern times, a ruler is equal to the ruled. In Korea, where 
Confucianism was strong the fact that their president wore a straw hat like peasants had 
to wear to avoid sunshine impressed peasants and let them identify with President Park. 
Hwang Byung Joo (2000) states that the rule of Park Chung Hee included modern politics 
based on the fact the ruler and the ruled are the same human beings.    
The plebian style of President Park attracted other real plebian peasants. The fact 
that President Park was a son of peasants who participated in the Tonghak Peasants 
Rebellion in 1994 (Oh 1999) gave President Park plenty of room to use propaganda as a 
real leader, not a politician (Hwang Byung 2000). As the son of a peasant, when 
President Park addressed peasants and others, people who already identified with him 
were ready to respond to his interpellation and participated in national development 
projects like the Jaegun Kookmin Undong, and the Saemaul Undong. 
The figures 4.1 show that President Park helped prepared the rice-planting, 
transplanted the rice, ordered harvest rice, and finally drank a Korean traditional alcohol, 
Makguli with an old peasant who was wearing the traditional Korean cloth. Identification 
with Park Chung Hee by peasants made peasants believe that President Park had no 
personal desire for a permanent dictatorship or rule, but he had only desire to develop the 
fatherland. This thought led peasants’ support to Park Chung Hee until he was 
assassinated by his staff in 1979. 
Figure 4.1 President Park with a Straw Hat  
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5. ENFORCED COOPERATION, PRESIDENT PARK CHUNG HEE AND THE 
GOVERNMENT 
Most advocates insist that the movement was a voluntary one. Peasants who 
wished to overcome their chronic poverty participated in the movement and competed 
with other villages to get theirs named as self-reliant and the best village. A belief that the 
Saemaul Undong was the largest voluntary movement by peasants is widespread, and 
informants believe that the movement was quite voluntary. However, coercive ways of 
using administrative power for the state were initiated during the movement’s early stage 
(Cho Hee 2005). The over-developed state, while experiencing colonial rule by Japan and 
the Korean War, grew and increased its power over society (Hwang Byung 2005; Alivi 
1972). Here, the role of the Ministry of Home Affairs appeared in the beginning of the 
Saemaul Undong. This ministry controlled the police, internal intelligence, local 
administrations and their branches, and had a strong penetrating power into civil society 
(Jung Jae and Choi Young 2003; Yi Hang and Park Sup 1997). When the movement was 
expanded to the national level, the roles of the government were also spread. Later, most 
functions and systems related to the tasks of the Saemaul Undong were taken care of by 
other ministries within their own jurisdictions beyond the Ministry of Home Affairs. On 
regional front, in February 1973, large cities and provinces opened divisions to lead the 
Saemaul Undong, while smaller cities, rural counties, and urban districts set up Saemaul 
divisions within their organizations (National Council of Saemaul Undong, 1999).  
Other Saemaul Undong-related organizations were also run as part of other 
ministries in the following manner:  
 
•The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries opened a division addressing the issue of 
Saemal income after its organizational revamping in 1973.  
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• The Ministry of Commerce and Industry administered a division in charge of 
developing processed agricultural food under its Bureau of Small and Medium-
Sized Businesses.  
• Another unit was responsible for providing agricultural and fishing communities 
with access to telephone services under the ministry’s Bureau of Power 
Development.  
• The Ministry of Culture and Education appointed officers charged with 
collaborating with the Chief School Commissioner to implement Saemaul 
Education programs.  
• The Ministry of Public Health and Society similarly opened a division responsible 
for regional welfare under its Bureau of Social Affairs, and the National 
Agricultural Cooperative Federation managed a department in charge of Saemaul 
projects. 
• In 1972, the Training Institute for Productive Farmers, previously under the 
umbrella of the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, was reborn as the 
Training Institute for Saemaul Leaders.  
The fact that the movement was led by the ministry of Home Affairs proves that 
the Saemaul Undong was, in fact, a top-down movement. The Ministry of Home Affairs 
was one of the main apparatuses of the state’s despotic powers to control people and 
maintain military dictatorship instead of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing (Park Jin 
and Han Do 1999). In Korea, local administrative organizations and central 
administrative organizations were controlled by the Ministry of Home Affairs. A 
structure of Local administrative organizations consisted of Do (Province)-Gun (County)-
Myun (or Up)-Yi (or Dong). The administrative districts were created in the period of 
Japanese colonialization (Yi Hang and Park Sup 1997).   
Before 1972, Saemaul leaders were from Yi Jangs, who were transferred by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs. There were officially 1,469 Up/Myun and 21,195 Dong/Yi in 
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South Korea. The numbers of officials135 were 13.3 per 1000 residents in 66,498 villages 
in South Korea (Yi Hang and Park Sup 1997). Myun-Jangs, who were heads in the lowest 
administrative branch, were appointed by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Yi and Dong 
Jangs were voluntary jobs of peasants or residents for which the Ministry of Home 
Affairs paid their salaries (quite a small amount of money) and ordered them to work for 
the government. This system was set up by the Japanese colonial government (Yi Hang 
and Park Sup 1997). The main ministry dealing with the Saemaul Undong was the 
Ministry of Home Affairs, not the Ministry of Farm and Fishery in 1972 (Park Jin and 
Han Do 1999; Namubu 1979).  
According to the informants’ interviews, the roles of the local branches of the 
Ministry of Home Affairs were very strong and important enough to force peasants to 
participate in the movement. In the cases of Sowon-Myun, Taean-Gun, and Chung Nam-
Do, early Saemaul leaders were from the Yi-jang of the Ministry of Home Affairs.  
In the local areas, government branches were important for launching the Saemaul 
Undong at the beginning of the movement. Pushed by President Park Chung Hee, under 
the politically, administratively, and economically centralized structure,136 officers would 
always have contact with local residents and be cooperative with peasants in order to 
finish the rural environmental improvement projects during the movement’s early period. 
 
 
 
 
135 Yi Hang and Park Sup compiled data from the yearbook of statistics of the Republic of Korea (1995).  
136 According to the Korea Research Institute for Local Administration (1999), local autonomy was 
abolished by the military coup group, President Park Chung Hee in 1961, right after the military coup. 
Formally, local autonomy was suspended, not abolished because the state would not implement local 
autonomy in order to develop the economy by stabilizing local polity (Yoo 2002). Yoo cited data compiled 
by the Ministry of Home Affairs (1995), showing that local autonomy was suspended and 
reinstitutionalized in 1989.   
  Figure 4.2 Structure of the Governmental Saemaul Undong Organization (1979) 
                                                                 
 
 
The minister of home affairs said that “the Saemaul Undong is a war against 
poverty, sloth, superstitions and bad traditions.” With this view, each head of Gun 
(county governor), deputy of county, and Up/Myun Jang should go on their rounds to 
check the degree of development in their districts. Other local officials should go to the 
fields ten to thirty times per month (Hwang Byung 2005). According to the informants’ 
interviews, the role of the local branches of the Ministry of Home Affairs were very 
strong and important enough to force peasants to participate in the movement. In the 
cases of Sowon-Myun, Taean-Gun, and Chung Nam-Do, early Saemaul leaders were 
from the Yi/Dong-jang of the Ministry of Home Affairs.  
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In the first stage, the state needed well-organized governmental power. Therefore, 
the Ministry of Home Affairs which controlled the police power, and local 
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administrations, and could penetrate deeply into civil society, was selected. There were 
big projects by the movement using the state despotic power to force people to follow. 
Those undertakings were the expansion of roads inside villages, and mass transportation 
like the bus and the Toilbyeo project (quantitatively innovated rice brand).  
To expand roads in rural villages, in particular, each village needed 5,715m² of 
road on average (Park Jin 2005; Namubu 1972).137 Park Jin Hwan (2005) and other 
literature (the National Council of Saemaul Undong 2003) insisted that farmers who 
owned the expropriated land had voluntarily donated it to the projects. To build the 
Saemaul public community hall and facilities, each village needed at least 1,653 square 
meters. Park Jin Hwan (2005) and other Saemaul Undong documents pointed out that the 
land price at that time was low thus not a hardship for farmers. Therefore, farmers 
donated voluntarily and willingly. In the end, the government saved a lot of money to set 
up infrastructures in these areas, especially roads, to modernize and develop rural areas. 
However, some critics of the Saemaul Undong showed that resistance from farmers 
against expropriation for those projects was strong (Cho Hee 2005; Koh Won 2006; Park 
Jin and Han Do 1999), not strong enough to have any impact on either the movement or 
its direction (Koh Won 2006; Hwan Byung 2005).  
An informant who worked in the project as a Yi-Jang, which was a position at the 
lowest level of administrative units, reflected on the past and said about the term, 
‘voluntary donation,’ 
 “It was absurd to name it as “donation” because the state ordered owners to 
donate their lands. I expropriated farmers’ lands by relying on police and administrative 
power that we needed to expand roads in villages. What does the term mean? When I 
needed some land for expanding, I just went to the owner’s home and said to them that I 
 
137 Park Jin Hwan stated the area necessary to expand village roads from the data of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs. To expand 1 meter in width, average 2,700 meter length, each village needed 5,712 square meter.  
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needed your land. There was nothing that the landowners could do or get any help from, 
because it was implemented by a presidential decree, which ordered peasants and people 
to expand their roads for modernization and development, so they could not accuse Yi-
Jang of violating their property rights. Accusations would not be possible either.”  
He continued, “I was close to getting killed, when we went to a landowner, he 
wielded a knife to show resistance. In the first phase, getting land was the most difficult 
problem to expand roads and roads inside villages as the first project in Sowon-Myun.”  
At that time, the government gave no compensation to those who were forced to 
donate land. However, according to the informant, only small landowners of Sogun-Yi, 
Sowon-Myun in Taean-Gun got some money for their expropriated lands. Because as 
other literature revealed, there were no rewards for donating their land. An earlier 
informant was proud of saying: 
 “When I worked in the project, I faced the strongest resistance from a 
landowner. I accused him of preventing me from working for the state project. He was 
called by the police and I went there with him. He submitted a written promise to 
voluntarily donate his land to the village and he was released. In the end, he was 
compensated for the land. I am very proud of his getting money back.” 
His friend who also worked as a Yi-Jang for the projects said the same thing: 
“I relied on policemen and the police station to get donations of land from 
farmers. We conquered farmers’ land. When owners resisted strongly us, however, we 
could ignore their resistance with policemen’s help. The owners would have nothing to 
resist and they could not find any place to make their complaints, because the police and 
administrative units were on our side.”  
Another informant, who was a Saemaul leader and still works for the Saemaul 
Undong, said: “It was not completely enforced expropriation. It was a kind of enforced 
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donation organized by the state. The government inserted revolutionary mind into the 
peasants’ spirit to modernize and develop the rural areas. We made it with the help of the 
state. All Koreans knew necessity of the expanded roads and the owners did not charge 
Saemaul Yi-Jang with violating others’ property rights.”  
He does not deny the enforced expropriation, but he insists that the state could not 
help but appropriate the farmers’ land to expand the roads, it was an urgent project. He 
said, “If we had not expanded the roads at that time, we would not be able to succeed in 
achieving modernization. If we did not the project at this time, we would not be able to do 
anything.” But even though they agreed with the enforced donation, they agreed with 
another belief that if they did not begin the Saemaul Undong, in particular, the project to 
expand roads in rural areas, they would not be able to enjoy benefits such as farm 
machines and mass transportation vehicles from the expanded roads, and to develop their 
village.  
The Tongilbyeo project (quantitatively innovated rice brand) is regarded as a 
major factor in solving the biggest problem for peasants after Korea was established. 
Most Koreans who remember the Saemaul Undong say positively that the diffusion of 
Tongilbyuo played a major role in overcoming the famine problem.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 185
Table 4.6 Increase of Rice Productivity and Rural Household Income in the 1970s 
Year Amount of Rice 
product (Ton/Ha) 
The Diffusion rate 
of Tongilbyeo (%) 
Rural Household 
income ($) 
1970 3.30 - 824 
1971 3.37 - 1,025 
1972 3.34 15.9 1,075 
1973 3.58 10.4 1,209 
1974 3.71 15.2 1,393 
1975 3.86 22.9 1,804 
1976 4.33 43.9 2,389 
1977 4.94 54.6 2,961 
 
The governmental agency, the Agrarian Developmental Office, had tried to invent 
a new rice breed to produce more rice after 1965 (Park Jin 2005; You Tae 1986; Park Jin 
and Hand Do 1999; the National Council of Saemaul Undong 1999). Kim In Hwan 
(1978) called it “the Green Revolution in Korea” to name rapidly increased rice 
productivity (Park Jin 2005). By introducing Tongilbyeo, the year’s rice yield increased 
from 3.37 tons per hectare to 4.94 tons per hectare in 1977 (Park Jin 2005). The table 4.6 
shows the rates of crop increase per hectare and the diffusion rates of Tongilbyeo by year. 
An informant remembers the past: 
 “We had been in an extreme poverty for a long time. In order to live at the 
minimum level of food supply, the high-yield variety of grain (Tong’il Byeo-a kind of 
rice) was strongly recommended by the government. If a farmer did not plant it in his 
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paddy field, officers with the high boots and governmental agents came into the paddy 
field and destroyed the paddy plants.”  
Another informant gives a similar opinion about Tongilbyeo: “Due to Tongilbyeo, 
there was a rapid growth of rice productivity, although its taste was too bad to eat for a 
meal.”   
An informant who still works for the Saemaul Undong says about it again: “The 
government suggested that we cultivate Tong’il byeo... in order to boost peasants’ 
morale, the government established a Saemaul Prize, and ranked peasants based on the 
yield of products and gave a prize to a peasant who achieved the most plentiful amount of 
rice or other grains.” 
In order to increase the productivity of rice and other grains, the government also 
pushed peasants into piling compost (green fertilizer) in each peasant household, because 
at that time there was not enough chemical fertilizer to cover all the fields (Park Jin 2005; 
Namubu 1981). To show degrees of achievement, every family piled a big compost pile 
in the fields near its house. An informant (Mr. Koo) who remembers his father’s story 
said:  
“To display their achievement in piling compost, peasants should make a big 
compost pile. However, because every peasant needed it, there were not enough raw 
materials of compost to cover all demands from peasants in a village. So some of the 
peasants who were late in making the pile laid bricks into the pile, and completed their 
mission to pile up a heap. However, the local officials to supervise the movement realized 
the peasants’ trick and when they inspected peasants’ achievement, they often used a 
long sharp stick to check whether bricks were used or not into a heap.”  
This episode shows well that peasants who participated in the movement feared 
the state and its power. During the movement, peasants felt like soldier in training camps, 
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who must unconditionally follow orders from seniors and officers. The Peasants’ fear of 
the state resulted from the Korean War period, when Koreans killed each other only due 
to different ideologies. The war memories of peasants lasted for a long time after the war 
ended in 1953 (Hwang Byung Joo 2005). Due to these memories of fear and terror, the 
military mentality of Koreans worked in the early stage of the movement in other words, 
everything ordered by the state was followed unconditionally.138   
The strong state with despotic power likes to use its capacity to influence society. 
Another interesting story about Koreans fearing state despotic power is about Dr. Tae-
Young You, who served in the Blue House as an advisor of the Saemaul Undong. He 
recalled: 
 “After meeting President Park Chung Hee, I was told that I should work for the 
rural movement at the Blue House from tomorrow. I answered that tomorrow was too 
soon for me to work here, because I was working for the rural movement at Kunkook 
University. Then President Park said that I should resign and come to work tomorrow. I 
answered again in the negative that it was not morally good to send in my resignation 
letter tonight and come to this place tomorrow morning. Then President Park said that he 
was aware of that and I may go now. Therefore, I came to my home and saw the time as 
12:30 A.M. When I went to the school, I saw the president of the university and the chief 
director of the university waiting for me at 8 A.M. They were surprised and a little bit 
fearful, because of me. I knew that both the university president and the chief director got 
some phone calls from the Korea Central Information Agency, the Blue House and the 
Ministry of Education after midnight. They got messages from them which informed both 
 
138 Park Jin Hwan (2005), along with Park Jin Do and Han Do Hyun (1999) said that at the early stage of 
the movement, most Saemaul leaders were young men who had finished state military service and were in 
their 20s and 30s. Dr. You also said the same that only young men who had finished their military service 
were compliant and worked harder than others. This feature appears in the Student National Defense Corp 
(Hakdohakdohokookdan). Most leaders and staff of Hakdohakdohokookdan consisted of reserved veterans 
who had finished their military duty.  
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of them to send me to the Blue House early in the morning without my feeling 
inconvenient. Then the president of the university said that I should not worry about 
anything about my classes, lectures, and other administrative stuff and just go to the Blue 
House and tell the president that it was a great honor for our school, the Kunkook 
University, to send me to the Blue House, and at last I began to work for the Blue 
House.”  
Top-down ways to keep the movement going deprived local autonomy of carrying 
out the movement. Especially when the state began to invest money in increasing 
peasants’ household income, governmental financial support increased after 1975 until 
President Park Chung Hee was assassinated in 1979.139  The projects planned by the 
government during the third stage of the movement were too big for each village to be 
capable of carrying out. Therefore, the state led villages and peasants who had feared the 
state power. However, as the state increased its financial proportion of the movement, the 
financial burdens of village increased, too. The movement was losing its vigor. The 
autonomy140 that local residents and peasants held in implementing early projects of the 
Saemaul Undong had disappeared. The military government destroyed the synergetic 
relationship between the local government and peasants, the participants. Koh Won 
(2006) pointed out that the Saemaul Undong decreased because cooperation between the 
state and peasants was broken due to the severe governmental intervention.  
 
139 The government financial supports account for 33.6 percent in 1971, 11.0 percent in 1972, 17.8 percent 
in 1973, 23.1 percent in 1974, 55.9 percent in 1975, 51.2 percent in 1976, 88.8 percent in 1977, 36.7 
percent in 1978, and 29.9 percent in 1979 (National Council of the Saemaul Undong 1999; 2003; Park Jin 
and Han Do 1999; Park Jin 2005; You Tae 1986; Namubu 1979). 
140 As a result, this governmental relationship with local peasants in Korea played a key role in success of 
the movement in the early period (Evans 1996). 
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6. CONCLUSION  
Beginning as a historical contingent happening, combined with the ruler’s desire 
and thought, the Saemaul Undong effectively introduced many projects of the movement. 
Peasants accepted responsibility for the poverty that the regime had given them, as well 
as the alternatives that the stage provided (Althusser 1977). They selected their futures 
where they could live happily under good conditions. Because they accepted the 
responsibility for their poverty, they participated aggressively in the movement, which 
insisted that the movement was a spiritual revolution to transform peasants’ mindsets into 
modern ones. They, therefore, identified themselves with modern thoughts like 
commercial farmers who could make money by cultivating, selling commercial crops and 
vegetables.  
Most peasants who participated in this interview think that the movement began 
as a the government initiative to relieve peasants’ poverty. Even though the government 
used coercive ways in the early stage of the movement, after changing their environment 
and seeing what they achieved in the first stage, peasants voluntarily and ever more 
enthusiastically participated in the movement.141 By experiencing compliance, struggle, 
and resistance with the state, peasants began to establish a positive relationship with it. 
But the first thing that peasants did in the movement agreed with the state’s policies. 
Underneath this compliance and agreement, the characteristics of the strong state were 
positioned. Since the peasants in the movement accepted the established structure which 
determined the relationship between individuals and the state, peasants continued to 
identify the order of ROK with them. The state succeeded in making a new nation in 
Korea, that is, of dutiful national subjects (Moon 2005). Therefore, in terms of peasant 
 
141 This attitude toward the movement appears in other Saemaul literatures, as Hwang Byung Joo (2005) 
says, “peasants did not follow the state, but also experienced resistance and struggle with the state. 
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household debt and migration to urban areas, even though the government policy to 
develop and modernize rural areas and agriculture failed to achieve its goal by the 
Saemaul Undong, many Koreans, regardless of participants in the movement, have 
believed that the movement changed rural areas and contributed to their modernization.    
The Saemaul Undong left a big impression on most Koreans as well as 
participants. Other Koreans along with Saemaul Participants, regard the movement as one 
of the most successful programs during the economic period and one of the greatest 
achievements of President Park Chung Hee today. In 2006, the National Information 
Agency conducted public opinion research on Koreans. According to the agency, 19.7 
percent of participants answered “Seoul Olympics in 1988,” 9.8 percent answered 
“Holding World Cup,” and 9.3 percent of Koreans answered “the Saemaul Undong.” In 
the question about historical events in Korean modern history after liberation from Japan 
in 1945 of which they were most proud. The Saemaul Undong got 9.7 percent and 9.8 
percent respectively, in two previous studies in 1996 and in 2001 conducted by the same 
governmental agency. The Saemaul Undong ranked second or third in most opinion polls 
conducted through governmental research or by other private research institutes (the 
Government Information Agency 2006: Dong A Ilbo 1997).142  
Why do Koreans regard the Saemaul Undong as the biggest and the most 
impressive historical event in Korean history? The Saemaul Undong was begun, to some 
degree, as a voluntary peasants’ movement initiated by strong state power. It was very 
clear to peasants that they could participate voluntarily in the movement. The Saemaul 
Undong was a good example that President Park had longed to achieve. That was the 
 
142Note that 35.8 percent of respondents voted for the Olympics and 14.8 percent voted for Economic 
Growth in 1996. Saemaul Undong ranked third (9.7 percent). In 2001, Olympics got 28.3 percent and 
Saemaul got 9.8 percent, ranked second. Except for two big historical events, Olympics, and World Cup, 
the Saemaul Undong is seen as the most impressive historical event. The Saemaul Undong has left a 
historically unmistakable impression on Koreans, even though it is not practiced by Koreans as often as 
before.  
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spiritual revolution. Based on its historical contingency, the Saemaul Undong began with 
little help from the state. Once the state was involved, the Saemaul Undong gave it 
greater capability to mobilize people and get more infrastructural power without a great 
amount of investment. Above all, to peasants who participated in the movement, the 
commitment of President Park and his officers’ to the movement was crucial. Before 
President Park, peasants had never experienced any dedicated president, and also no 
officer had treated them as equal patriots. In other words, the state provided peasants with 
an ideological sense of satisfaction by viewing them as leading players for modernization 
of the fatherland. Peasants had also seen what they could achieve in the bad conditions 
under which they had live for a long time. 
This sense of achievement led them to belief in and identity with the movement as 
a very successful movement in Korean history. Through these experiences, peasants 
accepted and identified values of the ROK and liberal capitalism, “the ROK’s economic 
order.” This identity was new to them and naturally was far away from the Korean nation 
identity which aimed at reunification soon. But what is worse, instead of citizens, the 
term, dutiful national subject means supporters of dictatorship, economic nationalism, 
distorted nationalism and aggressive nationalism to other weak members of the Korean 
nation. This situation is what Hannah Arendt worried about a long time ago. Many 
peasants and participants in the movement sacrificed themselves for the movement by 
donating their lands, spending much time, providing their money and physical labor, and 
so on. The objective output of the movement still remains in rural areas. However, the 
movement from which the regime ascribed the causes of poverty to peasants was wrongly 
led by the state and made peasants still alienated in economic development.    
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Chapter 5: Federation of Korean Trade Unions 
 From a politically mobilized organization to a de-politicized organization 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Korean workers have been said to play a leading role in Korea’s rapid economic 
growth. Workers contribution to economic growth as well as the sacrifice of peasants and 
rural economy is not deniable. During the economic development period, the 
Hankooknochong (Federation of Korean Trade Union thereafter the Federation or the 
Hankooknochong) was at the political center of the national formation of the Republic of 
Korea. The state has always called workers as national subjects to sacrifice themselves 
for their Korean nation. In the center of such a sacrifice of workers, the Hankooknochong 
was there. After being established in 1946, the Hankooknochong had not played its roles 
in helping union members or workers’ benefits, but played a role in helping achieve 
economic development by stabilizing the labor sector during the economic development 
period. 
The Hankooknochong’s roles during the economic development period changed 
from the time of Syngman Rhee’s regime. After Korea was emancipated from Japanese 
coercive colonial domination, the labor movement re-emerged in the vortex of freedom 
and autonomous efforts to build one Korean nation state. However, the labor movement 
led by leftist Jeon Pyung was soon repressed and destroyed by the U.S. military 
government and the other rightist groups. The Hankooknochong joined in the movement 
of the rightist groups to destroy the leftist labor groups and others as AMOs in other 
countries had done before. During the general strike initiated by the railroads labors’ in 
1946, the Hankooknochong joined in attacking leftist Jeon Pyung’s labor unions143 and 
began to absorb the leftist labor unions after the raid. Finally it absorbed the remains of 
 
143 National Council of Labor Unions of Korea was called Jeon Pyung created by the Leftist.  
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the leftist labor unions and increased its size and numbers by late 1947. During the period 
of the U.S military rule, it contributed to the formation of the rightist government in 
South Korea and participated in many political events including support of the ruling 
party, the Liberal Party. After the Korean War, the Taehannochong144 continued to have 
a strong relationship in the political arena and acted for some political rulers until it was 
abolished by a military decree after the military coup d é tat.   
 However, President Park had laborers to contribute to economic development 
and stabilize the political arena as well as the labor sector to induce foreign investment. 
This distinguished President Park’s regime from Syngman Rhee’s previous regime which 
had used the labor unions to achieve his political goals. Due to a political propaganda of 
capitalism and liberal democracy, the South Korean government gave labor unions some 
room to act for union members. The Hankooknochong has sometimes played an 
important role in supporting labor and members with a little autonomy in the limitations 
set up by the state. The Hankooknochong has occasionally stood on the borderline 
between union members’ and the state’s side. Even though Hankooknochong faithfully 
tried to follow the state’s policies, it had its own autonomous boundaries in which the 
state did not intervene. With this relative autonomy, however, the Hankooknochong did 
not focus on increasing its bargaining power with the state and companies members that 
it worked for. On the contrary, some times the leaders of Hankooknochong were often 
fractious and divided. The state used this factional feature of the Hankooknochong for 
their own purposes as well as relied on the state despotic power, especially Korean 
Central Intelligence Agency and manipulated the Hankooknochong to stabilize the labor 
sector.   
 
144 The Taehannochong was a previous name of the Hankooknochong, which will be discussed in coming 
section of this chapter.  
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Then what was the role of Hankooknochong in contributing to South Koreans 
becoming national subjects of the Republic of Korea? The strong despotic state power 
which South Korea used to wield became a key fact that forced labor unions to follow 
state orders and policies. Focusing on individual workers made workers subjects of the 
state who faithfully recognized themselves as what the state called. Also the issue of 
“Uhyong,”145 which would label them as traitors of the labor movement, had workers 
internalize ideologies that the state of Korea implanted. The slogan of “For Korean 
nation, for the ROK, and for my family,” justified their cooperation with state policy. In 
this process, individual workers were ready to respect what the state asked them to do.  
   
2. BACKGROUND OF THE FEDERATION OF KOREAN TRADE UNIONS 
The Federation of Korea Trade Unions (Hankooknochong or FKTU) has the 
longest history among AMOs in Korea. During the period of the USAMGIK (the U.S. 
military government) rule, the Federation was created with the slogan, 
“Anticommunism,” After ROK appeared in Korean history, the Federation contributed to 
Syngman Rhee’s long rule as his vanguard group with Student National Defense Corps 
(SNDC or HakdoHakdohokookdan). During the economic growth period, the Federation 
had been completely alienated in the political arena but played a role in supporting rapid 
economic growth. Why is the Federation an AMO and not an interest group? The 
Federation was founded by a rightist youth group in 1946 and had worked for the security 
of the regime for a long time since 1946. During the economic growth period, the 
Federation often supported employers and the state. The regime needed a strong labor 
organization to control and manage subordinate workers because it also required a 
 
145 It was originated from a word, for the King, but has been used to call a person who collaborated with 
the military dictatorship.  
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stabilized labor sector to encourage investment. In the following section, the historical, 
political, and, economic background of the Federation will be discussed.    
 
2.1 Historical Background  
 
From the beginning of its emergence, the Taehannochong claimed to stand for 
anticommunism and corporatism with the state and capitalists (Choi Jang 1988). The 
Federation played a role in stabilizing the labor sector and supported the ruling party at 
the same time. However, forming a close relationship and working for each regime of 
Korean presidents had made workers complain about leadership of the Federation and put 
the Federation into factionalism. In the end, the Federation was disbanded by a military 
law and then recreated eight months after it was abolished. Since then, the Federation has 
stood on a borderline between workers and the state of Korean.   
2.1.1 From Birth to Growth  
Before Korea was liberated from Japan on August 15 1945, a socialist centrist, Yo 
Un-hyung (Known to Americans as Lyuh Woon-hyung)146, had prepared to organize a 
committee to build a Korean Nation state, “The Korean People’s Republic.” Even though 
the Korean People’s Republic was a socialist organization, it included nationwide 145 
local administrative branches of the committee, controlled local security as well as 12 
ministries and 1 bureau of the central government and included leftists and rightists147. 
Under these socialist surroundings, National Council of Labor Unions of Korea (Chosun 
Nodong Chohap Junkook Pyunguihoi thereafter ‘Jeon Pyung’) was established in 
November 5-6 in 1945, which had 1194 labor unions and their members were 500,000 
 
146 Cumings 1997, p. 191 
147 In the first stage of People’s Committee of Korea, the majority was leftist.  
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workers from 40 regions in 13 provinces. Officially its principles were to follow the 
Chusun Nodongdang’s (the Korea Labor Party) rule and its leaders were members of the 
Korean Labor Party. In late September 1947, union members were 520,825 (Kim Young 
2005). The first principle of the leftist Jeon Pyung was the “Complete independence of 
Chosun (Korea). In other words, its guiding first principle was to participate aggressively 
in building one unified nation state based on advance democracy excluding the pro-
Japanese traitors of Korean nation.” (Hankooknochong 2002). The charateristics of 
Chosun Nodong Dang (The Labor party) as a vanguard group resulted in the collapse of 
Jeon Pyung, when the U.S military government and rightist groups tried to keep Jeon 
Pyung from surviving and acting as a nationwide trade union in 1947 (Kim Tae 1987). 
Experiencing opposition to US trusteeship in late 1945 and early 1946, rightist 
leaders realized that they needed a new vanguard group in the labor sector as well as a 
youth group like Seochong148.  Soon, Kim Goo149, an executive manager of the rightist 
youth group, “Dokchung,” met Tack Park, who was a deputy of labor in the U.S military 
government and expressed a desire to organize a rightist labor union group to try to 
destroy and absorb the leftist Jeon Pyung. As soon as he met Tack Park, he began 
organizing the Taehannochong (Hankooknochong 2002). The Federation of Korean 
Trade Unions was finally founded on March 10th 1946 under the rule of “USAMGIK, 
United States Armies' Military Government in Korea” in order to crack down on “the 
 
148 ‘Seochung’ was the most brutal group of rightists in Korea after liberation. Most members of the group 
were from western north part of North Korea and experienced discrimination by communists (Seo Joon 
1997) 
149 This man was not the same person who was a prime minister of refugee government. There was an 
interesting story why the man, Kim Goo, organized a rightist labor union. His father was a factory owner 
and when Korea was liberated, many Japanese owned companies were managed by workers and controlled 
by them. His father’s factory workers asked his father to hand the company over to them. Then Goo Kim 
asked help from rightist groups, especially to a bureau of labor affair in the U.S military government (Lee 
Won 2005 p. 118).  
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leftist Jeon Pyung150, a strong socialist labor union” during the liberation period and early 
rule under the United State Army government (Im Chong 2005). Taehannochong’s 
formal name was Taehan Dokrip Choksung Nodong Chongyonmang (The General 
Federation of Labor Unions for Korea Independence Promotion), which was abbreviated 
to Taehannochong (Yim Song 2004). The main principles of the Taehannochong were 
corporatism with the state and capitalists and anticommunism against communists and 
leftists groups, especially anti-Soviet. When it released its name to Koreans, 45 people 
participated in the founding meeting from 15 companies. However, most participants 
were not workers, but rightist youth group members (Lee Won 2004; 2005).  
The Taehannochong grew rapidly and expanded its social power over workers 
assisted by the U.S military government and rightist groups based on anticommunism and 
corporatism with factory owners. Above all, it faithfully followed its original aim, that is 
to say, to destroy “Jeon Pyung” and absorb their members (Kazar 1993). Actually Jeon 
Pyung did not want any conflict with the U.S military government and announced 
appreciation for the U.S military government for Korea’s liberation from Japan on 
November 30, 1945. Eventually however, the Jeon Pyung realized that the U.S military 
government was not a friend of Jeon Pyung, when the U.S military government 
announced a military law of “Establishing a bureau of labor and public policies on labor 
issues,” Jeon Pyung then faced unprecedented repression from the U.S military 
government as well as challenge from rightist groups (Lee Won 2005; Hankooknochong 
2003; Kim Tae 1987). As a result, Jeon Pyung modified its approache from cooperation 
to resistance against the U.S military government.  
 
150 Chosunnodongjeongookpyunguihoi (the National Council of Korea Labor Trade Unions), which was 
6under the influence of Chosun labor party and was established in November 1945, was abbreviated to 
Jeon Pyung (Cumings 1981; Yim Song 2004). 
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On September 6, 7, and 9, 1946, the leftist Jeon Pyung confronted the U.S 
military government with a general strike for two months. At first, 7000 workers from the 
Pusan branch of the Korea railroad organized a strike against the U.S. military 
government to increase food supplies. Soon, 15,000 Seoul branch workers threw down 
their tools to cooperation on the strike, which expanded to a national level. Most 
subordinate unions of Jeon Pyung participated in the general strike. In all, 251,000 
workers throughout the southern part of the Korean peninsula participated in the general 
strike including 16,000 students’ alliance strikers (Kim Tae 1987).  3000 policemen, 
who were controlled by the U.S military government, raided where the Seoul branch 
railroad workers of the Jeon Pyung assembled and held a demonstration at 2:00 am on 
September 30 1946. 2000 rightist youth group members were along with policemen, 
including Taeahannochong workers (Lee Won 2005; Hankooknochong 2003; Seo Joong 
1997). The police in the raid arrested 22 managers of the Jeon Pyung and 1200 union 
members. Two members were also killed in the raid. During the whole period of the 
general strike, 25 in total were killed by the police throughout the peninsula, according to 
table 5.1 .  
The failure of the Jeon Pyung efforts resulted from their ignorance of U.S military 
government aims and their failure to organize their own base by strengthening the 
autonomous management movement of factories by workers (Lee Won 2005; Kim Tae 
1987). In fact, the U.S. military government had doubts and prejudices against the Jeon 
Pyung as well as the Labor Party and People’s Republic of Korea (Cumings 1997). Also, 
right after being liberated from Japanese colonial domination, it was hard for labor unions 
to increase their power (Kee Won 2005). During the colonial period, the labor movement 
had increased in the early 1930s. However, during the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific 
War, the colonial government used state despotic power and the labor movement lost its 
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momentum and even went underground (Song Kyu et al 2004; Kim Tae 1987). The Jeon 
Pyung and the Chosun Labor Party in the early period of liberation met too strong an 
enemy to defeat.  
 
Table 5.1 Strike Data by Jeon Pyung  
Damage Period No. of cases Participants 
Killed Arrested Fired 
1945.8-1946.8 1,299 226998 - 1090 2,331
1946.9-1946.10 472 173,404 25 4780 7,767
1946.11-1947.2 67 24,434 - 361 1,553
1947.3 550 162,050 - 1646 3,883
1947.4-7 258 28,908 - 616 750
1947.8-1948.1 231 26,648 - 632 1,099
1948.2 394 80,471 N/A 1607 1,216
Total 3,371 722,914 25 10741 18,599
*Source: Chosununhang chosabu (A Research Bureau of Korea Bank) in 1947, 174 page151 
 
Throughout the general strike, the Taehannochong began to absorb union 
members of Jeon Pyung and ended the general strike of the Jeon Pyung. Especially, the 
Korea Railroads labor union was taken over by the Taehannochong and the 
Taehannochng announced the end of the strike. After another general strike of the leftist 
Jeon Pyung in March 1947, the U.S military government made the leftist Jeon Pyung 
illegal and after the February general strike, the Jeon Pyung disappeared into labor union 
                                                 
151 Song Kue Jin et all, 2004, Korean Modern History: Statistical Analysis, Ahyeon: Seoul, Korea. They 
recited this data in 445 page. Even though total sum is not correct, Chosununhanb chosabu data was exactly 
used.  
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history (Kim Tae 1987). As a ramification of the strong effort made by the U.S. military 
government with assistance from rightist youth groups, in August 1947, the 
Taehannochong had 236 labor unions and 46,374 members (male and female workers), 
while Jeon Pyung had 13 labor unions and 2456 members (male and female workers) 
(Song Kyu et al 2004).152  Unde exposed to severe suppression and challenges from 
Taehannochong, the Jeon Pyung continued to lose its power and capability to resist the 
U.S. military government and rightist groups in South Korea.  
 
2.1.2 Growth and Factionalism  
Factionalism in the Taehannochong was a serious problem that had existed since 
the organization was created. After the Jeon Pyung lost its strong power over South 
Korean workers, the Taehannochong grew to cover all labor unions in South Korea. As 
soon as it became a Federation of labor unions, the Taehannochong became a strong 
mobilization organization for Syngman Rhee’s regime along with the Student National 
Defense Corps (Seo Joong 1995; 1996; 1997). During Syngman Rhee’s regime, the 
Taehannochong was one of the strongest vanguard groups of Rhee’s regime and his 
party, the Liberal party (Seo Joong 1997b). Syngman Rhee and his party mobilized 
workers and unions in demonstrations for Syngman Rhee and his dictatorship during the 
1950s. The Taehannochong became a mainstay organization of the Liberal party of 
Syngman Rhee (Lee Won 2005; Hankooknochong 2003; Seo Joong 1997).  
Leaders of the Taehannochong were soon divided into various factions, right after 
the collapse of the Jeon Pyung. One important origin of the factions in the 
Taehannochong resulted from the original limits of the Taehannochong (Yim Son 2004; 
 
152 Lee Won-Bo (2005, p. 144) shows that there were 221 labor unions under Taehannochong and 39,000 
members in September 1947. However, Kyu Jin Song et al(2004)used data from a research bureau of Korea 
Bank in 1947. Even though there are some calculating errors in the data, in this research Korea bank data 
will be used.  
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2005; Yim Song Ja 2004, 2005)  The key fact was whether Taehannochong would be a 
partner or subordinate organization of Syngman Rhee or not. This issue related to the 
corrupt union leaders who produced two violently hostile groups: a reformist group and 
anti-reformist group that supported the chairman of the Federation of Korean Trade 
Unions (Taehannochong), who stood on the opposition side of Syngman Rhee. In the 
end, the opposite leaders to Syngman Rhee were removed from the Taehannochong (Yim 
Song 2004). However, the factionalism in the Taehannochong was the most serious 
problem and caused it to be divided into two different Federations, which led in turn for it 
to become an organization more easily manipulated by the state and the ruling party (the 
Liberal party).  
After the Korean War, the Taehannochong continued to grow and expand its 
power over local labor unions. The number of enterprises which had 5 or more 
employees actually decreased between 1953 and 1960, due to the economic depression. 
However, the number of labor unions increased from 562 in 1955, 634 in 1958, to 558 in 
1959 and the number of union members grew from 205,511 in 1955, 248,507 in 1957, to 
280,438 in 1959 (Lee Won 2005) Factionalism, corporatism, and anticommunism were 
all inherent in the Taehannochong. However, the corruption of leaders and local union 
presidents, and Uhyong issues of the Taehannocnong made some workers leave the 
Federation and even to found a new Federation which was autonomous and not 
associated with the political arena and would work for union members (Lee 2004; 2005; 
Yim Song 2004; 2005).  
Also at a more local level, labor unions organized their own strikes against their 
employers without deferring to the central Federation’s decision. The number of labor 
disputes increased from only nine cases in the year 1953 to 95 cases in 1959. The number 
of participants in labor disputes increased from 2,271 to 49, 813, in 1959 and included a 
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stevedores’ strike, cement industry workers’ strike, textile workers’ strike, and so on  
(Lee Won 2005).153 The central Federation, however, warned local labor union members 
who participated in those strikes and asked for law enforcement (the police) to intervene 
and stop the strikes. 
Corruption, close relationships with the ruling party, and acts against union 
members provoked local labor union members and other lower level unions. Union 
members and workers even began to resist their corrupt and pro-ruling party presidents. 
For example, this resistance happened by the Stevedore union and Chosun textile 
company’s union members. Even a secretary of a general of the Taehannochong 
criticized a president for corruption and resigned from his position at the Federation. The 
Federation which faced resistance both within and outside its ranks was still cooperating 
with the ruling party and Syngman Rhee’s regime. In the presidential election of March 
15, 1960, the Federation played a critical role in supporting the ruling party and President 
Syngman Rhee.  
At last, some local unions’ leaders who opposed the Federation formed a new 
organization, called “Jeonkooknohyup”-the Federation of National Labor Trade Unions 
on October 26, 1959 (Lee 2005). 311 local labor unions out of a the total of 541 unions, 
under the Federation’ influence, seceded from the Taehannochong, and joined in the new 
Federation (Jeonkooknohyup).  
Jeonkooknohyup’s principles included the forming a democratic labor movement 
from the grassroots, the establishing of Korean nation sovereignty, the building of an 
equal society for workers, and the achieving national economic development. The new 
Federation claimed they had 140, 000 union members taken from the Taehannochong 
 
153 p. 150-153 
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unions (Lee Won 2005). However, this new Federation (Jeonkooknohyup) had difficulty 
working effectively for members because the Taehannochong and the state tried to 
prevent their efforts. Until the April 19th Civilian Revolution, the new Federation was 
kept inactive.  
 
2.1.3 May 16 Military Coup and Re-Organization of the Labor Sector 
The Second Korean Republic was born after the April civilian revolution, and 
passed many laws, which had been used to suppress Koreans or worked for the previous 
dictator, Syngman Rhee. An good example is a presidential decree of interim cabinet 
meeting in 1960 to abolish Student National Defense Corps (Legislative Office 1960). 
The Second Republic also reduced the state power over society in order to increase the 
democracy. Workers in businesses were encouraged to organize labor unions. The 
numbers of labor unions grew from 558 unions in 1959 to 914 unions in 1960 with 
321,097 members. Under this new democratic regime, there were many social 
demonstrations by students, workers, the poor, and other Korean groups for example, 
teachers, financial workers, and even civil service officials.  Labor disputes increased 
from 95 cases with 49,813 participants in 1959 to 227 cases with 64,335 participants by 
1960. In addition to the increase in labor disputes, the number of street demonstrations 
also rapidly increased. From April 19, 1960, to September 30, 1960, 223, 475 workers 
participated in a total of 458 cases of street demonstrations (Lee Won 2005; 
Hankooknochong 2002).   
 There were severe social disorders during the Second Republic for about 10 
months. The ruling party, the Democratic Party, which was divided into two major 
factions, was struggling. Also they could not control the social disorders caused by the 
many street demonstrations, strikes, protests, and various movements because of a weak 
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administration, insufficient riot police, and divided parties and politics. There were 2000 
street demonstrations and 900,000 participated in those demonstrations in 1960 (Nahm 
1988). While state institutions and the administration power were impotent, military 
factions prepared a military coup to remove what they saw as an inefficient and corrupt 
administration, including some higher level of military generals in the Ministry of 
National Defense (Nahm 1988).  
On May 16, 1961, Major General Park Chung Hee led a military coup, and 
established the Supreme Council for the State Restoration. On May 23, 1961, the council 
announced the sixth military decree to prohibit the activity of any political, social, and 
other organizations. By May 31, 1961, all non-political social organizations had to be 
registered.  Local labor unions and the Federation which unified the Taehannochong and 
the Jeonkooknohyup could not register at all. On June 12, the supreme council of the 
military government announced the 32nd decree that each social organization must 
register. However, at the same time, the military government did not permit any labor 
unions and labor associations to function. The labor unions were suspended until August 
3, when the military government decreed that labor unions were allowed to register and 
work. However, the purpose of the decree was not so much to guarantee workers’ rights, 
but to use them to support the military government. The decree said “This law aims at 
making workers contribute to the restoration of the state by allowing them to act and 
work.” 
When the military government permitted the restoration of all labor unions and  a 
new Federations of Korea Trade Unions, the state gave nine guidelines and restrictions 
for managers of the unions or Federation: excluding 1) anyone who participated in any 
political party at managerial level or more; 2) anyone who worked for owners of a 
business (Uhyong or collaborators); 3) anyone who was a corrupt labor leader or a 
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dictator  of unions; 4) factionalists within unions; 5) anyone who was related to 
communists or leftists; 6) anyone who had not completed their  military obligations; 7) 
anyone who was deprived of public citizenship; 8) anyone who resisted the military coup 
in 1961 ; 9) anyone who was a pseudo worker or unqualified to rebuild labor unions. In 
addition to this, the military government re-organized all labor unions into national 
industrial labor unions, instead of local based labor unions.  
The military government organized nine leaders’ committee of labor union 
reconstruction, in order to rebuild the labor sector only 73 days after it ordered the 
suspension of labor unions (Lee Won 2004;2005; Song Ho 2000; Kim Jun 1999).   The 
emphasis on industrial labor unions lay in the hope of that the state wanted to easy 
control the labor sector. It wanted a single industrial union in one industry, because they 
then could easily control and manage other workers by the controlling labor union leaders 
(Kim Jun 1999). The military government preferred a hierarchical centralized system in 
labor unions similar to a military system. A characteristic of industrial labor union system 
is that industrial union can control their subordinate local labor unions (Lee Won 2004; 
Hankooknochong 2002). So a single national industrial union blueprint was chosen by 
the military government (Lee Won 2004; Song Ho 2000; Hankooknochong 2002; Kim 
Jun 1999) 154 . The rebuilding committee of the labor sector decided to organize 15 
industrial labor unions and appointed committee members to organize the unions.  
 
154 Lee Won-Bo (2004 p 108) and Kim Jun (1999) unveiled a hidden story about the reconstruction of the 
labor union system in the following: “After the military coup, I attended the office of the Federation 
(Nochong) without specific jobs. One day, a police sergeant stopped by the office and suggested that I 
participated in a group to rebuild the labor union system. I worked for three months and submitted a 120 
page reports to the military government, actually KCIA.” They said about the police sergeant who 
organized the reconstruction committee. “His name was Kim Sung Woon who was from Pyungando, North 
Korea before the Korean War, he worked in the intelligence part of the police headquarter. After he worked 
in the supreme committee of the state restoration, he became an executive manager of the 
Hankooknochong.”  
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The military government announced the principles of the labor union movement 
and the essential points of labor union organization related to anticommunism, economic 
development, and modernization of the fatherland (the Republic of Korea). Through the 
direction and the principles of rebuilding the labor sector by the military government, the 
military government tried to organize the labor sector with two big goals: one goal was 
the control and stabilization of the labor sector by the state; the second was to mobilize 
workers in economic development projects such as the Factory Saemaul Undong or a 
movement for productivity growth (Song Ho 2000; Kim Jun 1999).      
After the reconstruction of the labor sector, the main policies of the state, in the 
1960s, focused on achieving a stable labor relationship between workers and their 
companies in order not to hamper sustainable economic growth (Lee Won 1999). The 
state also fully supported economic growth. For real economic growth, a collaborative 
labor relationship with the unions was essential and necessary. State relations with labor 
sought to enhance productivity through repressive state apparatuses and through 
cooperative labor union leaders. As the principles for the rebuilding showed above, 
nationalism was the main means to mobilize people. The state continued to create new 
Korean histories and national tasks for contemporary Koreans to achieve. For the history 
and task, anticommunism and economic nationalism were introduced. The military 
government announced six principles for the national tasks. Among them, the first and 
the fifth are analyzed. The first principle was the democratic unification of national 
territory by strengthening anticommunism and establishing an independent autonomous 
economy in Korea. The fifth principle was the development of national industries. The 
state utilized economic nationalism to mobilize and harness the economic energies of the 
entire society (Kohli 2004). Anticommunism, especially, was the strong means used by 
the state to prevent the labor sector from striking and using other severe ways to 
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negotiate. The state also used the mass media to keep workers from labor disputes. 
Nationalism and anticommunism as a strong ideology continued to have a powerful 
impact on workers and other Korean subjects.  
 
2.2 The Conditions of the Labor Movement  
The increase in the total number of workers caused by the growth in business, low 
wages and bad working conditions, the additional increase in the number of female 
workers, combined with the conservativism of workers were all characteristics of the 
labor movement in the economic development period.  
 In the percentage distribution of GDP in current prices, industry, accounted for 
18.6 percent in the structures of production in 1960. The percentage of industry had 
increased to 28.4 percent of the production structure of the Korean economy by 1970. 
Manufacturing among the industrial sectors accounted for 12.1 percent of 18.6 percent in 
1960, which increased to 19.1 percent of 28.4 percent in 1970 (Koo 2001)155.  
1,133, 000 peasants moved to urban areas between 1960 and 1966. By 1966-1970, 
2,516, 000 peasants had migrated into urban areas. During the early period of the 
Saemaul Undong in1970-1975, 2,561,000 peasants left rural areas. Finally, during the last 
period of President Park’s regime in 1975-1980, 3,350,000 peasants left their villages (Yi 
Young 1988; Park Jin 1987). Most urban wage workers were from rural areas; 
particularly, after the first period of the five economic development plans, the migration 
into urban places increased rapidly.  
In fact, the proportion of wage workers increased rapidly with the speed of the 
economic growth. According to table 5.2 , the percentage of wage workers in 
manufacturing increased from 17.3 percent in 1963 to 26.3 percent in 1970, 37.1 percent 
 
155 Sector classification is based on the World Bank method suggested in World Bank, World 
Development Report, 1995, Koo (2001 p. 33) said. 
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in 1975, 38.2 percent in 1980 Table 5.2). The number of wage workers except in 
agricultural areas continued to increase. Most wage workers except agricultural workers 
lived in urban areas. Manufacturing workers’ growth in number contributed to the 
organization rates of labor unions.  
 
Table 5.2 Growth of Wage Workers in the Industrial Sector (Unit: thousands, %) 
 
 1963 1970 1975 1980 1985 Rate of Change 
(1985/1963) 
Agriculture 725 
(30.0) 
743
(19.60
677
(14.1)
551
(8.5)
437
(5.4)
0.6 
Manufacturing 417 
(17.3) 
995
(26.3)
1,782
(37.1)
2,475
(38.2)
3,146
(38.9)
7.5 
Service 
&Commerce 
1,272 
(52.7) 
2,049
(54.1)
2,344
(48.8)
3,459
(53.3)
4,507
(55.7)
3.5 
Total 2,414 
(100) 
3,787
(100)
4,803
(100)
6,485
(100)
8,090
(100)
3.4 
 
Ten years after the Federation was recreated in 1961, there were 17 industrial 
labor unions as compared to 14 industrial unions in 1961. There were 437 branches, 
2,995 chapters and 493, 711 union members in 1971 (Lee Won 2004). The increase in the 
union membership in the service sector was recorded as 3.67 times more than in 1961. 
However,   the size of the service and commerce industrial sectors was relatively smaller 
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than that of the manufacturing industry sector, and their smaller size was easily controlled 
by business owners. 
The growth of the Korean economy caused an increase in the number of wage 
workers. However, employees’ status shows another feature of the Korean economy in 
terms of job security. As Table 5.3 shows, the percentage of permanent employees was 
not high (Park Hae 2005). The number of irregular and part time workers in their status 
gave regular workers few opportunities to resist bad employers (Lee Won 2005). This 
fact gave employers and the state power to control the labor movement. In fact, the rates 
of organizing labor unions were higher in large businesses than in small businesses. The 
rate of organizing unions in business with 49 or less workers was 8.3 percent while the 
rate in business with 50-199 workers was 17.1 percent, 38.7 percent in business with 200-
499 workers, and 61.8 percent in businesses with 500 or more in 1971 (Lee Won Bo 
2004).156  
The increase in the service sectors and the numbers of workers in the sector 
resulted from the overall growth of the Korean economy and the spread of 
urbanization157. The improved labor conditions attracted workers in the industry and the 
unions could expand the number of members. However, in fact, the increase in the 
number of union members only matched the increased rate of workers due to the 
development of the Korean economy, particularly in the manufacturing sectors and the 
service sectors. Table 5.3 shows the change of employee’s job status and distribution of 
industries from the 1960s to the 1970s. Employee status ratio was not different as time 
went on, while the proportion of each industry changed and the proportion of employee 
changed. 
 
156 Lee Won Bo recites a data from an institute of Korea Development in 1973  
157 The fact that labor unions of transportation, stevedore, automobile, and seamen increased reflected the 
increase of the urban residents and of the foreign trades (Lee Won 2005; Hankooknochong 2002). 
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Table 5.3 Change of Employee’s Job Status and Distribution of Industries: 1960s-1970s                
(Unit: %) 
 Employee classified by status Employee classified by industries 
Year  Self 
employ 
Family 
employ 
Permanent 
employ 
Temporary 
informal 
Agriculture 
and fishery 
industry Service 
1963 37.1 31.4 12.2 19.3 63.1 8.7 28.2 
1964 36.9 32.4 11.8 18.9 61.9 8.8 28.2 
1965 36.7 31.2 13.3 18.8 58.6 10.4 31.0 
1966 30.1 30.4 15.0 24.5 57.9 10.8 31.3 
1967 36.1 26.6 17.1 18.2 55.2 12.8 32.0 
1968 35.1 27.4 19.5 18.0 52.4 14.0 33.6 
1969 34.9 27.0 21.6 16.5 51.3 14.3 34.4 
1970 34.2 27.0 22.9 15.9 50.4 14.4 35.2 
1971 34.2 26.5 23.0 16.3 48.4 14.2 37.4 
1972 34.2 27.3 21.2 17.3 50.5 14.2 35.2 
1975 34.3 25.5 22.0 18.7 45.9 19.1 35.0 
1977 33.2 22.2 25.5 19.1 41.8 22.4 35.8 
1979 33.5 18.8 29.1 18.5 36.5 24.5 39.0 
1980 33.9 18.8 30.4 16.9 34.0 22.6 43.4 
Note: Data Source was from the Economic Planning Board, The Yearbook of Economically Active 
Population. 1980 
According to table 5.4 , the Hankooknochong and its industrial unions tried to 
expand its numbers of union members. Amplifying the number of union members 
depended on the effectiveness of each industrial union and subordinate branches of the 
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unions. For the instance in the automobile labor union158, the number of labor union 
members increased to 77,084 in 1971 from 24,790 members in 1964, because the 
automobile union greatly improved labor conditions by negotiating with local employer 
unions (Lee Won 2004). 159  The improved labor conditions attracted workers to the 
industry and the unions expanded the number of members. However, in fact, the increase 
in the number of union members only matched the increased rate of workers due to rather 
the development of the Korean economy than the Federation’s efforts. 
 
Table 5.4 Growth of the Number of Union Members of Hankooknochong in the 1960s 
Year  Goal No. Achievement 
No. (%) 
Total members 
No. 
The real 
increased No. 
1962 55,000 47,300 (86.0) 176,165 79,334 
1963 55,319 48,255(87.2) 224,420 48,255 
1964 38,725 47,159(121.8) 271,579 47,159 
1965 57,227 57,740(100.9) 294,105 22,526 
1966 106,921 72,916(68.2) 336,974 42,869 
1967 64,466 66,418(103.0) 366,973 29,999 
1968 83,044 83,522(100.6) 399.909 32,936 
1969 95,576 103,514(94.7) 444,372 44,463 
Total  556,278 526,824(94.7) 268,207 347,541 
Source: The Hankooknochong, Monthly Report, 1963-1970160 
                                                 
158 The automobile labor union is not a labor union which produces vehicles. The auto unions consisted of 
workers who worked in the mass transportation service sectors like bus, taxi, and other transportation 
industries.  
159 Lee Won Bo compiled data of “Yearly Report” published by Hankooknochong in each year from 1962 
to 1971.  
160 Lee Won Bo 2004, p. 161 
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Due to the efforts of the Federation and subordinate industrial labor unions as 
well as economic development, overall numbers of unions increased and the increased 
numbers of union members did give negotiation power to union leaders against 
employers.  
 
Table 5.5 Change of the Number of Union Members161 (Unit: Number)                              
  1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 
Members 176,165 271,579 336,974 399,909 469,003
Business 577 952 980 2,291 3,454
Total  
Member/  
Business 
305.3 285.3 343.9 174.6 135.8
Members 53,089 58,594 71,989 98,142 118,953
Business 165 186 238 230 314
Manu 
-facturing  
Member/ 
Business 
321.8 315.0 302.5 426.7 378.8
Note: 1. manufacturing industry includes only textile, chemistry, metal labor unions 
     2. The number of business includes only business available collective agreement in labor contract.  
Source: the Hankooknochong, Year Report,  
 
The growth of the Korean economy was the most important reason that caused the 
number of union members to increase. From table 5.5 , in the manufacturing business, the 
number of businesses in 1970 was recorded about 1.9 times as many as the numbers in 
1962, while the number of unions in 1970 increased 2.24 times as many as the number in 
1962. But in the total industry, the number of businesses in 1970 increased 2.67 times as 
many as the number in 1962, while the number of union members in 1970 increased 6 
                                                 
161 Lee Won Bo 2004, p.163 
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times as many as the number in 1962. The rates of organizing labor unions in fact were 
less than the increased rates in workers or businesses. 
The number of female workers increased rapidly and the proportion of the female 
workers among total wage workers was 41.0 percent in 1963, 50.7 percent in 1973, 53.0 
percent in 1976, and 49.6 percent in 1978 of the total number of production workers. 
Most female workers worked in light manufacturing industries such as textile, garment, 
and electronics industries (Koo 2001). Most female workers were single, semi-skilled 
workers in their late teens and early 20s from rural areas (Lee Won 2005; Koo 2001). 
Intense work, long hours, and overtime work made female workers exhausted. In the end, 
the female workers’ severe labor conditions resulted in a big labor dispute and was a 
cause of the democratic labor movement in the late 1970s.   
From a wig maker, Bae Okbyung, it is possible to figure out wig workers’ lives in 
the 1970s.  She said, “a dormitory of a wig making company consisted of three floors: 
the first floor was the auditorium, restaurant, snack bar, and lounge; the second and third 
floors were used for the dormitory. In each room, there were two-story bunk beds and the 
floor was like a military floor (barracks), where 20 female workers stayed. The steam 
heating system was also different from the traditional Korean heating system, most of 
which had under floor heating systems (Park Hae 2005)”.  
Korean economic growth owed a great deal to the workers. During the economic 
development period, many workers suffered from low wages and bad conditions of work. 
Table 5.6  shows the wage costs of employers, during the economic development period. 
The growth rates of real wage costs were negative for the ten years from 1967 to 1976. 
Low incomes and bad working conditions became one cause that increased the rate of 
organizing labor unions in the labor sector. Workers realized that only with collective 
action, could they improve their working conditions and wages (Lee Won 2004; 2005).  
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Table 5.6 The Growth Rates of Wage Cost by the Year (Unit: %)                                   
 
Year  Nominal 
wage   
Consumer 
price  
Wholesale 
price 
Substantial 
wages 
Labor 
productivity 
Wage cost Substantial 
wage cost 
1967 22.5 10.4 6.4 14.0 17.7 3.9 -5.1 
1968 26.5 10.9 8.4 5.8 19.9 5.5 -16.2 
1969 23.5 12.5 6.4 9.8 26.5 -7.9 -8.2 
1970 26.9 16.1 9.1 9.4 12.6 12.7 3.3 
1971 16.1 13.4 8.8 2.2 9.8 5.7 -2.9 
Average 23.1 12.3 7.8 8.2 17.1 4.0 -5.8 
1972 13.9 11.7 13.8 2.1 9.0 4.4 -8.2 
1973 18.1 3.7 6.9 15.8 10.4 8.9 22.5 
1974 35.2 24.2 42.1 8.7 11.2 21.6 -28.9 
1975 27.1 25.3 26.6 1.4 11.6 13.9 -10.0 
1976 34.7 15.3 12.1 16.8 11.9 20.4 7.4 
Average 25.2 15.7 19.7 8.5 10.8 13.8 -3.4 
1977 33.8 10.1 9.0 21.5 11.0 20.5 10.5 
1978 32.2 14.4 11.7 13.7 11.6 22.4 9.6 
Source162: Hankooknochong, Economic development and income distribution p.200 
 
From the table above, real wage costs of employers recorded a minus growth, 
even though they gave workers nominally higher wages per year, during the economic 
development period. The growth in the nominal wage of workers made some scholars 
                                                 
162 Lee Won Bo 2004, p.331 
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state that economic development contributed to a relatively equal income distribution in 
South Korea. Haggard (1990) sees that labor-intensive export oriented industries 
benefited Korean workers more than other Latin American workers, because labor-
intensive industries hired more workers and produced a relatively equal income 
distribution. For workers who left their rural areas, getting jobs would benefit them more 
than remaining in poor rural areas and could even lead them to give support to the 
dictator. Under the authoritarian regime, therefore, workers were exploited by employers 
who were helped by the state, but workers also politically supported President Park. In 
addition to job opportunities, urban life style also contributed to the conservativism of 
workers. Park Haekwang (2005) defines the urban lives of workers as a future full of 
opportunity and giving them a happy urban life. This was one reason why early workers 
under severe working conditions showed such conservativism. They believed that the five 
year economic development plan of President Park led to the economic development of 
the 1960s. Working conditions would improve as the Korean economy grew.    
The attitude towards President Park Chung Hee and his regime, and the attitude 
towards the Republic of Korea, or voting preferences were measured in opinion polls. In 
the 1960s and early 1970s, social opinion researches were conducted by university 
institutes and professors. According to this research, less educated people, lower income 
people, and workers and peasants supported President Park more than Kim Dae Jung, a 
presidential candidate of the opposite party (Lee Young and Hong Sung 1976; Kim Se 
1971)163. The research asked whether they supported the Republic of Korea political 
system, President Park Chung Hee in the presidential election in 1971, and the degree of 
democratization (Oh Chang 2001).  
 
163 Oh Chang Hyun’s writing (2001) heavily relies on their researches. This research also recites their 
works from Oh’s writings. 
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According to the Korea University Labor Institute in 1971164, 76.3 percent of 
unskilled workers and 74.7 percent of skilled workers supported a policy that would 
introduce foreign capital from the United States and Japan into Korea. This support was 
given even though the Federation had resisted the regime’s modified labor laws to 
encourage foreign capital investment in 1968. Also the research asked unskilled workers, 
semi-skilled workers, skilled workers, and professional technicians whether they voted 
for President Park’s third time presidency or not in the presidential election in 1971. 49. 6 
percent of unskilled, 43.7 percent of semi-skilled, and 40.6 percent of skilled workers 
supported President Park in that election, while 35.6 percent of professional technicians 
voted for him. The opposition party’s candidate, Kim Dae Jung got 27.4 percent from 
unskilled 34.7 percent from semi-skilled, 34.8 percent from skilled, and 40.8 percent 
from professional technicians (Oh Chang 2001). In answer to the question 165 , “the 
political system of Korea is completely liberal and democratic,” political consciousness 
appears in the replies. 93.3 percent of unskilled workers answered “Korea is liberal and 
democratic.” 91.5 percent skilled workers answered the same. In this question, workers 
had a positive judgment of the political system of South Korea. And they supported 
President Park instead of alternative candidates.  
Three months after this research, President Park issued a new military decree   
and declared a new Constitution, the Yushin system, where the state discarded their past 
policy of “guided democracy and state corporatism.” The workers suffered from their 
conservativism and working conditions became worse. Under the Yushin system, the 
state relied only on its despotic power to control and manipulate workers instead of 
obtaining supports from them (Song Ho 2001’ Kim Sam 1999). Park’s regime soon faced 
 
164 Oh Chang Hyun recited data from the institute of Korea University Labor Issues in 1972.  
165 Unskilled workers sample was 1897 workers and skilled including semi-skilled workers were 5148 
cases.  
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resistance from the . A historical incident, such as the “YH trade company labor dispute,” 
in which was a wig maker company that shut down without paying workers’ wages, an 
example of resistance from the  (Lee Won 2005; Kim Bo 2006; Park Chong 2001)166. 
The wholesale repression by the state after the Yushin brought out factions among the 
ruling elites when the ruling elites tried to suppress resistances from below. Particularly, 
hardliner and moderate sectors were struggling with each other. The ruling elites of 
Park’s regime were divided by this resistance and weakened by internal conflicts (Cho 
Hee 2005; Kim Bo 2005 and 2006; Park Chong 2001). 
 
3. THE ROLE OF FKTU 
During the economic development period, the roles of the Federation were mainly 
two: one was to passively cooperate with the state labor policy at the level of the 
Federation; the other was to actively negotiate power over employers at the level of local 
unions. One was to work for the protection of union members’ rights. The other was to 
participate in national development projects and support President Park and his party. In 
fact, the Federation continued to support Park’s regime and its policies, even though the 
Federation resisted some governmental policies and labor law changes. The roles which 
appeared in the newspaper (Nochongbo) of the Federation mainly consisted of two 
positions: the workers’ demands and cooperation with the government as well as 
advertising the Federation’s activities. Most reports divide Park’s regime into three 
periods: the military rule period after the coup until 1963; the period of from 1963 to 
1972 when the Yushin system initiated; the period after the Yushin system began.  
 
166 The labor dispute of Y.H. Trade Company was a historical event that led to the collapse of Park’s 
regime. The company producing and exporting wigs closed due to severe drain of dollars and 
mismanagement. The workers of the company resisted the closure and demonstrated in a building of the 
opposite party. But riot police and law enforcement raided the building, and attacked and beat female 
workers and the chairmen of the opposite party, congressmen, and other politicians (Park Chong 2001p. 
381-383)  
 218
The first period was a phase of reorganization for the Federation (Kim Sam 2001; 
Kim Jun 1999). The second was a period of guided democracy and state corporatism 
(Kim Jun 1999; Choi Jang 1988 and 1983). The third period was one of wholesale 
repression or coercive suppression by the state apparatuses (Song Ho 1993; 2003).  
Hankooknochong continued to support Park’s regime and his dictatorship after the 
Federation was re-organized. Particularly, the Federation expressed or reported their 
support for President Park Chung Hee whenever new political incidents or issues 
appeared. In the different time periods, Park’s regime had different plans to control and 
manage the labor sectors. 
 
3.1 The Roots of the Cooperation Structure: Re-Organization of the Labor Sector in 
1961-1963 
In order to understand the roles of the Federation, it is necessary to look into the 
structure of the Federation and the period of the reorganization. The military government 
and President Park’s main interests were in de-politicization, and an economic 
mobilization that was expected to contribute to stabilization of the labor sector and 
encourage economic development (Song Ho 2000).  To avoid a direct relationship 
between the ruling party and the Federation resulting in the corruption of labor leaders, 
the military government tried to exclude political color from the Federation. Instead of a 
direct relationship with the labor sectors, the government wanted to rule the sectors by an 
indirectly in a way in which the state surveillance apparatuses such as the KCIA and 
Police intelligence agents kept their eyes on the leaders of the Federation. Controlling the 
leaders of the Federation was efficient and effective in managing workers, under the 
industrial union system, which the industrial labor unions themselves firmly controlled. 
In order to understand the Federation during the economic development period, it is 
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necessary to grasp the process how Park’s regime supported the Federation as a single 
labor union organization. And the state set the Federation as an assistant in developing 
the Korean economy, not as an obstacle (Lee Won-Bo 2005; Song Ho 2000; Kim Jun 
1999). Song (2000) defines the period of the 1960s as a period of state corporatism 
period.  
The National History Compilation Committee of the Military Revolution 
(1963) 167  explained why they abolished the previous labor unions and labor 
organizations, and planned to re-create labor unions under the single Federation:   
 
“The existence of the small and jumbled labor unions led by pseudo-workers 
caused factionalism among labor unions. The factionalism and struggles caused 
instability in the Korea economy. Also the Federation did not play the role of a real 
organization for the protection of workers’ rights and interests, but played the role of a 
leadership group of the single party dictatorship. This was the real character (face) of 
the Federation before the May 16 military revolution. In order to purify the labor sector, 
the Ministry of Public Health and Society encouraged the labor sectors to organize labor 
unions under the industrial labor union system of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions 
and imposed restrictions on the qualifications for the labor union leaders.”  
 
The process with which the state intervened in making local unions or the 
industrial unions, centered around the single Federation, the Hankooknochong.  The 
military regime wanted the Federation to form a single system and helped the Federation 
to unify all the labor sectors by using physical means and laws. When the military 
government announced the reorganization of the labor sectors on August 4 1961, other 
 
167 Kim Jun(1999) recited the minister’s announcement in page 107. The National History Compilation 
Committee of the Military Revolution was created for propaganda of the May 16th coup d e’tate.  
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workers and leaders of labor unions who were alienated by the state, tried to organize 
their own Federation which was different from the Federation of Korea trade unions (Lee 
Won 2005; Kim Jun 1999). The efforts of the opposition to the Hankooknochong to 
organize were soon destroyed by the state when their leaders were arrested after a series 
of raids. In 1961, when the military regime tried to re-create the Federation, the regime 
succeeded in appointing the leaders of a federation and presidents of the 11 industrial 
labor unions, which resulted later in even more severe factionalism in the labor 
movement (Kim Jun 1999).  
There was resistance against the Hankooknochong system in 1963. The military 
government withdrew martial law on December 6, 1962 and allowed political activities to 
resume on January 1, 1963. One faction tried to organize the Democratic Labor Party and 
another organized a committee for the formation of a new Federation. However, these 
movements were soon once again suppressed by the Hankooknochong and the state. In 
particular, the regime modified the labor laws, to prevent any other labor unions from 
organizing within the same business’s industries in early April, 1963, in order to support 
the Hankooknochong (Hankooknochong 2002). The banning of plural labor unions in the 
same business and industrial areas guaranteed the monopolistic rights of the 
Hankooknochong, which permitted them to control subordinate labor unions and 
industrial labor unions, under the industrial union system (Kim Jun 1999). The regime 
modified labor laws and strengthened the power of the industrial labor unions under the 
control of the Hankooknochong in order to build a cohesive and hierarchical labor sector. 
This corporatist 168  arrangement between the state and the labor sector lasted until 
 
168 In fact, Song Ho Keun (1991;1993;2003) has not agree with the opinion that there was a corporatist 
labor system, because there was no reward or social interests that workers shared with in terms of wage 
policies. Corporatist policies were only limited to the leaders of labor unions or top elites of the Federation. 
At the local level of labor unions, workers never got enough rewards from the state or employers. However, 
the state obviously took a corporative attitude to the labor sector during the 1960. Therefore, this research 
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President Park finally abandoned the relationship with the labor sector and introduced a 
period of wholesale repression after the Yushin system was initiated in 1972 (Kim Sam 
2001; Song Ho 2000; Kim Jun 1999; Choi Jang 1988).  
 
3.2 The Role of the Federation: Cooperation and Relative Autonomy  
During the guided democracy period from 1961 to 1971 (Song Ho 2001; Kim Jun 
1996), in which the state permitted a limited democracy, the Federation was relatively 
autonomous and supported Park’s regime. Under the restricted democracy during the 
above period, the Federation played two roles: the first role was to cooperate with the 
military government and later Park’s regime; the other was to secure their position as a 
single Federation. For the first role, the Federation organized a pro-government 
demonstration or assembly to support the military government or later civilian 
government of President Park. There were some very important historical supports for 
Park’s regime. In this section, Nochong news, a news paper of the Federation, later  
renamed, “Nochongbo or Hankooknochong,” will be analyzed. In most issues, front 
pages dealt with political issues in which Nochong would help build an advanced state 
and achieve economic growth, while the second page dealt with internal problems that 
each labor union or workers faced in their working places.  
The period is divided into three phases by characteristics of the regime and the 
Federation. In the first stage is the period of the formation of Hankooknochong and 
cooperation from 1961 to 1967. During this period, the Federation faithfully supported 
the de-politicization policy of the military government, and later civilian government of 
President Park. In the second from 1967 to 1972, the Federation saw political 
participation as critical to the Federation. The Federation and the labor sector actively 
 
defines the 1960s as corporatist period between the state and the labor sector. Through this corporatist 
relationship with the Federation, the state could contribute to the security of the labor sectors.  
 222
asked the government and employers to share political power and the output of economic 
development. Especially, Jeon Tae Il, who immolated himself for the improvement of 
labor condition and respecting labor laws, provoked the labor sector and the Federation. 
In the third period after the Yushin was launched, the labor sector just followed orders 
and the Federation remained a loyal supporter of the regime. At the local level, however, 
members connected with exogenous social democratic activities including religious 
groups like Catholic youth or Christian mission groups demanded democratic labor union 
and Federations from the upper level (Song Ho 2000).    
In the first stage, the Federation tried to expand its capacity to negotiate with and 
support the military government. At the subordinate industrial union level as well as each 
local labor union, the Federation aggressively met with and protested against bad 
employers. In this stage, corporatist labor politics dominated in which the state carefully 
observed on labor union leaders, and controlled them forcefully if necessary (Kim Jun 
1999; Song Ho 2000; 1993) 
In the first inaugural issue of the newspaper of Hankooknochong on May 21, 
1962, titled “Nochong,” which meant the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, the 
Federation announced a pledge that the Federation would play a leading role in the 
national restoration from the underdevelopment of Korea and the Korean War. 30,000 
union members participated in the assembly which was organized to celebrate the 
military coup d é tat. Despite their support for the military government, the Federation 
demanded that the government should allow public servants to organize their own labor 
union in the third section of the newspaper. Nochong, also supported all governmental 
policies about the development and modernization of the fatherland: the five year 
economic development plan and birth control plan (so-called, family regulation) in the 
name of the salvation of the unemployed. Nochong said in supporting the birth control 
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plan, “National subjects’ efforts are necessary to be emancipated from poverty.” 
Nochong added, “Population growth caused by the disorder of uncontrolled birth growth 
results in moral corruption, and social and economic evils.”  
Nochong gave a lot of space to the support of government policies.  
Nochong also had a headline on June 30, 1962, where the Federation asked the 
military government to permit the previous labor laws to be revived in order to keep 
severe disputes from happening. They asked the military government to preserve the 
power of labor unions to negotiate with employers. In this issue of June 30th, Nochong 
rebuked an ‘evil’ employer who fired 17 labor union members and hired some ‘evil’ 
workers. The employer had repressed labor unions before and Nochong suggested that 
labor unions should be united and resist the employer together. The Federation asked 14 
subordinate industrial labor unions to collect money to help the 17 fired workers. The 
Federation also recommended that the military government introduce a law to protect 
workers from employers who tried to remove restrictions on firing workers. In this 
period, the Federation tried to set workers-friendly laws and rules, rebuke evil employers, 
and save labor union members. Significantly, the Federation demanded many laborer 
friendly policies of the military government.  
In an issue on July 30, 1962, the Federation informed of about its own activities 
with the ILO (International Labor Organization).169  A headline reported activities of 
representatives of the Federation. According to Nochong, the chief representative of the 
Federation, Kwangsoo Kim, addressed ILO members.In his address, he justified the 
military coup d’etat saying that after the coup, Hankooknochong was re-established and 
built a strong labor union system under the Federation.  
 
169 Because the ROK has a dependent characteristic to foreign forces and international organizations such 
as the United Nations, the International Labor Organizations, the World Bank, social organizations used 
their international relationships with other global organizations.  
 224
                                                
His address was as follows: “……the first revolution was in April 1960 to protest 
dictator, Dr. Rhee (called Syngman Rhee) and his politicians elected in the corrupt 
presidential and assembly elections on March 15, 1960. The first revolution failed due to 
the incompetence of the Second Republic which could not control social disorder, street 
demonstrations, economic ruin, and communist activities against the Republic of Korea. 
Therefore, a just high spirited military officer group with a mission to restore of the 
Republic of Korea rose up against the corrupt and incompetent government and built a 
strong Federation of trade unions which were free from political power. However, some 
of the international union comrades could not understand the real situation of Korea. I am 
here to let you know the real situation which Korea is in now. …” 
Kwangsoo Kim’s address was very similar to what the military coup leader, Park 
Chung Hee’s said in 1961. Also the chief representative regarded the April revolution, as 
the first revolution and the May 16th military coup as the second revolution which would 
complete the first revolution. The activity of the representative of the Federation was    
propaganda on behalf of the military government. At that time, the military government 
was under pressure from international organizations like the ILO, UN, and other 
organizations to protect democracy and to reopen the democratic system (Lee Won 
2005). This pressure was inherent in the characteristics of the Republic of Korea that was 
formed with the help of international forces during the Korean War and afterward. The 
Republic of Korea, at that time, heavily relied on financial and military aid from the 
United State (Tilly 1990).170  International cooperation was necessary for the military 
government. On the second page of this issue, Nochong reported news that the railroad 
industrial union under the Federation had reached an agreement with the Ministry of 
 
170 Charles Tilly(1990) claims  that the Republic of Korea mobilized their military and economic 
resources not from domestic civil society, but from international organizations or the United State and thus 
the military sectors did not have to worry about any response from civil society in which they had to exploit 
resources. 
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Transportation in a joint labor-management conference. According to the agreement, the 
Ministry would pay overtime payment to railroad workers.  
In the sixth issue of Nochong (November 30 1962), Nochong reported a national 
convention of representatives from each local labor union and industrial labor union, 
where the Federation announced a manifesto, as follows:  
“We, one million workers as an essential source of production, will construct the 
ground to unification, defeating communism by our commitment to restoration of 
national industries and the building of a welfare state with hot-blooded patriotism and 
desire to work at the historical stage where a legendary siren to promise a ceaseless 
prosperity for this country and this nation echoes in every corner of the land of Korea. 
We who are greeting the national convention of representatives of labor unions who will 
correct evil employers whose wrong behavior run against democracy in industries by 
displaying steely unity and warm camaraderie. We solemnly declare that we all will 
march along a path to unification defeating communism by striving only for building of 
economic development in unison with employers.”171   
In December in 1962, the military government drew up the fifth Constitution  for 
approval by the national referendum on December 17 1962. Hankooknochong decided to 
join in the referendum for the new Constitution and encouraged union members to 
aggressively participate in the referendum. The Federation was able to negotiate with the 
military government for their rights like the right to strike. The Federation was relatively 
autonomous of the military government in the transitional period from the military 
 
171 이나라 이겨레의 무궁한 번영을 약속하는 우렁한 전설의 고동이 삼천리 방방곡곡에 
끊임없이 메아리치고 잇는 역사적 단계에 처하여 생산의 원동력인 우리 백만노동자들은 
피끊는 애국심과 불타는 근로의욕으로 국가산업의 부흥과 복지국가건설에 용약 헌신함으로써 
승공통일의 새터전을 쌓아올리련다. 1962년도 노총천국대의원회의를 맞이한 우리들은 따뜻한 
도지애와 강철같은 단결력을 유감없이 발휘하여 산업민주주화에 역행하는 일부 지각없는 
기업주의 그릇된 관념을 시정하고 노사일치협력하여 경제건설에 일로매진함으로써 
승공통일의 길로 총진군할 것을 엄숙히 선언한다. 
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government to a civil republic and could get respect for their rights from the military 
government. An incident to gain the right to strike happened by chance. A local union 
which was subordinate to the chemical industrial union went on strike because the 
company asked the union leaders and members to withdraw from the Federation and 
unions in July 10, 1962. At that time, Korea was ruled by martial law and the right to 
strike was prohibited. However, after the martial law was ended, the local union of the 
Miwang company went on strike on Janunary 16 1963. Law enforcement arrested some 
leaders of the union because they violated the martial law to prohibit strike. The 
Federation and the chemistry industrial unions entered a protest and reached an 
agreement with the Bureau of Labor under the Ministry of Health and Society. But the 
military government did not keep their promise and arrested the leaders of the Miwang 
company union. Hankoonochong and the chemical industrial union strongly protested the 
arrest. In the end, the military government announced that labor unions had a right to 
strike on April 17, 1963 (Lee Won 2004; Hankooknochong 2002). The struggle of 
Hankooknochong was possible because before the transfer of power to a civilian 
government the military government sought to appease the labor sector.   
Before the presidential election and later transfer of power to an elected civil 
government, the Federation declared that they would be strictly impartial on political 
issues and would not have relationships with any political parties. However, despite their 
declaration, the Federation suggested in the issue of September 30, 1963, that people 
should select good civil servants who would retain the military revolution’s ideals and the 
five year economic development plan.    
Nochong reported the Labor Day ceremony where President Park had addressed 
the labor union members on March 10 1967. In this ceremony, the Federation asked the 
president to allot a position in the National Assembly to the Federation. President Park 
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asked the Federation to cooperate with economic development. The newspaper informed 
labor union members of worker friendly tax policies from the National Tax Service, 
stressing that the Federation and labor unions had continued to ask the government to 
give workers and unions more tax exemption. In 1967, there were presidential elections 
and a National assembly election. In this year, the Federation announced its keynotes and 
goals which consisted of six keynotes and seven goals for the future labor movement172.  
 
 
Six keynotes 
1) Embodiment of Welfare Society and Social Justice 
2) Formation of Modern Labor-Management Relationship and Increase of productivity  
3) Labor Corporatism as a means of Labor Movement  
4) Strengthening the National Industrial Union System  
5) Strengthening Anticommunism and Establishing a Democratic Labor Movement  
6) Participation in Political Activities and Creation of New Political Conditions  
       
 Seven Goals 
1) Improving Labor Conditions  
2) Expansion of employment and Establishing the Job Training system 
3) Strengthening the Labor Protection System  
4) Effective Management of Secure Labor Health  
5) Expansion of the Social Welfare System  
6) Expansion and Strengthening Labor Unions  
7) Establishing Basic Labor Rights    
 
Significant in these key notes and goals is participation in political activities and 
efforts to influence the political situation. In the keynotes, the Federation argued that de-
politicization was ineffective in improving labor conditions and workers’ benefits, and 
 
172 Seventh issue on March 31 1967and ninth issue on April 30 1967. The key notes and goals of the 
Federation in the newspaper, Nochong, are different from sourcebook that the Federation published in 
2002. The source book restructured keynotes and goals by contents. This research cites the original lists to 
make sure what the Federation prepared for their future in the relationship with the regime.    
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furthermore, de-politicization could not give any advantages to the Federation. After 
1967, the Federation occasionally confronted government policies. The Federation 
utilized the situation where the regime gave more autonomy to social organizations in 
order to get public support in the presidential elections and national assembly elections. 
After the presidential election, the Federation tried to expand its social power and to have 
an impact on governmental policies.  
      On November 15 1967, the prime minister announced a government policy 
which asked each social organization to get preapproval by the government before they 
went to collective bargaining. The Federation openly criticized the prime minister and the 
government policy. Also on the first page, the Federation reported the Federation 
president’s New Year address on December 31, 1967 which emphasized establishing the 
right relation between workers and employers, and improving the income distribution 
structure.  
In the February 29, 1968 issue, the Federation reported a large scale 
anticommunist and Anti-North Korea assembly in Seoul. The news reported 50, 000 
Federation members including managers of   each labor union as well as the Federation 
on February 3 1968. Before this issue, on January 21 1968, North Korean guerillas 
invaded South Korea and threatened the Blue House and President Park Chung Hee. Two 
days later, North Korean naval ships captured the U.S naval ship, “the Pueblo,” and 
rebuked the U.S. government for spying on North Korea. All news in the first page of the 
issue were filled with the anticommunist assembly and the anti north Korea rally. 
Hankooknochong as a successor of Taehannochong, which was created to destroy the 
leftist labor unions and communist groups, had organized the biggest rally against North 
Korea and the communists.  
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On March 30 issue, the newspaper reported the workers day 173  ceremony in 
which 10,000 labor union members including the prime minister, the ruling party 
chairman, and other politicians participated. The executives of the Federation said that 
the Federation would participate aggressively in social, economic, and political activities 
in order to improve the distributive structure in the Korean economy.  
The issue of June 30 in 1968 focused on the construction of the Labor Hall which 
consisted of an education center, international labor organization office, medical center 
for workers, conference rooms, a labor study institute, an employment agency office and 
so on. Economic resources for the facilities were derived from governmental financial 
support (up to 50 percent), from international labor organizations (10 percent), and from 
the Seoul City government (20 percent). The contribution of subordinate labor unions of 
the Federation was 10 percent. Unlike previous issues, which concentrated on political 
issues, the first page of this issue, dealt with industrial disaster, the right of collective 
activity, and labor organization management.    
The issue of August 31 1968 reported the News that the Federation assembled in 
order to reproach the Soviet Union’s army which had invaded Czechoslovakia. Tens of 
thousands of citizens participated in the anti-communist demonstration on August 24 
1968.  
The issue of November 30 1968 reported that the Federation tried to further its 
goals to get a reduced income tax for the workers, to have employers obey labor laws, to 
establish a social welfare system, and to achieve proper real wages. The Federation 
directly sent their demands to President Park. The news celebrated its having 400, 000 
Federation members with 393 branches and 2685 sub-branches in September. There was 
an interesting slogan, “Find armed red guerillas and Build a social welfare system.” The 
 
173 During the Syngman Rhee’s regime period, the Federation changed Labor Day from May first to 
March 10, which was the foundation day of the Taehannochong.  
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news also reported that the Federation was cooperating with foreign investors in the 
electronics industry. In order to promote foreign investment, the labor struggle should be 
understated. The Federation was aware of the fact that severe labor disputes would bring 
national hostility to workers. Therefore, the Federation announced that a new balanced 
relation between workers and employers including foreign investors should be 
established.  
In 1969, the Federation emphasized growth of income of workers through tax 
exemption rates and bonuses. Also the Federation demanded that the government should 
guarantee employers’ compensation for industrial injury. According to the newspaper, in 
May, 1969, 9612 workers suffered from industrial accidents and the Federation asked the 
Bureau of Labor Department to help the workers.  On July 15 1969, The Federation also 
emphasized the need for an improvement in the quality of the executives of local union 
members and for educating them in order to strengthen the Federation’s capacity to 
negotiate. The Federation announced a statement in the name of the President of the 
Federation, Lee ChanHyuk, in which the Federation reprimanded an effort of the Korean 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry to modify labor laws, regulation of wage increases 
and the labor movement. In this period, the government and foreign investment groups as 
well as the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry tried to foster economic growth 
by weakening the labor sector. This challenge was the hardest one that the Federation had 
faced hitherto.  
In 1970, the Federation faced a concerted attempt to weaken the labor sectors. 
Still the Federation set a New Year goal to establish a welfare system for the working 
class. But the government had already introduced new regulations over labor in fields of 
foreign investment and was expanding into other working fields. On the issue of March 
15, 1969, an autographed letter from President Park was delivered to the executives of the 
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Federation including the President of the Federation, where President Park asked the 
labor sector to contribute to the growth of exports, because export provide more dollars 
and those dollars would bring economic growth. There was an interesting edition of the 
News which reported a rumor in which the government would dissolve the industrial 
labor union system and change the structure of the labor sector174. The Federation faced 
this rumor by asserting that the industrial union system should be strengthened for the 
labor movement and its contribution to economic growth. In 1970 the Federation news 
highlighted President Park and his affection for the Federation. President Park’s picture, 
letters, and activities emerged on pages of the newspaper issues in 1970. Most news 
about President Park did not focus on his policies for workers, but emphasized the 
spiritual reform of workers, employers, and economic growth. The Federation also 
announced a manifesto featuring anticommunism and North Korea. There was also a 
statement against a plan to withdraw some divisions of the U.S. army. The Federation 
said that the withdrawal of the U.S army would threaten the peace of South Korea, and 
other Asian states.  
The Federation began to educate women workers and to investigate the reality of 
women workers in labor intensive agriculture. According to research, 43.4 percent of 
female workers experienced sexual harassment and brutal treatment such as beating, 
abusing at work. And only 57.9 percent of them got their salary on the payday. 25 percent 
of female workers worked over 12 hours a day. In addition, only 68.5 percent of female 
workers got a holiday. In the case of the chemical industry union, 88 percent of female 
workers answered that their salary was not enough to live on. 66. 5 percent of female 
answered that their wage were insufficient.   
 
174 In the end, after Yushin system was launched, the government set a board of labor and management in 
companies and made all labor issues be discussed in the board. This board system incapacitated the 
industrial labor union system which was settled after military coup de tat.  
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Following the self-immolation of Jun Tae Il, university students workers became 
more active in the labor movement. In addition to student participation, religious groups 
like Catholic and Protestant Peasants Organizations and the Catholic Labor Youth 
Association (Jeunesse Ouvriere Chretienne, J.O.C) actively intervened in social 
problems. One labor activist recalled that the incident of Jeon Tae Il, made her active by 
joining the JOC and working in a chemistry company to learn about labor conditions 
(Park Soo 2004).    
In 1971, the Federation tried to expand its influence into politics. The 
Hankooknochong actively participated in political issues and pressured political parties 
on behalf of the Federation and the labor sectors.  The Federation began to send labor 
leaders to the National Assembly. Even though the leaders said that they ran as a 
candidate of the National Assembly as individuals, not as representatives of the 
Federation There was a slogan for the political participation of the Federation, “Building 
and Politics By workers’ hands.” In the end, one former leader of the Federation was 
elected as a member of the National Assembly.  
The period of four years from 1967 to 1971, was the heyday of the Federation in 
that the Federation continued to demand rights for the working class. The Federation 
even resisted government policies to regulate the wage system and modify the labor laws 
in the Labor Standard Acts, or the Act of Labor Dispute, or Act of Collective Action. The 
government and Park’s regime could not supress the resistance by the Federation which 
by now had 500,000 union members. In addition to this, the industrial labor union system 
was strong enough to resist employers’ unfair labor practices at a national level. In the 
end, the state tried to change this industrial labor union system and incapacitate the labor 
sectors after the Yushin System began in 1972 (Song Ho 1991; 2000; Kim Jun 1996; 
Choi Jang 1988; Kim Sam 2002). 
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3.3 The Dark Age of the Labor Sector: The Yushin System 
The dark age of the labor sector began with a statement supporting the military 
decree. President Park ordered another emergency decree to keep the labor movement 
from acting on August 3, 1972 before the Yushin Constitution. In this decree, the labor 
movement was severely restricted. The Yushin system banned labor disputes and strikes 
against employers. In addition to this, labor’s three prime rights were suspended 
temporarily in order to encourage foreign investment and save insolvent companies (Kim 
In 1998; Song Ho 1993). The government amended labor and management relations laws 
to establish a joint labor-management committee in each company, requiring all activities 
related to labor unions to get permission from the committee. This committee 
incapacitated the Federation and the industrial labor union system, by removing local 
labor unions from their supervision. The government utilized a right to make rules backed 
up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence (Mann 1988). Park’s regime could 
neutralize the Federation’s power by amending labor laws (Song Ho 2000). The regime 
had been surprised by the capacity and power that Hankooknochong had shown to resist 
economic policies detrimental to the labor sector (Song Ho 2000; Lee Won 2004; 
2005)175.  
However, even though the Federation and the industrial labor union were 
weakened by the state, the Federation and local labor unions still tried to expand their 
capacity to negotiate with the state and the employers. Their effort was supported by the 
increase in the number of workers, due to economic growth, the growth of Chaebol176, 
and the growth of heavy industrial companies. 
 
175 These scholars analysis appeared in some interviewee’s answers. An informant said, “The industrial 
labor union system was established by the military government. But the system gave the Federation or the 
labor sector a power that they could resist some economic policies. The government was surprised at their 
resistant power and tried to neutralize the industrial union system.” 
176 Big conglomerates of the Korean economy.  
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Table 5.7 Change of Development of Industrial Structure (Unit: %)                                  
 
Industrial Sector \Year  1970 1972 1975 1977 1979
 
Agriculture and fishery 26.9 26.3 24.5 22.9 20.3
 
Mining and manufacturing 22.4 23.3 27.5 28.3 27.8
 
(Manufacturing) 20.8 22.2 26.5 27 26.9
 
Social infrastructure 50.7 50.4 48 48.8 51.9
 
Light industry 62.2 63.6 53.6 51.5 48.8
 
Heavy industry 37.8 36.4 46.4 48.5 51.2
 Source: Bank of Korea , Korea GNP, 1982. Social infrastructure includes the service sector.  
 
Heavy industry developed in the 1970ies as the state planned (Table 5.7). The 
development of heavy industry led to an increase in manufacturing labor. The 
quantitative growth of the labor sector gave the Federation the appearance of growth (Lee 
Won 2005). In the end, the growth of the Korean economy, in particular, provided a good 
soil to the labor movement that made the Federation enlarge their size and union 
members.  
According to table 5.8 , growth rates of Chaebol in GDP proportion continued to 
increase in big 5, big 10, big 20, and big 46. In addition, annual growth rates (AGR) also 
were larger. The growth of Chaebol in Korea was both sides of the coin in the Korean 
economy. The economic power was concentrated in the Chaebols and the Chaebols’ 
voice got more power than before. Because their proportion in the Korean economy 
continued to increase, the government could not completely ignore their demands.  
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Table 5.8 Growth Rates of Chaebol and its Proportion in GDP (Unit: %)                                     
 
No. of Chaebol\ Year 1973 1975 1977 1978 
AGR177  
of Chaebol
 
Big 5 3.5 4.7 8.2 8.1 30.1
 
Big 10 5.1 7.1 10.6 10.9 28
 
Big 20 7.1 9.8 13.3 14.9 25.9
 
Big 46 9.8 12.3 16.3 17.1 22.8
 
GDP 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Lee Won 2004 
Table 5.9 shows the historical change of proportion in the Korean economy 
between small and medium business and Chaebol between 1963 and 1979. In particular, 
number of employee by Chaebol increased rapidly.  
  
Table 5.9 Proportion of Chaebol and Small & Medium Size Company (Unit: % ) 
 
 
 Number of business Number of employee Value added 
 
 1963 1979 1963 1979 1963 1979
 
Small & medium 98.5 94.3 62.4 39.5 49.8 28.5
 
Chaebol 1.5 5.7 37.6 60.5 50.2 71.5
Note: Small and Medium business is a business under 200 employees. 
Source: Korea Industrial Bank (1963) and Economic Planning Board (1979) 
Lee won 2004, p. 309  
 
 
 
                                                 
177 AGR is Annual Growth Rates. This means the annual growth rates of Chaebol in the 1970s (Lee Won 
2004). 
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As tables 5.8 and 5.9 show, the Chaebol’s influence in the Korean economy 
increased. And relatively, the voice of the labor sector decreased in the name of economic 
development.  
But still the quantitative growth of the labor sector continued. There were 17 
industrial labor unions in 1970 from 11 in 1961. Those industrial labor unions covered 
3,454 work places to a total of 5,106 in South Korea. In addition, 418 branches and 553-
sub branches in 1970 increased to 3,080 branches and 4,392 sub-branches (Lee Won 
2004; Hankooknochong 2002). The number of workers increased from 469,003 in 1970 
to 1,094,008 in 1979. The dream of Hankooknochong for one million members came true 
in 1978 (Nochongbo 1978).178 
The roles of the Federation were two: one was to increase its capacity to negotiate 
with employers and the government; the other was to collaborate with the regime to save 
the organization. To improve its organizational power, the Federation had often to 
struggle with the state and employers. Even though the Federation had a strong political 
relation with the regime, the Federation still had to represent the Korean working class 
who suffered from relatively low incomes during the economic growth period. The 
average wage of factory workers in 1970 reached 61.5 percent of the minimum cost of 
living. But in 1980, the average wage was 44.6 percent of the minimum wage. The 
working hours for factory workers were 51.6 hours per week in 1970. The average 
working hours in 1980 were 51.6 hours. Victims of industrial disasters in factories 
increased from 37,752 to 130,307 cases in 1979 (Lee Won 2005).  
But these efforts were not enough to satisfy the Korean working class.  The 
Federation was mainly interested in expanding its capacity and less interested in labor 
movements or improving labor conditions at the local level. Sometimes, the Federation 
 
178 Female workers increased from 115, 367 in 1970 to 371,587 in 1979. So proportion of female workers 
was 34 percent in 1979 from 24.6 percent in 1970 (Lee Won 2004; Hankooknochong 2002).  
 237
struggled with the third sector of the labor movement like the Urban Industry Missionary 
Society, which was founded by a sector of the Presbyterian Church to work with the 
Korean working class. When some religious associations criticized the Federation’s 
collaboration with the dictatorship in 1974, the Federation reproached these groups in the 
name of national security (Lee Won 2004; 2005; Hankooknochong 2002). After 1974, the 
Federation tried to neutralize subordinate labor unions that were influenced by these 
religious groups. In the process of this struggle, demands from below increased for the 
democratization of the Federation.  In the late 1970s, the labor movement was calm at 
the upper level, but at the lower level, the vested rights of the Federation and the 
established labor system were challenged by grassroots democratic movements. In this 
struggle, the upper level of unions could not help forming a closer relationship with the 
regime.   
 
4. FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
This part will focus on individuals whose experience had been in the labor sector 
during the economic development period. Transition from class to national subjects 
occurred during Park Chung Hee’s rule (Chang Mun 2006).  Labor union leaders, 
members of local unions and leaders of industrial labor unions were very closely tied 
with one another. In this part, I discuss the relative autonomy of the Federation, the 
characteristics of corporatism in the labor sector, resistance against the Federation and 
finally the conservativeness of workers in those years. The state’s effort to control union 
leaders and the labor movement was obvious. The regime continued to operate a strong 
surveillance system of labor, especially after the Yushin system was launched.   
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4.1 Workers’ Conservativeness 
Conservativeness of workers was one obstacle that kept the power of the 
Federation or other labor union leaders from expanding. In addition, factionalism among 
labor union leaders was strong. Conservativeness can be measured by the attitude to the 
labor movement, the degree of participation in strikes or resistance, and by 
Confucianism.  Confucianism was strong among union members of the labor movement.  
 The Federation structure was very hierarchical. The Federation was at the top 
and under the Federation was each industrial labor union. This industrial labor union had 
the power to decide the amount of wage growth and order each local labor union to 
follow their guide lines. The hierarchical system of the Federation was present when the 
Federation was recreated. Local labor unions could not directly negotiate with employers 
(Choi Jang 1988; Kim Jun 1999; Song Ho 2000; Hankooknochong 2002). This 
hierarchical structure was kept by maintaining factional division among labor union 
leaders. At the beginning of the Federation’s re-organization, factionalism in the labor 
sectors was very strong and if one factor seized union power, all members of the 
Federation, or of industrial labor unions, or of local labor unions were replaced by 
members of the winning faction. 
  An informant who was a vice president of a big local labor union remembered 
when he joined the labor union.  
“One day, I was working at night, then, some of my seniors came to me and 
suggested that I should work for labor union. They said that I could work as a 
representative of the labor union. I did not know anything about the labor union and even 
know about representatives. I was picked up by the seniors as a good candidate for the 
labor union. Therefore I began the work in the labor union.”  
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He continued, “The term of labor union chairman was three years. We succeeded 
to the term of previous chairman and staff, because they were arrested for illegal labor 
disputes. So one and half year after we began the term, new executives should be elected 
by labor union members. Then, some of seniors of our labor unions and the company 
plotted to change the established executives to new ones. Their scheme was successful 
and new chairman, Dalsoo Han, was elected. Chairman Han thought of keeping me 
working as secretary. But his factional members opposed this idea related to me. I had to 
stop working in the labor union. However, some months after I stopped working, they did 
not have so good a person as me for the position, so they asked me to work. So I resumed 
my work in the labor union.”  
Most workers in the 1960s were migrants from rural areas (Park Hae 2005; 
Hankooknochong 2002). These migrant workers showed conservative feature in their and 
working places. Even though they suffered from low income, severe working condition, 
and long work hours, they thought that they got more money from urban work than 
agricultural work.  
A textile worker179 remembered his childhood, “I had never had three meals a 
day. I mean it. If I had breakfast, then lunch was skipped. When I was young, I worked in 
other farmers’ paddy fields for some food. Then I could have three meals a day in others’ 
home, while I was working there.”  
This memory of poverty gave workers a dual attitude to urban life. An interesting 
piece of research by the Catholic Church (Tae Yo 1972)180 showed that even though 
urban workers lived in poor surroundings, they did not in fact return to their villages. 
Since the mid 1960s, the Protestant Urban Industry Missionary Society and the Catholic 
 
179 Park Hae Kwang (2005, 21) cited an interview with a textile workers. In his writing, the worker’s name 
is informed but in this research, the name is not informed, as other interview data do not report them.  
180 Park Haekwang (2005, 38) recited Tae Yohan’s research in 1972. 
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Youth Association acted for the rights of urban workers. Table 5.10 shows that they have 
some nostalgia for their home villages but they will not return to their rural areas because 
of their poverty. 
 
Table 5.10 “Will you return to your village permanently in some future?” 
 
 Laborers Students Total 
 
I like to return 62 (87.3) 13 (76.5) 75 (85.3) 
 
I don't like to return 9 (12.7) 4 (23.5) 12 (14.7) 
 
Not answer 5 1 6 
 
Total 76 18 95 
Data Source: Tae, Yohan, 1972, Research on Catholic migrants’ urban life, in Pastoral Theology, 20 
National Catholic Center: Seoul, Korea, Park Haekwang (2005) recited. 
 
This complex attitude appeared clearly when they participated in labor disputes or 
strikes. An informant remembers the union members’ behavior towards the union and 
leaders, “Members always demanded that they must earn more money. If they get a 
bonus, then next time, they want to get a better bonus. Increased bonuses and wages 
could not satisfy members. But we did not have the power to negotiate with employer to 
increase wages and bonuses. When we go on strike or a labor dispute, most of the 
members betrayed us and work for the company.”  
Politically, workers, before the Yushin system, showed conservativism. In 1971, 
when there was a presidential election, Kim Dae Jung and Park Chung Hee were rivals. 
In the urban areas, President Park got 47.5 percent, while Kim Dae Jung got 51.5 percent 
of support. But workers who live in urban areas voted for Park Chung Hee, while Kim 
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Dae Jung got an average 34.4 percent (Oh Chang 2002).181 In addition, over 90 percent 
of workers supported the social, political and economic system of ROK. According to   
research, workers believed that President Park succeeded in developing the Korean 
economy and therefore, they supported him, despite his dictatorship. This conservativism 
weakened the labor movement and facilitated the regime’s effort to neutralize the labor 
sector during the Yushin rule period. Workers who believed President Park would bring 
economic growth to Koreans believed also that national security was important and 
society should be stabilized. An informant who was a member of a chemical fertilizer 
company union in 1960 remembered social conditions of the Second Republic under the 
Democratic Party,  
 
“When the Liberal Party collapsed in the April Revolution, everything was chaos 
caused by severe struggles between New Sector and Old Sector of the Democratic Party. 
Protestors invaded the court, if they did not like sentences. They also even broke into the 
National Assembly, when the National Assembly enacted a law to bother them. In every 
social sector, struggle was spread.”  
 
The military coup denounced the incompetence of the Democratic Party, the 
ruling party. Its incompetence resulted in social disorder and national disaster in the 
economic sectors. Therefore, the military junta rose against the civilian government and 
established social order and the state system. The logic that social order would bring 
economic growth to Koreans was a useful ideology in suppressing the labor movement 
during the economic growth period. This conservativeness was the base of the labor 
 
181 Oh Chang Hyun (2002, 176) cited Kim Sejin’s research in 1971. The percentage is average of each 
professional, skilled, semi-skilled, unskilled worker.  
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corporatist order of the Federation. Demands for democratization of the Federation and 
the labor union system emerged after the 1970s (Kim Jun 1999).  
 
4.2 Realistic Activities, Relative Autonomy and Despotic State Power 
The realistic and practical activities of the Federation were common in the 
Federation’s history. According to the Nochong news paper, most activities of the 
Federation basically consisted of two types of work: One was to cooperate with the 
regime; the second was to have a relative autonomy and to work for the Federation and 
union members. The second type of the Federation’s work was related to its capacity and 
ability expansion, as the number of workers in the Korean economy increased. The size 
of the Federation in number was a good source of its bargaining power with the state.  
In the 1970s, especially after the Yushin system was launched, the labor 
movement was completely suppressed by state despotic power. Consider this episode of a 
demonstration, which an informant remembered.  
 
“There were three different work groups; one was white collars who graduated 
from universities; the second one was factory workers; the third one was temporary 
factory workers. The company increased white collar wages but did not increase factory 
workers. Therefore, we demonstrated after we finished our night shift work. Then, the 
company accused us of illegal labor disputes. Soon we were called to a police station. I 
was warned by a detective, who urged me to follow the law. He knew all my background 
by reference to my personal background. But my family background was good. That 
background let me continue to work for the labor union. We were released and the 
executives of the union were laid off. ”   
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Surveillance by the police of leaders of labor unions was common (Kim Jun 1999; 
Song Ho 2000; Lee Won 2005). The government used police intelligence to keep an eye 
on them. An informant remembered an episode that surveillance by the police became an 
every day event in the life of the leaders. He said,  
“Because I worked for the labor union, I was a marked man and other leaders 
too. Wherever we went, intelligence detectives followed us. I felt it was good because 
there were detectives with us. There was no person who had provoked a quarrel with us 
nor asked money of us.”   
This repression led the leaders to take another way and try to increase their 
negotiating power. Labor union leaders tried to avoid direct and immediate struggle with 
employers and the regime, because they had been neutralized by labor laws as well as by 
the state’s repressive power.  An informant who joined in the Federation in order to 
democratize the Federation and emancipate laborers from the capitalist order in Korea 
society answered as follows:  
 
“I joined in the Federation in order to democratize the Federation and organize 
an antigovernment movement. When I was a university student, I realized that the Korean 
laborers were exploited by the state and the employers. Therefore, after graduating from 
the university, I participated in this Federation. But as I worked in this Federation, I 
realized that the reality of working in the Federation was different from the ideal in my 
brain. I thought that this system of the Federation could speak for the laborers’ maximum 
interest. So I thought this system was necessary. This Federation system was the second 
best policy I could take, even though I came to here.”   
      An informant who worked in the metallic industrial union answered as 
follows,  
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“Frankly speaking, when our labor union (the industrial union) expanded and got 
power, many labor activists joined in our labor union. Some of them were graduates of 
universities. They mainly took responsibility for educating labor union members. 
Sometimes educating the members led to antigovernment directions. But we did not agree 
with the direction because we should work to get more benefits and the labor unions 
should focus on mutual relief function for our members, which the government could not 
provide us with. Being Antigovernment was a good ideal but it gave nothing to us.”   
 
Another informant who worked in the chemistry industrial union echoed the 
above reply, “there was no political issue in the Federation and in our industrial union. 
There were just demands for increase of wages, better labor conditions, and natural 
functions of labor unions. When the Federation and the industrial union advertised in a 
newspaper, then some of executives were called by Namsan (A mountain in southern 
Seoul part, where KCIA was located), so-called KCIA. Then the top of the Federation 
asked executive managers not to talk about political issues.”    
An informant who was in the mass transportation labor union said about a passive 
resistance. He said,  
“Strikes were prohibited by the government. But there were absurd practices by 
employers, so we found a very passive but effective way to resist. In a policy of mass 
transportation, conductress should wear the formal suit for a conductress. If a 
conductress does not wear it, she can not work in a bus. So when we went on to a labor 
dispute, we just put the uniform into big tub and poured water into it. Then we could not 
wear the formal uniform. It did mean ‘no work.’ It was a way of resistance and labor 
dispute at the same time.”   
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4.3 Establishing a Welfare System 
  Intensity of labor in South Korea was notorious for its severity. An informant 
who was a vice president of big electronic company labor union remembered in the 
1960s, “it was very difficult to find any job in the 1960s. So I was ready to work in any 
factory and other fields. But When I got a job in a company, I worked at least 12 hours 
and no holidays, I even worked on Sundays. I could not help stopping work anymore.” 
However, there was no good welfare system for the Korean working class who suffered 
from long hours of work. Welfare system in South Korea during the economic 
development period was so poor that it could not provide workers with good social 
security. In this interview, informants agreed that the welfare system of workers was 
unsatisfactory. An informant remembered,  
 
“When I began to work for the labor union, I thought I would do all that I could 
do if I established a cafeteria in my company. There was no cafeteria and the workers 
must go out side of the factory. It was too expensive for workers to buy food everyday. So 
the executives decided to establish a cafeteria in the company. But after I succeeded in 
setting the restaurant of workers, I found there were many things to do. The Next goal 
was to establish a credit union for labor union members. At that, most workers could not 
use the bank because their wages were so low that banks did not have any program for 
workers. So they used personalized liabilities with high interest rates. Workers hardship 
was very severe and the labor union executives decided to set the credit union for 
members. So I built a credit union and lent money for workers at very low interest rates. 
By next goal to improve the welfare system was to institute a housing union. These 
welfare systems gave us more powerful influence on laborers because only labor unions 
provided them with good welfare system. Laborers continued to join in the labor union.”  
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After stopping work in the local labor union, this informant began to work as a 
secretary general in an industrial labor union.  
 
“There was no building for the industrial labor union. Therefore, he made a plan 
to build the industrial labor union’s building. There was land to build the building and 
then we needed money. We asked local unions to donate money for building our 
industrial labor union complex. I said to them, you donate as much as a pack of cigarette 
price. Then you would remember the building forever.” He continued to say, “there were 
many people who believed in labor union and participated in those welfare systems. They 
became wealthy and made a lot. Therefore, we could get our own building and many of 
our industrial labor union offices are in the building. Most other industrial labor union 
did not have their own buildings. ” 
 
An informant who was a chairman of the mass transportation labor unions 
remembered, “At that time, all buses had a conductress in a bus. It was a duty. Most 
members of our labor union consisted of bus conductress and taxi drivers, not auto 
production worker. Time schedules of buses were not fixed because of traffic jams, other 
road conditions, and sudden break-downs etc. Therefore, setting a restroom, cafeteria, 
and lounge for rest for conductress after their duty were our main goals. A welfare system 
for the conductress was restricted to just basic working condition. It was sometimes not 
successful to improve the working condition for conductress.”  
For this industrial labor union, improving working conditions was the most urgent 
goal. Having a building was not even thought about. The welfare system at local labor 
unions was focused on improving working conditions. The Federation tried to settle its 
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own credit union system for stabilizing the workers’ fund situation. But at the local level, 
many workers did not have access to the upper level of the Federation.  
 
 5.4 The Uhyong Issue  
Uhyong issue is a very sensitive one to participants in the Federation, as we saw 
other AMOs. An informant who wanted to fight for workers put this issue as follows:  
“Some people thought working in this Federation was not good for the working 
class, on the contrary, working for the Federation contributed to the exploitation of 
workers. Their thought which labeled us as Uhyong made our roles in the Federation 
hard, difficult. Of course there were other groups of people who thought it was necessary 
to work in the Federation.”  
He continued, “Working with the Federation system gave me a source of trouble 
in my mind. There were a lot of students who worked in a company for the working class 
to prevent labor exploitation by employers and the state. As a regular white-collar 
worker in the Federation who had not been in a field of blue collar laborer, I often had 
an individual worry, because I was not sure whether what I was doing was right or not.”    
An informant spoke frankly of the Uhyong Issue,  
“I did not support the Yushin Constitution, but I did not oppose the Constitution 
either. I could not resist President Park. How could I resist a military dictator? I don’t 
understand somebody who blames their seniors as Uhyong. They did not resist Park’s 
regime or do not do anything to support resistance either. If they were put into prison by 
Park’s regime, due to their objection, I would admire them. They don’t deserve to blame 
their senior labor union leaders.”  
The people who participated in the Federation is a very sensitive issue. Because 
the Federation officially supported the Yushin system during the entire Yushin period, 
 248
the Federation suffered from both internal and external challenges asking the Federation 
to become a more democratic union. During the Yushin period, the Federation 
substantially lost its power to organize labor unions and to protest government policies. 
In addition, after Park Chung Hee was reelected in 1971, the Federation became a 
standard AMO. The Federation expanded its power, but could not mobilize members for 
the interests or profits of the labor union itself, but only mobilize members for the 
regime. Also, the Federation suppressed any movement which encouraged 
democratization in the labor sector. In interviews, informants of this interview were 
reluctant to discuss the Uhyong. They just said that they were blamed for the fact that 
they had put up so little resistance.  
 
5. CONCLUSION  
The state in the early stage of economic development, adopted a corporatist stance 
with the labor sector, even though the state did not give workers a high enough wage to 
live on. The state did, however, provide some benefits to leaders of the labor sectors and 
have a close relationship with labor leaders (Song Ho 2000).  
The reason why the state had taken the corporatist means with labor since 1961 
was result of the weakness of the states in its infrastructural power (Choi Jang 1988).  
The regime style was one of guided democracy by which the regime followed official 
principles of democracy like elections, despite the military characteristics of Park’s 
regime before the Yushin system.  
In terms of international relationships, the ROK was subordinated to external 
pressures to democratization. Domestically, South Korea’s democracy was a contrast to 
North Korea, which was communist. South Korea ideologically was aligned to liberal 
democracy. After the April Revolution, the experience of the power of the people meant 
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that a military dictator could not wield power by relying on violent means. However, 
after the state developed the capacity to control the labor sector by acts of regression, the 
state began to use physically violent means of control. Complete suppressive control over 
the labor sector began in 1972. The Yushin regime modified the labor laws slightly and 
somewhat neutralized the power of the Federation (Song Ho 2000). The Federation, 
therefore, became just a AMO which existed only for the regime’s purpose.  
As the characteristics of the state changed, the Federation of Korean Trade 
Unions played a role in supporting the dictatorship and in working for its union members. 
Using the newspaper, Nochong, or Hankooknochong, President Park initially tried to 
systematically depoliticize the labor sectors and mobilize laborers for economic 
development. The goal of economic development asked the regime to keep labor 
productivity high and also demanded that the state should provide employers and 
international investors with labor stability. After transferring power to a civilian elected 
government in 1963, most of whose elites were from military background including 
President Park Chung Hee and Kim Chong Pil, the government encouraged the labor 
sector to cooperate with the regime and encouraged higher productivity. The Federation 
and industrial labor union system followed their lead. However, even though the state 
managed to control higher level union leaders with rewards and surveillance, the 
Federation occasionally resisted the regime and employers. Until, the Yushin system of 
1972, the Federation and its subordinate industrial labor unions tried to expand their 
capacity and avoid being labeled Uhyong. To expand the Federation and labor unions, the 
Federation had to show that labor unions must satisfy some demands at the local level of 
unions and their members. The Federation at local levels did protest bad employers or 
companies over companies’ illegal lay-offs or poor practices. In addition, leaders of the 
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Federation and subordinate industrial labor unions provide workers with some social 
welfare benefits that the state and employers would not give them.  
Informants who participated in the Federation and served as presidents or leaders 
of the industrial unions emphasized their experiences in increasing the welfare benefit 
provided by the unions for their members. The union members and their leaders had to 
raise money for their own benefits and welfare because the state adopted liberal policies 
in economic development and welfare, because of insufficient resources (Gosta-Anderson 
1996). Leaders in the industrial unions were relatively autonomous of the regime, as long 
as they did not strike or resist the policies of the state. With relative autonomy, leaders of 
the Federation and subordinate unions could expand their power over members.   The 
Uhyong issue and severe factionalism in the labor sector emerged even though leaders of 
the Federation did not want to provoke them. To avoid being labeled as Uhyong leaders, 
they aggressively supported state policies for economic development and justified their 
collaboration with the dictator’s regime in the name of national economic development. 
Conservatism among workers was a strong base for a depoliticized and weak labor 
movement that supported what the state required.  
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Chapter 6: Student National Defense Corp: Stabilizing Schools and 
students in the Late 1970s 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The Republic of Korea is a “conscription society”, meaning a state in which about 
200,000 young South Korean men are required to begin and finish their military service 
every year. Both students and people are mobilized in government events, and the 
government leads these organizations. Conscription in South Korea has had a long 
tradition since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.  
However, in fact, the history of mass mobilization and conscription originated in 
the general mass mobilization system of the Japanese colonial government during the 
period of the Sino-Japanese war and World War II (from 1937 to1945). The Japanese 
colonial government attempted to mobilize Koreans and Korean social resources to wage 
war against the enemies of Japan. After being liberated from Japan, Korea was divided 
into two ideologically different Koreas and experienced serious struggles to build one 
Korean Nation state. In the process of struggling for unification, both North and South 
Korea tried to consolidate internally their power over each part of the peninsula. 
Particularly, South Korea which experienced very strong communist and leftist 
resistances created many AMOs to destroy resistance, and to absorb the remnants of 
discordant leftists and communists. The AMOs were also used to mobilize people for 
propaganda purpose. During the Korean War, the regime mobilized people and resources 
to wage a war against communist allies. After the Korean War ended, the government 
continued to mobilize people to achieve political, social, and economic purpose in the 
name of the state.  
This section will focus on the Student National Defense Corps (hereafter 
Hokookdan, or Hakdohokookdan) recreated by the Park Chung Hee government in the 
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mid-1970s in the wake of constitutional changes that would virtually guarantee him his 
lifetime presidency. Students have had important social and political influence and power 
in the modern Korean history. Especially during the period of dictatorship from 1960 to 
1987, they were the strongest potential antigovernment group in South Korea. The civil 
revolution and the collapse of Syngman Rhee’s regime in 1960 were initiated by student 
demonstrations. Park, a former major general of the Korean Army who seized political 
power through a coup d’etat in 1961, was aware of this fact. He and his staff, tried in 
various ways to keep students calm and docile, by introducing new education policies, 
military drills in schools, and increased school system control.182 They introduced the 
Hokookdan in the 1970s to depoliticize and nullify the more established autonomous 
student organizations in high schools and universities. The Hokookdan resulted in a 
marked reduction of the frequent large scale student demonstrations. To some degree, 
because of the Hokookdan, mass demonstrations of students were weakened for some 
years.  
This study will examine why the state created Hokookdan in 1949 and recreated it 
again in 1975 emphasizing the political background and will also examine how the 
Hokookdan worked. This will help us understand the process of formation of the dutiful 
national subject in Korea 
 
2. BACKGROUND OF THE HAKDOHOKOOKDAN  
The Hakdohokookdan emerged over two different time periods as an AMO. One 
was in the time of Rhee Syngman’s and the other in the time of Park Chung Hee’s. As an 
AMO, the Hokookdan was created by the regime to stabilize schools, and contributed to 
 
182 Despotic power means the state’s power like police, military forces, and particularly, intelligence 
agencies. 
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consolidating each regime by participating in political issues. However, in both periods, 
Hakdohokookdan differed a little. During Syngman Rhee’s rule, it was a vanguard group 
in the political arena, while under Park’s regime it focused on turning students’ attention 
on school, the so-called de-politicization in school.183 The backgrounds to the Hokookdan 
in the two periods were very different in detail, but the underlying forces were very 
similar.  
 
2.1 The Emergence of the Hakdohokookdan in the First Republic of Korea 
2.1.1 Political Background 
When Syngman Rhee came into power in 1948, his government, the Republic of 
Korea, was struggling with the leftists and communists who were in South Korea 
territory. For example, in the first election of 1948, civilians in the Cheju Island (which is 
the biggest island in Korea)184 rose against Syngman Rhee and his party’s plot to build a 
separate state. Another example occurred in a military base which let Syngman Rhee and 
his staff be scared about their insecurity. While the Cheju uprising was occurring, a 
Korean army regiment revolted against Syngman Rhee. When the government ordered 
the regiment to be dispatched to quell the Cheju civilian uprising,185 communists and 
leftists in the army regiment killed officers and revolted. At that time, Syngman Rhee’s 
political position was threatened by resistance from internal nationalists and leftists, 
 
183 Depoliticization in schools means the state made students disinterested in political issues or event, but 
interested in their own individual issues such as studying, getting jobs, and enjoying lives.  
184 Cheju is the biggest island in South Korea. Ruthless oppression by pro Japanese collaborators and 
rightist militia (Im2005), who were policemen and landlords, because they did not participate in the first 
election in 1948, made Cheju civilians a mass uprising against Syngman Rhee and his Party.  
185 Sergeants and soldiers killed higher officer and lieutenant colonel, a commander of 14th regiment, who 
was a Japanese colonial officer and revolted against South Korea. They conquered some province and 
succeeded for some while, but their revolts was repressed in November 1948. 
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because Syngman Rhee tried to make the separate state in Korean peninsula (Seo Joong 
1994, 1999, 2004; Kang Kyung 1999).  
President Rhee also faced the resistance of centrist members who wanted to 
eradicate Japanese collaborators in the Korean National Assembly, because a centrist 
member of the Korean Assembly enacted the Anti-Japanese Collaborator Law in 1949. 
Synagman Rhee needed to ally himself with Japanese collaborators because when he 
returned to Korea from the U.S, he had no political base and power group (Seo Joong 
1996; 2004). Most of Syngman Rhee’s ministers of the government, including 
administrative officers, army officers, and police officers were collaborators (Seo Joong 
2004b).186 If the Korean Assembly controlled by the centrists who opposed the President 
enacted and took action against his staff, his political power would be immediately 
weakened. And the possibility for him to be reelected would be reduced.187 
 When Syngman Rhee faced strong resistance from the opposition party’s 
challenges in Korean Assembly and from leftists, communists, and other civilians, he and 
his party also needed to enact a national security law, while they purged the South 
Korean army of its leftist and communist suspects in 1948 (Park 1991)188. After the 
national security law was enacted, the state arrested many leftist suspects and 
sympathizers, including many centrist Korean Assembly members. There were over100, 
000 political prisoners in South Korean prisons in early 1950 (Kim 1997). Under these 
serious challenges, Syngman Rhee and his ideologues realized that they needed a 
vanguard groups which would work for their regime. Students became a main target, 
because it was easy for the regime to mobilize students in that they were in one place at 
 
186 According to ministry of defense history, in case of Korean Army when Korean War broke out, 7 of 8 
division commanders s, 15 of 20 chief staff (75 %), and 20 of 22 regimen commanders (90%) were from 
Japanese colonial collaborator. According to Seo Joong-Seok (2004) November 1946, 82 % of high 
officers of Police were from Japanese colonial collaborators (949/1157).  
187 At that time, President was elected by the Korea Assembly poll.  
188 In the purge in the Korean army, 10% of the army, 4749 were removed from the army.  
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the same time, and schools were under the control of the ministry of education. 
Officially, the Student National Defense Corps was created to keep the National Security 
free from both North Korea’s and internal Communist threats, but substantially to keep 
Rhee’s regime secure from internal and external threats (HakdoHakdohokookdan, 1959). 
2.1.2 Creation of the Hakdohokookdan in 1949 
The student National Defense Corps was, therefore, founded in September 28th 
1949189, one year after the ROK was founded in 1948. According to the regulations of 
Hokookdan, it was under the supervision of Minister of Education 190 . Each of the 
Secondary Schools and universities was to have a Student National Defense Corps. The 
Center of the Student National Defense Corps was created and controlled each 
Hakdohokookdan. The School Students National Defense Corps consisted of faculty 
members as supervisors of the Hakdohokookdan, and the students of schools and 
secondary schools. The secondary schools included middle schools, profession technical 
schools, professional technical high schools, civic high schools, normal schools and high 
schools. 191  The Hakdohokookdan should help students through their extra-curricular 
activities, in the field of the development of their personality, in the cultivation of their 
ability to be self-governing, and in the performance of their social services by 
consolidating their patriotic movements (Joonganghakdohogukdan 1959).192  In 1949, 
28,000 students of 42 universities, which were all universities in South Korea, were 
 
189 September 28 in 1949 is the official day of foundation. At first stage, Hokookdan was inaugurated with 
forming the central Students National Defense Corpse Hakdohokookdan. 1959 Ten years History of the 
Student National Defense Corps. Seoul: The central Student National Defense Corps in April 22nd 1949 and 
inauguration ceremony of Hokookdan was held in Seoul National Stadium at the same time. After forming 
the Hokookdan, each regional Hokookdan were founded. After all units of HOGOOKDAN were founded, 
formal and official Hokookdan launched in September 28th 1949.  
190 Article 3 of Regulation of the Students National Defense Corps of the Republic of Korea 
191 Article 4 of ibid 
192 According to “Regulation of the Students National Defense Corps of the Republic of Korea Article 1 
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enrolled into the Hakdohokookdan. It grew to 82, 221 students from 129 Universities in 
South Korea in 1959 (Hakdohokookdan 1959).   
2.1.3 Ideologies of the Hakdohokookdan 
Ahn Ho-Sangsang 193 , a powerful ideologue of Syngman Rhee, and the first 
minister of Education in the First Republic of Korea, created, advocated, and developed 
Ilminism. Ahn concretized Ilminism (一民主義), which countered communism and other 
ideologies created by other nationalists. Ilminism meant briefly that one nation should 
have only one national ideology (Im Chong 2006), to set the spirit of anticommunism and 
ideological security in schools. Ilminism in fact focuses on tradition, the Korean nation, 
and anticommunism. According to Park Chan Seung (2002), Ilminism was a means of 
justifying Syngman Rhee’s separated state, the ROK. Ahn Ho-Sang openly claimed that 
democracy could not defeat North Korean Communism alone and South Koreans should 
be bound through Ilminism. As a way to implement Ilminism, Ahn Ho-Sang organized 
the Student National Defense Corps as a minister of the ROK, where students above the 
middle school level received compulsory military training in schools. The national roots 
of Korean Ilminism can be traced to two essences of the Korean people: “Tan’gun”, a 
Korean national ancestor and his idea, “Hong’ik in’gan” created in B.C. 2333; 
“Hwarangdo”, a military organization from a small state, Silla, which conquered two 
other kingdoms with the help of the Tang dynasty of China. The Silla kingdom defeated 
Tang’s army in 8th century AD. Despite this, the Silla kingdom lost the Manchu area. 
The role of the Hwarangdo was important in the process of defeating the armies of strong 
 
193 According to Park Noja, Ahn Ho-Sang was an evolutionary thinker and he believed “the strongest 
survives”. To Ahn Ho-Sang, this world is a battle field where only strongest can survive. Therefore, every 
Korean needs to be strong and this Spencerian thought has ruled Koreans for long time. Park Noja (2005) 
regards Ahn Ho-Sang as a fascist and Spencerian evolutionist ideologue. Park Chan Seung defines him a 
fascist.  
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countries’. Hwarangdo’s spirits remained in Korean history, despite Silla’s demise in 
tenth century AD.  
In addition to these national historical roots, Confucian culture and Japanese 
militarism are added to the traditions194. In the book, “Hakdo hokukdan kyolsong ui uiui 
(the Significance of the Formation of the Student National Defense Corps)”, Ahn Ho-
Sang wrote: “in order to practice democracy, in our country’s current stage, national 
unity is a prerequisite… The unification of ideology is the first step for the practice of 
democracy…the unification of students’ ideology is a priority matter”(Ahn 1949)195. To 
complete this goal, Hwarangdo was intended to be systemized as an ideology for 
militarizing students. Ahn Ho-Sang participated later in recreating the Hakdohokookdan 
in 1975 and revitalized Hwarangdo again as an ideology for military dictatorship of 
President Park Chung Hee.   
 
2.1.4 Roles of the Hokookdan 
Before the Korean War, Hakdohokookdan’s goals were mainly to destroy leftist 
student movement groups, and organizations and replace them into rightist ones (Kasza 
1995). After these goals were achieved, Hakdohokookdan participated in political 
activities of the state, especially Syngman Rhee’s political events. As Ahn Ho-Sang 
wrote (Ahn Ho 1949), the Hakdohokookdan helped Syagman Rhee’s regime and worked 
as a vanguard group in political events, with other AMOs such as the Taehannochong 
(Lee Jae 1984; Seo Joong 1997). There were some demonstrations and general meetings 
organized by Rhee’s regime as follows: 
 
 
194 In addition to these traditions, Seo Jook-Seok states, the morality of Ilminism had its basis on the 
traditional Confucian culture and the Japanese militaristic fascism (Seo, Joon-Seok. 1997. "Consciousness 
of Political Leaders and Confucian Culture " Daedong Munhwayeungu 36.) 
195 Recitation from Chae(2006) 
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· April 22 1953 - Students indignation march northward for reunifying Korea by a 
military way;  
· June 2 1953 - Forced mobilization for anti-truce talks demonstrations;  
· September 25 1954 - Nation indignation meeting against THE U.S forces withdrawal;  
·August 6 1955 - National convention against the Neutral Nations Armistice Supervisory 
Commission196, for 4 months;  
·March 10 1956 - Public request TO Syngman Rhee to run for a presidential election for 
a third time; 
·October 20 1956 - Korean Student anticommunism demonstration inspired by the 
government;  
·May 2 1958 - National Students and public assembly to support Indonesia’s 
anticommunism revolution;  
·February 13 1959 -Demonstrations against sending Koreans who were residing in Japan 
to North Korea, for 6 months.  
 
From the outset, as the Hakdohokookdan was mainly created by a presidential 
decree for political reasons to shore up Rhee’s regime, the Hokookdan succeeded, while 
the dictatorship survived, but lacked substance. As a vanguard group for the regime, the 
Hokookdan functioned faithfully. As soon as Syngman Rhee lost his power, however, the 
Hokookdan was abolished by a presidential ordinance from the Huh Jung interim 
government in an extraordinary Cabinet meeting, after “the April Nineteenth Civilian 
Revolution” on May 3, 1960 (Legislative Office 1960). As soon as the Hakdohokookdan 
was disbanded, Hakdohokookdan was immediately replaced by voluntary student 
organizations in secondary schools and in universities. Hakdohokookdan reemerged in 
Korean history under President Park, with the same ideologies.   
 
196 When United Nation forces signed the armistice agreement, NNASC (Neutral Nations Armistice 
Supervisory Commission must be set to supervise any possible military conflicts between North and South 
Korea. In this commission, Czechoslovakia and Poland which were communist states were included as well 
as Swiss and Sweden. Therefore, Syngman Rhee strongly hated this commission and ordered his cabinet 
members to organize anti NNASC movement.  
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2.2 Background of the Reemergence of the Hokookdan in 1975 
After the Yushin was launched in 1972, protests from below,such as students, 
laborers, and other civilians, were not serious. And the political scene appeared was very 
calm. However, the student organizations soon began demonstrations against the military 
dictatorship of President Park. On October 2, 1973, Seoul national university students 
demonstrated against the military dictatorship, asking the regime to explain the real truth 
of the kidnapping of Daejung Kim, who was a powerful rival of President Park, and later 
became a President of the ROK in late 1990 and a Nobel laureate in 2002. 
Daejung Kim was kidnapped by KCIA in Japan and was sent to South Korea. 
With this event, students, intellectuals, journalists, politicians, and religious leaders 
participated in a demonstration against Park’s Yushin. At the end of 1974, students 
organized a national unit for powerful, effective resistance called the “National 
Democratic Youth Association.” (Kim In 1998). The state wielded despotic power under 
the emergency decree of the Yushin Constitution to counterattack student resistance. In 
1975, Park’s regime tried to re-introduce the Hokookdan. On June 7th 1975, a 
presidential Ordinance to establish the Student National Defense Corps was officially 
announced. For three months, the regime prepared the recreation of Hokookdan and 
mobilized students in marching demonstrations to show that Hokookdan was indeed re-
established.197The official reasons for Hakdohokookdan revitalization, as mentioned by 
the minister of Education, Lew Kichoon, were,   
“Because the South Vietnamese were conquered by Communist North Vietnam in 
April 1975, the threat from Communist North Korea and the possibility of North Korea 
 
197 Around 1975, President Park and his regime faced serious political and social insecurity in both the 
domestic and international arena. This insecurity led Park’s regime to resurrectof Hakdohokookdan after a 
15 year absence. Synman Rhee had also made use of the communist threat to his regime security (Hong 
2000). 
invading again has increased to an unprecedented level. We need to organize students in 
order to prepare for a new Korean War by North Korea. This is need of the hour 
(Hankooktaehaksinmunsa 2003)”    
Park’s regime used the threat of communist North Korea, when the regime faced 
the unstable political situation caused by domestic resistance and by international 
pressure for democratization as well as international communization in Indochina. 
Therefore, to defend our fatherland from possible invasion from North Korea, students 
should participate in the Hakdohokookdan.   
 
Figure 6.1 Hakdohokookdan’s Emblem and Slogan 
 
  
The emblem with a pen and a sword symbolizes the slogan, “learning and defending.” The eagle means a 
strong state in military. On the picture of right, learning and defending in Korean and in Chinese letter.  
 
2.2.1 Student resistance against Park’s military dictatorship 
 
The increasing number of students was another background incentive to the 
revitalization of the Hakdohokookdan. To the state, the growing number of students 
would mean that student resistances would be stronger than before, because their actual 
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numbers would be sources to be mobilized for organizing demonstrations against the 
state. The state was concerned about the increase in potential enemy members. 
Population growth alone demanded that the government should open new schools for the 
young generation.  
Table 6.1 Number of babies and the birth rate in the 1970’s 
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Number 1,007 1,025 955 968 924 875 797 827 752 864 865 
Rate 4.53 4.54 4.14 4.10 3.81 3.47 3.05 3.02 2.65 2.90 2.83 
Source: Korea National Statistics Office, 2006, Yearbook of Population 
 
Since 1960, the Korean population and the birth rate has continued to grow. In the 
1970s, the total birth rate recorded higher birth rates than other countries. From table 6.1, 
the birth rate of Korea was 4.53, which was higher than Japan, 2.13 and the United 
States, 2.46 in 1970. 
 The state intended to open new educational institutions to meet the population 
growth. Education worked its prominent role in the period of nation formation and 
economic development in Korea after its liberation from Japanese colonial domination. 
The state helped to build higher education institutions such universities, technical 
colleges, and other institutions. The Korean government made efforts to expand the 
educational infrastructure for Koreans. This effort helped expand human capital in South 
Korea. During the economic development period from the 1960s to the 1980s, education 
institutions such elementary, middle, high and even universities, have experienced 
tremendous growth. The formal value of educational credentials are regarded as an 
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important way to evaluate people and has helped people to move up to higher social 
levels in Korea 1961 to 1986 (Lee Jeong 2003).  
Due to the modern education system and Korean parents’ passion to educate their 
children as well as the growth of the Korean population, the number of education 
institutions increased as rapidly as economic growth. Also the recruitment system of the 
government, 198  school alumni connections, the influence of Confucian ideas, have 
contributed to the increase in the student population (Kim In 1993). The Increase in the 
total the number of students is an important fact in understanding why the state could not 
help revitalizing the Hakdohokoogdan in both high schools and universities.  
The increase in the number of schools and students has made the potential 
resistance to military dictatorship greater. Because there were only a few students of 
university or college level, the main force of the students’ movements were organized 
and consisted of high school students during the period of Japanese colonial domination 
and the period of the first republic. Even in the April nineteenth civilian revolution, the 
force and power of the secondary school students were as strong as university students199. 
 
198 In Korean History, family and education have been regarded as an important social mobility vehicle. 
Both family and education had often played a powerful role in upgrading social status, particularly in 
dynasty transition period since AD 958. National examination system was introduced by kings and was 
focused on recruiting bureaucrats out of the ruling aristocrat families and their kin groups in pre-modern 
Korean societies in order for the kings to restrain and check the ruling aristocrats and protect the kings’ 
rights and power.  However, preparing for that examination required a lot of time, money, and other 
members of family sacrifice and commitments to one member (specifically a male member) who was 
working up to that examination. It often took 20-30 years for one to prepare, and pass the national 
examination, and go to office as a bureaucrat. Without the family’s total support, it would have not been 
possible to prepare and pass it. So, although eligibility for those tests were opened not only to the 
established ruling aristocrats but also all plebeian and peasants except slaves and servants, other feudal 
layers of social stratification except aristocrats (Yang-ban) could not afford to even prepare for the Chosun 
dynasty. Therefore, national examination system did not play its original role as social mobility channel, as 
the class system was structured. The family system (expanded family structure including kin groups) and 
social status was a strong fact that prevented education from serving as equalizer in that society (Kim In 
1993; Lee Jeong 2003) 
199 Seo, Joong-seok points out that, at the first stage of the April civilian revolution, the main force of the 
movement consisted of middle-high school students. And their slogan was “seniors (university students) 
are corrupted and they should be educated”. Also the emerging force of students’ resistance in the April 
revolution was motivated by the middle and high school students’ resistance before the Korea university 
students’ demonstration April 18th 1960 (Seo,Joong 1997). 
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The number of middle and high school students (802,027 students) was 8 times more 
than that of college and university students (92,930 students) as table 3.2 shows. The first 
demonstration and the first organization against the corrupt election of 1960, which led to 
the April civilian resistance, was initiated by high school students and their organization 
in February 28, 1960. On April 19, the April civilian resistance was begun by 3,000 
students’ demonstration and it was followed by 100,000 civilians’ demonstration in the 
afternoon of the day (Oh 1999). Street demonstrations continued until 250 professors 
demonstrated against Syngman Rhee and his party corruption (Kim In 1994). During the 
Second Republic rule for 9 months, students also led a peaceful unification movement 
and other social reforms. However, during the Second Republic period, political 
situations were very unstable and the economy was still in depression. Above all, 
factional wrangling in the ruling Democratic Party proved their inability to control and 
manage the Republic of Korea, which resulted in the military coup of May 16 1961.  
During the military committee ruling period from 1961 to 1963, the students’ 
associations were abolished and other similar political, social organizations were 
eliminated (Oh Chang 2001; Lee Jae 1984). The first demonstration against the 
governmental plans to rehabilitate the relationship between Korea and Japan was initiated 
by Seoul high school students in March 21, 1964 (Lee Jae 1984).  
The increase in the number of secondary schools and in their level threatened 
President Park Chung Hee and his regime. Therefore, after the military coup d é tat, 
military authority tried to keep student calm and docile at high schools. This was the 
movement of transforming resistant student into docile and loyal ones known 
(Jungsingaejo Undong), implemented by the government. To achieve the purpose, the 
government changed many educational policies to obtain the loyalty of students in their 
classroom as well as out of school. Table 6.2 and 6.3 in the next page shows the increase 
of the number of schools and of students. 
Figure 6.2 High school student demonstrations200  
 
If the students could be controlled or manipulated by the government, they could 
become a useful resource to them. The state used its legislative power to control 
educational institutions, such as schools. First, policies to control the school authorities 
and teachers were enforced. The policies manipulated students with a value of entering 
prestigious universities. Once they were under control, mobilizing students was easy for 
the state. Student participation in events organized by the government or the military 
authorities was very important for a long time. Many students were, in fact, mobilized for 
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200 Picture source: Korea democracy foundation. The first picture shows that Kyungki high school student 
marched against Korea Japan diplomatic treaty in 1964. Students carried a banner in which funeral of 
nationalist democracy was written. Nationalist democracy was created by President Park for economic 
development and modernization. Therefore, meaning against nationalist democracy was against Park 
Chung Hee and his policies at that time. The second picture was a demonstration against Syngman Rhee’s 
dictatorship in 1960. 
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various events unrelated to their school jobs such as to welcome foreign presidents, to 
support anticommunist meeting, to impeach North Korea, and to support the Korean 
army’s dispatch to the Vietnam War during the period of President Park’s administration 
from 1961 to 1979, for 18years. 
Table 6.2 The change of number of schools over period  
   
Year Total Kind. Elem. Mid. Sch High Sch. College Univ. Pop.*
1945 3000  2834 166 28** 0 
1950 4559  3942 395 262 43** 4** 
1955 5662  4205 849 557 44 21526
1960 6252  4496 4053 640 52 24989
1965 8339 423 5125 1208 701 48 70 28705
1970 9792 484 5961 1608 889 65 71 31466
1975 10939 611 6367 1967 1152 101 72 34707
1980 11550 902 6487 2100 1353 128 85 37436
Source: Korea Education Development Institute statistical Yearly Report 2003  
 *: population Korea national Statistical Office 2000     
**: Lee, Jaoh the history of Student movement after liberation 1984 (not included in total) 
Table 6.3 The change of number of students over period 
   
Year Total Kind. Elem. Mid.sch High.sch College Univ. Pop.*
1945 1446852  1366024 80828 7879** 0 
1950 3042329  2658420 380829 3080 11358**  
1955 3763782  2947436 475342 260613 78649 21526
1960 4522131  3622685 528593 273434 92930 24989
1965 6376931 19566 4941345 751341 426531 23159 105643 28705
1970 8008147 22271 5749301 1318808 590382 33483 146414 31466
1975 9236092 32032 5599074 2026823 1123017 62866 208986 34707
1980 10634680 66433 5658002 2471997 1696792 165051 402979 37436
Source: Korea Education Development Institute statistical Yearly Report 2003  
*: population Korea national Statistical Office 2000     
**: Lee, Jaoh the history of Student movement after liberation 1984 (not included in total) 
Kind.=kindergarden        
Elem.=elementary school       
Mid.sch= Middle school       
High.sch=High school       
Univ.=University        
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These events must be placed in the historical context of democratization in Korea. 
Students became a single group which could be assembled in large numbers by political 
power, as the number of students grew all the time with the increase of schools. But due 
to Syngman Rhee and his staff’s efforts to stabilize students through the 
Hakdohokookdan, students were obligated to work for Hakdohokookdan and therefore, to 
work for Synman Rhee’s government. However, after Hakdohokookdan was abolished in 
1960, voluntary Students organizations at schools replaced the Hakdohokookdan and 
acted on social and political issues for governmental policies or against state policies. 
When the democratic government was replaced by the military coup, voluntary student 
association could not do anything about it, due to the despotic state power during the 
military government period 1961 through 1963. After the military coup d é tat was 
stabilized by the military junta groups, the military government announced a decree that 
prohibited social group activities related to political issues and dissolved all social groups 
and political groups such as parties, labor unions, other organizations (Kim Jun 1996; 
Kim In 1998). This military suppression had an impact on student movements and there 
was no antimilitary government movement by student organizations until the new civilian 
government began to negotiate a diplomatic relation with Japan in 1964.  
  The new leader of the ROK, Park Chung Hee, who placed himself on the 
reserve list to become a president in the 1963 presidential election, soon initiated 
struggles with students in Korea. The struggle which began at the diplomatic talks with 
Japan continued up to his death in 1979. There were big historical events which faced 
strong resistance by students in the following events (Seo Joon, 1997; Kinyumsauphoi, 
2006; Lee Jae 1984): 
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· 1964~1965 -the Korea-Japan talk about the normalization of the relationship between 
the two countries;  
·1965 - Dispatching the Korean army to the Vietnam War;  
·1968~1969 - Changing the Constitution201 for the third presidential term of Park Chung 
Hee; 
·Since 1969 - Introducing military drills in class courses in educational institutes;  
·Since 1970 - Biased economic policies against Labor class and a worker’s suicide by 
burning himself;  
· Since1972 – The New Constitution of Revitalizing Reform imitating Japanese political 
revolution of 1868 in 1972 (Yusin Constitution). Especially, President Park was trying to 
establish his own permanent dictatorship. The most serious resistance at first was from 
students, not citizens or the opposition parties.  
 
Particularly, after the Yushin Constitution was established, student movements 
and civilian resistance began to resist Park’s regime. The regime reacted to resistance in a 
variety of methods. 
 
2.2.2 Reaction from the State: Revitalization of the Hogookdan 
The government directly and indirectly wielded its several monopolized means to 
neutralize student resistance such as using military forces to counter student dissent, 
enacting laws prohibiting demonstrations, trying to control schools and changing the 
patterns of national university entrance systems in as many ways as possible. Park’s 
regime experienced strong resistance from students against the historic Korea-Japan talks 
for the normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan in 1964-1965. 
President Park and his staff tried to take actions to suppress student resistance. The first 
action was to change the educational codes and institutions that made student compete 
against each other. The amended institutions were very powerful in the conditions of 
Confucianism. Therefore, students particularly in high schools lost their power to 
 
201 According to fifth Constitution of the Republic of Korea modified during the military interim 
government by Coup group, third term of presidency was prohibited. However, President Park after 
reelected for another term, needed more terms for presidency.  
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participate in demonstrations and resistance against the regime. The creation of the 
Charter of National Education was another effort on December 5, 1968, which paralleled 
the Charter of Japanese Imperial Education. This education charter was approved by most 
South Koreans.  
 Park’s regime made another plan, which was called “the Detail Schema of 
military Drill at School for Students”, on January 10th 1969. The official excuse of 
establishing military drill courses was the guerillas’ invasion in January and October 
1968 (Jeon Jae 2002). On November 29th of that year, military drills were strengthened 
in high school, and at higher levels of education institutes. Moreover, the government 
announced military drill plans for also female students at school. This plan focused on 
female student’s roles as nurses, while male students were regarded as soldiers in July 
28th 1970 (Munkyobu 1995). The issue of military drills at schools aggravated students 
and generated more resistance, because the drill courses at school aimed at training 
students like soldiers. The military dictator’s regime made Korean society seem like a 
barrack society controlled by the garrison state (Lasswell 1941; Han Hong 2003). The 
garrison decree is a more direct method to suppress student movements and resistance. 
The South Korean government enacted the garrison decree in 1970. According to the 
decree, Korean army regiments were used to occupy universities, when students’ 
demonstration became serious. (Lee Jae 1984).  
  After the Yushin system was established, students’ resistances became worse, 
and citizens began to participate in resistance as well as politicians, religion activists, and 
labor workers. President Park reacted by announcing nine emergency ordinances to be in 
place for three years and used physical violence through the, military police, military 
intelligence agencies and Korean central intelligence agencies (KCIA). The KCIA which 
was the most powerful repressive means for President Park, fabricated many North 
 269
                                                
Korean espionage cases and killed legally and illegally many  Korean protesters.(Lee Jae 
1984; Seo Joong 1997). The National Democratic Youth Student Association event was 
one of the biggest accusations fabricated by the KCIA. When the democratic association 
strongly resisted Park’s regime after the Yushin system, the KCIA identified the people’s 
revolution party as202 manipulating the democratic association in early April 1974. The 
government invoked the fourth emergency decree by the Yushin Constitution, arrested 
suspects, and killed nine civilians after the Supreme Court sentenced them to death (Kim 
In 1998)203. Despite the temporary stability achieved by the persecution, the government 
did not succeed in stabilizing the political crisis and regime insecurity produced by the 
resistance of February 1975. At this time the power base of the resistance were student 
groups who assembled and acted at University. After experiencing the resistance of 1974 
and early 1975, the ordinary cabinet council issued a Presidential Decree to establish the 
Students National Defense Corps in May 21st 1975, and the Central Student National 
Defense Corps was established in September 2nd 1975. In October 1st of the same year, 
furthermore, government made it a rule that no students could graduate from school 
without the required military credits (Munkyobu 1998).  
 
2.3 Roles of the hakdohokookdan  
There were two different roles of the Hokookdan: one was to depoliticize students 
by confining them inside schools and the other was to play a role as a speardhead group 
for Park’s regime, as the Hokookdan played a similar role in Syngman Rhee’s regime 
 
202 KCIA announced that the agency arrested 41 civilians who tried to build a peoples revolution party. 
They indicted 11 civilians among 41, however, and among them only 2 suspects were sentenced to two 
years in prison. Two people were soon released. It was regarded as a plotted case by KCIA (Kim In 1998).  
203 The death was called as judicial murder. Twenty hours after the Korea Supreme Court rejected the 
appeal about unjust sentence by the court, eight suspects were sentenced to death. The government in 2006 
and the Supreme Court in 2007 announced the sentence was wrong and victims should be compensated for 
that.   
before. Both roles of the Hokookdan were not sufficiently successful to satisfy President 
Park, even though the Hokookdan temporarily did bring student stability in the first three 
years. However, the first role of the Hokookdan remained for a long time and contributed 
to making dutiful national subjects in Korean society. The Hokookdan’s main roles were 
military drill, serving the local community, and de-politicization.  
 2.3.1 Military Drill 
 
Figure 6.3 Military Drill204  
 
 
Park’s regime, when it faced Vietnamese communization and domestic pressures 
for democratization, imitated the Youth military organization of Silla called Hwarangdo 
and recreated Students National Defense Corps in 1975. The state defined a situation in 
which the Republic of Korea was at risk from invasion by North Korea and in which 
international powers surrounding Korea were hostile to the Republic of Korea. Unlike the 
first Korean War, it was claimed that no nation would come to their assistance. 
Therefore, Koreans, needed to defend themselves and students could not only be in 
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204 In picture, about 10,000 university students throughout South Korea were enlisted temporarily for ten 
days to be trained in 1975. For university student, Munmudae as a military camp for students was founded 
and local military drill centers were established. In the right picture, high school students were called to be 
trained in local military base and centers (National Archives 1975).  
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classrooms and schools. They should do something. Official aims of the 
Hakdohokookdan were captured by the slogan “learning and defending”; first during the 
war period, providing local defense and preserving order in the rear behind the front 
battle field; second, at peace time, practicing military readiness drills 
(Hankooktaehaksinmunsa 2003).   
 Practicing military drill out of schools actually was not systemized and was 
conducted in regular military drill class at each school level. Male and female leaders of 
Hokookdan were sent to military camp for training in the early stages. The government 
documentary film (1975) said there were 200 male students who took special military 
training at Seorak Mountain. Figure 6.3  shows that male university students are taking 
basic military training. There are some conflicting answers of informants about military 
drill for Hakdohokookdan students. Some of interviewees answered that they received 
military drill in military school out of their school, while others answered “no.” One of 
the female staff of Hakdohokookdan said, 
 
“We went to a Women’s corps training institute at Yongsan, Seoul. When I was 
there, there were 101 female staffs of Hakdohokookdan from each university or college 
throughout South Korea…. There we were trained like army soliders. We even received 
chemical, biological, and radiological drill.”  
 
Figure 6.4 shows that female leaders of the Hokookdan were taking basic military 
training. For female leaders of the Hokookdan, the Women’s Army Training Institution at 
Yongsan was used in the left picture and the right picture shows that they were being 
trained shooting at Munmoodae in Kyungkido in 1975. 
 
Figure 6.4 Female leader of Hakdohokookdan trained 
 
 
 
Female leaders were enlisted for four days at first but after 1975, the period of 
military training was expanded to seven days. This military drill had an impact on 
female’s spirit to work for Hokookdan. A female informant remembered and said about 
her military experience as follows:  
 
“When I was posted at the Women’s Army Training Institution, I was frustrated 
with the military barrack because I felt that I could not make it. Some of my cohort 
trainees were crying and saying they wanted to see their parents. Some of them continued 
to complain of why they should be there. Military drill was very difficult for women most 
of whom had never been trained to follow. There were no exceptions and all of us were 
trained like male soldiers. However, most of us soon became accustomed to military 
drills. When I finished the military camp, I though that female students including me 
could do anything for our fatherland. If I returned to the school, the Hokookdan’s jobs 
would not be hard for me, I thought. This shift in my thought became a big part of the 
military training that I could obtain.”  
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According to this interview, the military drill of Hokookdan was particularly, , 
effective in reforming female students’ spirit. In the military drill courses of schools, 
female students had not taken any basic military drill, since female students were viewed 
as being nurses and assistants in war, while male students would have to become soldiers. 
 
2.3.2 Weakening Student Organization and Depoliticization  
The Hakdohokookdan in the 1970s was resurrected to secure Park’s dictatorship 
under the name of national security, similar to the reason that Syngman Rhee created the 
Hakdohokookdan originally in 1949 (Hong 2000). It was expected to neutralize students’ 
movements, which became stronger and stronger, against Park’s regime in the late 1970s. 
Park’s regime focused more on making students docile and obedient by depoliticizing 
them rather than mobilizing them for direct political purposes, or demonstrations 
sponsored by the government. There was one visible demonstration sponsored by the 
KCIA and government, when the United States’ intelligence agency tried to eavesdrop on 
the Blue House, where President Park lived and worked.  
Mobilizing students into government demonstrations was, however, not the main 
interest of the regime. The goal was to weaken established student organizations which 
had engaged in demonstrations against the permanent military dictatorship of President 
Park. The characteristic role of the Hokookdan under Park’s regime focused on turning 
students’ attention away from the political issues to others and educating students with 
state values such as anticommunism, national security, and economic development 
according to the political position of the ruler. In other words, regime security was the 
main interest for the political decision makers and leaders had who created AMOs, at the 
time. Understanding the structure of the Hakdohokookdan will help to understand its role 
in de-politicization and why the government recreated the Hakdohokookdan.  
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Even though most state issues were also political ones, student identified national 
goals (economic development, anticommunism, and modernization etc.) as the state 
issues. The state aimed at quarantining general students from student activists and group 
leaders by making students indulge in their private life concerns or scattering students 
during the summer vacations. To student activist groups, the Hakdohokookdan was the 
most powerful barricade to keep them from assembling the body of students.   The 
presidential ordinance of the Hakdohokookdan strengthened the functions of the 
established voluntary student association and varied the functions of it by adding some 
posts and their staff into the Hakdohokookdan.  
 
2.3.3 The Structure of the Hakdohokookdan  
Positions of the Hakdohokookdan were organized vertically and hierarchically, 
instead of horizontally and through equal relationships, as in the structure of military 
organization. Therefore, all member of the Hakdohokookdan must follow orders from 
head of the Hakdohokookdan, the president, as soldiers should follow their commanders. 
Financial support to run the Hakdohokookdan was not provided by the regime. Most of 
the budget of the Hakdohokookdan was from tuition fees and school authorities’ support. 
This financial independence left same autonomous room to the Hakdohokookdan, even 
though the regime provided leaders of the Hakdohokookdan with souvenirs (Presidential 
Secretary Office 1975)205.  
The Hakdohokookdan took over all the functions of voluntary student 
associations. The structure of the Hakdohokookdan at each school level was the same as 
that of the previous students’ association. The Student National Defense Corps mainly 
 
205 Presidential Secretary Office asked the Ministry of Budget to provide the reserved fund of budget to 
give souvenir to presidents of the Hakdokookdan, according to the National Archive of Korea in 1975. It 
was not asked by the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Home Affairs. After the first lady was 
assassinated in 1974, the power of the regime moved to the Presidential Secretary Office (Cumings 1997) 
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consisted of six assistant staff under the direct control of the President, who was called “a 
division commander” and college presidents, called “a regimental commander”. Each 
college has departmental leaders, called “a battalion commander”. In the case of Yonsei 
University in 1977, there was one division commander and one vice commander, eleven 
college commanders “regimental commanders” and six divisions: the general affair’s 
division; military training division; region division; Saemaul division; female student 
division; athletic division.  
There were two different posts from the previous voluntary student association. 
The Saemaul post was newly created at that time. In the Samaeul post, the main aim was 
to go to a rural area specifically assigned by the university unit and to help peasants by 
participating in the harvest and in doing other chores. At the time, rural areas were short 
of manpowers because peasants were migrating into urban areas as a result of 
industrialization. Sometimes the Saemaul post often participated in the urban part of the 
Saemaul Undong performing task as road cleaning like picking up waste, traffic order 
campaigns, taking care of the garden beds of roads and so on. The year 1975 was the 
second phase of the Saemaul Undong and the regime tried to expand its scope to the 
national level including all cities and other nonrural areas such as schools, factories, 
urban homes, and private companies.  
In 1976, during the summer vacation, about 1000 leaders of the Hakdohokookdan 
and members were assembled for summer volunteer activities and about 22,000  students 
from 184 universities (including colleges, junior colleges and technical colleges and so 
on) participated volunteer work in 663 local areas (National Archive 1975). Addition to 
this, each university began to establish a sisterhood relationship with each rural county 
(National Archives 1976).  
 
Figure 6.5 Saemaul Movement Participation and Volunteer Activities to Serve Rural 
Areas 
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It had another important impact that spread students throughout the whole 
southern Korea Peninsula. These extra local works in rural or urban areas played an 
important role in keeping student activists from assembling students during summer 
vacation for antigovernment demonstrations. The voluntary service of Universities’ 
students has remained a tradition, which was regarded as the best change for student 
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activist groups to educate the newly coming students as a fighter for student 
demonstrations during the summer vacation in rural areas with student activists taking-
over student associations at universities in 1985. 
The regime continued to actively engage students as forming a cornerstone of the 
Republic of Korea, and not of the regime in power. The established structure gave a lot of 
room to the regime to call on students. The regime introduced only a presidential decree 
to protect itself from student resistance. It was very successful in the early period and 
later failed to stabilize because student demonstrations reemerged against Park’s regime. 
The new method of mobilizing students differentiated political issues from national 
issues. Serving local or rural areas made students fulfill their national duty as intellectuals 
and students. Getting trained through military camp drill conveyed the idea that they were 
Hwarngdo who sacrificed themselves to defend the Silla kingdom. This distinction 
between political issues and national issues or state issues was highly influential in 
leading students to identify with state values.  
 
3. FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATION   
In this section, the focus is on what was happened on the ground. When a policy 
was implemented by the state, how did students respond to a new student organization 
that replaced older established voluntary student associations.  
The Hakdohokookdan participants gained greater rewards than other AMO 
participants. Most interviewees who participated in the Hakdohokookdan at the 
University as presidents or staff are now employed in good jobs such as professors, 
CEOs, executive managers of big Korean banks. Despite their social positions, they are 
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concerned by being labeled, Uhyong, 206  which meant originally “King’s Use or 
Governmental Service.”  
 
3.1 Conformity, Obedience, and Causes  
The president of Hakdohokookdan and its staff were recruited by the authorities 
of each school. Participants said that they just followed suggestions or orders from school 
authorities such as the teachers, principals in high schools, professors and deans in 
universities. When school authorities needed to recruit a president of the 
Hakdohokookdan and its staff, they seriously considered anyone amenable to the 
authorities. Interviewees emphasized that they were exemplary or model students at their 
school. The reasons why they were recruited, they think, were that they were model 
students to others in every aspect of school life. Above all, amenability was the key 
criterion to choose students. So, male students of the Hakdohokookdan’s were from 
military veterans or ROTC. Some of the interviewees seemed to show their pride that 
they were exemplary for other students by following faithfully the school authorities they 
were in and other social authorities. 
An interviewee answered,  
“When I was senior at high school, the principal of our school called me and my 
friends.  I could not remember the exact time, while the established volunteer student 
association was working, without asking whether we will do the Hakdohokookdan or not, 
the schools ordered us to work for the Hakdohokookdan. The school authority selected 
 
206 In modern Korea times, it has meant ‘traitor of belief’, ‘collaborators with the Military dictatorship or 
authority’, or ‘government patronized persons or organizations’ in South Korea. The social labeling 
regarding them as bullyboys of the dictatorship under the strong military dictatorship is reluctant to makes 
them accept interview offer, which let them narrate their past experiences. 
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about 10 students and appointed each student to be a regimental commander, a battalion 
commander and company commanders.”  
He continued, “I heard the authority consider grades, leadership, and the 
physical conditions of students. At that time, I exercised weight training, was taller than 
others, and had many friends. What I knew about the Hakdohokookdan was the fact that 
an established student association would be replaced with the Student National Defense 
Corps. I was very confused with the change and with my jobs related to 
Hakdohokookdan.” 
A female interviewee who was proud of her high school 207  said about their 
school, “We, at that time, were FM208, which meant ‘faithful to rules, well-disciplined 
and good examples’. Our school consisted of best students. There were only a group of 
model students who spent their time only in studying. Our school was the best in 
Kyungnam province at that time. We were right and true-bred students who followed 
rules from above without thinking.”  
A male informant who participated in the Hakdohokookdan as a company 
commander and who is working for a big Korean bank said about the time that he was 
recruited as a Hakdohokookdan member.  
“One day I got a call from the department chair, after finishing military service 
and returning to the university, he said ‘we need to meet’. I went to his office and there 
he exhorted me to have a word with the Hakdohokookdan as a company commander and 
deputy-commander of college. …. I think students who were called from the school 
authorities were reluctant to take the responsibility for the Hakdohokookdan jobs… 
 
207 Her high schoo, Kyung Nam women’s school was the highest ranking of other Pusan area and 
vicinities.  
208 FM, an abbreviation for `frequency modulation', is a method of transmitting radio waves that can be 
used to broadcast high quality sound. This word have been used a meaning, very exemplary thing, model 
thing for other. This word is very often used in that meaning in South Korea.  
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Therefore, most commanders (student leaders) were chosen from persons who finished 
their military services.” 
‘Without thinking and following the orders from the top” also appeared in the 
interviewee’s answer, who participated in a Hakdohokookdan commencement ceremony 
in 1975. She prepared for the ceremony for three months during the summer vacation. 
She said, “Although it was difficult for weak female students like us to practice for a long 
time under the severe sun of summer209, I was naive enough to just follow what the older 
students and the school authorities ordered us to do without thinking anything against the 
orders.”  
 The school authorities chose the Hakdokookdan leaders because they were 
obedient to the authorities. Are their obedient characteristics explained by participants’ 
personality? Where has these compliant characteristics originated from?  Research finds 
two factors which are relevant to this question: first an institutional approach; second a 
cultural approach under military culture mixed with Japanese legacies (Cumings 1983; 
Miller and Kanazawa 2000). For the first institutional approach, the state tried to change 
the educational systems and institutions to transform Korean students into docile type of 
human beings making changes in the national entrance examination, efforts to control 
schools and school authorities by enacting educational laws, making changes in the 
curriculum by inserting the concepts of anticommunism and economy from political 
human being. This institutional approach strengthened competition among students to get 
higher scores and to get admission into prestigious universities, which meant future 
success in Korean society (Kim In 1993; Kim Sang 2004). The second approach focused 
on the everyday life of students under military culture mixed with Japanese colonial 
legacies, which strengthened students’ conformity to social orders (Cumings 1984).   
 
209 The Hakdohokookdan commencement ceremony was going to be held in September. Therefore, 
students who was going to participated in should drill marching in summer.  
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3.1.1 Institutional Factors   
The ROK began to intensively educate ideologies of the ROK to Korean students 
such as anticommunism, liberalism, capitalism and democracy for the counterpart of 
communism in North Korea. Anticommunist education first began during the Korean 
War and after the war, the South Korean government tried to make students a dutiful 
anticommunists, even though it was not included in the regular curriculum. The military 
government that came into power by the military coup d’état in 1961, strengthened 
anticommunist education by reforming the Secondary School System in 1963 (Munkyobu 
1998). The second curriculum reform from 1963 to 1973 was set up, in which an intense 
anticommunism class was included for all students, one through six grade years, in the 
regular course in the elementary schools for one hour a week. In the middle school 
curriculum, an anticommunism class was also introduced.210  In 1968 President Park 
established the Charter of National Education. And the Cabinet decided to institute a new 
military drill course in high schools and universities in 1969 (Munkyobu 1998). 
Furthermore, the curriculum of the secondary school system changed from 
democratic and liberal to practical education for the modernization of “our fatherland,” 
while anticommunist education was inherited by the military government from 1961-
1963, and by the 3rd and the 4th Republic during the whole period of Park Chung Hee.211 
The military revolution council was created and renamed the supreme council for 
rehabilitating the state and nation in 1961 by Park Chung Hee, a leader of the coup. The 
 
210 For the middle school student, the second curriculum system was modified from one hour 
anticommunism class to two hours  anticommunism class in 1971 (Munckyobu 1998) 
211 The military government succeeded the anticommunism policies and more strongly strengthened it in 
order to clean any suspicious doubt against a major general and leader of military government, Park Chung 
Hee, because the military leader, Park Chung Hee was suspected as a communist because he was arrested 
after Yǒsun Revolt of 13th regiment was cracked down by South Korean Army. 
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supreme council announced the educational policies that consisted of four goals; 1 
annihilating the indirect invasion from North Korea; 2 Revolution in mentality, 
education, and in the education administration system for reform in humanity; 3 
Emphasis on a  practical and technical education system building for eradicating 
poverty; 4 Cultural Revolution212. Goal no. 1 is related to anticommunism. The other 
goals were to turn the students’ direction toward economic development and de-
politicization from political issues which had prevailed in the Korean society after the 
April civilian revolution in 1960.  
The second curriculum period (1963.2-1973.2) for middle schools introduced a 
new course, anticommunism and ethics, and strengthened the industrial and business 
courses. A national history course was a part of social courses. National history became a 
single course in society courses in the third curriculum period (1973.8-1981.12). A 
foreign language course was required. And industrial and technical classes were 
intensified.  
For high school students, middle school curriculum, anticommunism and 
technical and industrial curriculums were intensified. The features of curriculum for high 
school students were to strengthen some courses such as the anticommunism curriculum, 
military drill courses were newly created, and industrial technical courses and foreign 
language added. Overall, the government tried to train students toward becoming a 
modern capitalist, competitive, and compliance student by concentrating on their future 
success. 
 
 
212 The military government regarded old manners of education system except anti communism as enemy 
which was pulverized. 
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3.1.2 Institutional Change Strengthening Competition among Students 
The remodeling in humanity movement by the interim military authority began 
after the military coup in 1961. The term, remodeling in humanity, means transformation 
of a premodern human being who was regarded as retarded, lazy, passive, political-
centered, and poor Koreans into new modern, economic, dutiful, national, faithful 
Koreans. The Governments in the 1960s, including the interim military government, put 
institutional transformations into effect such as remodeling personalities of Koreans, 
introducing no entrance exam for middle schools, the policy of equalizing high 
schools213, educating the ideas of the Chart of National Education under the slogan of 
“modernization of our fatherland” (Munkyobu 1998). The government newly created an 
industrial and job training college system in which students could get high school 
diploma and college diplomas after five years of schooling in order to intensify the 
technical education policy in 1963. The number of industrial and job training college 
increased to four in 1964, nine in 1967, and reached 20,741 students in twenty three 
colleges in 1969 (Munkyobu 1998). 
The state decreased the number of four year universities from 71 to 50, while the 
number of junior colleges that taught industrial and technical knowledge for two years 
increased from twelve to twenty seven and ten teachers’ colleges were newly 
institutionalized. The work of manipulating the number of private universities was one 
part of the efforts that the state tried to control school authorities in the 1960s.  
Controlling the number of universities made a strong unexpected and expected 
impact on high school students. As opposed to the increase in the number of high school 
students, the allowed number of university students was limited by law after 1966. The 
 
213 Equalizing level of high schools means that the state made levels of high school even and distributed 
students to each high school. Therefore, there was no prestigious high school anymore and only glorious 
history of high school.    
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law of controlling the number of university students and the law to put in place a 
registration system for degrees were the symbols of efforts to control universities and 
their students. As a consequence of this, the number of students who wanted to be 
enrolled at the university increased but the number that the university could accept was 
very limited. The most powerful changes happened in the national entrance system for 
higher levels of education. Students’ conformity was increased by the reform of the 
national entrance examination for university in order to supply human resources for the 
economic development and modernization of South Korea. Competition was intensified 
for entrance into university and high school students could not help spending their time in 
studying for the standardized examination by the state. The existence of the national 
entrance examinations for middle schools, high schools, colleges and universities forced 
students to spend most of their time in studying standardized curriculum.  
In addition to these changes in the entrance exam system, various examination 
courses were intensified, thereby reducing opportunities to be enrolled at the universities. 
After the military coup d’état, President Park reduced the number of four year 
universities from 71 universities to 50 universities, and created special, technical and 
mechanical colleges in the name of reforming the collapsed private school system 
(Munkyobu 1998).  These educational systems worked in making students study a 
narrow curriculum, not pay their attention to other social and political issues and in 
supplying human resources to economic development. In this education system, the more 
time students spent studying, the more opportunity the students could get for admission to 
prestigious high school or universities, because in the standardized examination system, 
the students who could spend most time in memorizing the curriculum and contents 
would be more successful.  
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3.1.3 Cultural Factors 
The second factor of student conformity is the high visibility (Miller and 
Kanazawa 2000) of the students in the classroom and out of school. The third factor of 
students’ conformity is that the school authorities in universities chose representatives 
from some special seniors who finished military service in South Korea. South Korea is a 
kind of “conscription society”, in which everyone must finish his military obligation. 
Without finishing the military obligation, it was hard for unfinished people to get a job in 
South Korea except for someone who had social and political influence.  
A series of reforms in the education system made students docile and well 
behaved. Students adapted themselves to changed circumstances in order to get 
admission into more prestigious universities. President Park was elected for a third 
presidency on May 3, and his ruling party (Konghwadang) succeeded in grasping 
political power and becoming majority on July 8, 1967. Students began demonstrating 
against the fraudulent election. On the July 15, 1967, there were student demonstrations. 
Students in five universities and twenty one high schools demonstrated against President 
Park and his ruling party for four days. This massive demonstration in which high school 
students participated faded away as time passed. By the 1970s, high school students lost 
their key position of demonstration by students.  
When Bruce Cumings visited South Korea as a member of the Peace Corps in the 
1960s and 1970s, he was surprised at finding Koreans still accustomed to the Japanese 
colonial legacy. Particularly, the school system and the activities of school students were 
very similar to those of the Japanese system.  
Cumings (1984) said, “An older and more knowledgeable traveler will observe 
that Korean schoolboys bear a strange resemblance to Japanese students of an earlier 
era, with their black uniforms and shaved heads. A truly sophisticated observer might 
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note that the capitol building in Seoul is not simply in the style of colonial architecture 
the world over, but when seen from the air is shaped like the first of the two characters 
that we translate as “Japan.”  
There is, for an example, an old manner of the colonial legacy, which was based 
on the military drill, in the education area. On every Monday, students arranged in rank, 
stood in the playground with black uniforms which were used in the Japanese colonial 
domination period and then they listened to orders from the principal or teachers. Masao 
Takaki, or later Okamoto Minoru was the Japanese name of the former President Park 
who wanted to be a loyal military officer of the Japanese empire. Park Chung Hee, like 
other high officers and officials of the early period of the Republic of Korea, was 
educated in the Japanese colonial education system and became a military officer after 
graduation from Manchurian and Japanese national military academies. He and his staff 
who experienced the Japanese colonial education system and military services during the 
Japanese colonial rule intensified the Japanese colonial system of education that had still 
remained in the freed and newly created South Korea.  
The high visibility (Miller and Kanazawa 2000) emphasized by Japan’s education 
system appeared in the structure of the classroom in South Korea, where all students were 
in the same room and were exposed to teachers and school authorities. On an everyday 
basis, students were subject to group projects and individuals were not allowed to do their 
own works. Students’ activities were performed in the same classroom as their peers from 
Monday through Saturday. According to each student’s behavior, students were subject 
to group sanction from the school authorities. Students became accustomed to orders 
from the school and to control of the school authorities. These characteristics were found 
in President Park’s military philosophy. According to this military spirit, if one member 
of a company made a mistake, it would become a disaster for the company. Therefore, a 
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mistake should be punished in the group by the leader (Park Chung 2005)214. Miller and 
Kanazawa’s argument of the effect of visibility underlies an increase in students’ 
conformity. This system led to students’ obedience and conformity. Therefore, the social 
consequences of the educational system of South Korea made the political leaders, who 
had been collaborators of the Japanese colonial government, survive in the newly created 
the Republic of Korea, in which they worked to make a national subject instead of a 
citizen in South Korea.   
 
3.2 Identifying the State with the Economy: Re-Feudalized Koreans by System  
  
The interviewees of the Hakdohokookdan showed more individualistic 
characteristics and a more ambivalent attitude to economic growth and the military 
dictatorship of the former President Park Chung Hee. Individualistic characteristics are 
close to an idea of new liberalism. Everybody is responsible for their own poverty. If he 
wants to be wealthy, he must work harder than any other individual in the village or in 
South Korea. People’s liberal attitude demonstrates that Koreans are internally colonized 
by the system. There are some differences between participants who were in the 
interviewed group of high school students and those who were there as university 
students. The differences show that, the less informants were educated, the deeper and 
stronger they were colonized (Habermas 1989). Some of the latter are professors at 
universities and they tended to analyze rather than by answering about their personal 
experience and personal thinking. But even though they tried to analyze these things, they 
were still strongly colonized by system.  
 
214 President Park Chung Hee published his books, which were written by other writers but most ideas 
were from Park himself (Jager 2003).  
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A participant who was a president of Hakdohokookdan at a high school in Busan 
defines the concept of the rich and strong military state which a great deal of Korean 
intellectuals and elites had looked forward to seeing since the nineteenth century (Park 
Chung 2005b) as the following: “Power is economic. An individual is economically 
strong then it is good. Likewise, the state is strong in economy then the state becomes a 
strong military state.” This attitude is very similar to the one that a Major General Park 
Chung Hee pointed out right after the military coup in 1962 (Park Chung 2005a). In his 
writings aimed at legitimizing the military coup, Park Chung Hee insisted that because 
the Korean Nation faced Minjokjuk wiki (National Crisis) due to chronic poverty and 
underdevelopment, we, the Korean Nation, need to develop our country economically 
(Park 2005a). It was the Korean Nation’s Duty (HanMinjok ui uimoo). It is the only way 
to avoid another colonization of Korea. His claims that economic development is a 
national duty of Koreans and economic development, is the state development that has 
disciplined Koreans for 18 years, the period of his ruling of South Korea. A participant 
who was a president of the Hakdohokookdan at a university answered as following:  
“The Leadership of a leader is very important. To my point of view, when former 
President Park took power through the Coup, he had less legitimacy. However, the 
economic development of South Korea through the five-year Economic development plan 
gave him great legitimacy for the coup and his dictatorship.” 
 An informant who was a president of the Hakdohokookdan (called ‘a division 
commander’) at a big university, who did not follow an order 215 from government 
 
215 In 1978, a big event broke out. That was a case that U.S agencies eavesdropped a Blue House, 
Presidential resident place. South Korean government at that time organized civil government inspired 
demonstration before the American Embassy, let each Hakdohokookdan continued to organize it.  As a 
result of his disobedience, a dean of students’ affairs at Yonsei University was called to a police station and 
agencies tried to find him out for some days. 
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agencies to mobilize his students for an antiAmerican demonstration in 1978, and 
suffered from it, said about Park Chung Hee, 
 “I think that after experiencing President Park Chung Hee’s death, and the 80s 
and 90s, his long term dictatorship and five-year economic development plan from the 
60s to the 70s, made the Republic of Korea what it is.” He continues “at that time I did 
not know what kind of vision for Korea his leadership had and I was stuck to his 
dictatorship and the rumors about his private life” 
 He seems to think that because there was Park Chung Hee in Korean history, 
South Korea achieved rapid economic development and modernization. With economic 
development and modernization, he tries to understand South Korea in general. After 
graduating from university, he was refeudalized by the system over and over again.  
 One participant who was a departmental leader of the Hakdohokookdan and now 
has one son and one daughter studying abroad said, when asked about his children’s 
living out of his country, “They should return to Korea when they finish their studying 
and contribute to the economic development of their fatherland.” He thinks that when his 
children finished their study, they are supposed to return and to contribute to their 
fatherland’s economic development and this is the only solid way for them to succeed in 
their lives.  
Re-Feudalization in South Korea by Habermasian concept, “System”, happened 
in the process that the state set economic development as a means of political legitimacy 
and as a supreme task of the Korean nation and that South Korea succeeded in leading 
economic development. For economic development and state modernization, every social 
sector has been sacrificed and nationalism under the development of South Korea is now 
strong.  
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3.3 Korean Nationalism only within the Boundary of the State  
  
 The slogan of the Hakdohokookdan, “learning and defending” emphasized the 
permanent invasion threat from North Korea. Anticommunism, economic growth, and 
modernization were essential to making Nationalism in South Korea bound to the 
category of the state and its economy. An informant answered frankly “I hope not to be 
reunified at this moment. Don’t give anything to North Korea and we just live with 
ourselves (here her meaning is with only South Koreans). How many are poor people 
here in South Korea? Once we have to save our poor people and then finish the social 
security system or welfare system for OUR South Koreans, then we may help North 
Koreans. Without saving our people, is it good to help another country’s people? I am 
not sure whether I am right or not, but I am saying my thought.”  
She worries about the reunification cost and the future of her Republic of Korea 
which political elites have founded as a weak state always militarily threatened by North 
Korea. She regards North Koreans and Chinese Koreans as members of the Korean 
nation, ‘WE’. Emotionally North and Chinese Koreans are members of the Korean nation 
to her. But in fact, she is excluding them at the boundary of ‘WE”. The boundary of “We” 
to her means “We only in the Republic of Korea”. 
 Another informant who was president of HakdoHakdohokookdan says “I think 
that reunification may be an agreement that there are two republics of Koreans. Each side 
may have its own leaders and remove the ceasefire line and communicate with each other 
freely.” Also he is worried about the cost of reunification. An informant who is a 
historian and professor says,  
“I don’t think we should reunify Korean peninsula again unconditionally. The 
unconditional reunification is not right, according to some experiences of world….if we 
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do it unconditionally, situations would be worse than before, because North Koreans are 
much worse than Iraqis and terror would rise everywhere and always. Even though it is 
regrettable to live in a separated situation, we need to live like this… I think that both 
sides of South Koreans who unconditionally like North Korea and unqualifiedly dislike 
North Korea are trouble makers at this time. ”  
The regime continued to actively engage students as forming a cornerstone of the 
Republic of Korea, and not of the regime in power. The established structure gave a lot of 
room to the regime to call on students. The regime introduced only a presidential decree 
to protect itself from student resistance. It was very successful in the early period and 
later failed to stabilize because student demonstrations reemerged against Park’s regime. 
The new type of mobilizing students differentiated political issues and national issues. 
Serving local or rural areas made students fulfill their national duty as intellectuals and 
students. Getting trained through the military camp drill conveyed the idea that they were 
Hwarngdo who sacrificed themselves to defend Silla kingdom. This distinction between 
political issues and national issues or state issues was highly influential in leading 
students to identify with state values.  
 
3.4 De-politicization, its Consequence, and the Problem of Uhyong 
 
In modern Korean history, the Uhyong issue was big among students during the 
period of military dictatorship. There were a lot of governmental agencies and spies of 
the state in universities during the period. Sometimes, formally since 1981, military and 
governmental agencies utilized some conscripted university students who were members 
of the anti-governmental student groups as government spies. During the period of Park’s 
regime, the use of students as spies was less popular than the 80s and early the 90s to 
utilize conscripted students. Working for military dictatorship and its regimes meant 
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Ûyong and the issue was omnipresent during those periods and important issues216 to 
both the Hakdohokookdan and student activity groups. There were many governmental 
intelligence agencies at universities and they met students whenever they wanted to see 
them. Uhyong at that time, therefore, meant a puppet of the government whose actions 
were controlled by the order of governmental intelligent agencies and school authorities. 
During his democratized time compared to the military dictatorship period, the labeling 
was and still is a very sensitive issue to participants in the Hakdokookdan. 
Officially, the recreation of the Hakdohokookdan was to defend the Republic of 
Korea and protect the fatherland from invasion from North Korea. However, the main 
purpose of recreating the Hakdohokookdan was to make students calm and depoliticized, 
and thus to stabilize students. That is SNDD was recreated for the expansion of Park’s 
regime. Therefore, anyone who participated in the Hakdohokookdan at that time could be 
regarded as collaborators or traitors against democratic Korea as well as their student 
colleagues who fought for the democratic society of South Korea. The labeling of the 
Hakdohokookdan participants by their colleagues was strong and informants of these 
studies’ interviews strongly emphasized on their similar roles in voluntary student 
associations.  
Except for military drill, most Hakdohokookdan members conducted regular 
students’ activities such as student assembly, sports contests, festivals, academic 
conferences, inviting celebrities to speak in front of students, volunteer works for local 
communities and so on, which were the main roles of the voluntary and autonomous 
student organizations before. Most informants said that “there was no special thing that 
Hakdohokookdan particularly emphasized for Park’s regime and the state. The only 
 
216 A private of military intelligence agencies (called Boansa) disclosed a terrible news about spying on 
1300 people of anti-dictatorship groups. He was conscripted and worked for military intelligence agencies. 
Due to his disclosure, governmental surveillance of students and schools were totally hidden and unveiled. 
Sometimes it was called open-secrete.  
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different thing was who appointed the president of Hakdohokookdan; whether general 
students elected or school authority appointed him?” Some of the informants are proud 
of their disobedience against orders, when government agencies demanded them to 
organize pro-government or pro-Park Chung Hee demonstrations and mobilize students 
to government-inspired demonstrations against eavesdroping by the United States 
government. An informant who was a President of the Hakdohokookdan at Yonsei 
university in fall 1978 - spring 1979 said, “The most difficult to keep in mind  was to 
avoid government agencies because we did not follow agencies’ orders asking us to 
support governmental policies and rules.” The informant said about another significance 
of Hakdohokookdan, “even though we did not organize student demonstrations against 
the military dictatorship, it was meaningful to some degree in that we kept another 
student association going and it was a bridge to a voluntary and autonomous student 
association.” Disobedience by presidents of Hakdohokookdan sometimes gave them a 
kind of consolation, which could prevent other students from labeling them as Uhyong. 
Leaders of Hakdohokookdan said  
“We did not work for the permanent military dictatorship of Park Chung Hee but 
for the quality of students’ life at school and their academics, and we were their friends 
and colleagues.” He said another thing: “the government at that time ordered 
Hakdohokookdan of each university to support the policies of the state and demonstrate 
for the government. However, we did not follow their demands and instead of doing them, 
we ,who consisted of Hakdohokookdan, came together and schemed technical ways to 
avoid following them. We focused on the activities of voluntary student associations 
except political ones.”  
Due to Ûhyong labeling against them, they emphasized the normal activities of 
the voluntary student associations. These activities means depoliticized ones and they 
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also played a role in depoliticizing the general student population at that time. These 
normal activities of depoliticized the Hakdohokookdan played an important role in 
stabilizing students by depriving them of opportunities to organize antigovernment 
demonstrations, because the past demonstrations by students were organized by students 
associations. After the reemergence of the Hakdohokookdan, students’ movements for the 
democratization of South Korea and anti-dictatorship went underground and into hiding. 
So students organized internal circles at school or externally formed antigovernment 
circles at church or other religious bases. These circles however, could not organize big 
or large demonstrations but produced some printed reading materials from which they let 
people know about the dictatorship and its abuse of human rights under military 
governments (Lee Jae 1984).  
This change in student movements with the reemergence of the Hakdohokookdan 
are indicated by an interviewee’s comments,  
“There were no student demonstrations in 1975, 1976, and 1977 but in 1978 there 
were some demonstrations…so the ministry of education controlled and managed 
universities tightly in a military barrack format. When I was a freshmen in 1975, 
demonstrations were mainly organized by students’ associations, but students 
organization in 1978 were circle based and led demonstrations which made the demise of 
military dictatorship and the Yushin system known to Koreans .”  
To some students who eagerly participated in student movements, the 
reappearance of the HakdoHakdohokookdan meant that they lost an important means to 
organize students and mobilize funds for student movements against the military 
dictatorship of President Park. And moreover, for students in general, the opportunities to 
join social movements or student movements for democratization decreased in number 
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and size. And therefore, student movements were weakened for a while. An informant 
who was a President of HakdoHakdohokookdan at a university concedes this role,  
“Anyway, Hakdohokookdan gave help to President Park by stabilizing students 
and it was to some degree successful. To most students, the existence of Hakdohokookdan 
gave them better conditions to study, because if there were a lot of student 
demonstrations, the school would be closed, then they would not be studying anymore. 
Furthermore, academic activities were regarded as a priority by Hakdohokookdan”.   
The role of weakening student movements seemed to be successful as he admits. 
But some of the students who thought that Hakdohokookdan should organize and join in 
the demonstrations were very discontented.  
At this moment, the problem of ‘Ǔhyong’ arose. There were serious conflicts 
between Hakdohokookdan groups and student movement groups. Many students, 
regardless of their political identity, considered Hakdohokookdan members as an 
‘Ǔyong’ group. Most informants in University Hakdohokookdans answered in the 
interview that they suffered from other students’ disdain because others thought their 
existence played a role in keeping Park’s dictatorship secure. An informant remembered 
others saying “you, Hakdohokookdan members, always answer “Yes” whenever you are 
asked to do something by government, don’t you?”  An informant who experienced 
military drill at a military base answered, “The most difficult to endure was to be called 
‘Ǔhyong’ and it let me think sometimes whether I am leading a fair university life?” 
 
3.5 Myth of Strong State in South Korea: Weak State Perspective  
 
Unlike what we have heard for a long time about the Republic of Korea during 
the period of economic development, South Korea was not strong enough to penetrate 
civil society and to control it as unrestrictedly as the state wanted. That the state would 
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have a strong state of infrastructural power because of its strong militarily authoritative 
state, turned out to be a false prejudice. However, although its state infrastructural power 
was weak, the state despotic power was strong (Mann 1988). South Korea was not 
supported by the state infrastructural power as much as most researchers believe. 
President Park during the 60s and the 70s, tried to keep students from resisting against the 
government by relying on state despotic power apparatuses like the police, secret police, 
military agencies and intelligence agencies (KCIA), by enacting many ordinances and 
laws. However, the regime could not keep the students silent and calm. Any dictatorship 
regime cannot completely rely on only physically violent means in order to keep their 
regime secure. Dictatorship needs voluntary support or at least organized voluntary 
support from the below with penetrating infrastructural power. Therefore, military 
dictatorship regimes need to get Administered Mass Organizations (Kasza 1995). In this 
respect, the Republic of Korea was not strong enough to keep an eye on students by using 
intelligence agencies due to the weak state infrastructural power. In other words, even 
though the state was controlling schools and their authority in general, they could not get 
voluntary support from them.  
Two interesting happened at Yonsei University in the late 1970s. At that time, 
there were six government intelligence agencies in Yonsei Univesity in the Seoul 
campus: the Korean Central intelligence agency who managed five other agencies; agents 
from the national police headquarters; local police detectives; military police agents; 
ministry of education agents; defense security command agents,217 In 1974 due to the 
heavy resistance from schools, distinguished men of society and opposition party 
members out of office, the government ordered the fourth emergency ordinance and 
closure of some of the universities and high schools, and arrested many students and 
 
217 Some of intelligent agencies changed their names per new republic with New president before. The 
name is used here from current their English name.  
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antigovernment professors from universities, according to the Yusin Constitution. In the 
spring of 1975, however, the government made an appeasement gesture by releasing 
arrested people. Even though the government showed clemency to democracy activists, 
antigovernment and anti-park movement and demonstrations would not disappear and 
instead became tougher and tougher.  
An interviewee said, “When I was a freshman at Yonsei University, participated 
for the first time in a student demonstration in 1975, it was weird for me because I saw 
the dean of student affairs giving a speech commemorating the student demonstration 
before their going out of the university gate against the riot police. ….. furthermore, 
Yonsei University accepted professors who were arrested and fired, and students who 
were arrested and expelled, due to their antigovernment activities. The government coped 
with the situation by ordering a special ordinance of school closure. After school closure, 
the president of Yonsei University, dean of religion, and dean of planning office were all 
fired.”   
Officially, at that time Yonsei University was asked not to accept these fired 
professors and expelled students. However, the University did not follow the order of the 
government and the dean of student affairs addressed the students who went to 
demonstrate. The anti-dictatorship movements of students were supported by even school 
authorities who were supposed to back up the government. A similar case happened in 
1978. 
 In 1977, South Korea noticed that the CIA Seoul branch eavesdropped on the 
Blue House where the President of the Republic of Korea lives and works. Korean and 
U.S mass media reported this fact. The relationship between Park’s regime and the 
United States government deteriorated. In 1978, the Korean central intelligence agency 
wove a plot to organize student demonstrations against the United States before the 
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building of a U.S. embassy, by using the Hakdohokookdan. Each Hakdohokookdan 
member got an order in which it was to organize student demonstrations against the 
eavesdropping case. When the president of the Hakdokookdan was ordered to organize it, 
he was very concerned with the Uhyong problem. Even though he was a president of the 
Hakdohokookdan which was blamed for their roles in supporting Park’s dictatorship, he 
did not wish to follow the order in the name of his conscience. When he went to the dean 
of student affairs at Yonsei University for advice, the dean said to him, “Just consider 
deeply the 93 years of history of Yonsei University and act in a way to make you avoid an 
indelible stain on Yonsei University’s reputation.”  After the meeting, he consulted with 
his staff on the Hakdohokookdan and concluded that just three staff members would 
sacrifice themselves for Yonsei University. He said, “Three staff members went before 
the U.S embassy building and opened their placard. Then the policemen who guarded the 
building arrested them and released them on the spot. However, the tiny demonstration 
was too small to be reported in the newspaper. This president was in trouble with the 
intelligence agencies and scared, so he went to the departmental chairman. The 
department chair said, “There is a room that has been vacated recently. Hide in this 
room. Do not open the door, even though you may hear something outside”. Intelligence 
agencies tried to get him but failed. Then, they took the dean of student affairs to 
Seodaemun police station for one night. He thought the dean was arrested instead of him. 
The Hokookdan president remembers the dean saying,  
“Teachers are responsible for teaching students truth. I just say that students 
should play their own roles. The decision depends on you, not on me. You are already an 
adult, not a child.” 
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The Hakdohokookdan president recalled, “I could decide what I should do about 
a government-ordered demonstration against the U.S, when I heard that the dean said 
that the student history of Yonsei depended on my decision and behavior.”  
 
He remembers the dean as a true teacher. The Republic of Korea was at that time 
strong enough to maintain surveillance on the everyday life of South Koreans. However, 
the state could not implement its own will over people completely, because the state did 
not have sufficient legitimacy. Even though it was created by the state, Hakdohokookdan 
had a relative autonomy from the state, since the state itself had a weak infrastructure.  
There is another example of the weak state. It concerns the organization of 
Hakdohokookdan and its recruiting system. The establishment of Hakdohokookdan was 
made by a presidential ordinance of the Republic of Korea in May 1975. This rule stated 
just the general principles of the Hakdohokookdan, the organization structure, and 
managerial regulations, but no further details. According to interviewees at Yonsei 
University, the school authority did not appoint a President of the Hakdohokookdan. 
Instead of doing this, the Yonsei University authority selected the indirect election 
system in which a representative from each department choose their leader. The school 
authority, then just appointed the indirectly selected candidate and got a nominal 
approval from the central bureau of Hakdohokookdan. An interviewee remembered an 
election event, 
 “In 1978, we went to a workshop of Hakdohokookdan staff and its members…. I 
suggested that even though we were an administered mass organization and kept students 
associations alive and the school authority appointed the first and second presidents, we 
needed to be at least a formal democracy. …an indirect democratic system was necessary 
for us to select a president of the Hakdohokookdan. All staff, all representatives of 
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departments (called a battalion commander formally but called representatives of the 
colleges and departments at Yonsei Uuniversity) came together and voted for the 
president election. The dean of student affairs accepted the suggestion and we elected the 
president indirectly.”   
He is proud of making his milestone in Yonsei History.  
From the beginning, there were many autonomous opportunities available for 
each local university and for the Hakdohokookdan. According to the ordinance, the 
central bureau of the Student National Defense Corp should be set up at Munkyobu 
(Munkyobu) and manipulate each Hakdohokookdan at the school level. Nominally, the 
central bureau of the Hakdohokookdan did not control, supervise, and manipulate each 
Hakdohokookdan. Instead of supervising, it was supposed to be satisfied with its nominal 
or marginal position, since the ordinance did not provide the particulars for running 
Hakdohokookdan. Judged by these characteristics of the ordinance, the state did not want 
to intervene in students’ affairs in all details but to just replace the established voluntary 
associations in order to keep students from demonstrating against the state and Park’s 
regime.  
In Park’s regime, the state had very limited resources to control society. Because 
it was a weak state, the state tried to be efficient and effective. Therefore, the regime 
created AMOs. It tried to control and manage society by using them (kasza 1995). 
   
4. CONCLUSION 
Administered mass organizations (AMO) at School started because of the demand 
for national security in South Korea in 1949 and 1975. However, most threats from 
outside the state had already been removed before they were created. Whey did the state 
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create AMOs, despite the disappearance of their external enemies? The right answer lay 
in effects to secure the regime’s stability, as Kasza pointed out (1995).  
The military regime had tried to stabilize students to secure its own power, 
because students had an important role in resisting the military regime and other 
examples of political resistance had previously been initiated by the student power in 
modern Korea history. The Student National Defense Corp and its reemergence in the 
mid 1970s was one of the last weapons that Park Chung Hee and his staff could utilize to 
overcome inner and outer challenges to their dictatorship and political power.  In the 
end, as President Park and his staff wished, the existence of the Hakdohokookdan in the 
late 1970s seemed to be to some degree successful though, because there were only some 
very small scale student demonstrations after it was recreated. This research found some 
interesting characteristics: conformity, nationalism within the boundary of state, 
economic developmentalism, the Uyong issue, and finally the myth of strong state. All 
the characteristics which interviewees had shown are about the process of the formation 
of the dutiful national subject in South Korea.   
Ideologically, the existence of the Hakdohokookdan itself let students to realize 
their duties were: learning and defending. Learning meant acquiring knowledge for the 
fatherland modernization, economic development, and building wealthy country. 
Defending meant repulsing enemies and protecting the land and nation from outside evil. 
Practically, the Hakdohokookdan kept student activists from mobilizing other students. 
The state could focus on other forces hostile to the government.  
Informants of this study said we need reunification but the system should be a 
liberal capitalist democracy, in other words, the South Korean system should lead the 
path to reunification. Some informants seem to be concerned with the issue of freedom. 
The communist system of North Korea does not give people freedom, they say, while 
 302
‘We,’ South Koreans enjoy the freedom to do anything. This freedom issue in fact is an 
ideology that South Koreans have been given by the state. Even though many South 
Koreans could hardly exercise even their political rights as citizens, they believed that 
they enjoyed their freedom. During the economic development period, most South 
Koreans were deprived of their political, social, and economic rights. Students were 
officially institutionalized as an army reserve by participating in the Hakdohokookdan in 
the name of national security. Students were further depoliticized by participating in 
AMOs. What was worse, even though students are the future intellectuals of Korea, they 
lost their powers of critical thinking and became submissive national subjects in the name 
of the ROK.  
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7. Summary and Conclusion   
7.1 SUMMARY  
This study begins with the exploration of the question, “what made exclusive 
nationalism a feature of South Koreans, which tends to excludes some members of the 
Korean nation and include others?” To solve this question, this research examines the 
relationship between the state’s mobilization strategies and the formation of national 
subjects in Korea. The study assumes that the mobilization strategies used by the state in 
national development projects played a role in the formation of the national subject by 
creating a new nation for South Koreans. AMOs were a mechanism of state mobilization. 
Unexpectedly, the organizations contributed to forming a new nation separate from the 
Korean nation that was supposed to form a single nation state after being emancipated 
from Japanese colonial domination. The discordance between nation state and the 
national state that South Koreans had kept after liberation in 1945 is a starting point of 
this study. It was a historical consequence of the various actors surrounding Korea after 
Korea had been colonized by Japan. In solving the struggle, the economic development 
and modernization goals of the ROK led South Koreans to becoming members of a new 
nation and keep their separate identity from the Korean nation. From this historical point 
of view, understanding the colonial experiences and the Korean War are a starting line of 
this research.  
When the last dynasty was annexed by Japan on August 29, 1910, Koreans did 
not have any strong state to penetrate its power into its society. The collapse of the the 
Chosun Dynasty did not take place in a day. It was a historically cumulative result that 
Chosun Dynasty could not avoid. In the nineteenth century, the Chosun Dynasty tried to 
reform the kingdom’s system, but failed to reform state systems such as taxation, a 
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modern military sector, and a capitalist economic system. As a result, Koreans became a 
colony of Japan. Japan built a strong modern colonial state, and founded modern social 
systems like property rights and a modern law system. The Japanese state made the 
colonial national state overdeveloped above society, with physically powerful means as 
well as the introduction of a capitalist order. Above all, the modern private property 
rights, which Japan introduced into Korea by the Land Survey in 1914-1918, destroyed 
the rural economy and caused Koreans to be divided into different classes. The modern 
property laws introduced by Japan played a role in forming a modern economic system as 
Weber (1961) defined it. Class conflict, which was inherent in the national conflict with 
Japan, resulted in severe class struggles among Koreans after emancipation from Japan 
and was one of the reasons for the Korean War.  
The overdeveloped state and the legacies of the colonial government survived, 
even though Korea was freed from a colony of Japan after World War II. The USAMGIK 
ruled South Korea by an agreement with the Soviet Union. However, the USAMGIK 
repressed various civilian movements to build a single Korean nation and helped rightist 
groups to form a separated modern national state in South Korea to prevent Communists 
and leftists from building a single nation state, which was friendly to the Soviet Union.  
Meanwhile the Soviet Union also manipulated Koreans into building a communist 
state in North Korea and abolished the legacies of Japanese colonial rules, which was 
supported by North Koreans. In the process of overcoming the separation of the Korean 
peninsula, the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950 through on invasion of the North 
Korean’s People’s Army. Thus lasted for three years and resulted in four million 
casualties (including soldiers and civilians).  
Through waging a war against the Red Communist North Korea and its allies, the 
ROK developed a strong military sector with about 700,000 soldiers in 1953 up from 
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about 100,000 soldiers before the war. The ROK’s administrative bureaucrats 
successfully increased its independent capability to wage the war and run a national 
budget, even though the state relied heavily on assistance from outsiders such as the 
United States and other international organizations. Institutionally the ROK became a 
national state in terms of a state’s definition such as territory, boundary, administration, 
and the monopoly of physical means.  
Before the Korean War, there were many Leftist groups and Communist guerrillas 
in the southern part of the Korean peninsula. They controlled some of the territories of 
the ROK. Ideologically, South Korea was divided into various factions such as Centrist, 
Leftist, and Rightist groups. Each ideological group was divided into different groups 
based on different backgrounds and social bases. After the Korean War, however, South 
Korea was consolidated by the Rightist groups through politics, social ideology, and a 
capitalist economic system. As a consequence of the war, the ROK monopolized physical 
violent means in the name of state security, demarcated its border within the 
demilitarized zones from North Korea, and differentiated administration apparatuses of 
modern types. After the Korean War, this condition also created homogeneous political 
elites by organized Liberal and Rightist groups.  
Unlike the success of the elites of the ROK, during the Korean War, Koreans saw 
the miserable lives of those people who had a different ideology from the ROK. This 
terror the state violence that Koreans suffered homogenized them. The homogenized 
Koreans were also encouraged to become dutiful national subjects (Moon 2005; 
Althusser 1972). Under these conditions, the state could easily establish its social power 
sufficiently enough to mobilize people to achieve any of the ROK’s goals. The ROK, 
however, was not a complete national state in terms of internalizing its subjects, although 
South Koreans were seemingly unified by anticommunism ideology. Contrary to 
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established beliefs, the state of Syngman Rhee could not internalize Koreans to be dutiful 
national subjects of the ROK. Cho Bong-Ahm’s case in the presidential election of 1956 
along with the aspirations for unification of the Korean peninsula right after the April 
Civilian Revolution in 1960, were two examples showing that Koreans had not been 
internalized the state ideology as national subjects. Even though Koreans experienced a 
severe war which resulted in about four million Korean casualties, their wish to unify the 
Korean peninsula did not cease but rather erupted after the dictator, Syngman Rhee’s 
regime collapsed, during the Second Republic.     
Forty years after the April civilian revolution and the collapse of Syngman Rhee’s 
regime, (according to the recent public opinion polls), most Koreans lost their interest 
and ambition to reunify the Korean peninsula, unlike Koreans who lived through the 
April of 1960. Koreans are concerned with their economic status and earning more 
money, instead of unification and forming a single nation state including both the North 
and the South. Koreans have become a new nation only for the ROK and created their 
own space within the southern part of the Korean peninsula. According to the theory of 
citizenship, national subjects have excluded other Korean members since the Korean 
economy developed in the 1960s. A form of state-centered Korean nationalism is in fact, 
not a traditional Korean nationalism, because it does not include other Koreans and other 
Korean territories. Pseudo-Korean nationalisms have had various faces in the context of 
economic development and the political transition period. They have changed their guise 
along with different social conditions, because it was a means of the state which needed 
ideologies to put them into Koreans’ minds. In the end, the unification issue has been 
excluded from Korean nationalism issues by the state and political elites, as the Korean 
economy has developed.  
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Of course, Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee often used the unification issue as 
political rhetoric to gain the support of Koreans. But unification as rhetoric was just a 
political slogan and a last goal of the Korean nation. The two heads of ROK always, in 
fact, tried to exclude the unification issue from the boundaries of Korean nationalism, 
because their political legitimacy stood on the opposite side of Korean nationalism. 
Above all, they denied peaceful unification and removed any discourse on unification of 
the nation.  
This research has hypothesized that the creation of a new nation by ideologies 
began to appear in the period of economic development and the Park Chung Hee regime. 
Accounting to the AMOs theory, military regimes and dictators liked to create AMOs in 
order to implement their policies and political aims. In the early period of the ROK, the 
AMO theory explained why Syngman Rhee created various AMOs. Syngman Rhee’s 
regime sought to destroy Leftist groups and other Rightist groups, and absorb the remains 
of the groups destroyed. After demolishing other organizations, AMOs concentrated their 
capacity on supporting the ruling party and regimes. Park Chung Hee’s regime was, 
however, different from Syngman Rhee’s in terms of the AMO theory. As a general and 
later president, Park focused on de-politicizing Koreans by separating AMOs and other 
social organizations from the political arena. Right after the military coup, General Park 
tried to wipe out all collaborators of the previous dictator regime in every social and 
political sector.  
President Park thought that a political relationship with social organizations was 
socially and economically inefficient and corrupt. Because President Park seized political 
power in an illegal way, he needed to obtain political legitimacy. To do so, President Park 
made the results of economic development visible to Koreans. President Park set the 
biggest national agenda for the future of the Korean nation, that is, economic 
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development and building a strong and wealthy nation state, which had been a dream of 
Korean enlightenment idealists since the nineteenth century. In order to achieve 
economic development and make Koreans indifferent to political agendas, President Park 
Chung Hee depoliticized Koreans. De-politicized AMOs were used to achieve different 
political goals to develop the Korean economy and to modernize. Through those goals, 
Park tried to obtain political legitimacy.  
He suggested incessantly that if the Korean nation succeeded in economic 
development, the nation would become a new nation wealthy and strong in military 
power. He always tried to call to Koreans’ minds the story of the strong nation state 
(Kokooryu) that built a vast kingdom in Manchuria and the northern part of the Korean 
peninsula. He recalled the story of Admiral Yi Soon-Shin who never lost a battle against 
the Japanese naval fleets during the Korean and Japanese war in the seventeenth century. 
To Koreans who had experienced colonial domination by Japan, the building of a strong 
wealthy nation state was one of their most earnest desires. According to case interviews, 
many people accepted the suggestion and participated in the national development 
projects intermediated by AMOs. Developing the economy became a more urgent 
mission for Koreans than the unification of the Korean peninsula.   
Each previous regime mobilized people, to destroy antigovernmental groups and 
antiregime groups by organizing various AMOs. The Student National Defense Corps, 
the Korean Federation Trade Unions, and other youth organizations were created to 
mobilize people. However, the AMOs created by President Park Chung Hee were very 
different from previous AMOs. The established AMOs were also modified or re-created 
after being abolished by the interim military government. Those were a new job to de-
politicize people and mobilize them into development projects or other non-political 
goals. This approach made Koreans indifferent to political issues. Of the interviewees 
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who participated in those AMOs, their participation gave them a way to avoid being 
blamed for Uhyong in the democratized period. In quite a few cases, most AMOs had not 
participated in political demonstrations during the economic development period. Most 
interviewees did not participate in any pro-government or pro-Park Chung Hee 
demonstration organized by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) or despotic 
state apparatuses. There are two major issues in the contemporary era: One is the Uhyong 
issue and the other is a strong pride to achieve modernization and economic development 
independently. There were three major AMOs; the Hakdohokookdan (Student National 
Defense Corps), the Hankooknochong (Federation of Korean Trade Unions), and the 
Saemaul Undong (New Village Movement).  
The Student National Defense Corps (Hakdohokookdan) was the last major AMO 
to be created by Park’s regime in the mid 1970s. Park Chung Hee, who faced resistance 
from students after the Yushin system was initiated, needed to stabilize students. At first, 
President Park had relied on despotic power such as the police, the KCIA, the military 
intelligence agency, military decrees, emergency measures and military decrees from the 
new Constitution of Yushin. He still could not succeed in keeping students from 
demonstrating. As a ramification, he re-created the Hakdohokookdan in 1975. After 
creating the Hakdohokookdan, he was able to stabilize students for years. As a main force 
of resistance to military dictatorship, the student movements lost their power for a long 
time. What happened to the previous voluntary student associations? Nothing happened 
to them. The Hakdohokookdan just replaced their roles in the schools. The new student 
association created by Park’s regime concentrated on non-political student activities. 
They focused on academic jobs and student life within the boundaries of universities 
instead of organizing student demonstrations against the dictator. As a result, the student 
activity groups soon lost their momentum to organize anti-dictatorship movements. The 
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leaders of the Hakdohokookdan denied any accusation that they helped the military 
dictator, Park Chung Hee (so-called Uhyong). They kept the student associations alive 
and handed them over to the voluntary associations after Hakdohokookdan law was 
abolished once again in 1984. One of the association presidents denied a KCIA order that 
he should organize anti-American demonstrations to protest a conflict caused Park’s 
regime was able to achieve to some degree its goal by creating the Hakdohokookdan.  
The Federation of Korean Trade Unions (hereafter Hankooknochong or the 
Federation) originated from the Taehannocnong which aimed at destroying the leftist 
Jeonpyung (the Leftist Federation of Trade Unions) and absorbing its remains. After the 
disappearance of the Jeonpyung, the Federation was loyal to Syngman Rhee’s regime and 
was then abolished by the military coup government. The military government under a 
Major general, Park Chung Hee, de-politicized the Federation to stabilize the labor sector 
and supply well qualified laborers to the economic sectors. At the recreation stage, the 
Federation was deprived of political power and organizational forces. By keeping the 
industrial labor union, local union, and Federation leaders under control of state 
surveillance system, Park’s regime stabilized the labor sector. This relationship between 
union leaders and the regime was sustained by giving the leaders hold real power to 
control their union members. Real rewards to those leaders were strong, yet at the same 
time, physical methods such as surveillance and arrests were strong enough to keep union 
members from participating in political resistance against the state and its policies. In the 
labor sector, the state wielded its power to control it and to keep it stable as well as 
exercising some legislative functions of the state (Song Ho 2000; Mann 1988). 
Those leaders under the control of the regime and intelligence agents tried to 
avoid being called Uhyong. They built labor unions under the Federation’s control to 
work for union members by forming a welfare system through raising enough money for 
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themselves. Labor union leaders or presidents of unions were relatively autonomous 
within their organizations, even though real autonomy was restricted by the state. They 
also tried to increase their unions’ capacity to negotiate and resist illegal lay-offs by 
company owners. Through doing their two jobs -- increasing union members’ benefits 
and contributing to economic development by cooperating with the state -- Korean labor 
leaders took a strong pride in playing a leading role in economic development. As a 
consequence of de-politicization, they believed that they did not work for Park’s regime, 
but rather for the ROK. They began to identify themselves with members of the ROK.  
The Saemaul Undong (New Village Movement) expanded contingently to the 
national level through the desire of President Park Chung Hee. Unlike other agricultural 
development projects, this movement showed the possibility of developing rural areas 
through a spiritual revolution. The Saemaul Undong aggressively asked peasants to 
participate in various projects of the movement. Peasants and other rural residents who 
participated were proud of themselves because they believed that they contributed to the 
modernization of rural areas and helped to overcome chronic rural poverty in Korea. 
Politically, at a very important stage before the Yushin system was launched, President 
Park Chung Hee launched the movement and expanded it to the national level. Due to 
visible and objective output figures created by the movement, Koreans believed that it 
was very successful and had achieved modernization in rural areas.  
The state continually called for peasants to participate in the movement. Peasants 
and other rural residents who had experienced the Korean War knew the power of the 
state and feared that power. In the massive movement, individual peasants and individual 
villages could not avoid being called to participate. Interviewees identified themselves 
with the values of the movement, which the state created by ascribing peasants’ poverty 
to be their own responsibility. Peasants who participated in the movement still say that 
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they were not interested in any political events and issues but instead wanted to overcome 
chronic poverty and develop the Korean economy. They believe also that, due to the 
Saemaul Undong, Korean rural lives had changed for the better.   
 
7.2 CONCLUSION: NATIONAL SUBJECT VS CITIZEN  
Like Syngman Rhee and his regime, President Park Chung Hee also needed to 
create a new nation out of the Korean nation. In order to do so, President Park took three 
steps in creating his new ideologies which would work for his goals like anticommunism, 
economic development, and his permanent dictatorship. He always criticized negative 
attitudes, the past and the present. He suggested an alternative for the future. AMOs 
played their roles in creating a new nation. South Koreans accepted the state’s plans to 
develop the economy and modernize the country to defend against North Korea and 
communism.  
The strong state was able to mobilize Koreans to achieve economic development 
and modernization by relying on its despotic power and infrastructural power. The 
regime could separate the national development issue from political issues by making 
developmental issues national concerns. South Koreans who experienced Syngman 
Rhee’s dictatorship for twelve years and the April revolution which uprooted the dictator 
were ready to accept willingly those national issues. Based on those national concerns, 
the regime of Park Chung Hee mobilized people and thus South Koreans were 
depoliticized. The state planned national development projects in the name of 
“movement” and to stabilize social sectors like the labor, and the education sectors. 
People actively participated in those movements through the medium of AMOs in the 
name of a new nation for the Korean nation. Because the regime set economic 
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development as the most important and urgent national duty that Koreans achieve, 
Koreans answered the call from the state by participating in the movements. 
This face of nationalism shows that the various forms of Korean nationalism 
converged on an economic nationalism and the supreme duty of the Korean nation, 
“unification and the formation of a single nation state,” have been ignored by 
contemporary South Koreans. Koreans have begun to exclude other Korean nation 
members who had not shared in their experiences, including North Koreans and other 
Koreans. A new nation existed only for a group of Koreans who lived in the southern part 
of the Korean peninsula, so-called South Koreans. The de-militarized zone or armistice 
line became a border which divided Koreans into two ideologically different 
nations .(Thongchai 1997). Two different incidents - a female who used a foreign product 
and was blamed during the economic crisis period and a Japanese Korean Judo athlete 
who was recently discriminated against are examples of the current state-created 
nationalism against other Korean members, even though the victims were also Korean 
nationalists and proud of their nationality.   
From these analyses, two interesting points can explain the emergence of dutiful 
national subjects (Kookmin): One is the issue of Uhyong blame under the social situation 
of the democratization period and the other is a strong pride of achievement in economic 
development and modernization independently. The Saemaul Undong participants were 
proud of their achievement because they just focused on making their environment better 
and increasing agricultural productivity. They did not have to worry about the Uhyong 
issue more than the Hakdohokookdan participants and the Hankooknochong. Participants 
in both the Hakdohokookdan and the Hankooknochong focused on their own jobs to 
increase benefits both for students and laborers respectively, instead of collaborating with 
a dictator’s regime. The de-politicization issue is successful in this justification. In fact, 
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de-politicization was one of the aims that President Park tried to set up in AMOs. With 
de-politicization, participants could participate in more programs because they thought 
that they could avoid being blamed for being collaborators with the dictator.  
The negative ramifications of de-politicization and group identity resulted in 
economic nationalism. When the state tried to develop the Korean economy and 
modernize South Korea and the people’s minds, what they did first was to destroy the old 
Korean nation identity to aspire for unification and the formation of a single nation state. 
The state destroyed Koreans and built national subjects, who were merely individuals and 
one dimensional people (Marcuse 1991). The atomized individuals had been ready for 
being easily bound by one strong ideology like economic nationalism. These atomized 
individuals were origins of totalitarianism (Arendt 1962). The masses supported the 
dictators of the ROK. As some of informants of this research have said, many still need 
another dictator in contemporary Korea. The appearance of national subjects instead of 
citizens caused the appearance of another dictator when President Park Chung Hee was 
assassinated. Under other military dictator regimes, South Koreans suffered for many 
more years.  
An interesting saying about the risk of national subjects, not citizens, comparable 
to the case of the German generals in World War II,  
“one of whom, when asked to at Nuremberg, How was it possible that all you 
honorable generals could continue to serve a murderer with such unquestioning loyalty?, 
replied that it was not the task of a solider to act as judge over his supreme commander. 
Let history do that or God in Heaven (Thus General Alfred Jodl, hanged at Nuremberg)” 
(Arendt 1994).  
The state mobilized Koreans in national development projects like the Saemaul 
Undong, not for regime security. The atomized individuals willingly participated in those 
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movements in the name of Korean economic development and the Korean nation, which 
were created by state ideologues. The strong power of the state attracted the people’s 
desire to overcome poverty and become wealthy. One dimensional man and one 
dimensional society (Marcuse 1991), that focused only on economic development meant 
the emergence of national subjects. Park’s regime made the outcome of the economic 
development of South Korea his achievement as a president, not a political leader. 
Depoliticized people supported a dictator as their president and identified themselves 
with national subjects who always participated in national development projects. 
Therefore, as Brubaker (1992) explains in his book, the state policymakers only needed 
to atomize people who had different ideologies, cultures, and identities and then create a 
new nation covering all atomized individuals within their territories (Thongchai 1997). 
Former President Park was very successful in doing so.  
South Koreans have not thought that they need an alternative to economic 
development, the principal ruling ideology of the ROK. The goal of national profit has 
been a good excuse for the regimes of the ROK, particularly when each regime faced the 
people’s resistance or experienced class conflicts. The existence of national subjects has 
been a basis of this pattern of regimes. In this democratized era, national subjects should 
be replaced with citizens, who should be beyond one dimensional man.   
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